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Abstract
Research into emotional processing in eating disorders (ED) is still very much in its
infancy. Milligan and Waller (2000), Waller et al (2003) and others have shown that
there is difficulty with the emotion of anger, especially in its expression. Whilst others
(e.g. Troop et al, 2000) have demonstrated an increased sensitivity for disgust with an
ED population. In recent years, there has been significant development in CBT
models of eating disorders; in particular, bulimia nervosa and these models have
started to suggest that eating disorder symptomatology acts as an emotional regulator
(e.g. Cooper et al, 2004; Waller et al, 2007). Although these models are a useful start
in understanding emotions in eating, there is a lack of a theoretical understanding of
why people with eating disorders have particular difficulties with certain emotions.
This thesis presented a detailed consideration of the literature that has attempted to
understand the relationship between emotions and eating disorder symptomatology by
proposing a new model of eating disorders that is based upon the recent theoretical
developments in emotional processing (i.e. SPAARS model, Power and Dalgleish,
1997, 1999). This SPAARS-ED model was used as the theoretical backdrop for the
thesis, and the data from the four studies were designed to test some of the key
hypotheses stemming from the model. The first study was a grounded theory study
that investigated perceptions of the basic emotions and the developmental histories of
emotions within a group of 11 people with severe anorexia nervosa. The results
highlighted themes of anger and sadness being suppressed, and were often regarded as
being 'toxic'. Furthermore, themes were also explored that focused on meta-
emotional skills and participants recollections of how their parents, peers and
caregivers used to respond to their emotions. The second study directly tested the
theoretical idea of 'coupled emotions', and this study found data that demonstrated
increased levels of disgust following an anger induction for people with bulimic
symptoms, in comparison to control participants. The third study was a survey based
study that quantitatively looked at both the predictive power of each of the basic
emotions for disordered eating patterns, and also how certain emotion response styles
from carers (e.g. punitive, dismissive, etc towards an emotion) were related to
disorder eating. The results showed that anger and sadness predicted eating disorder
symptoms, and the effect was large. However, there were no significant associations
between emotion response styles and disordered eating.
The final study was a hybrid study that was based on the two quantitative studies in
this thesis. In a cross sectional study, a group of participants with anorexia nervosa
were compared to control participants. This study had two parts, with the first part
focusing on emotion regulation styles and core beliefs, whilst the second part repeated
and developed the experimental methodology from study 2. The results showed that
people with anorexia nervosa had significantly more internal dysfunctional emotion
regulation style, and significantly more negative beliefs about the self and others
when compared to controls. Interestingly these core beliefs patterns were significantly
correlated with state emotions, with negative other beliefs being correlated to state
anger, whilst negative internal beliefs were significantly correlated to state emotions
of disgust and sadness. The second part of this study showed that, following an
induced anger emotion, people with anorexia nervosa showed significantly higher
levels of disgust, and estimation of body size. This was taken as further evidence of a
potential coupled emotion effect, between anger and disgust within eating disorders.
These findings were then discussed, in relation to both the SPAARS-ED model, and
the general literature.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
John R.E. Fox
1.1 Eating Disorders: Diagnosis and Classification
Eating disorders often attract considerable public and media interest, with many
magazines commonly discussing 'stars' difficulties with their eating or their body
sizes. Fairburn and Harrison (2003) pointed out that eating disorders are a significant
source of physical and psychosocial morbidity, and they carry the highest mortality
rate of any of the psychiatric disorders (e.g. Herzog et al. 2000). Eating disorders
have been grouped into three types; anorexia nervosa, bulimia nervosa and atypical
eating disorders or eating disorders not otherwise specified (EDNOS). Across these
three eating disorder diagnoses are the extreme concerns about shape and weight,
described by Russell (1970) as a 'morbid fear of fatness'. There is always a marked
tendency to evaluate one's own self-worth by body shape and weight, and an extreme
preoccupation to be 'thin'.
The term 'anorexia nervosa' is of Greek origin, which translates to a Tack of desire to
eat', and the first reported cases stem back to the 19th Century. There were numerous
reports of 'fasting girls' in the late part of the 19th Century, with Mollie Fancher,
otherwise known as the "Brooklyn Enigma", being very well known for her claim of
not eating, or eating very little for extended periods of time. There was also the
famous case of the 'Welsh Fasting Girl' (Sarah Jacob) who claimed not to eat any
food at all after the age of twelve. Sadly, Sarah died shortly after being admitted into
hospital after the effects of pronounced starvation (for fuller details please see
Brumberg, 2001). Recent history has also led this scientific/medical condition to
become the focus of popular media, and famous cases have continued to fascinate the
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public, with such cases as Karen Carpenter and the Brazilian model, Ana Carolina
Reston, dying from complications stemming from anorexia nervosa. According to the
main diagnosis systems (DSM-IV, APA, 1994), anorexia nervosa is classified by an
inability to maintain body weight above 85% of what would be normally expected for
a person of a particular height. This is often operationalised as having a body mass
index (BMI) of below 17.51 (World Health Organisation, WHO, 1992). As discussed
above, a diagnosis of anorexia nervosa, according to DSM-IV, also requires the
person to have a profound fear of putting on weight, and overvalued ideas of weight
and shape. A diagnosis of anorexia nervosa is divided into two type sub-types,
restriction (AN-R) (with no bingeing or purging present) and binge-purge sub-type
(AN-B/P). Within anorexia nervosa, it is very common to have marked episodes of
excessive exercise.
The word bulimia derives from the Greek fiovhTnia. (boullmia; ravenous hunger), a
compound of flovg (bous), ox and X/juog (llmos), hunger, and is now understood as
meaning an 'ox like hunger'. Unlike anorexia nervosa, the history of bulimia is
considerably shorter, with Gerald Russell publishing the first account of bulimia
nervosa in 1979 (Russell, 1979). Like anorexia, recent interest in the popular media
has become considerable, with famous cases disclosing their own struggles with the
condition, including Diana, Princess of Wales, Geri Halliwell and John Prescott.
According to DSM-IV (APA, 1994), a diagnosis of bulimia nervosa requires frequent
episodes of bingeing and vomiting, with no associated weight loss. Therefore, weight
should be within normal limits for what would be expected for the person's height. It
1
Body mass index is a statistically representation of the relation between height and weight. Normal
body weight is defined as between 20 and 25, whilst under 20 is underweight and over 25 is
overweight.
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is, perhaps, not surprising that people with bulimia nervosa often describe themselves
as 'failed anorexics' (Fairburn and Harrison, 2003).
Eating disorders not otherwise specified (EDNOS) is defined within DSM-IV as
individuals with clinically severe eating disorders, but do not conform to the
diagnostic criteria for either anorexia nervosa or bulimia nervosa. The appendix of
DSM-IV also provides a provisional criterion for binge eating disorder (BED), a sub
type of atypical eating disorders, which is hallmarked by episodes of binge eating
without frequent use of inappropriate compensatory behaviours (e.g. bingeing-
vomiting). (Please see appendix 1 for a complete list ofDSM -IV criteria for eating
disorders).
1.2. Distribution and Course
Eating disorders are by their nature very secretive and, as a consequence, it is difficult
to ascertain their exact prevalence. This secretive nature of eating disorders is often
due to the ego-syntonic nature of thinness within anorexia nervosa (Serpell et al,
1999) and the shame associated with bulimia nervosa (Hayaki et al, 2002). However,
despite these difficulties there is evidence that the occurrence of eating disorders has
increased over recent years (Willi et al. 1990; Tunbull et al. 1996). Polivy and
Herman (2002) estimated that the incidence of eating disorders range from 3% to 10%
of females aged 15 years to 29 years, with the incidence of anorexia nervosa and
bulimia nervosa ranging from 0.3% to 0.9% and 1% to 1.5%, respectively, among
Western European and American young women (Hoek and Van Hocken, 2003;
Hudson et al. 2007). The increase in incidence rates may be, in part, due to better
diagnostic practices, better detection and increased help-seeking behaviours,
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especially in anorexia nervosa (Van Hoeken and Lucas, 1998). In terms of EDNOS,
recent research has suggested that there is a prevalence rate of 2.4% (Machado et al.
2007).
The course and outcome of eating disorders is extremely variable, with a complex
interplay of a number of variables that appear to dictate the nature of the course of the
eating disorder. Steinhausen (2002) argued that the age of onset, length of history,
severity ofweight loss and development of bingeing and vomiting appear to lead to a
poor prognosis in anorexia nervosa. It also appears that for 10-20% of cases, anorexia
nervosa becomes unremitting and intractable (Sullivan et al. 1998), with 50% of the
cases developing into bulimia nervosa ((BN) Bulik et al. 1997). As discussed above,
anorexia nervosa has the highest mortality rate of all the psychiatric disorders, with
5% to 8% dying from conditions directly relating to their anorexia nervosa (Herzog et
al., 2000; Steinhausen et al. 2000).
For bulimia nervosa, the course is slightly different. As discussed above, individuals
with a history of anorexia nervosa often develop bulimia nervosa (Fichter and
Quadflieg, 2007). Whilst for those without a history of anorexia, it often starts later in
life than anorexia nervosa. In this instance, bulimia nervosa often starts via dietary
restriction which then descends into a vicious cycle of bingeing and vomiting with no
associated weight loss (Fairburn et al., 2000). Prognosis for bulimia nervosa is not
good, as up to 50% of individuals meeting criteria for bulimia will continue to meet
diagnostic criteria for an eating disorder (normally EDNOS) five to ten years after
initial onset (Collings and King, 1994; Keel et al., 1999). Similarly, atypical eating
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disorders have been shown to also have a poor prognosis, and they often develop into
anorexia or bulimia nervosa (Herzog et ah, 1993).
1.3. Issues with Diagnosis
Over recent years, researchers have started to give consideration to how accurately the
diagnosis systems capture the clinical reality of eating pathology. One such area has
been to consider whether mild eating disorders are quantifiably different to diagnosed
formal eating disorders. This debate has been labeled as the 'continuum versus
discontinuity' debate, with various authors taking difference stances (e.g. Stice et ah,
1998; Ruderman and Besbeas, 1992). One such study that has attempted to address
this question demonstrated that eating disordered women differed significantly from
women with milder eating pathology (such as 'symptomatic dieters') on their
psychological/ cognitive profile, with eating disordered women endorsing more core
beliefs relevant to emotional deprivation, mistrust, social isolation, shame and failure
to achieve. Interestingly, there was not a significant difference between the groups on
the actual eating symptomatology (Leung and Price, 2007). This finding gave support
to the discontinuity models of eating disorders, and this may have significant
implications for treatment. However, Cooper and Fairburn (1992) argued that EDNOS
could be regarded as evidence of people suffering with milder forms of disordered
eating, which means that a continuity model maybe implicated, as people may move
along the continuum depending on their eating symptomatology and level of negative
core beliefs (as above).
The issue of the actual distinction between the eating disorders has attracted much
debate in recent years. In medical terms, a diagnosis is a cornerstone ofmedical
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practice as it allows the clinician to hypothesize about aetiology, know the likely
prognosis and what would be the best treatment. However, the diagnostic process
within the eating disorders is far from clear. According to Fairburn, the core elements
of eating disorders are essentially the same (i.e. across AN, BN and EDNOS), because
they all over-evaluate shape, weight and the control of eating. According to this view,
there is a similarity in the expression of similar attitudes and behaviour across both
disorders; thus, according to Fairburn, "...patients with anorexia nervosa restrict their food
intake in the same rigid and extreme way as patients with bulimia nervosa, and they too
may vomit, misuse laxatives or diuretics, and over-exercise" (Fairburn, Cooper and
Shafran, 2003, p. 519). In these disorders, there is marked body dissatisfaction and this
plays a powerful maintaining role for the disorders (e.g. marked fear of being fat).
Research has also demonstrated that binge eating does not distinguish between anorexia
nervosa and bulimia nervosa because there is a subgroup of patients with anorexia who
also binge eat (with or without compensatory purging) (e.g. Casper, Eckert, Halima,
Goldberg, & Davis, 1980; Garfinkel, Moldofsky, & Garner, 1980). Fairburn & Harrison
(2003) argued that the most compelling evidence for a transdiagnostic account of
eating disorders comes from the longitudinal study of eating disorder diagnoses.
Within their paper, they presented evidence ofmigration between the various eating
disorder diagnoses. For example, Sullivan, Bulik, Carter, Gendell, & Joyce (1996)
demonstrated that in about a quarter of cases of bulimia nervosa, there have been
episodes of anorexia nervosa. In a recent prospective study, Milos and colleagues
(Milos et al., 2005) found that stability in eating disorder diagnoses was low, with just
a third of participants retaining their diagnoses over a 30 month period. Interestingly
these results were not due to remission rates as they were low for all the participants,
so consequently, movement between the diagnoses occurred in over half the cases in
their study. This finding has been supported by a recent study that also demonstrated
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considerable diagnostic flux (Fichter and Quadflieg, 2007). In a recent conference
paper, Fairburn (2007) made the point that almost half of the people seeking help with
eating difficulties do not fulfil criteria for either BN or AN and are often given the
diagnosis of eating disorders not otherwise specified (EDNOS) (Ricca, Mannucci,
Mezzani, et al. 2001; Millar, 1998). This group of patients often share many of the
characteristics of both BN and AN, but are not accounted for by the current diagnostic
specific models. Likewise, a mixture of both bulimic and anorexic symptoms for
almost half of presenting patient suggested that a trans-diagnostic approach would be
the best way to formulate and understand eating disorders.
Other authors have suggested alternatives to a complete trans-diagnostic model of
eating disorders. In line with developments in the psychosis field 15 to 20 years ago
(e.g. Bentall, 1992, Boyle, 2002) some authors have started to suggest that eating
disorders should be distinguished according to their predominant symptoms. Based on
a review of research studies Williamson and colleagues postulated a difference
according to whether the person binge ate or not, along with a continuum between
restriction, normal eating and obesity (Williamson et ah, 2005). Equally, Eddy et al.
(2007) argued that a distinction between the sub-types of the same diagnostic category
should be based upon their prognostic path, such as bulimia nervosa with or without a
history of anorexia nervosa. What is significant about this debate is how it highlights
the importance of distinguishing the eating disorders via a closer examination of the
underlying psychological mechanisms that underpin the eating disorders.
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1.3 Psychiatric Co-Morbidity
It is often an observed feature of the clinical presentation of people with eating
disorders that they present with a whole host of co-morbid difficulties. Milos et ah,
(2003) discussed how research has tended to focus on the high level of co-morbidity
with affective disorders and personality disorders. Co-morbidity within eating
disorders is very common (e.g. Halmi, 1995), with depression being the most
common co-morbid problem (O'Brien & Vincent, 2003), with levels of co-morbidity
ranging from 45% in mixed eating disorders (Geist, Davies & Heinman, 1998) to
86% in an AN group (Rastam, 1992). For bulimia nervosa, Brewerton et al. (1995)
reported that 63% of their bulimia sample also suffered from major depression.
Hudson et al (2007) argued that both anorexia and bulimia nervosa are highly
positively associated with the core DSM-IV mood, anxiety, impulse-control and
substance use disorders.
In terms of co-morbid personality disorders, research has demonstrated that bulimic
symptoms often co-exist with cluster B personality disorders (e.g. Borderline
personality disorders) which are associated with impulsivity and emotional
dysregulation (Spindler and Milos, 2007; Sansone et al., 2005). For anorexia nervosa,
there appears to be a link with obsessive-compulsive disorder (Binder et al., 2006) and
obsessive-compulsive personality cluster disorders (Bruce and Steiger, 2005). When
considering the co-morbidity of personality disorder with eating disorders, there is
often a tautological aspect to the process of diagnosis, as the features of the eating
disorders (especially anorexia nervosa) often fulfil criteria for personality disorder in
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their own right (e.g. tolerance of uncertainty within obsessionality personality
disorder).
As discussed above, depression is the most common co-morbid condition of eating
disorders, with anxiety also being a significant co-morbid condition. This has led
some authors to argue that eating disorders should be regarded as an extension of
anxiety disorders (e.g. Pallister and Waller, 2008; Waller, 2008). This chapter will
now discuss the theories that relate these disorders to eating disorders, as it will be
argued later in the thesis that theories of eating disorders often fail to account for the
co-morbidity in eating disorders.
1.3.1 Depression and Eating Disorders
A focus within the literature has been upon the debate as to which disorder predates
the other. One line of research has indicated that starvation may play a significant
part in the development of depression within anorexia nervosa. Altemus & Gold
(1992) demonstrated that starvation and/ or protein malnutrition can lead to elevations
in corticotrophin-releasing hormone (CRH), which may play a role in depression. A
number of other studies have demonstrated that calorie controlled diets lead to a
reduction in 5-HT functioning, which may contribute to depressed mood (Cowen,
Anderson & Fairburn, 1992). In the seminal work by Keys, Brozek, Elenschel,
Mickelsen & Taylor (1950) it was found that 'psychologically robust' men who were
placed on a 'semi-starvation diet' all had significant lowering of mood over the course
of the study, which lasted for 6 to 12 months post refeeding. Interestingly, Laessle,
Platte, Schweiger & Pirke (1996) found some evidence that, in normal weight healthy
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controls, alternating a diet of restriction with unlimited eating was associated with a
significant lowering of mood, feelings of loss of control, and heightened irritability. In
comparison with the Keys study, a significant proportion of participants started to
binge and purge and their mood deteriorated. Fluctuating eating patterns do seem to
be related to a lowering of mood. However, in all of these studies, it is not clear
whether the lowering of mood ever reached clinical caseness levels. For example, in
the Laessle et al. study, mood only deteriorated by a mean average of 10% between
the dieting days and the unlimited intake days.
As pointed out by O'Brien & Vincent (2003), there is evidence to suggest that caloric
deprivation may act as a contributor to depressive symptomatology within women
with bulimia and anorexia, but it does not appear to account fully for the high level of
co-morbidity. On this point, Levy & Dixon (1985), in their review, argued that the
data suggested that the association between AN and depression is more complex than
only being the result of starvation. Unfortunately, in their review, there were a number
ofmethodological difficulties with the studies presented. However, these authors
stated there was sufficient evidence to suggest that depression often predates the onset
of the eating disorder and it often continues once the eating disorder has abated.
Interestingly, they also discussed the fact that there is a high prevalence of depression
in the relatives of people with an eating disorder and this may be a clue to the
emotional environment and genetic transmission.
Stice (2001) undertook a sophisticated prospective study in which he tested his Dual
Pathway model of bulimia nervosa. This model stated that both societal pressure for
thinness and a thin-ideal internalisation contributed to body dissatisfaction, which
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then predicted dieting and negative affect, which in turn, predicted bulimic symptoms.
Furthermore, in keeping with research cited above, Stice proposed that dieting also
had a significant effect upon the lowering of mood. In testing this model, Stice (2001)
found that in a sample of 231 high school girls the model was supported by the data.
However, it is interesting that dieting only marginally predicted negative affect in the
sample. Stice argued that his study presented evidence of how the social norms of
thinness for woman, and the internalisation of these norms, lead to marked body
dissatisfaction, which played a direct role in the development of negative affect and
dieting. In relation to the above discussion, the study gave evidence that negative
affect is both a significant contributor and consequence of dieting and body
dissatisfaction. However, the study has some important drawbacks; first, the dual
pathway model only accounted for 23% of the variance from the data, and therefore, it
is clear that other significant variables play a role in developing bulimic symptoms.
Secondly, the model does not adequately account for why some women are
particularly prone to internalise the thin-ideal, nor does it explain the findings from
Milos et al. (2005), who showed significant movement between the diagnoses. Recent
research has demonstrated that the vast majority ofwomen have significant levels of
body dissatisfaction (e.g. Levine, Piran & Stoddard, 1999); however, Stice's model
does not help to explain why certain women develop pathological levels of body
dissatisfaction and eating disorders, whilst others do not. Recent research has started
to clarify these points a little, with Measelle, Stice and Hogansen (2006) finding that
depressive symptoms predict eating disorders in 13-18 year old girls over a four year
period, but not the reverse. Furthermore, Burton, Stice, Bearman, and Rohde (2007)
found further evidence of the relationship between depressive symptoms and bulimic
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symptoms; when they developed an intervention for depression in eating disorders,
they found a clinically significant improvement in the bulimic symptoms.
1.3.1.1 Summary of Co-morbidity of Depression and Eating
Disorders
There has been much consideration regarding the relationship between depression and
eating disorders. The initial theoretical focus of this work has investigated on whether
or not depression predates the eating disorder, or whether the eating disorder predates
the depression. The work of Stice (2001) has demonstrated that the relationship
between depression and eating disorders is a complex reciprocal process, and recent
research has identified that there are many similarities in the type of cognitions
present in both depression and eating disorders. As will be seen later in this chapter,
cognitive theorists have started to formulate the role eating disorder symptomatology
potentially plays in regulating negative affect. However, despite these advances, these
cognitive approaches are still lacking. There is only one model that discusses
depression in eating disorders (i.e. Wonderlich et al, 2001; 2008) but this is not
discussed within the context of co-morbidity or the broad nature of affect in eating
disorder, nor is there any theoretical consideration of the high levels of body
dissatisfaction that is nearly always present in eating disorders. As will be discussed
later in this thesis, these models are overly concerned with verbal cognition and,
hence, they often fail to account for the potentially different levels of cognitive
representations that are often theorised in other cognitive clinical models (e.g.
Integrated Cognitive Subsystems, ICS (Teasdale and Barnard, 1993); Schematic
Propositional Analogue Association Representation System (SPAARS) (Power and
Dalgleish, 1997; 2008).
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1.4 Psychological Models
Both anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa are disorders that have only recently been
subjected to systematic research and theory development. However, this research has
yielded pointers about some of the important mechanisms that may underpin these
disorders. In her review of cognitive approaches to eating disorders, Cooper (2005)
argued that cognitive approaches have gone through two principal shifts in their
development, especially in the theoretical account of bulimia nervosa. The 1st
generation approaches for eating disorders were broadly behavioural in manner, in
that they focussed on the need to change eating behaviours to reduce symptoms for
the patient (e.g. Fairburn et al. 1986). The 2nd generation builds on original models of
bulimia and proposes a much more enhanced cognitive-affective component to the
cognitive-behavioural models and therapies of eating disorders (e.g. Cooper et al.,
2005; Waller et al., 2007). This chapter will now discuss the main theories in turn.
1.4.1. Theoretical models of Anorexia nervosa
1.4.1.1 Anorexia nervosa: Behavioural Models
The early models of anorexia nervosa proposed that it was a learnt disorder, which
was maintained by both positive and negative reinforcement. Accordingly, the person
engages in dieting behaviour which results in the losing ofweight and the acceptance
from peers, which leave the person with a sense of control (positive reinforcement).
Whilst the dieting behaviour is negatively reinforced as it prevents social disapproval,
feeling out of control and having a sense of failure (De Silva, 1995). Slade (1982)
proposed a behavioural model of anorexia nervosa that was based on functional
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analysis, which incorporated antecedent and predisposing factors at the onset of the
anorexia nervosa. According to this model, an interaction between individual
predisposing factors, such as perfectionistic tendencies, low self-esteem or family
conflicts, interface with challenges with the young girl's interpersonal life (e.g.
independence and autonomy). These dynamics leave the young girl with a strong need
for control in her life and control of the body becomes an ideal vehicle for this need,
as it is entirely under the control of the self. Moreover, the body also becomes the
object of control, according to the theory, as it often commented on critically by peers.
Therefore, as with the above model, weight loss is positively reinforced by feelings of
success and satisfaction, and it is negatively reinforced by the fear of failure and the
avoidance of the stressor that predated the onset of the disorder. The outcome of these
factors is that the young girl descends into a spiral of weight loss and endocrinology
disturbance which results in the full blown clinical presentation of anorexia nervosa.
Slade, within this model, also attempted to explain the development of bulimic
symptoms, as he proposed that the strict dietary standards are broken via a starvation
preoccupation with food, which is then 'remedied by weight control compensatory
strategies', such as vomiting and laxative use.
Although this model highlights the importance of perfectionistic beliefs in anorexia
nervosa (e.g. Bruce and Steiger, 2005) and family difficulties (e.g. Schmidt, Tiller and
Treasure, 1993), there are a whole host of unanswered questions that arise from this
model, for example, what is the nature of the cognitive appraisals that would mediate
the relationship between societal pressures to be thin? Fairburn et al (1999)
highlighted the tendency to evaluate one's self worth and well being predominantly
by weight and shape, and this is missing from Slade's model. Likewise, it makes only
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a small mention of emotion within the model and hence does not account for the
apparent emotional difficulties within eating disorders. As will be discussed with a
number of the theoretical accounts of eating disorders, this model fails to explain co-
morbid conditions that often occur with eating disorders (e.g. depression, please see
below), and this is especially true as the model proposes that the positive
reinforcement of the disorder leads to feelings of success and satisfaction.
1.4.1.2. Anorexia nervosa: A Flight from Maturation
Crisp (1980) proposed that anorexia nervosa was essentially a flight from growing up/
maturation. According to the theory, anorexia nervosa is an extreme way of coping
with the demands and challenges stemming from puberty and growing up. These
challenges include, sexual development, body changes, becoming sexually aware and
starting to understand the world from an adult perspective that includes the finite
nature of the life. Therefore, according to Crisp, returning the body weight to pre-
puberty weight offers the individual a way to eliminate these impulses by way of
delaying the process of sexual development maturation. Within this theory, the
tension comes with the reduction ofweight to an unstable level, as the body attempts
to force the individual to eat via starvation feelings, cravings, etc. Crisp also argued
that certain environmental factors contribute significantly to the development of
anorexia nervosa, such being female and growing up within a middle class family
where love and support are conditional on compliance, and emotional expression and
confrontation are inhibited. These factors are important for the theory, as Crisp argues
that the sexual impulses that accompany the puberty stage often are associated with
feelings of anger and disgust (especially if the young female has experienced negative
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sexual experiences), and the family of origin denies the opportunity to express these
feelings.
This model of anorexia was an important first step in starting to understand anorexia
nervosa, as it offers an integrated theory of both developmental and environment
factors. Unlike the above theory proposed by Slade (1982), Crisp (1980) discussed the
importance of emotional variables in anorexia nervosa and how being a low weight
can operate as an emotional avoidance strategy. This point has been picked up by
cognitive theorists and will be discussed later in this chapter. Also, the treatment
implications from this model are clear and Crisp (1980) advocated that for treatment
to work, the patient needs to be supported to put weight on so that the maturation
process can restart and support can be offered over this period. It is interesting that
throughout this process, Crisp argued that 'recovery from anorexia nervosa often
requires that some degree of depression and related self-awareness be experienced'
(Crisp, 1997, p.240). This is the first mention within the literature of the connection
between depression and anorexia nervosa, and this will be built upon throughout this
thesis.
1.4.1.3 Anorexia Nervosa: Cognitive-Behavioural Models
Cognitive-behavioural therapies have been successfully applied to a number of
psychological disorders, stemming from depression (Beck et al., 1979) and anxiety
(Wells, 1997). Its application to anorexia nervosa stems back to the early 1980s,
where Garner and Bermis (1982) proposed a model that suggested that distortions
about weight and shape of the body maintain the condition, and in keeping with the
behavioural models discussed above, they argued that positive reinforcement from
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peers about their slimness and an overriding sense of control act as important
maintainers for the anorexia nervosa. Just under ten years later, Vitousek and Orimoto
(1993) developed a cognitive-behavioural model that builds upon Garner and Bermis'
model, as they acknowledge the positive consequence that food restriction holds for
the individual, such as a sense of success, pride, superiority, control and receipt of
attention from others. In many ways this model incorporates the contextual factors
that were first discussed by the behavioural model of Slade (1982), as Vitousek and
Orimoto argued that the individual's sense of self is challenged by a stressor (e.g.
change, loss, onset of puberty), which is then 'resolved' by a belief that thinness is the
solution to personal distress. These beliefs are fuelled by certain contextual factors,
such as societal views of thinness, low self-esteem, perfectionism and asceticism.
Although this model does address some of the weaknesses that are inherent in the
behavioural accounts of anorexia nervosa, the model is very vague and it lacks detail
on the specific processes that are hypothesised to occur within this model.
Fairburn et ah, (1999) proposed a model that attempted to address some of the deficits
in the Vitousek and Orimoto (1993) model. Fairburn et al proposed that the key
construct for the onset and maintenance of anorexia nervosa is one of control. This
need for control is driven by feelings of ineffectiveness, perfectionism and low self-
esteem. According to the model, tight dietary restriction directly reinforces a sense of
control within the individual, and this becomes the barometer of the individual's
overall sense of control and of self-worth. However, in line with Crisp's theory,
maintaining this low weight requires more and more effort due to the effects of
starvation that accompany restriction (e.g. intense hunger, increased sense of fullness,
reduced concentration). These interactions between the need for control over eating
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and the pressures of the physical effects of starvation create vicious cycles where the
individual engages in body checking and sense of failure following eating, and the
reinstatement of strict dieting regime. Fairburn et al (1999) postulated that, 'by
successfully controlling their eating these individuals are controlling all that is
important in their lives....In this way they are also avoiding having to face other
difficulties, such as family problems, forming relationships and the issue of sex.'
(p.5). Although this adds to the previous cognitive models, it leaves many unanswered
questions, such as the issue of co-morbidity and the nature of emotions in eating
disorders. Also, as discussed by Cooper (2005), the available treatment studies based
upon these models only provide weak evidence for them, and despite some of the
advances they offer in understanding the linkages between cognitive, emotional and
interpersonal factors, they lack an account of how eating disorders act as an emotion
regulation strategy. Furthermore, they do not account for how anorexia nervosa is also
ego syntonic and it clearly plays an important role in someone's life that goes beyond
weight and shape.
Wolff and Serpell (1998) proposed a model that emphasised the importance ofmeta-
cognitions in anorexia nervosa. Within this context, meta-cognition can be defined as
beliefs about thinking and actions that pertain to thinking regulation. Models ofmeta-
cognition have been applied to other psychological disorders, such as depression
(Teasdale, 1985), generalised anxiety disorder (Wells, 1997) and OCD (Wells, 1997).
The Wolff and Serpell model proposed that pro anorexic meta-beliefs play an
important role in maintaining the anorexia nervosa. For example, having the belief
that not having anorexia would lead to their 'world falling apart' would have a
significant negative effect upon the levels ofmotivation within the person.
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Interestingly, the authors argued that it may be a therapeutic error to solely focus on
negative automatic thoughts pertaining to the actual eating disorder, as it may lead the
therapist to miss positive meta-beliefs that may assist in the process of change.
Following on from Wolff and Serpell's theory, Schmidt and Treasure (2006)
developed a cognitive-interpersonal maintenance model ofAN, which places
particular focus on the 'valued and visible' nature of anorexia nervosa. Interestingly,
it does not emphasise the importance of shape and weight concerns that previous
cognitive accounts have emphasised, but it advocates that the response of key others
interlink with a number of cognitive variables, such as perfectionistic personality
traits/ cognitive rigidity, experiential avoidance and pro-anorexic beliefs (in keeping
with the above theory). This theory appears to draw heavily from the early
behavioural models of eating disorders, in that, it proposes that reinforcement (both
positive and negative) maintains the anorexia nervosa. Again, although it is useful in
reflecting upon the interaction between cognitive and interpersonal variables, these
arguments do not appear to have moved the discussion on much further than the
behavioural accounts of anorexia nervosa.
1.4.2. Theoretical Accounts of Bulimia Nervosa
1.4.2.1 Bulimia Nervosa: Cognitive - Behavioural Models (1st
Generation Models)
Cognitive-behavioural treatments of bulimia nervosa (CBT-BN) have the strongest
efficacy of all the psychological treatments in all the eating disorders (Fairburn et al,
1986). In outcome research, CBT-BN has only been shown to be effective in 50% of
cases. It started out as predominantly a maintenance model that originally worked on
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a dietary and behavioural level. Please see the figure below for a visual version of the
CBT-BN (Fairburn et al, 1986).
Figure 1: Fairburn's CBT model of Bulimia Nervosa (Fairburn et al. 1986).
According to this model, cognitions relating to the over valuation of shape and weight
and their relation to self-worth/ self-esteem are at the heart of bulimia nervosa. These
factors lead to intense and rigid dieting, via perfectionistic beliefs. In the original
model, bingeing occurs when the physiological pressures to eat become
overwhelming for the person, or when there is an abandonment of dietary restraint
following a minor transgression of rigid dietary rules. In 1997, in response to research
demonstrating how bingeing can reduce negative affect (e.g. Eleatherton and
Baumeister, 1991), Fairburn proposed that bingeing can occur in response to negative
affect. However, he discussed, via his revision, that the use of bingeing to reduce
negative affect actually reinforces negative self-evaluation, shape and weight
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concerns and dietary restraint. Furthermore, following a binge, the individual typically
responds by vomiting, and the use of laxatives and diuretics. These are negatively
reinforced by reducing anxiety and potential weight gain, but have a deleterious effect
upon self-esteem and self-evaluation. Although this is a useful model in beginning to
explain the relation between cognition, physiology, and, later, negative affect, it
leaves a number of questions unanswered. For example, it does not explain what
differentiates a person from succeeding to restrict their diet, to someone who
ultimately ends up bingeing and vomiting. Although mention is made of the relation
between negative affect and binge eating, no consideration is given to the underlying
mechanisms that underpin this process.
1.4.2.2. Eating Disorders: Cognitive-Behavioural Accounts: 2nd
Generation Accounts
Cooper (2005) discussed how the application of cognitive theory to eating disorders
has gone through a number of significant developments over the last few years (for a
full discussion of the cognitive theory in eating disorders, see Cooper, 2005).
Previously, cognitive theory was broadly concerned with the role of behaviour and
physiology in eating disorders, in particular, BN ( Fairburn, Cooper, & Cooper 1986).
However, there have been a number of important theoretical advances over recent
years. Cooper (2005) argued that over recent years, 2nd generation cognitive theories
of eating disorders have appeared within the literature which postulate that the
cognition-affect dimension is of central importance. These theoretical developments
were built on research that revealed how eating disorder symptomatology appears to
operate as an escape from aversive self-awareness and emotional distress (e.g.
Heatherton and Baumeister, 1991; Root, Fallon & Friedrich, 1986).
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Building on this empirical basis, Cooper et al. (2004) developed a model of BN that
worked on the tenet that eating helps the self to dissociate from painful cognitions and
negative affect. According to this model, external events activate negative self-beliefs
which facilitate negative emotion. This triggering of negative emotions leads to
bulimic symptoms, especially bingeing. The decision to binge is facilitated by positive
beliefs (e.g. 'eating will make the distress go away'), but is also accompanied by
negative beliefs (e.g. eating will make me fat'). This leads to the triggering of
permissible thoughts to reduce the subsequent cognitive dissonance that occurs
between the negative and positive beliefs (e.g. 'I have no control ofmy eating').
Therefore, in this model, the beliefs that bingeing will help the self to dissociate from
negative affect are central to understanding bulimia nervosa. In keeping with Cooper
et al's model, Corstorphine, Mountford, Tomlinson, Waller and Meyer (2007) found
further evidence that people with eating disorders avoid their emotions, and are
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Waller, Kennerley & Ohanian (2007) proposed a slightly different cognitive theory of
eating disorders that was largely based on schema theory (Young, Klosko &
Weishaar, 2003). According to the broader theory, a schema is defined as a pervasive
set of beliefs and emotions that a person has about themself, others and the world. It is
argued that these schemas originate from experiences in childhood (Young et al.
2003) and research has demonstrated that eating disordered patients have more
'pathological schemas' when compared to normal participants and dieters (e.g.
Cooper, 1997; Cooper & Hunt, 1998; Leung, Waller & Thomas, 1999; Waller,
Ohanian, Meyer & Osman, 2000; Waller, Dickson & Ohanian, 2002).
The types of schemas that have been found to be important in eating disorders are the
socially orientated schemas, such as abandonment, mistrust/ abuse, defectiveness/
shame (Meyer & Waller, 1999) . Cooper, Todd and Wells (1998) found evidence of
higher levels of negative self-belief in people with eating disorders, which appeared to
focus on themes ofworthlessness, uselessness, failure, abandonment and being alone,
when compared to a control group . On the basis of these results, Waller, Kennerley,
and Ohanian (2007) proposed a theory that attempted to account for the different
symptom patterns within eating disorders (e.g. restriction vs. bingeing-purging).
Again, as with Cooper et al.'s model, Waller et al.'s model is essentially an affect
regulation model as it proposed that food restriction is used as a strategy for primary
avoidance of the distress associated with negative emotions and schemas, whilst
bingeing is viewed as a strategy for secondary avoidance of the distress of triggered
negative emotions and schemas.
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Corstorphine (2006) building on the above models, proposed a cognitive-affective
model of eating disorders that is broadly based upon dialectical behavioural therapy
(DBT; Linehan, 1993). The main points of this model are that individuals learn in
their childhoods that certain emotions and individual traits are not tolerated by their
caregivers. Therefore, the young females who are destined to develop eating disorders
grow up learning that certain emotions are not 'acceptable' and/ or are 'dangerous'. In
keeping with the other cognitive-affective models discussed above, bingeing-purging/
restriction is used to distance or prevent an emotion from occurring, however, the
avoidance of a primary emotion is then related to the emergence of a secondary
emotion. For example, feeling angry at a betrayal (primary emotion) which is
suppressed, the individual then develops guilt at having experienced anger (secondary
emotion). Corstorphine (2006) argued that it is the secondary emotion that causes
much of the distress that is present in eating disorders.
For all three of these cognitive-affective theories, the emphasis is very much on the
cognitive variables. The emotions discussed are often not specified, and it is not stated
whether the emotion generated in the model is akin to depression, or whether it is
something different. In the consideration of theoretical movements within the arena of
affective disorders, the role of negative core beliefs and associated negative
cognitions have long been shown to play an important role in depression (Beck, Rush,
Shaw & Emery. 1979). Although it remains an empirical question, the most
parsimonious account of the negative emotion alluded to in these '2nd generation
cognitive models' is that the high co-morbidity between depression and eating
disorders can be formulated and understood. This question has received some
empirical consideration. Waller and colleagues (Waller, Shah, Ohanian, & Elliott
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2001) compared severely depressed patients to moderately to severely depressed
bulimic patients, and they found equivalent levels of core beliefs in each group.
However, when they performed a discriminate analysis on their data, they found only
failure beliefs could distinguish the depressed and the depressed bulimic groups.
Unfortunately, there were a number ofmethodological problems with this study. For
example, the patient groups having very small n sizes, with the BN and low
depression group only having seven participants. Cooper and colleagues undertook
an analogue study that attempted to address some of the methodological weaknesses
of the Waller et al study (Cooper, Rose & Turner, 2006). They compared four groups
of adolescent girls on a specific measure of self-beliefs within eating disorders, using
the Eating Disorder Belief Questionnaire (EDBQ) and the Young Schema
Questionnaire (YSQ), in which they were classified according to their scores on the
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) and the Eating Attitudes Test (EAT) . These
groups were 'healthy' (low BDI & low EAT scores), high BDI (with low EAT
scores), high EAT (with low BDI scores) and 'unhealthy' (high BDI and high EAT
scores). They found that both measures could distinguish the 'healthy group' from the
high BDI group, but could not distinguish the high EAT group from the 'healthy
group'. Both the YSQ and EDBQ measures could not distinguish between the
'unhealthy group' and the high BDI group. Within a discriminate function analysis,
Cooper et al (2006) found that only two beliefs (as measured on the EDBQ) were
specifically related to eating disorder symptoms. These were 'I'm stupid' and 'I'm
ugly'. Although this study demonstrated that there were some differences in the core
beliefs between the four conditions, it is hard to draw any definitive conclusions from
this or from Waller's data. Both studies were cross-sectional, and the fact that failure
seems to be a dominant theme may well be accounted for by the actual bulimia
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symptomatology. A feature of bulimia that has been discussed by other authors, is that
there is a strong desire to lose weight, but fail due to the presence of physiological
mechanisms (e.g. Fairburn et al., 1993), so it is perhaps not surprising that they feel
like a 'failure'. This criticism is also potentially applicable to the belief of being
'ugly'. Within the Cooper et al (2006) study, the group means were very low in
comparison with clinical norms on the BDI and EAT. Therefore, it is hard to make
any firm conclusions about the relevance of these results for clinical populations.
Despite these criticisms, it does appear that there is preliminary evidence that suggests
there is some commonality in the type of beliefs between people with eating disorders
and people with depression. This is certainly an area that warrants further
investigation.
Wonderlich et al., (2001) presented a model that attempts to integrate some of the
above ideas on emotions and cognitions in their Integrated Cognitive-Affective
Therapy model (ICAT). According to this model, the person with bulimia nervosa has
a discrepancy between the 'ideal self and the 'perceived self, which creates negative
emotion, which they argued could be regarded as depression or anxiety, within the
individual. Once this has been created, the person resorts to a 'self-directed style',
where the individual engages in coping strategies that include cognitive (e.g., self-
criticism, absence of self-acceptance) and behavioural (e.g., rigorous regimens of
exercise, extreme dieting, or binge and purge behaviours) efforts. These strategies
aimed at the self, would have the impact of reducing awareness of negative emotions
through simple distraction or blocking, but may also represent motivated efforts to
modify the actual self (i.e., lose weight). Wonderlich et al., (2008) published two
studies that supported the ICAT model, as their data indicated that females with
06/12/2009 36
Doctor ofPhilosophy (PhD) University of Edinburgh John R.E. Fox
bulimia nervosa displayed higher levels of self discrepancy and negative self-directed
styles. They also found that negative mood states mediated relations between bulimic
status and negative self directed coping styles. This model also fits the data from
Dunkley and Grilo (2007) who found that the relation between self-criticism and
over-valuation ofweight and shape was partly mediated or explained by low self-
esteem and depressive symptoms for people with binge eating disorder. Although this
study's data refers to binge eating disorder, there are many similarities between binge-
eating disorder and bulimia nervosa.
This model is a useful start in attempting to connect the body of research that has
demonstrated that people with bulimia nervosa often have co-morbid depression and
anxiety. Furthermore, it starts to offer some of the cognitive constructs that would
help to explain the co-morbidity and how they may well fuel the actual eating
disorder. However, this model lacks a significant amount of detail about why people
with bulimia nervosa resort to self-directed strategies, nor does it explain why the
individual has to engage in bulimic symptoms, as opposed to just restriction (as in
anorexia nervosa), or other emotion regulation strategies, such as self-harm. In other
words, there appears to be a link missing that connects the low mood to the eating
disorder. This model appears to suffer the same fate as those by Cooper et al (2004)
and Waller et al., (2007), in that, it cannot actually account for the full array of eating
disorder symptoms, such as the profound body dissatisfaction. Another criticism of
these studies, and indeed, ofmany on the topic of eating disorders and emotions, is
the reliance on self-report measures to collect data. Self-report measures are open to
biases in recall and may not capture the real time experience of the emotion.
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Researchers from the US have started to use alternative research methodologies, in
order to by-pass the reliance on self-report, which have included laboratory
techniques and the use of real time recording techniques, such as palm pilots. An
interesting lab study was completed by Agras and Telch (1998) where they examined
the effects of calorie deprivation and negative mood on binge eating individuals.
Within this study, people with binge eating disorder were randomly allocated to either
a neutral mood induction or a negative mood induction. They found that negative
mood, but not caloric deprivation, led to a significant increase in the loss of control
over eating, as demonstrated by their eating behaviour at a buffet laid on by the
researchers. Using hand held technology, Engelberg et al., (2007) found that over a 7
to 29 day period, negative affect and altered states of awareness preceded binges in
people with bulimia nervosa. The authors argued that this provides further evidence of
the causal role that negative mood appears to have in bulimic symptomatology.
Although these studies have given further support that bingeing has the function of
managing affect, these results do not move on the theoretical understanding of eating
disorders a great deal. This lack of theoretical sophistication echoes the views of
authors from other psychopathology fields, who argue that the problems and
limitations of current cognitive behavioural treatments may actually be due to the lack
of explanatory power in contemporary models of eating disorders (e.g. Cooper, 2005;
Grilo, Devlin, Cachelin & Yanovski, 1997). In terms of accounting for the complex
relationships between emotions that are present in eating disorders, Corstorphine's
(2006) model and Wonderlich et al. (2001) make a good start in considering how
beliefs about emotions are important in understanding eating disorders. Elowever, as
discussed above, they fail to incorporate contemporary emotion theory and they failed
to explain co-morbidity with other affective disorders in an adequate fashion. None of
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the cognitive-affective models explain why eating disorders occur, in that why does a
young woman choose eating to manage her emotions rather than some other method
(e.g. substance use), or why does the eating disorder always come with pathological
body dissatisfaction.
1.5 Developmental Factors in Eating Disorders
As has been discussed above, there has been consideration of the role of up bringing
and childhood development in the aetiology of eating disorders. The now classical
theory of Crisp (1980) proposed that anorexia rises out of a maturational crisis around
puberty. Other authors have argued that specific traumas are of importance in
understanding the aetiology of eating disorders, whilst others have focused upon the
actual attachment between the person with the eating disorders and (typically) their
mother. This section will now consider these issues in turn.
1.5.1 Childhood Abuse
The discussion of whether or not childhood abuse (e.g. sexual, physical, and
emotional) plays an aetiological role in eating pathology has attracted much attention
in recent years. Some authors have argued that there does appear to be a connection
between bulimic symptomatology and childhood sexual abuse (Smolak & Levine,
2007), whilst other authors have stated that the relationship between childhood sexual
abuse and eating pathology is overstated (e.g. Polivy & Herman, 2002). These authors
discussed how childhood sexual abuse is also associated with depression and other
psychological disturbances, and hence specific effects cannot be concluded. Smolak
and Levine (2007) argued that there is sufficient evidence to link bulimic symptoms
with a history of childhood sexual abuse, whilst it is still not clear for anorexia-
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restricting symptoms. Within their review, they also discussed how there is some
evidence beginning to suggest that other forms of trauma (both in childhood and in
adulthood) may well be related to eating/ body image disturbance (e.g. Faravelli,
Guigni, Salatori, & Ricca, 2004; Treuer, Koperdak, Rozsa, & Furedi, 2005).
In considering the nature of the relationship between childhood abuse and future
psychopathology, Andrews (1995) demonstrated that body shame moderates the
relationship between abusive experiences (both adult and child) and depression. In a
follow up study, Andrews (1997) demonstrated that the relationship between bulimic
symptomatology and childhood abuse was moderated by body shame. Although
depression was not measured in this study, the results are in keeping with the point
already raised, in that, Andrews has tried to develop more complex models of the
relationship between abuse and symptomatology. This suggests that abuse may play a
role in the development of bodily shame and any subsequent depression/ eating
pathology. Likewise, this depression may play a moderating role in the development
of eating disorder symptomatology (as hypothesed by Wonderlich et al. 2001). The
problem with this research is that it lacks any real theoretical underpinning on why
body shame is significant for the development of both depression and an eating
disorder in people who have been abused. This is important because the roles of
particular emotions seem to be significant (e.g. sadness, disgust), and any theory
would need to incorporate these emotional factors (please see later in the thesis).
Interestingly, some researchers have suggested that one of the key factors in the
abusive experiences is not just the act per se, but the emotional messages that are
communicated both directly and indirectly, via the abuse. Kent and Waller (2000), on
this issue, argued that the emotional environment in which childhood abuse occurs
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moderates its impact upon the person, as these traumas often occur within
relationships that are 'emotionally damaging'. It is well documented that experiences
of sexual abuse may leave the victim vulnerable to shame towards their own body;
these types of experiences may include sexual excitement resulting from the abuse,
seeking abuse in order to avoid being rejected, etc (e.g. Ainscough and Toon, 2000).
Briere (1996) proposed a model that goes some way to address the above points, as it
is proposed that childhood abuse disrupts the development of self-identity and affect
tolerance/ regulation, where the individual often resorts to distractive coping
strategies, such as bingeing and restriction to deal with overwhelming affect (e.g.
Linehan, 1993).
1.5.2 Attachment Patterns
As discussed at the end of the last section, Briere's model places an emphasis upon
early attachment relationships, and these relationships shape the development of skills
to regulate and tolerate negative affect. The importance of attachment figures has
been the topic of researchers and theorists for decades and has included notable
writings by Bowlby (1969). Although it is clearly beyond the scope of this chapter to
detail the literature pertaining to attachment, it is an important theoretical construct
that runs alongside emotion functioning. As will be seen below, Oatley (1987) and
Power and Dalgleish (2008) argue that emotions are functional and work on the
premise of guiding appraisal for a given situation (e.g. finding a bear in the wood -
threat to physical safety - fear). It is argued by many authors that some of the main
functions of emotions are to guide social processes, such as attachment, and its sister
concept, affiliation. Jenkins and Oatley (1996) devised a model of three principal
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social motivations which looked at the emotional overtures of attachment, affiliation
and assertion. It has long been argued that attachment is an evolutionary mechanism
that has the function of protecting the new born. This idea of a 'secure base' continues
into adolescence (Allen et al, 2003). According to the theory, the child feels safe,
secure and comfort when close to the attachment figure, but feels fear, anxiety and
distress when they are not around. According to MacDonald (1992) affiliation is a
system of warmth and affection, and it is an autonomous process to attachment
(please see diagram below). Unlike attachment, affiliation and warmth is associated
with joy and affection, whilst lack of affiliation and warmth leads to sadness. A study
by Fox and Davidson (1987) found that babies who were approached by their mothers
with open arms showed joy and activation on the left cortex.
Figure 3
A Affiliation
Figure 3: Shows the Jenkins and Oatley schema of three principal social motivations,
attachment, affiliation and assertion (as orthogonal dimensions). The emotions are
presented as movements in three dimensional space.
Within the eating disorders field, Bruch (1973) argued that understanding attachment
problems in eating disorders is crucial. Likewise, Cooper (2005) argued that a
disturbance in the caregiver-infant relationship, where the caregiver responses are not
in tune with the infant's internal state, result in ego deficits, which she describes as a
disturbance of self-awareness and self-concept, which results in an inability to
> Trust
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distinguish hunger and satiety from other needs and discomforts. Within this
framework, it is adolescence that places the individual under stress which reveals the
inherent difficulties with self-identity and self-reflection. Shoebridge and Gowers
(2000) found that mothers of a child that goes on to develop anorexia nervosa often
report heightened anxiety during the prenatal and perinatal period. Moreover, they
argue that this suggests that the mothers resort to being over-controlling and
overprotective throughout the child's development. Ward et al. (2000; 2001) also
found evidence of a dismissive attachment style, which was also associated with
reduced emotional expression and deficits in emotional processing with people with
anorexia nervosa and their parents. Although it remains an empirical question, one
hypothesis is that these attachment patterns also allude to difficulties in maternal
affection, which, according to Jenkins and Oatley (1996), leave the child with a
propensity to experience sadness.
As has been discussed above, early relationships have been regarded as the corner
stone of helping the child to learn affect regulation skills, and problems with these
attachments may lead the child to develop alexithymia. According to Stefnos (1973),
alexithymia can be regarded as a difficulty in identifying feelings, distinguishing
feelings from bodily sensations of emotional arousal, and describing feelings to other
people. A number of research studies have identified a relationship between eating
disorders symptomatology and alexithymia, in particular within anorexia nervosa
(Troop et al., 1995; Zonneville-Bender et al., 2002). Alexithymia will be discussed
more fully below.
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1.5.3 Family Environment
Kent and Waller (2000) argued that emotional abuse has often been the 'elephant in
the room' when the role of childhood abuse and eating disorders has been discussed in
the literature. Within their review, they pointed out that there appears to be a
phenomenological link between childhood emotional abuse and eating pathology and
this link may have a broader impact upon eating pathology than other types of trauma.
Furthermore, they proposed that the relationship between childhood emotional abuse
(CEA) and eating pathology is moderated by low self- esteem. According to these
authors, childhood emotional abuse has a profound effect upon self-esteem, because
its toxic effect cannot be easily attributed to external factors (e.g. the abuser). They
argued that CEA operates as a generalised risk factor for both bulimic and restricting
symptom patterns.
Drawing on dialectical behavioural therapy (DBT), Corstorphine (2006) argued that a
key origin of emotional regulation difficulties often present in people with eating
disorders is growing up in an environment that is perceived to be invalidating, where
there is a discordance between the actual emotion being expressed and the responses
from key individuals in the child's life (e.g. caregivers). According to Corstorphine
(2006), this often means that emotions are either responded to negatively or ignored,
and positive emotions are encouraged and are held in high esteem by the family.
Some of the ideas from DBT are also reflected in the expressed emotions (EE)
literature. The EE concept refers to the number of critical comments, hostility and
emotional over-involvement that occurs within the environment around the person
with the disorder, and this has been extensively researched for many psychiatric
disorders, including psychosis (e.g. Vaughn and Leff, 1976a, b). The relation
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between emotional expressiveness in the family environment and a child's ability to
identify and describe their feelings has been documented in the literature (Kench and
Irwin, 2000). As was discussed with the Briere model, it may well be that the
interrelation between inherited influences and the lack of skill in the parent in
describing their feelings may explain these links. Related to this point, Espina (2003)
found that parents of children with eating disorders reported significantly higher
levels of alexithymia, as measured by the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS), whilst
Kyriacou et al, 2008 has shown that parents of individuals with anorexia nervosa
exhibited higher levels of expressed emotion (e.g. such as emotional over-
involvement and criticism), when compared to normal controls. Waller, Corstorphine
and Mountford (2007) argued that these 'invalidating environments' lead to the
development of two principal emotional difficulties in adulthood, being chaotic-
dissociative and detached-alexithymic presentations. The chaotic-dissociative
presentation is hallmarked by an impulsive-bulimic presentation, where the individual
experiences their emotions as overwhelming and terrifying, and is often engaged in
behaviours to reduce or dissociate from her emotions. The detached-alexithymic
presentation is where the person presents in a much more detached and 'emotionally
cut off manner. It is argued that the key difference between these presentations is the
point at which the emotion is inhibited. In other words, in the chaotic-dissociative
presentation, the emotion is inhibited once it enters consciousness, whilst for the
detached-alexithymic presentation, the emotion is inhibited before the emotion is
experienced consciously. These authors argued that this earlier inhibition is the reason
why clients with this type of presentation often deny any emotional experience. This
point is important in terms of theoretical development, because it fits with the schema
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approaches that Waller and colleagues (Waller, Kennerley and Ohanian, 2007) have
proposed, which were discussed above.
1.5.4 Summary of Developmental Factors
It does appear that there is a growing consensus that emotional invalidation during up¬
bringing is important in the development of emotional difficulties in adulthood (e.g.
Krause et al, 2003). The work ofWaller and colleagues (Waller, Cordery,
Corstorphine, Hinrichsen, Lawson, Mountford and Russell, 2007; Waller, Kennerley
and Ohanian, 2007) has highlighted how a potential key factor in delineating the
eating disorders is when the emotional inhibition occurs and this can lead to markedly
different presentations. However, there is a lack of theory in how this accounts for co-
morbid depression and body dissatisfaction. Moreover, the theoretical consideration
of emotions is very simplistic. There is no attempt to discuss which potential emotions
may be effected by upbringing, as there is some suggestion from emotions theory that
environmental responses to individual emotional states may actually create different
relationships with different emotions. For example, the SPAARS model (Power and
Dalgleish, 1997; 2008) argued, from a basic emotions perspective, that emotions
develop as semi-independent cognitive modules (in keeping with other domains of
cognitive development, such as memory, or perception). Therefore, the external
influences may 'invalidate' certain emotions by claiming that they are wrong or not
allowed, and as such, certain emotional states may become ego dystonic and
frightening to the sense of self if they are evoked.
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1.6 Research on Emotional Factors in Eating Disorders
As has been seen above, research has identified the role of emotional functioning in
eating disorders, with the role of negative affect being of significance in the onset and
maintenance of the eating disorders (e.g. Amow et ah, 1995; Wegner et ah, 2002;
Binford et ah, 2004; Fairburn et ah, 2003). Although it remains an empirical question,
there has been debate in the literature about the nature of affect in eating disorders, as
it is not clear from contemporary models of eating disorders, whether the actual level
of emotion or the ability to tolerate negative emotions is more important. In an
interesting study, Anestis et al. (2007) found in an analogue study, with undergraduate
students, that high scores on the distress intolerance scale (Simons and Garner, 2005)
predicted bulimic symptomatology, when they controlled for depression and anxiety
symptoms. Also, within this analysis, the authors found that distress intolerance
further mediated the relationship between anxiety sensitivity (defined as the actual
physical symptoms and their perceived consequences) and bulimic symptoms. Anestis
et al. (2007) argued that it is not simply the presence of negative affect that predicts
eating pathology, but whether the negative affect is perceived to be intolerable.
Despite this finding, it still needs to be tested whether individuals with eating
disorders experience significantly higher levels of emotion than control participants
within situations, where the triggering of an emotion can be controlled. In other
words, this question needs to be addressed by the types ofmethodologies that induce
emotion within the laboratory (e.g. Agras and Telch, 1998). This will be a feature of
this thesis. This section will now consider the research that has applied the five basic
emotions to eating disorders. However, before this discussion can proceed, it is
important to note that there has been a significant debate about the nature of emotions
and whether there are dimensions of emotionality (e.g. negative affect) or distinct
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basic emotions. Furthermore, no consideration of emotion within eating disorders
would be complete without an analysis of the issue of alexithymia within the eating
disorders. These two topics will now be discussed.
1.6.1 Basic Emotions or Dimensions of Emotionality?
The issue of whether emotion can be understood as differences along two continuums
of positive and negative affect (e.g. Berkowitz, 1999; Watson and Clark, 1992) or as
discreet, individual emotions (e.g. Arnold, 1960; Ekman et ah, 1992a; Oatley and
Johnson-Laird, 1987) has been the source of debate for many years in the study of
emotion. Although it remains somewhat controversial, there is some agreement that
there are a number of broadly distinct and separate basic emotions, namely fear,
disgust, anger, sadness and happiness. Power and Dalgleish (1997; 2008) argued that
there are a number of sources of evidence for a basic emotions approach, including a
conceptual argument for different appraisals across the different emotions (e.g.
appraisal of loss in sadness), pan cultural awareness of different emotions (e.g.
Ekman, 1973; Ekman, 1992a; Ekman, 1992b) and the linguistic analysis of emotional
terms by Oatley and Johnson-Laird (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989). Interestingly,
research has started to highlight how there appears to be emotion specific physiology,
within autonomic arousal. This work is not without its critics, as some authors have
argued that the similarities between different types of arousal patterns outweigh any
similarities (e.g. Stemller, 1989). This debate is bound to continue; however, it is the
perspective of this thesis that there is now enough evidence to argue for a basic
emotions approach and this approach will be used across the rest of this thesis.
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This debate about the primacy of particular basic emotions is missing from much of
the literature of eating disorders. For instance, throughout this chapter, it has been
shown that many theorists have argued that negative emotion causes bingeing (e.g.
Cooper et al, 2004, Wonderlich et al, 2001) or the fear of negative emotion causes
restriction (e.g. Waller, Kennerley, and Ohanian, 2007; Corstorphine, 2006).
However, there is very little consideration of which emotions are important. Related
to this literature on emotional processing, there is no account, within the eating
disorder research, of the actual architecture of emotional processing such as the
different types of regulation that can occur for an emotion over its time course (e.g.
How fast does an emotion return to baseline after it has been activated?)
1.6.1 Eating Disorders and Alexithymia
As already discussed in this chapter, a number of authors have linked the adverse
effects of childhood abuse and/ or problematic dynamics within the family home to
the development of problematic knowledge of the emotions within the self. These
difficulties have been called alexithymia. This idea of a difficulty identifying,
distinguishing and expressing emotions in eating disorders has a long history
stemming back to Bruch (1962). Bruch (1962) felt that the main problem in anorexia
was a difficulty in distinguishing and expressing emotions, and having a sense of total
lack of control within one's life. As detailed earlier, a body of research has identified
how people with eating disorders, especially anorexia nervosa, appear to have a high
degree of alexithymia, with most of this research using the Toronto Alexithymia Scale
(TAS). Alexithymia has been shown to be an important variable for predicting
outcome, as it has been shown to have negative impact upon prognosis (Speranza et
al., 2007).
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Sim and Zeman (2005), using an analogue study, found that the relation between body
dissatisfaction and dysregulated eating was partly mediated by the frequency of
negative emotional experience, poor emotional awareness and non-constructive
coping with negative affect. There have been several hypotheses about what this
mediated relationship signified, with one hypothesis being that individuals with poor
emotional recognition and coping skills may attribute their negative emotions to their
body, via body dissatisfaction, and use disordered eating to reduce their
uncomfortable level of arousal. Whilst other hypotheses suggested that it could be the
other way round, with body dissatisfaction compromising one's ability to identify and
cope with negative affect, and therefore, using disordered eating to manage
ambiguous emotional states. A related study that directly assessed the relation
between body dissatisfaction and emotional expressiveness was conducted by Hayaki
and colleagues (Hayaki et al, 2002). Within this analogue study, they found that poor
emotional expression predicted body dissatisfaction, when depression and
assertiveness were controlled.
Much of the research on alexithymia in eating disorders has tended to be rather
simplistic in how in considers their relation, with recent research demonstrating that
the role of low mood may be an important variable to consider. Bydlowski et al.
(2005) and Kessler et al. (2006) found that there is a close link between measures of
anxiety and depression, and alexithymia. Whilst, Eisguirrea et al. (2004) found that
the relationship between eating pathology and alexithymia was moderated by levels of
depression. What is interesting about these results is how they emphasise the apparent
conceptual contradiction within analysis of alexithymia; how it is possible for
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individuals who are unable to distinguish and name their emotional states be able to
fill out measures about their own emotional status (e.g. mood measures, etc).
Likewise, the construct itself has a confused conceptual underpinning, in that, some
authors refer to it as a trait phenomena (Taylor et al. 1997), whilst others use it as a
state construct (Honkalampi et al. 2001).
Secondly, the majority of studies have not considered the meta-emotional skills that
underpin alexithymia, and it may be that certain emotional skills remain intact whilst
others are problematic. For example, it may be that people with eating disorders are
able to acknowledge their own emotional states, but are too frightened to express this
emotion. This would certainly fit with a SPAARS/ basic emotions view, in that,
certain eniotional states are ego dystonic, and hence, perceived to be overwhelming to
the self. Related to this point is the fact the majority of the studies on alexithymia are
predominantly correlational, and as such, the direction of causation is not clear
between alexithymia and eating disorder symptomatology. Keys et al (1950) found in
their seminal study of the effects of starvation that reduced weight and food intake
was associated with reduction in emotional expressiveness. It may well be that the
noted effects from an extreme diet may actually account for the alexithymic
presentation. There is only one study that has attempted to address this point, Schmidt
et al (1993) looked at TAS scores between bulimia and anorexia groups, and
compared them to controls. This was also done across two time points, and they found
that improvement in symptoms (due to medication) was not related to improvement
on the TAS. Although they argued that this suggests that alexithymia acts more as a
trait like construct, they did acknowledge that most of their participants at time 2 still
met clinical caseness levels. It was interesting, however, that BMI did not correlate
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with TAS, and they concluded that this was evidence that alexithymia was not just a
product ofweight loss and malnourishment.
As will be discussed throughout this thesis, the SPAARS model (Power and
Dalgleish, 2997; 2008) proposed a model that suggesting that different learning
experiences, whilst growing up, lead the individual to have different relationships
with each of their basic emotions. Therefore, it is theoretically possible that someone
may have developed an emotion which is ego dystonic and lost to the self, whilst
other emotions are much more integrated with the sense of self. In this instance, it
would be plausible for an individual to be alexithymic for certain emotions, whilst
still be able to express and regulate the other basic emotions.
This section will now consider the five basic emotions in turn.
1.6.1 Anger
Research over the last five years has demonstrated that anger is a particularly difficult
emotion for people with both bulimia and anorexia nervosa. Waller, Babbs, Milligan,
Meyer, Ohanian and Leung (2003) found that women with eating disorders, especially
those with bulimic symptoms, reported significantly higher state anger scores and
significantly higher anger suppression scores when compared to university student
controls. In other words, Waller et al. (2003) found that their participants had an
increase in their levels of anger, but were less likely to express this emotion.
Interestingly these authors found that higher levels of trait anger were associated with
'unhealthy core beliefs' in both groups, whilst the same core beliefs were only
associated with anger inhibition in the eating disorder group. Within this paper, the
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authors discussed how their results could have implications for the treatment of eating
disorders, as a feature of therapy could be to consider whether problem-solving
strategies would assist the patient in making changes to their environment that either
reduced the anger eliciting components, or helped in the expression of anger. Waller,
Kennerley and Ohanian (2007) discussed the evidence of the relation between state
anger and anger suppression, and these authors argued that binge eating served as an
emotional-avoidance function (as discussed above). In a recent study, Ioannou and
Fox (in press) found that depression and the perception of threat from the emotion of
anger predicted poor emotional expression in people with eating pathology, whilst
Coggins and Fox (2009) found in a qualitative study of emotional inhibition that anger
was the most difficult emotion to be experienced and this was linked directly, by the
participants, to dieting and food restriction.
Within restricting eating disorders, Geller and colleagues (Geller et al., 2000) found
that people with a diagnosis ofAN exhibited significantly higher levels of anger
suppression, when compared to psychiatric and normal controls. Related to this anger
suppression, Geller et al. (2000) also found that their participants endorsed more care
and self-sacrifice schemas (i.e. putting the needs of others before their own) and
silenced self schemas (the inhibition of self-expression and action to avoid
confrontation and interpersonal conflict).
Milligan, Waller, & Andrews (2002) undertook a study that looked at the relationship
between anger and disordered eating within a female prison population. These authors
found that levels of probable eating disorders, as measured by the SCOFF2, were
2 The SCOFF is a 5 item screening measure of eating disorders that asks questions about levels of
vomiting, loss of control over eating, loosing ofweight, beliefs of being overweight when not and a
sense that food dominates life (Morgan, Reid, & Lacey, 1999).
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significantly higher than would be expected in the general population. In terms of
difficulties with anger, these authors found that bulimic symptoms were associated
with levels of trait anger, whilst restricting symptoms were associated with state
anger. Therefore, these authors concluded that the restrictive environment (i.e. prison)
prevents an outlet for anger, and the women regulated these emotions by using
differing eating disorder symptomatology. This regulatory aspect of eating disorders
controlling or inhibiting anger was also shown in a recent paper by Engel et al.
(2007), as these authors found that levels of anger predicted binge eating episodes and
this relationship was moderated by levels of subjective impulsivity. Interestingly, this
study used palm pilot technology to collect data from participants within their
everyday life. Furthermore, Telch, Agras and Linehan (2001) undertook a trial of
DBT, in group format, for people with binge eating disorder. They found for the
people, who undertook DBT, the vast majority had stopped bingeing at the end of
treatment (89%). Interesting, the only measure that reduced (apart from symptoms)
was the urge to binge in response to anger. Although the authors do not discuss this
finding in any real depth, it does appear to be an important finding as it could be
interpreted that anger was the main driver for the binges, which was reduced via the
DBT. These findings are very much in keeping with the models discussed above, such
as Cooper et al. (2004) and Waller, Kennerley, and Ohanian (2007), and these
theoretical points will be explored later in this thesis.
A final point in attempting to detail the relationship of anger with eating disorders is
the need to consider the research that has examined the relationship between anger
and depression. As detailed above, the co-morbidity between depression and eating
disorders is high and a number of theories have proposed that depression originates
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from difficulties with anger. Freud (1917/1963) argued that depression originated
from a mixture of anger and sadness at the loss of a significant other. In their review
of the relationship between depression and anger, DiGiuseppe and Tafrate (2007)
argued that there was some evidence which suggested that depression can be a
product of an inability to express anger (e.g. Mook et al, 1990). However, they argued
that these relationships may be different between populations. Keeping this in mind,
this potential relationship between inhibited anger, eating disorders and depression is
an important theoretical point that will be returned to later in this thesis.
1.6.2 Sadness
As has been discussed above, the literature on the role of sadness in eating disorders
has not been researched at all. In a review of the literature, not one single reference
was identified that looked at the role of sadness in eating disorders. However, as
detailed in the above section, the relation of depression to eating disorders has been
extensively researched and the literature seems to be indicating that there is both a
cause and a consequence of depression within disordered eating. Although there are
potential conceptual problems with claiming that depression is a disorder of sadness,
Power and Tarsia (2007), using the basic emotions scale, found that the main emotion
of depression (measured using the Beck Depression Inventory, BDI) was sadness.
These authors also found that the emotion of disgust was also important in depression,
and it will be argued later in this thesis that this relationship between sadness, disgust
and eating disorders is significant in understanding the co-morbidity between eating
disorders and depression.
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1.6.3 Happiness
The overt consideration of happiness in eating disorders is still rather limited. As
already been detailed elsewhere in this thesis, research has tended to focus on
negative emotions and how these play a role in eating disorders. Research by Overton,
Selway, Strongman and Houston (2005) highlighted how eating disorder symptoms
can be used to regulate negative emotions and, importantly, facilitate the experience
of pleasant emotion. Linked to this perspective is the work by Goss and Gilbert (2002)
who have argued that eating disorders, in particular, restricting eating disorders, are
often linked to pride. These authors, drawing on the work of Bruch (1973), argued
that the eating disorder starts as means of gaining acceptance, avoiding rejection and
painful emotions, which results in pride. This pride becomes internalised and it
becomes a source of internal pride with the self. In other words, this pride is used to
defend against some of the more painful emotions (e.g. shame) and thoughts that were
there prior to the start of the eating disorder. As with sadness and depression, there are
a number of conceptual problems with linking pride with happiness, but it is
suggestive of a link that warrants research. Indeed, it would be very interesting to
consider how the emotion of happiness is managed within individuals with binge-
purging presentations, as it may be incongruous to their main emotional state and
therefore suppressed or avoided.
1.6.4 Fear
Within DSM-IV (APA, 1994), fear is regarded as a key diagnostic feature of
Anorexia Nervosa, especially in relation to the fear of becoming 'fat'. However,
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despite its apparent salience in eating disorders, it has not received a significant
amount of attention within the eating disorders literature. In a recent article, Waller
(2008) argued that next editions of the diagnostic systems (e.g. DSM and ICD) should
reframe eating disorders as a subset of anxiety, as there is such a high co-morbidity of
anxiety with eating disorders (e.g. Goddart, Flament, Perdereau and Jeammet, 2002;
Pallister and Waller, 2008). Furthermore, research has demonstrated that anxiety tends
to precede eating concerns (e.g. Bulik, Sullivan, Fear and Joyce, 1997; Swinbourne
and Touyz, 2007). In a recent review paper by Pallister and Waller (2008), it is argued
that the relationship between anxiety and eating disorders is an unclear one, as the
chronology between the two disorders is not clear. However, Pallister and Waller
(2008) argued that it is possible to conceptually relate anxiety and eating disorders, as
they may share common aetiological factors and these factors can increase
susceptibility to either disorder. In contrast to this thesis, they took a traditional
cognitive-behavioural view and argue that safety behaviours and vulnerability
schemas are the main cognitive constructs behind these disorders (for a fuller
discussion, see Pallister and Waller, 2008).
In a more direct experimental test of the effect of fear on eating behaviours,
Heatherton, Herman and Polivy (1991) undertook a study in which they looked at the
effects of the fear of threat (both physical and ego) on eating in restrained and
unrestrained eaters. They found that ego threat (e.g. failing at an easy task), but not
physical threat (e.g. electric shock), led to an increase in a restrained eater's eating,
whilst unrestrained eaters showed no such increase in their eating. For the physical
threat, the unrestrained eaters showed a significant reduction in their eating, but the
restrained eaters showed no change in their eating levels. The authors argued that
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these findings highlight how fear of a more personal nature makes self-awareness
more painful and the shift towards disinhibition helps the individual to 'escape from
the self.
In a study that looked directly at the effects of fear and disgust on eating attitudes,
Harvey et al. (2002) found that disgust was as equally important as fear in the
avoidance of certain stimuli (high calorie foods and large body sizes). As discussed by
Haidt, Rozin, McCauley and Imada (1997), disgust is often regarded as the emotion
that has been used by humans to keep a distance between oneself and objects that
would be hazardous to health if ingested. Uher et al. (2005) found that measures of
anxiety and disgust often correlate highly (+0.7) and this may offer a position where it
could be argued that they both have the function of distancing oneself from a feared
object or outcome. It may be that disgust of one's body or of food may actual account
for the 'fear' reaction towards perceived body weight within the eating disorders.
Davey, Bickerstaffe and MacDonald (2006) found evidence for this type of
relationship between disgust and fear/ anxiety, using an experimental methodology.
They found that induced disgust led to an increase in negative interpretational bias
which maintained levels of anxiety in their participants, and these authors argued that
this provides evidence for the causal role of disgust in anxiety psychopathologies.
This confusion between fear/ anxiety and disgust has the potential to be an important
theoretical point in the understanding of eating disorders, because the long reported
'fear of food' or the 'fear of becoming fat' may actually be disgust reactions, and
hence, may account for the high co-morbidity between anxiety and eating disorders
(Waller, 2008).
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1.6.5 Disgust
Davey (1994) defined disgust as; 'a type of rejection response that is characterised by
a specific facial expression, a desire to distance oneself from the object of disgust, a
physiological manifestation ofmild nausea'. Given that a common feature of eating
disorders is the feeling of disgust towards the patient's own body, it is perhaps
surprising that there has been so little research in this area. Nick Troop and colleagues
found a mixed picture when they investigated disgust in eating disorders (Troop,
Murphy, Bramon, & Treasure, 2000; Troop, Treasure, & Serpell, 2002). They
hypothesised that eating disorders would be associated with an increased general
sensitivity towards the emotion of disgust. Interestingly, they found that patients with
a current eating disorder did demonstrate an increased sensitivity towards disgust that
was associated with body or food, but not with more general areas of disgust (e.g.
sexual practices). In a similar study, Burney and Irwin demonstrated that shame
towards the body and eating are uniquely predictive of eating pathology (Burney &
Irwin, 2000). It has been discussed elsewhere that shame is a complex emotion that is
derived from the basic emotion of disgust (e.g. Power and Dalgleish, 1997; 2008).
Indeed, a study by Marziller and Davey (2004) found evidence for primary and
secondary disgust. It was argued that primary disgust was defined by the stimulus'
ability to elicit fear of oral incorporation or stemming from an animal origin, whilst
secondary disgust was defined by moral or social transgressions. In many ways, it
appears that the secondary disgust, as proposed by Marziller and Davey (2004), is
very much like the complex emotion of shame and fits with the Power and Dalgleish
(1997; 2008) notion of shame being a multifaceted more complex version of disgust.
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The Troop et al findings (2000, 2002) are interesting for their potential theoretical
implications. Some authors have argued that within AN, the feelings of anger towards
an external object are unacceptable, and as a consequence, they are directed towards
the self in terms of the physical body being perceived as 'fat' (Bruch, 1973, 1978).
Although, Bruch does not talk about this perception of being 'fat' in disgust terms, it
is alluded to. In other words, feelings of disgust towards the body could potentially
work in a way to manage other more painful or 'ego dystonic' emotions, such as
anger (as discussed above). This may help to explain why the participants in Troop et
al's studies were more sensitive for disgust directed at their own bodies. Emerging
from within the research literature, there is some preliminary evidence to support this
hypothesis. Geller et al (2000) found, in the study reported above, that inhibited
expression of emotions was related to body dissatisfaction. This finding was
reinforced by the findings from Hayaki, Friedman and Brownell (2002) when they
found that limited emotional expression predicted body dissatisfaction in an analogue
sample (when BMI, non-assertiveness and depressive symptoms were controlled in
their analysis).
As described above, it is argued that shame is a complex version of disgust, and
shame has been shown to be of significance in eating disorders. Goss and Gilbert
(2002) argued that shame is a central emotion in eating disorders and involves two
forms of shame, internal (negative self-evaluation) and external (others looking down
upon them). Frank (1991) highlighted that people with eating disorders have
significantly higher shame and guilt about eating, when compared to depressed and
control participants. Cook (1994) found that internal shame was significantly higher
in eating disorders groups than in all other clinical comparison groups. On the issue of
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body shame, Swan and Andrews (2003) found that symptomatic and recovered
females with eating disorders have significantly higher level of body shame and
shame about eating than controls, whilst Polivy and Herman (1993) and DeSilva
(1995) found that binge eating can regulate shame affect in participants with eating
disorders. In a qualitative study by Skarderud (2007) data were gathered that
highlighted how people with AN feel shame over a number of domains, including
shame for some of the emotions they are feeling (in keeping with the Corstophine,
2006 cognitive-affective model), body shame, shame for not achieving more, shame
for not controlling their behaviour, and shame for having an eating disorder.
Skarderud (2007) also found evidence that an eating disorder can give someone pride
in their life for keeping control within their lives and maintaining thinness.
Some research has started to suggest that females are more predisposed to experience
disgust and associated emotions (e.g. shame) than males. This particular point was
addressed by Barrett and colleagues when they found that female children were more
likely to react with shame when a toy broke (the participants withdrew from the
broken toy), whilst male children appeared to react more with guilt (they attempted to
fix the toy) (Barrett, Zahn-Waxler, & Cole, 1993).
As discussed above, there is a growing body of evidence that certain emotions are
being inhibited and are 'managed' by other, more acceptable emotions. The
theoretical treatment of disgust has highlighted how it is the emotion of rejection and
is often behind the desire to distance oneself from the object of disgust (Davey, 1994),
such as food or body shape (as seen in eating disorders). The picture that disgust and
its derivative, shame, are being 'used' as a way ofmanaging other emotional states is
allowing the eating disorder literature to move away from simplistic models of
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maintenance and 'pure cognition'. This is a key construct of this chapter, in that,
emotions can become connected and have either a facilitatory or inhibitory function to
one other. In other words, experiencing disgust can be used to inhibit other more
painful, ego dystonic emotions from being expressed and/ or experienced.
1.7 Summary and Conclusions
The early cognitive accounts of eating disorders (e.g. Fairburn et al., 1986), in
particular bulimia nervosa, proposed a maintenance level model that showed how
extreme dieting led to breakthrough bingeing and associated purging methods to
avoid weight gain. This model led to the development of a manualised CBT for BN
which had some success in treating bulimic symptoms in normal weight individuals.
However, the therapy only accounted for a 50% improvement in patients and it was
clear that there were gaps in the theory and the intervention. One of the main gaps in
these early models was the explicit role of both cognitive and emotional triggers for
eating disorder symptoms (e.g. Cooper, Todd and Wells, 1998; Cooper, Rose and
Turner, 2006). Furthermore, these models offered no attempt to understand co¬
morbidity in the eating disorders, especially with depression. The works of Cooper et
al (2004), Waller, Kennerley, and Ohanian (2007) and Wonderlich et al. (2001) have
highlighted how certain eating disorder symptoms (e.g. bingeing-vomiting and
restriction) are used to regulate and manage 'painful emotional states' and associated
cognitions. These points of their models highlight an important theoretical
advancement in the understanding of eating disorders. However, the way that emotion
is conceptualised is simplistic and does not take into account the research that has
highlighted a more complex relationship between emotional expression and eating
disorders. For example, it is not clear from these cognitive models why eating
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disorder symptoms are chosen as emotion regulation strategies, instead of other
behaviours (e.g. self-harm). Moreover, there is a complete lack of consideration of the
marked body dissatisfaction that is almost always present in eating disorders, with the
works of Geller et al (2000) and Hayaki et al (2002) suggesting that there is an inverse
relationship between the expression of emotion and body dissatisfaction. The nature
of the emotions behind the eating disorder symptoms is also neglected, as none of
these models have attempted to incorporate the apparent difficulties with anger and
disgust into their models (as shown by previous research).
It is argued that these 2nd generation cognitive models have allowed the theory to
move beyond simple cognitive-behavioural accounts of eating disorders, as they have
highlighted the need to consider emotional factors. But, in keeping with Cooper's
(2005) point, theoretical accounts of eating disorders need to be developed to account
for the research on specific emotion functioning, the high level of body dissatisfaction
and co-morbidity. In keeping with Fairburn and Harrison' (2003) point, it is argued
that where there are shared distinctive clinical features across diagnoses and there are
significant movement of patients between different diagnostic states, clinical
phenomena should be understood from a transdiagnostic perspective. As has been
highlighted throughout this thesis, patients nearly always present with co-morbid
depression and anxiety, but the paucity of theory has limited our understanding of this
potential transdiagnostic process.
Finally, cognitive behavioural models of psychopathology have also come under
criticism from a number of authors for only considering emotion eliciting propositions
within a verbal format (e.g. negative automatic thoughts) (e.g. Power and Dalgleish,
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1997; 2008; Jones, 2001). There are a number of potential emotion eliciting stimuli
that could play a role in the generation of affect (both positive and negative) and it is
clear from clinical work with people with eating disorders that there are potentially
different schematic representations of emotions in eating disorders. For example, the
disgust towards the body generated by the sensation of a pair ofjeans being too tight,
or the visual image of the self being 'fat' (e.g. Cooper et al, 2007). It will be argued
that these analogical representations are of specific importance in understanding
emotions in the eating disorders, and this theoretical point is in keeping with other
authors' observations in other psychological disorders, where it is argued that single
level cognitive behavioural models lack explanatory power, which compromise their
ability to generate effective clinical interventions (Dalgleish, 2004; Jones, 2001).
1.7.1 Introduction to a New Theory of Eating Disorders - SPAARS-
ED
As can be seen through the introduction chapter, it is argued that a new model of
eating disorders needs to account for the difficulties with certain basic emotions (e.g.
anger and disgust), and for the relationship between expression of emotion and body
dissatisfaction, and the high level of co-morbidity between depression and anxiety.
Furthermore, theoretical consideration needs to be given to the different
representations of information that can elicit emotion.
Although a more comprehensive introduction to the SPAARS model will be given, its
key points will be presented here to highlight how this model addresses the gaps in the
literature and allows for the generation of a new model of eating disorders. Within the
SPAARS model, it is argued that certain emotions can become 'coupled', where two
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emotions become linked and work together either in a facilitatory or inhibitory way.
As will be seen below, this emotional process may help to explain the findings of the
low emotional expression and high body dissatisfaction (Hayaki et al, 2002; Geller et
al, 2000). Furthermore, Power and Dalgleish (1997; 2008) argued that common
emotion processes may account for co-morbidity and this may help to explain co¬
morbidity in eating disorders. Finally, the SPAARS model incorporates a second route
to emotion generation that can work without cognitive awareness, which has the
potential to explain the clinically observed link between different representations and
emotional responses (e.g. 'tight jeans' = disgust). All of these points are new concepts
in the study of eating disorders and it is argued that considering eating disorders from
a SPAARS perspective allows for an important theoretical advancement from the
cognitive-behavioural models discussed above. This thesis will now present a more
detailed overview of the SPAARS model (Power and Dalgleish, 1997; 2008).
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Chapter 2: Outline of the New Theoretical Model -
Aims for the Thesis
As seen at the end of the last chapter, the literature review identified that emotions
and emotional regulation have now come to be regarded as a core construct in
understanding eating disorders. The literature, to date, has discussed how there is an
important interaction between cognitive and emotional variables, but often the notion
of emotion has not been particularly well developed in current theories. Furthermore,
research in this field has often been compromised by the choice of methodologies.
This thesis will undertake a number of studies that test some of the assumptions that
the SPAARS-ED model proposes in response to some of these empirical and
theoretical weakness from the research literature. However, before this plan is detailed
in this chapter, an overview of the SPAARS model of emotion shall be presented, and
its application to eating disorders shall also be discussed.
2.1 Multi-Level Approach to Cognition and Emotion - SPAARS
Model (Power and Dalgleish, 1997; 2008)
As has been more fully discussed elsewhere (Power and Dalgleish, 1997; 2008),
cognitive theory ofmental disorder has tended to be based on single-level approaches
to emotion, where, for example, there is a direct link between verbal propositional
cognition (e.g. a negative automatic thought) and emotion (e.g. depression). Although
there have been clear benefits from this type of operationalised cognition in therapy
(Gloaguen, Cottraux, Cucherat, & Blackburn, 1998), CBT still has its drawbacks and
theoretical difficulties, including its difficulty in accounting for why certain
06/12/2009 66
Doctor ofPhilosophy (PhD) University of Edinburgh John R.E. Fox
propositions in verbal form often miss how other stimuli (e.g. visual) can generate
emotion (Teasdale and Barnard, 1993). Also, as noted by Jones (2001) the classic
'Beckian' CBT approach often does not account for the complex interactions between
emotion and cognition observed in therapy, and how one set of propositions (in the
form of verbal thoughts) can account for a number of different emotions within one
person. Finally, as Power and Dalgleish (1999) pointed out, it is often observed
clinically that patients will report various emotions, but without any apparent
associated cognitions. This is a potentially serious theoretical flaw in any single level
approach to mental disorder.
A number of authors have proposed models that show how emotions can be
potentially generated across multi-layers of processing (e.g. Integrated Cognitive Sub¬
system model ICS, Teasdale and Barnard, 1993; SPAARS model, Power and
Dalgleish, 1997; 2008). As the SPAARS model builds upon the ICS model, this










Figure 1: Power and Dalgleish's Multilevel Model ofEmotion—SPAARS.
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As can be seen above, an event (either internal or external) enters the Schematic
Propositional Analogical Associative Representation System (SPAARS) via the
analogical system. According to Power and Dalgleish (1999), the analogical system is
made up of a number of parallel processing modules that are modality-specific (e.g.
verbal, olfactory, gustatory, and proprioceptive). The representations generated
within a specific modality do not require a linguistic interpretation to have a meaning
and modular-specific representations are present throughout the SPAARS processing.
It is argued that these modular-specific representations within SPAARS are an
important point in understanding certain emotional disorders. For example, in post
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), certain sights, sounds or other bodily sensations
may become inherent parts of the memory of the traumatic event (Power and
Dalgleish, 1997; 2008). The schematic model level is the highest processing part of
the SPAARS model and it is essentially an effortful appraisal route, in which either
external or internal stimuli are evaluated. This route is in keeping with contemporary
theory in 'normal' emotional processing (for a fuller discussion, see Power and
Dalgleish, 1997; 2008 and Teasdale and Barnard, 1993) and according to these
theories, this schematic level of processing incorporates a higher level of
representation that is above 'verbal expressible propositional concepts'. Within their
book, Power and Dalgleish discussed the distinction between propositional and
schematic model (implicational) representations, by using the example offered by
Teasdale and Barnard, in which they compared a piece of prose to a piece of poetry.
This is given below:
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Implicational meaning
O what can ail thee, Knight-at Arms
Alone andpalely loitering?
The sedge has wither 'dfrom the lake
And no birds sing
Propositional Meaning
What is the matter, armed old-fashioned soldier,
Standing by yourselfand doing nothing with a pallid expression?
The reed-like plants have decomposed by the lake
And there are not any birds singing
As noted by Teasdale and Barnard (1993, p.73) 'the implicational meaning or 'sense'
conveyed by the two versions is very different. The poetic form conveys a sense of
melancholy, emptiness and abandonment that is largely lost in the much more matter
of fact tone of the prose example.' As Jones pointed out, this abstract level of
processing is much more complex than Beck's concept of a schema (Jones, 2001).
According to Beck, a schema is the sum of propositional statements that have been
learnt over a period of time, whilst Power and Dalgleish argued that the schematic
appraisals capture the contextual, historical and emotional information (as shown in
the poetry example). Thus, within the schematic models, the system is dynamic,
draws from all other parts of the system to generate rules that apply to emotion
generation and, in agreement with Beck et al (1979), the SPAARS model proposed
that domains of knowledge are organised around the self, others and the world.
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The propositional level within the SPAARS model is representations that can be
entirely described within normal language (although not one particular language).
These representations are more akin to the negative automatic thoughts that are
considered in other theories (e.g. Beck et al, 1979). The representations within this
level are discreet (e.g. 'the tallest mountain in the world is Everest') and the
propositional level does not have a direct emotion output. In agreement with Teasdale
and Barnard (1993), it is argued that this level of information processing feeds into
either the schematic or associative level for emotion generation, and certain words or
phrases may lead to the direct generation of emotion (e.g. certain insulting or
offensive words), or they may trigger associative emotion due to a certain place or
person being mentioned (e.g. the name of someone who has recently died).
The second route to emotion generation is an associative route, where emotion is
produced without any direct cognition. It is proposed that there are two primary
pathways for an event to become linked with an emotion. The first is via an
evolutionary preparedness for certain stimuli to elicit emotion (e.g. a snake phobia vs
a telephone phobia). This draws from Seligman's proposal that certain stimuli may be
more 'evolutionary prepared' for emotion generation (e.g. snakes, spiders, etc)
(Seligman, 1975). Whilst a second source for the development of event-emotion links
being developed comes from a learning perspective, in which certain pairings of
events with emotions may become automated. For example, the eating of a particular
food that gives someone a bad case of food poisoning could be linked with the
emotion of disgust. This emotion could then be automatically generated every time
that person saw the food following taste-aversion conditioning. Jones (2001) also
pointed out that the event may also be internal, as well as external. For example,
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propositional representations can also be linked to particular emotions, such as the
thought/ feeling that 'they are out there' may be linked, over time, with the emotion of
fear. Therefore, certain propositional statements can become an emotion generator in
their own right, but through an automated associative route.
There are two final theoretical points from the SPAARS model that need to be
considered before the model is applied to eating disorders, which are the constructs of
inhibition and coupled emotions. According to the SPAARS model, inhibition can
occur in three different ways, passive, active and the inhibition ofparticular emotion
modules. Passive inhibition can be broadly understood as when the individual has an
awareness of the internal emotional state and uses strategies such as distraction to
inhibit the emotion, whilst active inhibition is much more akin to the psychodynamic
concepts of repression and dissociation. According to the model, early learning leads
to the development of schematic models that lie across the three domains of
knowledge (i.e. self, others, world). Once these schematic models have been
developed, they have the capacity to organise and filter information. This can be seen
more clearly in the following example; Peter experiences over his childhood constant
comments and opinions from his caregivers that he is not very nice person because he
is loud and talkative. The schematic model of the self would develop accordingly (e.g.
SELF-BAD-NOT LIKEABLE) which would then inhibit incoming information to the
contrary. However, once a 'critical mass' has been achieved that represents
information to the contrary, Peter may be able to develop alternative schematic
models that account for the new information about the self (e.g. Peter may have
started a relationship where he is loved and respected). In this instance, the original
schematic model of the selfmight not be lost, but it could be inhibited. If events occur
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that trigger the old schematic model, the prior emotion could occur (e.g. losing a
relationship - sadness). In this instance, the 'new' schematic model would become
inhibited. As discussed by Young et al. (2003) and Le Doux (1996) there is some
evidence that suggests that schematic representations are laid down, through early
childhood, within the sub-cortex. Although it is not clear whether their definition of
schema is the same as the one proposed by Power and Dalgleish (1997; 2008), it does
fit theoretically, as Le Doux proposed that once a schema has been laid within the
amygdala it is very resistant to change, and it is argued that it never completely
disappears.
A key point in understanding the SPAARS model's role for emotional inhibition is
that it proposes that the emotional schematic modules develop in a way that are akin
to other modularised cognitive functions (e.g. elements of perception, etc).
Accordingly, an individual's learning history may play a significant role in learning
whether certain basic emotions are 'acceptable' or not. If, from an early age, a
particular emotion is regarded as wrong or unacceptable, it is proposed that this
modularised emotion 'splits off from normal emotional development and becomes
'ego-dystonic' and modularised. Thereby, the schematic model within SPAARS
operates in a way that is similar to a 'central executive', in that, it monitors
information processing and the corresponding emotional output from the SPAARS
model.
The notion of 'coupled emotions' is an important feature of the SPAARS model. It is
argued that 2 or more basic emotions can become coupled via a person's learning
history. Power and Dalgleish argued that more complex emotions and, importantly,
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emotional disorders can be the product of coupled emotions. For example, depression
may be made up of the emotions of sadness and disgust directed at the self. The idea
of coupled emotions compliments emotional inhibition because one emotion may be
regarded as ego-dystonic, whilst the other emotion may be viewed as 'acceptable to
the self. In this instance, the acceptable emotion would be used to inhibit the
unacceptable or 'ego-dystonic emotion'.
Emotional disorder occurs when the system becomes 'stuck', such as when different
components of the system start to activate other parts of the system. For example,
when a schematic model has been activated that indicates that the self is bad (i.e.
SELF-BAD), this then leads to the activation of propositional representations (e.g. 'I
am a bad person'). Through a process of repetition this then leads onto the
development of an associative link to low mood.
2.2 Applying a Multi-Modal Emotion Approach to Eating
Disorders - SPAARS-ED
Throughout this thesis, it has been proposed that any theoretical understanding of
eating disorders needs to account fully for the complex interrelationship of emotions
that research has highlighted. It is argued that eating disorders are an affect regulation
strategy, and hence should be regarded as an extension to affective or emotional
disorders/ difficulties. The work ofWaller et al (2007) and Corstorphine (2006) have
shown that the interpersonal context is important, as individuals with eating disorders
have a number of socially orientated 'schemas' (e.g. fear of rejection, mistrust in
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relationships, unrelenting standards, etc), and there is an overall sense of the self
perceiving themselves as 'bad', 'worthless' or at risk of rejection/ abandonment.
According to the SPAARS model, these representations could be understood as
'SELF-BAD, OTHERS-IMPORTANT and WORLD-UNSAFE'. As has been
discussed earlier, research has identified that these types of appraisals are also found
in depression, and, thus, one of outputs of the schematic arm of the SPAARS is the
activation of the sadness emotion module.
Research by Geller et al (2000) and Waller et al (2003) has started to suggest that the
anger module is significant for people with eating disorders. It is hypothesised that the
anger module may be primed by earlier experience. Moreover, anger has traditionally
been regarded as a non-feminine emotion in Western Cultures and this may place a
cultural propensity on females having difficulties in expressing their anger (e.g.
Tavris, 1989, 1992; Lorenz, 1966). Kent and Waller (2000), in their review, pointed
out that emotional abuse may well lead to the development of belief systems that are
likely to involve seeing oneself as undeserving and unlovable, seeing others as
dangerous and hurtful, and experiencing the world as harmful, unpredictable and
unfair.
According to emotion theory (e.g. Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Power and
Dalgleish, 1997; 2008) anger can be understood as an emotional response to the
blocking of goals; these goals can be regarded as life goals, relationship goals, etc. It
is plausible that one of the main emotional responses to early life experiences is the
development of a sensitive anger emotion module (e.g. at being 'let down' by carers,
anger at self for being a 'bad person', etc). DiGiuseppe & Tafrate (2007) argued that
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having the experiences of abuse and maltreatment in childhood left the developing
child with a significant 'hurt', leading to a sense of the unfairness of the world.
Interestingly, they argued that these experiences were also responsible for a number of
cognitive errors, such as an expectation of threat and suspicion from others. These
authors, from their review of the literature, also suggested that the research evidence
on the emotion of anger shows that the relationship between perceptions of threat and
anger expression is moderated by beliefs of self-efficacy (i.e. limited expression of
anger is related to low self-efficacy). Related to this point on the role of self-efficacy
to anger expression, Hochschild (1979) termed the phrase 'emotional deviance'
which describes the dissonance between the perceptions of one's own emotional
experience and the perception of socially prescribed 'emotional scripts' for the
expression of certain emotions. In other words, certain environments may be
perceived to limit or expressly forbid the expression of certain emotions, such as
anger. These points offer some useful additions to the theoretical points raised above
in the discussion of emotional abuse within eating disorders (e.g. Kent and Waller,
2000; Corstorphine, 2006). It is argued that abuse and neglect leave a child with an
emotional hurt, which predisposes the young person to a sense of threat and
unfairness within their surrounding world. These same experiences also predispose
the same person to perceptions of low self-efficacy and therefore, according to the
points raised above, limit the expression of anger. Moreover, DiGuiseppe and Tafrate
(2007) also argued that there is evidence that inhibited anger leaves the person more
vulnerable to episodes of depression (as discussed above).
These theoretical points about the expression of anger appear to be important in their
application to eating disorders because research has shown that this is an emotion that
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is inhibited within these disorders. Geller and colleagues (Geller et ah, 2000)
discussed how people with eating disorders may well suppress anger in an attempt to
protect relationships. The points raised by DiGiuseppe and Tafrate (2007) suggest that
the emotional factors in a female with an eating disorder background may well be
important (e.g. neglect, frank criticism and belittlement), because abuse may well
leave the individual with a sense of 'hurt', which predispose the person with the
eating disorder to perceptions of being treated unfairly, and thus an increase in overall
levels of anger. However, due to beliefs about low self-efficacy, this anger may be
inhibited. These developmental factors, in SPAARS terms, would lead anger to
become modualised and ego-dystonic and thus detached from the person's sense of
self (for example, ANGER-DANGEROUS; ANGER-THREAT-OTHERS). However,
there would also be in existence other anger modules that would suggest that other
people are dangerous, threatening and important (For example; OTHERS-
THREATENING; OTHERS-DANGEROUS), and other modules that would suggest
that the world is unfair and unpredictable (WORLD-UNFAIR; WORLD-
UNPREDICTABLE).
Research has highlighted the importance of disgust and its potential role in body and
food related aspects of eating disorders (e.g. Troop et al, 2002). Moreover, the
application of a dual level emotion theory allows for the theoretical development of
the role of disgust, and its relation to other emotions. Work by Geller et al (2000) and
Hayaki et al (2002) have shown that the lack of expression of emotions, in particular
anger, is related to disgust and body dissatisfaction. On the basis of this research it is
proposed that disgust via both 'preparedness' and 'over-learning' becomes an
automatic emotion within certain contexts and interpersonal relations. Previous
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research has shown that body shape concern is significantly high amongst adolescent
females and negative feeling towards the body is virtually universal in modern day
society (Stice, 2001; Maine & Kelly, 2005). Given the presence of socially directed
schemas and the inhibition of anger, it is argued that anger and disgust (and to a lesser
degree sadness) may become coupled during the course of emotional development.
The work of Power and Dalgleish (1997; 2008) argued that depression can be
understood as the product of the coupling of disgust (in the form of self-disgust) and
sadness, and this theoretical point may help to explain the high level of co-morbidity
of depression and eating disorders. The coupling of anger and disgust may also help to
explain the theoretical processes that are occurring in eating disorders. The potential
use of the basic emotion module of disgust to suppress and 'redirect' the emotion of
the anger is an important part of the model being proposed, and to a lesser degree,
sadness. According to SPAARS, the representations throughout the model take
different sensory modalities (e.g. olfactory, tactile, and visual). It is a common
observation in clinical practice that people with eating disorders have an array of
modalities that evoke disgust towards themselves and food. For example, the
sensation of a 'tight pair ofjeans', the smell of food cooking, the visual image of the
self being fat or eating could potentially be directly related to the emotion of disgust
for people with eating disorders. Anxiety is often regarded as a key emotion within
eating disorders, as a morbid fear of fatness is regarded as a crucial symptom (e.g.
DSM-IV, APA, 1994). It was discussed earlier in this thesis that there is a strong
relationship between disgust and anxiety (fear) in eating disorders, as they are both
emotions of avoidance (e.g. Uher et al, 2005). The work from Davey et al (2006)
suggested that the relationship between disgust and anxiety is uni-directional with
induced disgust creating a negative interpretational bias within the individual. It is
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argued that the emotion of disgust leads to the development of fear, in that, there is a
fear ofweight gain and/ or food. In other words, the fear of disgust eliciting stimuli
induces anxiety in people with eating disorders, and therefore, the anxiety is
secondary to the principal emotion of disgust. This is an area that appears to warrant
further investigation.
Figure 2: The SPAARS model of eating disorders (SPAARS-ED)
Thus, once the SPAARS-ED model has been activated in a particular fashion, it
becomes biased in its appraisal of incoming information (both externally and
internally) and this can lead to the development of a 'default mode' of operating. This
'locking' maintains the dominant emotion within the SPAARS-ED model, and thus,
the person has a heightened sensitivity to disgust eliciting stimulus, via the associative
route. The feedback loops in the SPAARS model help us to explain why it is only
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self-disgust that is particularly sensitive, as the analogue system is 'locked' on the
main stimuli of disgust elicitation, namely food, body and self.
According to the SPAARS model, emotional modules are shaped by an individual's
own learning experiences. Power and Dalgleish (1997; 2008) argued that certain
environments and/ or cultures lead an individual to learn that the expression, or
indeed, the feeling of a particular emotion is 'bad' or 'wrong', and in these situations
the person comes to perceive that particular emotion as being ego-dystonic/ damaging
to the sense of self. In these situations, the schematic arm will inhibit the experience
of that emotion, although the emotion may still be generated at the associative level.
Within Western culture, traditionally certain emotions are acceptable to be expressed
by females, whilst others are often not allowed (e.g. anger). Perhaps it is no
coincidence, therefore, that females are the vast majority of sufferers of eating
disorders.
Waller et al. (2007) discussed how one of the key processes within their model was
where the actual emotion was being inhibited. The notion of primary and secondary
inhibition of emotion fits neatly with the definitions proposed within the general
SPAARS model, of passive and active inhibition. According to the model, passive
inhibition is a process that requires active inhibition of an emotion that has conscious
awareness, this notion fits with all the research that has demonstrated that bingeing
and vomiting occurs in relation to negative affect. The primary avoidance of negative
emotion fits with the idea of active inhibition where the individual uses almost
automatic procedures (e.g. repression and dissociation) to inhibit emotion. It is likely
that in reality, both processes are in operation within eating disorders, but to varying
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degrees. It is an empirical question whether these differences could account for the
different symptoms patterns found in eating disorders (e.g. restricting versus binge-
vomiting).
The final theoretical point that needs to be discussed is the role of eating disorder
symptomatology that maintains the emotional components of the eating disorder. As
discussed by others, eating disorder symptoms have an important physiological
underpinning. For both restricting and binge-purging eating disorders, the role of
extreme dieting has been shown to be important in the maintenance of the eating
disorders (Fairburn et al. 1993; Keys et al. 1950). As discussed above, research
suggests that extreme dieting and bingeing-purging cycles have an impact on lowering
mood (e.g. Keys et al, 1950). It is argued that these physiological effects may well
feedback into the emotional processes and reinforce a sense ofworthlessness, disgust,
and provoke a sense of anger at oneself for having the eating disorder. Furthermore,
these factors lock the SPAARS model for certain emotions and therefore, maintain the
disorder within the individual.
2.3 Research Questions stemming from the SPAARS-ED
model and an Overview of the Research Studies within
this Thesis
As can be seen above, a number of research questions arise from the SPAARS-ED
model. These concern the actual nature of emotions within eating disorders, and
whether there are differences between the five basic emotions within this population.
It is proposed within that model that there will be particular difficulties with the
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emotions of anger and, to a lesser degree, sadness. It is proposed, via a SPAARS
approach, that these emotions would have a qualitatively different relationship with
the sense of self for people with eating disorders. It is proposed that within the eating
disorders, there would be developmental origins for these difficulties with these
particular emotions and there would be issues for carers for their own meta-emotional
skills. Finally, a keystone of the SPAARS-ED model is the theoretical notion of
emotional coupling; in that, it is proposed that the emotions of anger and disgust are a
key process within eating pathology. Within this thesis, four studies were completed
to address these research questions. An overview will be presented of each study with
their study aims. As will be seen these studies attempt to use different methodologies
with a view of avoiding the criticisms that a significant amount of the previous
research has received.
2.4 A Qualitative Exploration of the Perception of Emotions
in Anorexia Nervosa: A Basic Emotion and
Developmental Perspective
The above review of the literature has highlighted how people with anorexia nervosa
have a difficult relationship with their own emotions. It is apparent from the literature
review that there is a lack of a detailed and comprehensive study of emotions within
eating disorders. This lack of in-depth research has compromised researchers from
developing sophisticated theoretical accounts of emotions within eating disorders. It is
for this reason that the first study in this PhD was decided to be a qualitative study of
emotions in anorexia nervosa. It was designed to focus on these individuals'
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experiences of emotion and their management from a basic emotions and
developmental perspective. As discussed by Elliott, Fischer and Rennie (1999),
exploratory qualitative methods are recommended for research areas where there are
significant gaps in the knowledge base of a particular issue or problem. This
methodology is particularly useful in attempting to understand particular phenomena
from the perspective of the interviewees (Hodgetts and Wright, 2007). Qualitative
methodology also has the distinct advantage of employing an inductive approach,
which explores the subject matter in as much detail as possible whilst preserving the
subtlety and ambiguity of the issue or problem under study (e.g. Elliott et al, 1999).
Although there are a number of potential qualitative approaches that could have been
used, a Grounded Theory perspective was chosen due to the current theoretical
limitations in understanding emotional inhibition in eating disorders. It was hoped that
this choice ofmethodology would aid further theoretical development, which would
inform the design of other studies for this PhD.
2.5 The Relation ofAnger to Disgust: The Potential Role of
Coupled Emotions within Bulimic Pathology
Although it is beyond this section's scope to discuss the above study's findings in
detail, it was found in the above study that the emotions of anger and disgust were of
key theoretical significance. It was apparent from the data that participants were
experiencing a high amount of anger and there was some qualitative data that
suggested that participants were coupling anger and disgust. It was felt that a study
that looked at these two findings in a more quantitative manner would provide
evidence of this effect with a slightly different population, people with a probable
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bulimic presentation. The final aim was to investigate how people with eating
pathology express anger towards other people or objects, or whether they suppress
anger within the self. Furthermore, this part of the study was designed to investigate
the ability to control the outward expression of anger and the ability to control the
expression of anger within a short time frame.
2.6 An Investigation into Levels of Basic Emotions and
History of Emotional Environments in Females with
Eating Pathology
As was detailed within the SPAARS-ED model, it was proposed that the principal
conscious emotion within eating disorders would be disgust. This finding was given
some evidence from the first two studies of this PhD, but this study was designed to
investigate all the basic emotions within the group of females with eating pathology.
By using this methodology, this allowed for a more detailed examination of all the
emotions and to see what the emotional profile was for this group of participants. A
second expectation of the model was that participants would have experienced
challenging and invalidating environments towards their emotional expression. This
part of the study examined responses to emotions over a number of created scenarios,
and measured responses, such as distress reactions, punitive reactions, expressive
encouragement, emotion-focused reactions, problem-focused reactions, minimization
reactions.
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2.7 An Investigation into Basic Emotions, Emotional
Regulation, Core Beliefs and Emotional Coupling in
Anorexia Nervosa
This study is the final study of this thesis and it incorporates many of the aspects of
the three previous studies. It replicates the emotional coupling anger-disgust study,
and it looks at basic emotion and emotion regulation strategies that may be present in
anorexia nervosa. Another aim of this study was to examine the types of core beliefs
that may be present in anorexia nervosa. The data for this study was collected at
eating disorder services around the UK and it represents a truly clinical study to test
the final aspect of the SPAARS-ED model for this PhD thesis.
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Chapter 3: A Qualitative Exploration of the Perception
of Emotions in Anorexia Nervosa: A Basic Emotion
and Developmental Perspective
3.1 Introduction
As discussed in the introduction, the role of emotions in eating disorders has not been
adequately covered by the research literature. This forms a key aim of this study. In
keeping with the basic emotions literature, this study adopted a basic emotions
approach, but was also interested in understanding the emotional environment in
which this study's participants grew up. Although there are some theoretical pointers
from the literature, there was very little data to support these perspectives. This
formed the second main aim of this study.
Within the introduction, the studies discussed have used a small set ofmethodologies
which has limited the opportunities for a detailed exploration of individual emotions
in eating disorders (as suggested by the SPAARS model). For all of these studies, the
use of questionnaires and standardised measures has prevented a fuller investigation
ofwhat makes certain emotions difficult for people with eating disorders. It is argued
that this field needs an inductive methodology that allows the development of a theory
of emotions from the individual's experiences and their specific conceptualisation of
emotion in their narratives relating to their specific difficulties. This inductive
methodology would also allow the researcher to explicitly consider theory and its
development as this would assist in the broader understanding of the role of emotion
in the eating disorders. It is for these reasons that this study has adopted a qualitative
methodological approach.
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3.2 Study Aims
The above literature review has left a number of questions about the nature of emotion
within eating disorders, such as how do people account for their difficulties with their
emotions and what is the developmental pathway for these emotional processes? The
work of Eisenburg et al. (1998; 2001) and Krause et al. (2003) have highlighted that
there is a need to understand emotional inhibition from a developmental perspective,
and the role of parental responses (especially parental distress) to children's expressed
emotions appears to be important. However, it is not known what pathways (if any)
are important in the eating disorders, and it is for this reason that it is argued
deductive methodologies are limiting the research in this field.
The study presented here aims to examine accounts of individuals who had a
diagnosed anorexic condition. This study was designed to focus on these individuals'
experiences of emotion and their management from a basic emotions and
developmental perspective.
3.2 Theoretical and Clinical Implications
As discussed by Elliott, Fischer and Rennie (1999), exploratory qualitative methods
are recommended for research areas where there are significant gaps in the knowledge
base of a particular issue or problem. Qualitative methodology also has the distinct
advantage of employing an inductive approach, which explores the subject matter in
as much detail as possible whilst preserving the subtlety and ambiguity of the issue or
problem under study (e.g. Elliott et al, 1999).
In terms of theory, it is anticipated that the rich data generated from this study will
allow for a broader theory development on emotional functioning in eating disorders.
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A qualitative study was chosen as the first study of this PhD thesis, as it is an ideal
way of generating theory that would lead to the development ofmore accurate
quantitative studies. In saying this, it is important to say that it is not proposed that
qualitative methodologies are only useful for pilot data collection, as they offer rich
data that stands on its own in terms of usefulness and potential clinical applications.
3.3 Methodology
3.3.1 Choice of Methodology
As was discussed above in the identification of the research question, this study has
chosen a qualitative methodology, due to the exploratory nature of the research topic.
This section will give an overview of the debate concerning qualitative
methodologies, with a focus on Grounded Theory. This section will not only provide
details of the process and procedures undertaken within this study, but it will also
consider how to ensure quality within qualitative research methodology.
3.3.2 Qualitative versus Quantitative Methodologies: An
Ongoing Debate
Quantitative methods, which involve operationalising phenomena into quantifiable
variables for the purpose of testing experimental hypotheses derived from existing
theories, have been deemed inappropriate for this study due to their inability to
address the subtle elements of what the perceptions and personal histories are for the
basic emotions in anorexia nervosa. Qualitative methodologies place much more of
an emphasis on what has been developed to permit a systematic investigation of how
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people construe their world and how they experience events, including their own
emotions. As summarized by Malterud (2001),
"Qualitative research methods are strategies for the systematic collection,
organisation, and interpretation of textual material obtained from talk or
observation, which allow the exploration of social events as experienced by
individuals in their natural context." (p397)
3.3.3 Rationale for Choice ofQualitative Methodology
As highlighted by Smith (2003) there are many different methods for conducting
qualitative research. Behind these different methodologies, most have quite different
epistemological positions upon which they are based. This complexity in the field in
qualitative research has, at times, made it a difficult field to break into and to get to
grips with the methodologies proposed. However, this level of complexity is
somewhat inevitable, as they all pose different types of questions. The importance of
this diversity was noted by Reicher (2000: p4),
"They have different philosophical roots, they have different theoretical
assumptions and they ask different types of questions".
Within his review of qualitative research, he identified that there were two principle
epistemological positions underpinning differing qualitative methodologies, which
were: -
• Methodologies which attempt to get a better understanding of people's
experiences, ways of thinking and actions. In other words, it is much
preoccupied by accessing the 'experiential' for the participants. In
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epistemological terms, this stance has often been referred to as the 'realist'
stance.
• Methodologies which are much more concerned with the role of language in
the construction of reality. In other words, these approaches focus on the
actual descriptions and contents stemming from the data sources (e.g.
interviews). From an epistemological position, this type of methodology has
been referred to as a 'constructionist stance.'
Madill and colleagues (Madill, Jordan, & Shirley, 2000) developed a stance that
places itself as a 'contextual constructionist' and roughly corresponds to the less
extreme forms of the 'realist' and 'constructionist' positions outlined above. In
essence, this orientation accepts that it is possible to learn something about the world,
but regards all such knowledge as necessarily contextual and standpoint-dependent.
Various researchers have sought to describe techniques that characterise an approach
to qualitative enquiry in accordance with this position (and others).
Within healthcare research, there are now two principal qualitative research
methodologies that are in general use - phenomenology and grounded theory (Pope,
Mays and Popay, 2007). Within phenomenological analysis, the goal is to describe,
interpret and understand the meanings of experiences for the participants. Therefore,
research using this methodology would normally seek to demonstrate both the
transferable general qualities ofwhat makes the experience what it is, and the variety
of description across a number of contexts. In grounded theory, the goal is to develop
a theory in which particular concepts and activities fit together to have an explanatory
power.
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It was felt in the designing of this study that both types of qualitative methodologies
were potentially useful for addressing the research question in this study. A
phenomenological approach would have allowed for a detailed exploration of the
actual experience of emotions, as well as a more experiential approach to
understanding the participant's own accounts of their own upbringing. However, this
study was designed to be a first study in a series of studies for a PhD, and therefore,
the lack of theory within a phenomenological approach would have limited the
potential applications of these findings. It was on the basis of this decision process
that a grounded theory approach was decided upon, however, unlike quantitative
approaches, qualitative methodologies are designed to be flexible (Charmaz, 2006)
and this study was designed to incorporate an element of experiential analysis in order
not to lose the richness of the emotional experience of the participants.
3.3.4 Grounded Theory
Since the inception of grounded theory in 1967 by Glaser and Strauss, there have been
many differing interpretations of the key analytic principles (Glaser and Strauss,
1967). Glaser himself disagreed with the publication of Strauss and Corbin's 1990
work, where he argued that Strauss and Corbin were placing quantitative methods into
to Grounded Theory, as they were attempting to force data into a theory rather than
letting a theory emerge with no preconceptions (Coyne & Cowley 2006).
The process of grounded theory involves the recognition of the role of the researcher
in the analysis of the data (Strauss and Corbin, 1990), and also draws on social
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constructionist ideas (Charmaz, 1990). This perspective on the analysis was a crucial
aspect of the treatment of the results, because it was felt that the researcher's
perspective on how the emotions were displayed and acknowledged by the participant
would need to be interpreted by the researcher. This acknowledgment of the
researcher's perspective has been regarded as a vital component to the data analysis
and theory generation and it is in keeping with Charmaz's point that 'any theoretical
rendering offers an interpretative portrayal of the studied world, not an exact picture
of it' (Charmaz, 2006, p. 10). In order to ensure the quality of this study, Elliot et al.
(1999) devised a set of 'evolving guidelines' which detail a range of criteria that
would help the researcher to ensure the quality of their research. These guidelines
were devised from reviewing 40 existing quality standards, which resulted in the
establishment of 14 guidelines. Elliot et al. (1999) acknowledge that seven of these
guidelines are relevant to both quantitative and qualitative methodologies (e.g. respect
for the participant). However, the other seven are considered particular for qualitative
methodologies and will be presented in detail below, with how this study has
addressed each point.
• Owning One's Perspective
Authors specify their theoretical orientations andpersonal anticipations, both
as known in advance and as they become apparent during the research,
recognising the role they play in understanding. Disclosure ofpersonal values
helps the readers to interpret the researchers' data and understanding of
them, and to consider possible alternatives.
In keeping with the theoretical background described above, the term reflexivity
refers to the need of the grounded theorist to acknowledge his or her own
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philosophical and conceptual stance of the world and how this interacts with their own
knowledge base and the interview with the participants. The researcher in this study
is a 38 year old male clinical psychologist. This piece of work was instigated to meet
the requirements for a PhD degree. He is married and could be regarded as being
middle class. He has been qualified as a clinical psychologist for over 6 years and has
spent the majority of his qualified life working with adult women with eating
disorders. The author works from an integrated perspective from a cognitive-
behavioural through to a schema therapy perspective, and he is now receiving clinical
supervision within the cognitive analytic model from a trainer on the CAT North West
training programme. It is acknowledged that this clinical experience will have had an
impact upon the analysis; however, it is argued that this experience would have
facilitated the analysis and allowed for improved theoretical development. His interest
in the topic of emotional processes in eating disorder was directly bom out of his
clinical experiences, where it seemed that difficulties with emotions lay at the centre
of his clients' clinical formulations.
The author also worked on a clinical psychology training programme where he
supervises qualitative clinical doctorates, and as such, he has some experience of
using and supervising the use of grounded theory in clinical research. Although, due
to the nature of undertaking a PhD and working clinically in the area it is impossible
to be without knowledge of the area, the data were collected and analysed over 2006
prior to any significant reading or writing of papers for the PhD research program. It
was intended that this would prevent any undue bias influencing the data collection
and analysis, although it is acknowledged that the author had a significant amount of
knowledge about eating disorders prior to this study's data collection and analysis.
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• Situating the Sample
Authors describe the research participants and their life circumstances to aid
the reader in judging the range ofpersons and situations to which the findings
may be relevant.
Within this methodology section, a full description of the participants and the research
setting will be given in as much detail as possible (within the general limits of
confidentiality), thus allowing the reader to fully consider the relevance for other
settings and samples.
• Providing Credibility Checks
Researchers adopt a methodfor checking the creditability oftheir categories
themes or accounts. For example, checking their understanding ofthe data with
other qualitative researchers, so that they can review the data and lookfor
discrepancies, overstatements or errors.
This issue of validity was taken very seriously in this study and a number of checks
were put in place. It is recorded within the Grounded Theory literature that there are
three principal types of validation checks for qualitative research (e.g. Charmaz,
2006). These include the use of other qualitative researchers to check the codings of
various parts of transcripts, to consider how the results fit with the current literature
base and to check with the actual participants to see if the results fit with their
understanding of the issue. In this study, two other researchers cross-validated two of
the eleven transcripts (these were selected randomly). The results from this study were
discussed regularly with his supervisor, where there was a constant discussion about
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the data, analysis and category development. This meant the researcher stayed very
close to his data, and was in a constant process ofjustifying and considering the data
analysis. It was decided early on in the analysis not to approach participants for
validation, as the analysis made a number of inferences based upon the participant's
presentations and these may not have been picked up upon by the participants.
• Grounding in Examples
Authors provide examples ofthe data to illustrate both the analytic procedures
used and the understanding developed in light ofthem. Examples allow the
appraisal of the fit between the data and the authors' understanding of them
and allow readers to construct alternative meanings.
Throughout the write up of the analysis, examples taken from the transcript are
presented, in order to allow the reader to assess the creditability of the research. A key
part of this process was to also provide examples taken from the researchers memos,
so that the reader can gain insight into the researcher's perspective throughout the
analysis.
• Coherence
The understanding is represented in a way that achieves coherence and
integration while preserving the nuances in the data. This understandingfits
together to form a 'data-based story.'
This study's analysis was undertaken to be true to the data and therefore, offer a
creditable account of what the participants had discussed in their interviews.
Therefore the data is presented both in narrative and diagrammatic form, allowing the
reader to gain a clearer understanding of how the categories relate to each other.
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• Accomplishing general vs. specific research tasks.
Where a general understanding ofa phenomenon is intended, it is based on an
appropriate range of instances (informants or situations). Limitations of
extending the findings to other contexts and informants are specified. Where
understanding a specific instance or case is the goal, it has been studied and
described systematically ad comprehensively enough to provide the reader a
basisfor attaining that understanding. Such case studies also address
limitations ofextending the findings to other instances.
The issue of how generalisable a qualitative research study is a perennial question/
criticism of qualitative research. The concept of generalisability in the context of the
qualitative research is multi-faceted. An attempt to consider this issue was proposed
by Lewis and Ritchie (2003) who considered that there are three elements of
generalisability in qualitative research, which are; representational - where the results
of the sample represent the more generic parent group from which the sample was
drawn. Inferential - where the findings from the research can be generalised beyond
the current sample, and theoretical - where the theory developed from the data has
applicability to the broader group. Although these elements proposed by Lewis and
Ritchie (2003) are useful, they are source ofmuch debate within the field. The idea of
having a theory that is independent of context is at odds with many of the underlying
epistemologies of qualitative psychology. However, Lewis and Ritchie (2003)
propose that one way of understanding theoretical generalisability is understand how
this study's data fits in with the general research literature, as by doing this
comparison, it can be seen if existing theories can be supported, elaborated upon or
06/12/2009 95
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) University of Edinburgh John R.E. Fox
disputed (i.e. if the research actually tells the broader research community anything
about what is being investigated).
In terms of inferential generalisation, Lincoln and Guba (1985) argued that the key
process is one of comparison between the 'sending context' (where the research was
carried out) and the 'receiving context' (the context where the research is being
applied). Lincoln and Guba (1985) proposed that providing a full description of the
'sending context' so that the reader will be able to consider how generalisable the
research findings are to given context/ situation.
In terms of representational generalisation, it is normally based upon standard
reliability checks that are administered by another qualitative researcher. This fits
with Seale (1999) point that reflexivity and transparency involves, showing the
audience 'As much as possible of the procedures that have led to a particular set
of conclusions' (p. 158) as this may allow the reader to replicate the study for
themselves. However, this does not mean that it would be expected that other
researchers would come with the same categories and concepts.
• Resonating with the Readers
The manuscript stimulates resonance in readers, meaning that the material is
presented in such a way that readers, taking all other guidelines into account
judge it to have represented accurately the subject matter or to have it clarified or
expanded their appreciation and understanding of it.
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Through a process reflexivity and transparency, it is proposed that the reader produces
an account that translates the richness of the data that was uncovered throughout the
research process. It is then up to the reader to consider whether the narrative resonates
with them.
3.3.5 Data Collection
Data were collected from a regional eating disorder unit. This unit offers both
inpatient and day treatments and the researcher, at the time of data collection, did not
work clinically at the unit. However, the researcher had a good working relationship
with the Lead Consultant at the Unit and he actively supported recruitment into this
project. The unit had 28 inpatient beds and approximately 30 places in their day
service.
3.3.6 Participants and recruitment process
Participants
Ethical approval was first granted from the Local NHS ethics committee and research
governance was sought from the hospital R&D committee (see appendix 2 for a copy
of the ethics approval letter). Once approval was gained, the researcher went to a
number of community meetings where patients met with staff to discuss issues that
pertain to the ward. The inpatient unit was split into two sections; intensive care (ITU)
and acute. The ITU's patients were typically very low weight and were often on non-
solid diet and used nasal gastric tubes for refeeding, whilst the acute patients were
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much more physically stable. There are 15 beds on the ITU and 13 beds on the acute.
In conversations with the Consultant, it was decided that the researcher should focus
on acute and day patients, because the ITU patients would not be physically able to
engage. The researcher was mindful of this externally placed restriction on the study,
and this was reflected upon throughout the results section. The researcher gave
information about the study and gave out participant information sheets. Patients were
then left to decide whether they would like to take part and if they decided to take
part, they informed nursing staff, who informed the researcher of their decision. The
day service is a service that runs in a very similar vein as the inpatient unit, with an
emphasis on supported eating. Patients, in the day unit, have a tendency to need
longer term support and are still symptomatic and in need of intensive support. There
are approximately 30 places at the day service. For the day service, the same
procedure was followed as the researcher attended the community meeting with
patients and gave out participant information sheets. Patients who were interested in
taking part gave their signed consent forms to the nursing staff. Data collection and
first stage analysis was undertaken over a 7 month period.
Within this stage of the study, 30 participant information sheets were given out and 17
people expressed an interest in taking part. One person was excluded because he was
a male patient. Five changed their minds to take part or were discharged before the
interview could be arranged and eleven consented to take part in the study. Five
participants were inpatients at the time of the interview, and the remaining 6 were
taken from the day service. All the participants had a diagnosis of anorexia nervosa
and this was confirmed by the Consultant Psychiatrist on the unit, who used ICD-10
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1 26 AN-R 12.8 15.0
2 51 AN-B/P 14.3 16.2
3 18 AN-R 12.8 17.0
4 42 AN-B/P 15.3 17.1
5 36 AN-B/P 14.3 16.9
6 21 AN-R 13 16.3
7 46 AN-B/P 17.5 20.1
8 46 AN -B/P 16.3 17.0
9 24 AN-R 12.2 15.1
10 32 AN-B/P 10.9 13.3
11 19 AN-R 14.9 16.6
Table X: shows the age, diagnosis and BMI status of each participant in this study
Each participant was interviewed for approximately 60 minutes, and the interviews
were undertaken by the author. All interviews were transcribed by the first author and
analysed using a qualitative data analysis software package (QSR*NVIVO - version
6) to facilitate organisation of the data. Field notes were also made after each
interview, alongside a research diary. Participant's awareness of how they understood
and engaged with emotions differed. However each of the 11 interviewed were aware
on some level of their emotions and they could discuss their relationships with them.
Therefore, although there was some inevitable inference drawn about the participant's
relationships with their emotions, the researcher sought at all times to keep the
analysis grounded within the data.
Grounded theory interview schedule
Eleven participants were interviewed. Participants were aware that the focus of the
study was on the perception of emotions, having been introduced to the concept at the
unit meeting and at the start of each interview. However, it was found that some
participants had a better understanding and awareness of their own emotions as a
process than others. With this in mind, an in-depth interview schedule was used to
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guide the researcher's questions during the interviews and capture the range of
participant's experiences, including both experiences, beliefs about expression and
developmental histories of emotional expression in the family. This was designed by
the researchers during discussion with colleagues and through reflection upon the
researcher's clinical work. These conversations involved 'bouncing ideas' about what
the researcher was trying to research, and how best to ask the questions. For example,
the researcher was keen to ask about all the emotions, and it proposed that each
emotion should be asked about individually. It is for this reason why the researcher
used a semi-structured interview schedule instead of using an open question to start
the interview3. The researcher was conscious of using general questions that allowed
the interviewee to access beliefs, ideas, etc about their individual emotions (e.g.
sadness, anger, etc). The questions asked about their current understanding and
experience of emotions was based on the study aims. The questions used in this study
can be seen in table 2 below:
Table 2
'Could you tell me about your eating disorder?' (E.g. symptoms, duration of the
disorder, etc.);
'What do you understand about emotions?' (Check out if this distinguished from
drives, such as sex, hunger, etc.);
'How do you express these emotions? (be mindful of non-verbal communication, such
as behavioural expressions);
Do you ever feel angry? Examples, Sad? Examples? (This was done for each basic
emotion); if the person denies feeling any of the emotions ask, What would it be like
to experience — emotions?
Do you think that it would be comfortable to express these emotions? Would they be
overwhelming?
'Was your family an emotional family?
Did they show their emotions? (If so, how?) (Be mindful about the respondent calling
their family emotional, as they were always happy, sad, etc.)
Ask about each emotion individually, as above.
Table 2: shows the interview schedule for this study
3 It is common practice in Grounded Theory studies to just ask one open question to allow the participant free reign to answer the
question and discuss the topic of choice.
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In line with grounded theory principles of theoretical sampling, the schedule was
regularly reviewed and updated alongside emerging theories. This took place
formally in discussion with colleagues and supervisor after interviews 3, where the
following question was removed: what do you understand about emotions?' (Check
out if this distinguished from drives, such as sex, hunger, etc.), as all the participants
had an understanding about their emotions and were able to distinguish and discuss
these in the research interviews. Furthermore, questions were added that actually
asked about meal time experiences, to see if conflict occurred around mealtimes.
As will be seen within the results section, there is a relationship between the overall
themes and the interview schedule. To some extent this is an inevitable outcome of
asking each participant the same or similar set of questions. For example, based on the
study aims, all participants were asked about their experiences of emotions in
childhood, therefore 'emotions in childhood' is a core category within the final
results. However, it is the sub categories that highlight the novel data found in the
interviews and these are the concepts that have been used to create the final model of
emotional processing in anorexia nervosa (Figure 2).
Data Analysis and grounded theory process
Interview transcripts were analysed by the researcher using the principles of grounded
theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967), but as discussed above, also incorporated a social
construction element (e.g Charmaz, 2006). A brief overview of the process of
grounded theory follows:
• Data are first gathered (interviews) and transcribed from the audiotape.
• The transcripts are first analysed using a process called open coding. This
involves going through each line, capturing meaning and comparing data
instances for similarities and differences.
• Whilst open coding is taking place and codes are being formed, new data
are sampled in light of these codes. This means that data analysis takes
place alongside data collection, and questions asked at interview change
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according to the findings of the open coding process. This is known as
theoretical sampling.
• Throughout the whole process of analysis the researcher writes memos.
Memos are thoughts that arise regarding the analysis, for example emerging
concepts or links to existing theories.
• After the initial stage of open coding is complete, these codes are then
compared, grouped and lifted into core categories, which attempt to capture
what is happening in the data. (i.e. 'axial coding'). Core categories are given
conceptual definitions therefore moving them beyond descriptive tools to
analytic units. This process continues until no new relevant insights can be
made, known as data saturation.
• Core categories are then built into conceptual models and theories by using
memos made to link them to each other and the existing literature.
(Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003; Charmaz, 2003).
Whilst this process was taking place, emerging themes were reflected upon in
supervision and informed both interview schedule changes and, decisions as to who to
invite to interview. For example, a particularly consistent well-evidenced theme found
mid way through the analysis described challenging beliefs about anger being a
'toxic'/ dangerous emotion. This led to fuller discussion on anger occurring in the
interviews. Where it was possible to engage in negative case analysis, this was done.
Although, due to the pragmatic nature of recruitment this case analysis was limited,
however, contrasting cases occurred in the more advanced analysing and theorising.
3.3.7 Validity and reliability
Recent qualitative validity and reliability guidelines published by Elliot et al (1999)
were adhered to. These included addressing subjectivity through situating the
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research and highlighting the authors' backgrounds, presenting results in an explicit
and understandable way whilst providing direct interview quotes and checking
credibility via a number of different methods. It also included auditing of analysis by
two researchers separate from the research study, triangulation of qualitative themes
and the comparison of the themes with clinical evidence and experience. The two
separate researchers' cross-checked two transcripts with their accompanying codes
and memos. These two researchers were experienced clinical psychology qualitative
researchers (please see appendix 3)
3.4 Results
There were two principal aims of this study. The first aim was to consider the actual
perception of emotional states from a basic emotions perspective, whilst the second
aim was to investigate the socio-affective environment within which the participant's
grew up. The results section is organised around these two principal aims. The
analysis revealed that the participants in this study witnessed and experienced a
significant amount of negative affect in their earlier lives. Furthermore, participants
also discussed how these early emotional environments were paradoxically non-
emotional and subdued. It became apparent through the analysis that the participants
were often left feeling ill-equipped to deal with their emotions from these early
histories and these influences were organised under the heading of'development of
poor meta-emotional skills'.
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3.4.1 Development of Poor Meta-Emotional Skills
Overwhelming Affect
Within this section of the study, participants appeared to discuss two broad themes,
with one on the actual emotions generated over their childhood, whilst another was
how the family of origin managed or exhibited emotions. In terms of the actual
emotions generated over childhood participants discussed a number of categories that
related to specific experiences as they were growing up and these fed directly into the
development of two overarching categories, which were, (1) 'experiencing anger as
overwhelming', (2) 'too much emotion'. It is important to say at this stage that these
overarching categories were not discreet, as some of the lower order themes
contributed to two or more categories in the analysis. This broad model has been
represented diagrammatically in Figure 1. Each category was made up of a number of
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Experiencing Anger as Overwhelming
Although the interview schedule only used a broad question to ask about early history,
it was striking how often the role of anger appeared to be present in the participant's
upbringing. A significant number of participant's shared how they witnessed or
experienced anger, which was often coupled with violence. The researcher was
mindful of not only the words spoken but also the way participants talked about their
experiences, for example tone and speed of speech, laughter or affect change.
Within the interview transcripts, the analysis revealed that two themes made up this
overarching category, which were; 'Jekyll and Hyde Anger' and 'witnessing
violence'.
'Jekyll and Hyde Anger'
A number of participants discussed how they lived with someone who was
unpredictable and would often get angry at the 'drop of a hat'. For example;
participant 10 discussed how her stepfather was a violent man:
P. 10 "I didn 't get on very well with my stepfather, he wasn 't very nice "
Interviewer: Why was that?
P. 10 'He was physically and verbally violent to my mother, he was nasty you know
On another occasion, Participant 9 stated, "I mean he were like Jekyll and Hyde, when
he was nice, he were nice, and he was bad, he was bad'.
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Participant 6 discussed how her father was very volatile and violent towards her
mother and she was often scared to come home from school, as she did not know what
'type ofmood' he would be having:
P.6 '7/ was very tense aroundmy mum and dad, especially my dad. He was very
jealous, very aggressive andyou never knew what to expect. I was sometimes scared
to come home from school andfind out what mood he was in'.
For participant 6, she also discussed how she had been in a violent relationship, where
she experienced repeated assaults and violence. The nature of these experiences
coupled with her early life experience left participant 6 with the experience of anger
as being overwhelming and dangerous.
The crucial part of this category appeared to be the unpredictability of the anger and
how frightening it was for the participants. They almost seemed to be hyper aroused
every time they went home. Even in the interview, both the participants seemed
initially wary of talking to a male researcher (they were aware that the interviewer
would be male prior to the interview). Although this will be discussed later in the
results, it appears that the participants learnt that anger was a scary and dangerous
emotion that needed to be avoided.
Witnessing Anger
Although related to above category, this category was different in a number of key
codes as participants witnessed a wide array ofwhat they perceived as being
'destructive' or 'damaging anger'. For a number of participants, they often witnessed
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the apparent futility of anger, in that, it just caused distress and upset. For example,
participant 4 discussed:
P. 4 ...and then ofthe five children, there was one girl and one boy who were very
angry and slammed doors, they'd express those sorts ofemotions, erm, so yeah, that
was expressed. Erm, but it never led anywhere, never got resolved, and basically it
was not a good thing...'
p.4. ...you knew that expressing an emotion was not a good thing... '
Participant 4 discussed how there was a lot of conflict around mealtimes and did
discuss how her eating disorder was not related to her experiences with her eating. For
example: P.4 'I don't think it has anything to do with my eating disorder, but there
was massive, massive conflicts at meal times'. She continues, 'my brother lost the plot
big time and mealtimes was time that they saw him, he would come andjoin us for
tea, but he'd sit with his back to the table and he'djust be abusive to myparents'. It
struck the interviewer that this was an interesting point in the interview, as participant
4 felt angry with her brother for ruining the meals, but could not say anything about it,
for example: 'I could not express that I really hated it (participant 4 looks really
angry in the interview), and ask why was he was here and why can't we have our
meals on our own...'. I was left with the sense that participant 4 just kept her head
down and concentrated on her eating, whilst the anger and the row ensued. This
concentration on her food was felt to be significant as eating appeared to help her to
cope with the experiences at mealtime. Participant 4 suffered from episodes of binge
eating to manage her emotions.
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Participant 3 also discussed how her family were largely aemotional, but alluded to
how her family had two big arguments that have left their mark upon her.
Participant 3: ... There was not much emotion in front ofme, but I do remember one or
two incidents where there's been like a big confrontation... Participant 3 looked
visibly emotional as she discussed this point.
Although this overarching theme only consisted of two categories, it was striking in
the interviews that strong displays of anger were perceived to be very damaging to the
child. They often felt afraid, alone and a number (approximately half of the
participants) seemed to develop a narrative about anger being an overwhelming and
almost toxic emotion that needed to be avoided at all costs. This belief about anger
being overwhelming appears to be particularly challenging as a number of participants
also discussed feeling a lot of anger as a child, at events that occurred around them.
This feeling of anger is the next over arching category to be discussed.
'Too Much Emotion'
One branch of the analysis revealed how participants discussed a sense of loss in their
early life. This sense of loss seemed to interface with a sense of how participants as
children felt that their own care needs were not met by those around them. Therefore,
this sense of loss and perceived lack of care seemed to create a high level of emotion
in the participants, which seemed to centre on the feelings of sadness and anger.
Within the discussions with the participants it was apparent that there was only
minimal mention of frank abuse (e.g. sexual and physical abuse) and the participants
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often appeared confused by the lack of an event or series of events that they could
'blame' but still had an apparent high level of 'trapped emotion' that could not be let
out. Within this section, the results will be presented around the key events and
themes that seemed to emerge from the data, which included; 'bereavement and the
process of grief; 'divorce/ 'transition and loss' 'and 'bullying'.
'Bereavement and the process ofgrief'
About quarter of the participants discussed how they had lost close family member.
Participant 8 discusses that she lost her father and her baby in a three year period,
when she was a teenager.
Interviewer: when didyour dadpass away?
p.8. erm, he was only 45, so 1976, I was 16'
Interviewer: that must have been a difficult time?
p. 8. Oh God, yeah, yeah, definitely!!
Participant 8 also disclosed how she had lost a baby at the age of 19.
p.8 .. .and then, when I was 19, erm, I had a baby, which lived then died so, you know
its like I had a lots of issues to deal with it'.
Participant 8 discussed how she did not manage her emotions from these events until
much later in her life.
p. 8 'Obviously, I view my emotions differently and I deal with my emotions in a
different way'. Within another discussion, participant 8 stated: 7 didn 't really admit
to myselftill I was 30, when I was on my knees, that I had a problem with how I was
feeling.
Although, participant 8 did not verbally state which emotions she had felt in response
to her losses, she appeared to alternate between being very sad (quite tearful) and
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being quite angry in the interview. Interestingly, Participant 8 also discussed how she
had a number of health issues as a child that prevented her from expressing her
emotion (especially anger), as it would provoke her asthma and/ or eczema. For
example:
p. 8. Interviewer: 'As a child ifyou would become angry?'
p.8: 'Erm, more than likely I'd have an asthma attack as a child'
Another example of interplay between emotion and loss was shared by participant 10.
As discussed above, participant 10 had a step father who was violent and aggressive
towards her mother. This participant's parents separated when she was 10 and she
discussed how her life was quite idyllic before her parents split up. Once participant
10's mother had remarried, life appeared to change for the worse and she appeared to
be quite angry and frightened by this transition. However, she stated that she was very
close to her mother and she felt very angry with her stepfather about how he treated
her. For example: -
Participant 10: 'He was physically and verbally violent to my mother, not me, he was
nasty, you know, like a disgustingfella, he really angered me
In the interviewer's memos after the interview, it was postulated that participant 10
felt anger about her mum and dad splitting and ruining her idyllic life. However, she
could not tell her mum how she felt. When we considered care more generally in the
interview, she appeared to have some entitlement beliefs about deserving care from
people around her. For example:
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Interviewer: When was the last time you felt angry about something?
Participant 10: About some treatment I was having here, I didn 'tfeel that I was
getting the right treatment, so I got quite emotional and angry'.
Although the researcher did not request the information, staff volunteered how they
found her to be an angry woman, especially if they did not meet her requests as soon
as it was asked. At this stage of the analysis, the researcher recorded the staff
comments within a memo and this was used when constructing and reflecting upon
the coding frame. It was also incorporated as it gave a good background description
that fitted with the emerging theme in the analysis. When we discussed her
relationship with her mother, she shared with me how close she felt they were and
how she was the only one who she could share her emotions. However, in her late
teens, her mother became ill with cancer and died. Even here, we discussed how she
suppressed her emotions to nurse her mother and she would not let her step father be
involved in her care or subsequent funeral.
For example: participant 10 states: I didn't want my step dad to arrange or do
anything. I did it all; I looked after my mum while she waspoorly in the house'. She
continues later in the conversation, 'sadness is a difficult emotion, and I'd think, well,
I'm ok now, you know, put on a smile and get on with things, like looking after mum'.
Interestingly, she discussed how she started to restrict her eating once her mother had
died, participant 10: 'She died, she passed away, and that's when I think the problem
started, I started to diet'.
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All through the interviews with participants who had experienced the loss of loved
ones was a sense of anger and sadness at their loss. As has been discussed these
emotions were strong within the participants and these emotions were not seen
favourably and were often suppressed for a variety of reasons. This will be explored
in later sections of the results.
Divorce and transitions in early life
As with the above category, about quarter of the participants discussed how their
parents split up and their early life involved many transitions and changes. In addition
to the above category, some of the participants discussed openly that they felt
resentful and angry for the changes that were forced upon as a result of their parent's
divorce. For example: participant 6 states that: 'my mum and dad divorced when I was
5, and then I like lived with me dad till I was probably about 8, as my mum did not
have anywhere to live, so she lived with her parents'. She continues by stating that
there were two or three further moves and her father met a new partner. She then says,
7found it hard to tell my dad that I wanted to live with my mum, and my sister took
the place ofmy mum for a bit. Ifelt quite resentful and angry about all ofthis, and it
did cause problems with my sister later on.'
At the age of 8, participant 6 moved back with her mum, but was not able to see much
of her, as she worked and left her with babysitters. This caused a lot of anger for her,
but she felt unable to say anything to her mother. For example, when I lived with my
mother, I stayed at the cottage for a while, we didn 't spend much time with her and
we, like, with babysitters and nannies a lot. I could not tell my mum I was not happy
and resentful, as I was so grateful to be living with her again.'
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Another example of how divorce and transition had an impact upon levels of affect
came from participant 1; within her interview participant 6 stated that:
'there was lots ofupset in my life, like myparents divorced and we used to move
around a lot, so I changed school quite a few times, so Iwas quite emotional and
angry about that and I was not really settled until Imoved to where I live now when I
was about 7 or 8.'
For the participants, the experience of change and transition following both
bereavements and divorce appeared to be very challenging for all the participants in
the study. It often left them feeling very angry with the situation the change has left
them in, and feeling angry at the loss of a loved one. At the same time, the changes
left participants feeling sad for their loss. These emotions were often perceived to be
wrong and they were often suppressed. Significantly, for all the examples offered
above, the start of the eating disorder could almost be pinned to these critical events in
their lives.
Bullying
The last category that appeared to contribute to the overarching theme of 'too much
emotion' was one of 'bullying'. Participants discussed how being bullied by other
children left them feeling very sad and alone, fearful, disgusted with one's own body
and feeling very angry with how they were treated. For example, participant 11
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discussed how one girl had made her feel all of these emotions, but in particular anger
and disgust:
Participant 11: 'One girl commented on how I looked and she described me as like,
chubby with spots andjust not pretty, and this girl came up to me laughing, I could
have said something reallyfunny, but Ijust stood thereLater in the conversation, she
starts to get angry in the interview, 7 think now I'dprobably tell her, or go up to the
other girl and given her a good smack now to be honest. I'd love to find her today and
tell her, look what the bloody hell you have done to me, you know, it makes me really
upset (interpreted as angry) such like bitchy comments and stuff like that....'
Participant 1 discussed how bullying was both verbal and physical and she struggled
at school due to this bullying. Across this bullying was how it affected her sense of
self. For example:
Interviewer: Did the bullying have an impact?
Participant 1: Definitely! Cos I was always criticised, it was always about me that I
was criticised, so I did take it on board, took it all to heart and then criticisedmyself.'
Interviewer: (Interviewee was quite animated in the interview) you sound like you
became angry with yourself, you turned it inwards?
Participant 1: Yeah, yeah.
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Summary ofOverwhelming Affect
Almost all the participants described their socio-emotional environments as being
challenging whilst they were growing up. Throughout the analysis of the interviews, it
was apparent that the emotion of anger was a difficult emotion for the participants, as
they had often experienced anger as being overwhelming and dangerous from people
around them. In comparison, a number of participants also discussed how events had
significantly increased their levels of emotions, in particular, anger and sadness,
which were often suppressed in order to protect oneself or another key individual in
the participant's life. With the exception of two of the participants discussed above,
all the above participants who experienced overwhelming affect and/ or witnessed this
high level of emotion, either binged and/ or vomited. Although this will be covered
later in the results section, it was apparent that the use of bingeing and vomiting was a
powerful strategy to suppress the apparent high level of affect present in these
participants. This dynamic of too much emotion which was unable to be expressed
was a key construct in the analysis and it will be returned to throughout the results
section.
3.4.2 Poverty of Emotional Environments
Within this section of the study, participants appeared to discuss 2 broad themes,
which were Tow level emotions in family' and 'denial of emotion'. This overarching
category, at first sight, may seem to be in conflict with the above category of
'overwhelming emotions'. However, this conflict shows the complexity of the data for
this participant group, participants who experienced high levels of emotions often had
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an emotional back drop of little or no emotions being expressed/ shared. Within the
memos, it was reflected that this contrast in the experience of emotions was
potentially the most toxic of them all. A good example of this emotional dynamic
was shared by participant 3 who witnessed two big angry confrontations, but for the
rest of the time, her home life was largely devoid of emotion.
Lack ofMeta-Emotions skill within the Family
A significant proportion of the participants described their families as either having
low level or no emotions whilst they were growing up. This lack of emotion did not
feel like an active process within the family, as it appeared to be almost the default
mode for the families of participants. 4 participants discussed how they felt that their
fathers were totally unable to discuss anything emotional and this seemed to be highly
significant to the development of a poor emotional environment for the participant as
a child. Given these apparent difficulties with how families managed and expressed
their emotion, it was interesting in the interviews that some of the participants
struggled to find the language to describe the emotional environment as they were
growing up. For example, participant 3 stated: -
Participant 3:1 don't think that emotions weren 't something what we talked about
really, they 're not, it was just like, it was something we didn 't talk about really, we
don't talk things through we just, ifyou've got any problems just keep them to
yourselfkind ofthing.'
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In considering the principle theme of this category, participants discussed how their
fathers often appeared not to have the skills to express or manage their own emotional
states. For example:
Participant 11: ...I think he has been really sad about like how I'm feeling upset
about it, and I don't know, but he kind ofnever showed it, he's just silent, but I know
what that means that he just doesn't know what to say and that he's upset and
For participant 11, she discusses that her father was almost without any expression of
emotion, whilst participant 9 discusses quite sadly about how her father does not show
any emotions, even after the death of one of his friends. This can be seen in the
following example:
Participant 9: 'a friend that we always sat with at football, he died recently, like quite
suddenly, and Ijust thought, you 're not, he didn't seem to show any emotion and I
think it was his way ofjust dealing with it.'
The difficulties were not solely related to fathers, as participant 3 discussed how her
mother struggled to express her emotions. It was felt within the analysis that it was
significant that participant's 3 mother had a number ofmental health problems
(mainly depression, with some anxiety) and these seemed to impact directly her
emotional life and her ability to share her emotions or to facilitate emotional
expression within the family. For example:
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Participant 3:1 suppose my mum wasn't like she should be really, she were scared of
going out sometimes she wouldn't answer the door, erm, she had various like bad like
low points really and there was a lot ofupset really.
Later on in the interview, participant 3 answered the following:
Interviewer: Did that have a bearing on how emotions were expressed at home?
Participant 3: Yeah, probably, cos she kept a lot like bottled up I think andjust I think
we didn 7 really understand what was going on because she'd never talk to us about
what was happening, it was just a lot ofher keeping herselfto herselfbasically I
think.
As discussed above, participant's three family did not share their emotions with each
other and it felt that the environment must have been devoid of emotions. As shall be
seen later, participant 3 had marked beliefs about the toxicity of certain emotions and
it felt that the interview had uncovered some of the main impacts upon this emotional
development for participant 3.
Denial ofEmotions
In contrast to the above category, this category was felt to be an active process where
families close to the participants actively suppressed the expression of emotions. A
decision was made at the analysis stage about which type of poor expression of
emotion was due to poor meta-emotional skills versus a denial of emotion. It could be
argued that these two categories are overlapping, which may well be true of the data.
However, it was felt that were different emphases between these categories and it is
for these reasons, they have been kept separate and not collapsed together.
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Denial of emotion appeared to be relevant to almost all of the participants, but
especially relevant to 4 participants. For these participants, it felt that even their own
emotions were often denied by family and this caused a lot of confusion for the
participants concerned. It was considered within the analysis to split the category
between 'denial of emotion within family', and 'family denial of emotion within the
self, but the overlap between the two constructs was too high and hence it was
decided to keep them together.
This category really speaks for itself, in that, the family effectively denied that they
were experiencing any emotions, even though they were clearly present. For example,
participant 5 states very clearly how emotions were denied in the family.
Participant 5: 'this is just my take on it, is that I was brought up in afamily where,
again it's so cliched but it's so true, where you didn 't have emotions, you didn 't have
feelings, and ifyou did, if they were happy emotions, that's quite acceptable, but it
you had any er, obscure, feeling about anything that you aired, it would be ignored or
dismissed, so there was cheerfulness, happiness, but it was all obviously unreal and
superficial, but that's how the family dealt with everythingThis striking example
taken from the interview transcription highlights how emotions were actively denied
or 'covered up', this was especially true, when it is considered that there were difficult
traumatic events going on within the family. For example, Participant 5 discusses:
'there was drink in the family, there was violence, there was sexual abuse, and lots of
secrets about the older members ofthe family, my aunt lives next door, which I think
she knew what went on because I've had close contact with my aunt and been able to
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unravel some ofthe stuff some ofthe family dynamics and why, I'm, I'm the way I
am...'.
As highlighted above, participant 4 had two siblings that expressed a high level of
anger, especially around mealtimes. For participant 4, however, her parents responded
with anger to her brother, but this use of anger did not resolve the situation, as it
appeared that it would continue. In the interview, it was discussed how the family did
their best to limit the amount of emotion being expressed by negative means, such as
ridicule or anger. For example:
Participant 4: 'there was one girl and one boy who were very angry and slammed
doors, they'd express those sorts ofemotions, erm, so yeah, that was expressed. Erm,
but it never led anywhere, never got resolved, and basically it wasn't a good thing,
because when I cried I would be laughed at and when the other two used to slam
doors and shout, they'd be told off so you knew that expressing emotions wasn't
good, not worth the effort'.
In other part of the interview, participant 4 shared that she learnt that emotions were
bad and to be avoided by witnessing and experiencing her parent's reactions towards
them. For example:
Participant 4: 'Well it's what I saw, ifyou express your anger that's bad, you're
naughty. Ifyou cry, you 're a fool, you 're silly, cos everybody else doesn 't cry, it's
wrong, and best is to be my like my parents, or you could be happy'.
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The vast array of experiences that seemed to lead to the same place is demonstrated
quite clearly by the experiences of participant 8. She grew an overtly emotional
environment where it was reported that her family expressed their emotions normally.
However, in contrast to this environment, participant 8 described her upbringing as
being 'cosseted' because of her physical health difficulties, especially her asthma.
This can be seen in the next quote:
Participant 8: Erm, Iwas cosseted a lot as well, erm, so I kind ofsay, I mean Iwould
imagine that rest of them showed normal emotions, you know it weren't, I mean I'm
not saying it were the Waltons, but it weren't abusive or, but as I say I tend to get
cosseted cos there was always something up with me.
However, this cosseting prevented participant 8 from learning about her own
emotions and she was actively prevented from expressing any difficult emotion, such
as anger. For example:
Participant 8: 7 don't think I had the chance to really express myselfproperly, cos it
were you know, you can't do this andyou '11 not be able to do that, andwhat have you,
so, I suppose that's been part ofme not being able to, know my own emotions really
as well. Participant 8 went on to explain that she avoided situations that led to
arguments, for example, 'I'm not one for confrontation or, so I can't, it takes a lotfor
me to lose me temper, you knowfight. The interviewer then asked: What do you think
would have happened, as a child, ifyou would have become angry? Erm, more than
likely I'd have had an asthma attack as a child'.
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3.4.3 Summary ofDevelopment of Poor Meta-Emotional
Skills
Across this part of the analysis it was apparent that the participants were often brought
up in environments that were often a conflict between too much emotion and
environments that were devoid of emotional expression. This represented an
interesting challenge to the researchers as it left him with the question of how to
validate these themes, as it would be difficult to find evidence to the contrary. In
reflecting upon this issue, the researcher considered the issue of how responsive and
appropriate the responses were in relation to the event that the participants discussed
in the interview. It would be useful to undertake another study with questions
pertaining to this issue of meta-emotional skills and to look for negative cases in order
to promote theory development. A number of participants witnessed a high level of
anger and this appeared to have a profound effect upon the participants. Whilst for
others there were apparent difficulties for the caregivers to manage their own
emotions. For some of the interviews there were some initial difficulty to find the
language to express their emotions, but all the participants were able to engage in the
interview after a little prompting. This is interesting, as at first sight, participants may
have been labelled alexithymic, but with careful interviewing, they all were able to
discuss their emotions. As shall be seen later in the results section, all of the
participants had self-confessed difficulties in their experience, expression and beliefs
about their emotions.
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3.5 Perception and Management of Emotion
As discussed at the end of the introduction, the second main aim of this study was to
investigate the actual perceptions of emotional states and how the participants manage
them within their life. The analysis revealed that the results for this section of the
study revolved around four principal categories; namely, 'inhibition of emotion',
'meta-emotional skills', 'facilitation of emotion' and 'use of symptoms to suppress
emotions'. In keeping with a grounded theory tradition, each of these categories was
made up of sub-ordinate categories. As with the above analysis all aspects of the
interview were used to facilitate the data analysis, including presentation in the
interview and apparent emotion in the interview. Figure 2 shows the overarching the
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'Inhibition ofEmotion'
This category is made up of two principal emotions being inhibited within the
participants, anger and sadness. All the participants discussed how they inhibit either
or both anger and/ or sadness within their emotions. This can be seen in the following
quote, which was a quite typical answer to the question about expressing emotions.
Interviewer: how do you express emotions?
Participant 1:1find it hard to talk about them, erm, ifI'm upset I do cry a lot (laugh),
erm, again, I generally don't express my emotions very much, erm, I keep them to
myselfa lot.
'Anger'
This category is made up of 5 subordinate categories that highlight the views and
beliefs participants held about the emotion of anger. With the exception of two
subordinate categories, the participants discussed how their inhibition of anger was
related to interpersonal factors, such as not being rejected by loved ones, or not
engaging in conflict. These theoretical points will be considered in more detail at the
end of the section. These will be now discussed in turn.
'Toxicity ofanger'
With the exception of two participants, everyone in this study discussed how the
actual emotion seemed dangerous and almost toxic to them and people around them
and it was to be avoided at all costs. It many ways this category was a core category
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for the inhibition of anger, as the beliefs about anger appeared to fuel the overarching
belief that anger was a toxic emotions. For example; participant 3 stated: I don't like
being angry at people, because it makes people feel bad, itfeels ifyou are
responsible. It's like it's transferred. Like it's kind oflike you're ifyou feel bad
(anger) then you 're like spreading that to other people. In a later part of the
conversation, participant 3 shared how having a negative emotion was, as if,
fundamentally wrong and she was a bad person for having something that could be
spread to other people. Significantly, she then feels that she needs to punish herself
for having that emotion, by not eating. This is clearly demonstrated in the following
quote, Participant 3: well you kind ofpull yourself, keep it quiet, don't say anything,
cos then you might affect people like, and like you kind ofyou keep it to yourself, like,
you tell yourselfoffkind ofthing, inside your head, and like you don't, I suppose like I
don't eat comes into it, like you punish yourself, like ifyou've done something wrong.
As discussed in the above section, participant 2 witnessed her own mother struggle
with depression and it seemed within the analysis that this did play a significant role
in the development of the beliefs about the toxicity of sharing emotions, such as
anger. A very similar discussion occurred with participant 2, when she stated that,'/
would never knowingly upset another person, because I'm, probably because I know
how equally upset I am, I would avoid upsetting other people because when I'm upset
(anger) Ifind it such a distressing way to be.' Again, it is argued that this
demonstrates how the emotion of anger appears to be dangerous and distressing and
the participants have 'no right to share this emotion' with other people.
'Causing Rejection'
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Four participants discussed how they believed that the expression of anger would
ultimately lead to being rejected by those people closest to her. For example,
participant 2 stated: 'part ofthe reason that I don't er, express anger very often at
home with my husband is erm, and because I'm afraid that he would leave me'.
As discussed earlier, participant 5 was angry at her parents after they split up and at
one point she explained that she became angry and this had consequence for her, as it
caused difficulties in her relationship with her father. Participant 5:1felt quite angry
towards my step mum at one point, but when I did actually express that once, but then
it kind of, like had consequences, like so then I have always like felt a bit worried
about doing that again. This statement from participant 5 was interesting as it
highlighted how her upbringing led her to feel angry (as discussed before), but when
she attempted to express it, it caused more problems that it solved. This thereby led to
further inhibition of this emotion.
'Automatic Avoidance'
Across the data there was repeated mention of an almost automatic avoidance of
emotion, but in particular, anger. For example, participant 8 discusses how she has
virtually no recollection of anger being avoided until it has already happened. For
example: '.. .Every time Ifeel angry or what have you, or life's not beingfair to me,
that I'm not going to eat, because then, it just clicks in so quickyou know that, and
then you go down again, and start all over again... ' This is in an interesting example
of how participant 8 automatically blocks her anger emotion and this is directly linked
to restriction of food. This is a point that is covered later in this part of the results.
When considering this theme within the data, the interviewed hypothesised how these
processes seem to occur outside of conscious awareness, however, participant 9
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discusses how she is aware of her emotion, but does not expresses it. Indeed, she
reports how she appears to change the emotion into sadness. For example: Participant
9 states: 'Ifeel angry, like Ilike everyone to be on time and things like that, so I get
angry if they were late or my mum said she was coming and she didn't come, but I
wouldn't say anything, just like get a bit sad, and that would be it.' This relation of
sadness to anger was felt to be a significant theoretical point and it was reflected upon
within the research memos. It was started to be considered whether this relation
between sadness and anger could start to account for the high co-morbidity between
eating disorders and depression. Likewise, the relation between anger and restriction
could suggest that there are couplings occurring at an emotional level that fuel the
eating disorder.
Avoidance ofConflict
Through the analysis there was repeated mention that participants would avoid
conflict with other people. Some participants discussed how they did not have belief
that their view or emotion was legitimate. For example: Participant 8 states: Ifeel
sometimes I have trouble er with my opinion being worthy, even though I know it is,
but a lot ofthe time ifsimply won't because it's erm, it's like I don't want the
confrontation, so Ijust pooh pooh it...'Whilst participant 2 discussed how she would
avoid conflict at almost any cost, and indeed, suppress their own view/ need in order
to prevent conflict, 'I would have, erm, I erm, avoid conflict almost at any cost with
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A significant feature of the analysis that arose from the data was how a proportion of
the participants kept their anger within themselves and this caused a significant
amount of difficulty for them. Not only was this anger apparently challenging to
experience as it was perceived as being toxic (as discussed above), it was also directly
related to eating disorder symptoms for a number of participants. This category felt to
be another core category within anger category as it highlighted a direct emotional
link between the experience of an emotion and the eating disorder symptoms. For
example, participant 2 discussed how she used vomiting to release her anger.
Participant 2: 'but certainly ifI'm upset or angry or both then it does affect my eating,
erm, both because ifI'm upset and angry I don'tfeel that I can eat, physically, but
also erm, that yeah I can get my anger out by erm, by not eating but also particularly
with inducing vomiting, I do that when I'm angry'.
Whilst participant 6 discussed how her eating disorder was a way ofmanaging her
anger in a way that did not require it being expressed. For example,
Participant 6: 'the eating disorder was the way ofcoping with that anger, rather than
expressing it.'
Participant 8 discussed how 'toxic' her anger was to herself, and how it provoked and
maintained her anorexic restricting. What was very interesting from participant 8's
account was another potential dynamic between anger and the need for control over
oneself. It was noted in the research memos that this dynamic appears to allude to
how anger is seen as unpredictable and uncontrollable, which also adds to the
perceived toxicity of this emotion. For example:
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Participant 8: ifyou're anorexic, eating disorder, it's, the longer you internalise it
(anger) the more you starve, because you getyour own power and control from
starving yourself'.
Lastly, participant 11 discussed very succinctly that the experience of coming into
hospital for her eating disorder was associated with high level of anger and then
sadness. Again, in the interview memos it was reflected upon how coming it hospital
removes the very powerful way an eating disorder suppresses emotions, and it seemed
for participant 11 that this had led to her experience a markedly increased amount of
emotion that was being experienced For example:
Participant 11: '... Well in myfirst admission, erm, I was just angry, erm, all the time,
like and then a few weeks on Ijust got really upset because Ifelt like my college, like
my A levels and everything were just like slipping away and I was, wasn 't going to get
anywhere, so I was just upset about that...'
Difficulties with the emotion of anger were one of the most salient categories in the
analysis. Participants spoke about how it was the most challenging emotion which
was to be avoided at all costs. The interviewer was struck both by its apparent toxicity
to the participants, how this was directly related to both restriction and vomiting and
how it appeared it could be coupled with other emotions. Again, it was reflected upon
in the memos that, although sadness was a challenging emotion, it was less
challenging than anger. It was hypothesised that the dynamic of coupling may well be
a process in eating disorders where toxic emotions are managed. This hypothesis was
returned to throughout the analysis, and it will be discussed further in the results.
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'Sadness'
This category was the second inhibited emotion that emerged from the analysis. It was
a much smaller category, but, nevertheless, it was still deemed to be a significant
inhibited emotion for the majority of the participants. In terms of it being the principal
emotion avoided, two participants spoke quite candidly about how sadness was the
toughest emotion to feel and express, whilst others spoke about sadness being an ever
present emotion, but not feeling comfortable to share this emotion with other people.
The analysis of sadness would be incomplete if it did not include some discussion of
depression. Almost all of the participants discussed how they had struggled with low
mood, both prior to their eating disorder and also due to their eating disorder. For
example, participant 11 stated that she felt like she had been depressed for a long
time: 'I think, sadness was importantfor me because I'd realised that it's kind oflike
because I was being sad well probably depressedfor so long andjust by being like
this and not being comfortable with myselfthat being what Ifeel crappy and sad...'
However, the majority of participants were well aware of how restriction played a role
in the lowering of mood, although most participants were never really sure whether
the low mood came first or prior to the eating disorder. For example, participant 6
discussed: '.. .7 was never sure whether it started like with being depressed and then,
but I didn't, I think I got, I tend to get more depressed when I cut back on my eating
because I think I actually lose more weight, you do, and I had to be on anti¬
depressant, whenever I come off them, I've kind ofgone downhill again... '. It does
appear that participant 6 was postulating that the anti-depressants kept her mood
stable, which in turn, protected her against her eating disorder. This dynamic of
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depression predating the anorexia certainly came through the data analysis, but it was
a very 'cloudy' dynamic. In terms of expressing sadness, this category broke down
into two more sub-categories, namely, 'protection of others' and 'appearing weak'.
Protection ofOthers
This category related to the points raised by the participants about how they felt that
sadness was difficult emotion for others, especially loved ones, to see. Participant 4
discussed how she felt shame and guilt for how her emotions would affect her own
family. Participant 4: 'I'm frightened erm my husband, that he '11, well just sort of
realises how sad I am, and it '11 think I've made him sad as well. And the children
seeing how sad I am, would ruin their childhood, cos you know... '. This theme carried
over a number of participant's responses.
'Appearing Weak/ Shame at expressing sadness'
This category was also felt to be tinged with shame. Participant 10 openly discussed
how she viewed sadness and any expression of sadness as a sign of weakness. As was
discussed previously, participant 10 grew up with a violent step father and she also
cared for her mother whilst she was in the terminal stages of cancer. These seem to
have a significant impact upon her beliefs about sadness being a sign ofweakness.
This can be seen in the following quote: Ijust see it, ifI start crying it's a sign of
weakness and something that I don't like doing really. Participant 9 appeared to share
a behavioural sign of shame of expressing sadness, as she discussed how she would
hide herself away if she cried, participant 9: 'Sadness, if it was really bad then I'd
probably cry but, then I'dprobably go awayfrom people'. This example of shame
was also discussed by participant 1, '...ifI'm upset I'm crying, but I try and, I do that
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on my own, I don't really show it very much, unless I'm really upset... '. Participant 8
did discuss how context was often very important in allowing her to become sad and
cry. She discussed a an example of where crying is often regarded as the norm, for
example: Participant 8: feel sad about something or ifI'm watching a weepy
fdm, or something daft like that, at least you know I can let the tears fall now...'.
As with the inhibited anger section above, it was striking within the analysis that there
was a large amount of sadness, under the guise of depression (although this was not
confirmed by clinical diagnostic interview). But this sadness was a largely inhibited
emotion, as it was regarded as an emotion of weakness and shame, and hence, it had a
feeling of being a trapped emotion. This, however, it did not appear to be as severe as
for anger, as participants often discussed ways (whether it was intentional or not) of
letting their sadness out. They spoke of being tearful on their own, or finding
situations where they could cry without feeling shame or weak.
This overarching category relates to the participant's sense of their skill in managing
their own emotional states. As been discussed already, anger and sadness were the
most challenging emotions for the participants and they often struggled to know how
to manage them skilfully. Related to this point was how a number of participants did
not feel that they had permission to express certain emotional states, and this appeared
to be related to the notion of whether the sense of selfwas acceptable as an emotional
being. This permission to express their emotions was also related to whether they had
somebody with whom they felt able to express their emotional states with them.
3.5.2 Meta Emotional Skills
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Another category that emerged from the analysis on meta-emotional skills was one on
the actual skills to express emotions, as there was often confusion about the emotions
they were feeling and apparent lack of knowledge in how would be the best way to
share those emotions. Given the historical factors for the participants, it was felt not to
be surprising that there was this lack of this meta-emotional knowledge and skill. The
final category that comes under the meta-emotional skills was one of emotional
coupling. This was briefly discussed above, and it became apparent in the interviews
that two emotions appeared to be connected in some way. Some of this was stated
very consciously by the participants, whilst other times it was inferred from the
interview. This will be discussed more fully below.
Permission to Express Emotions
The permission to express emotions appeared to be driven by two factors, one that
centred upon the acceptability of the self as an emotional being, whilst another
focussed on having a person with whom the participant could be emotional.
Even in this situation, only a few participants felt that they had someone with whom
they could discuss their feelings and, even this situation, it was still quite guarded,
with a tendency to 'back fire' (as with participant 6). For participant 10, the issue of
having a confident to speak to about one's feelings was highly significant. Within the
interview, she spoke of only being able to speak to her mother about how she was
feeling and, as discussed above, she then lost her mother which then triggered her
eating disorder, for example:
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Interviewer: Didyou feel comfortable being able to walk in and express how you were
feeling to your mother?
Participant 10: Yeah, I must admit I were very, very close with my mum.
Interviewer: So ifyou sort offelt quite sad and upset ... ?
Participant 10: Oh yeah, she was very approachable, yeah definitely.
In terms of theory development, the importance of having a confident with whom they
could express their emotions was in direct contrast to many other of the participants,
as they often felt unable to speak to anyone about their emotions. Once participant
10's mother became very ill, she suppressed her emotions and this appeared to have a
direct relation to the start of her eating disorder.
Other participants discussed how they needed other people to indicate that they had
permission to express their emotions. Participant 3 discussed how she needs to be
given permission to have emotions or to share how she feels. It was discussed in the
after interview memos that it appeared that participant 3 was denying herself from
being an emotional person and other people needed to give her permission to share
her emotions. This can be seen quite clearly in the following quote:
Participant 3:1 suppose I'm kind oflike, I have strong views sometimes ofthat I
shouldn 't be emotional, but there's times when I'm annoyed when I think oh I
shouldn 7 say that, I shouldn 7 be expressing my opinion, and I suppose sometimes,
but most, erm, Ifeel like I shouldn 7 be like tellingpeople what Ifeel, cos they don 7
want to know and they have not given me permission to share my emotions with
them....'
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Un-acceptability of self as an emotional being
Participants both discussed and presented as individuals that were often without
emotion, especially at the beginning of the interview. When this was explored further
in the interviews, it was stated that they felt it was wrong to be an 'emotional person'
and to share how they were feeling with other people. The most striking example of
this was discussed by participant 5, and this can be seen in the following example:
Participant 5: '...I suppose to a certain extent, and erm, this is about me, I am not
acceptable, ifI have any kind ofemotion, let's not share it with anyone
Emotion Expression Skills
This category appeared to relate directly to the categories that discussed the
difficulties in the emotional environments within which the participants grew up. The
lack of emotion skills seemed to be related to the lack ofmodelling of good emotion
skills whilst growing up. Furthermore, the denial of emotion whilst growing up also
appeared to relate to the confusion that often surrounded the experience of their
emotions. This overarching category was made up of three categories, which were;
emotional confusion, over-control of emotions and the use of eating disorder to
express emotions.
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Lack of Clarity in Knowing One's Own Emotions
In an interesting contradiction to the above often frank and illuminating discussion on
why sadness and anger were inhibited, participants often discussed how, in the past,
the lacked clarity in what emotions they were feeling. For example,
Participant 8: 'that you can't do this andyou '11 not be able to do that, and what have
you, so, I suppose that's been part ofme not being able to, know my own emotions
really as well
Participant 4, as discussed earlier, grew up within a loving, responsive family, but
sadly she had two significant traumas in her teenage life. However, she discuss that
had to suppress her emotions because of physical health problems. At no time in the
interview, did she give the impression that she was not able to identify her emotions
and indeed, spoke of her anger and sorrow at certain events in her life. Through the
analysis, the interviewer was left with a sense of how participants were often unsure
about their emotional states, but this was not the same as not knowing their emotional
states. Across the interview, the interviewer was careful in assisting the interviewee to
feel safe in their discussion, and this seemed to assist in their discussion of their
emotions.
Within the analysis, negative case comparison was used to promote theoretical
development. One participant spoke of confusion with regards to her emotions and
through the analysis, the process of gaining clarity of one's own emotions appeared to
be on a continuum. As discussed earlier, participant 4 witnessed a high level of anger
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whilst growing up and was often ridiculed when she expressed or showed emotion,
and within the interviews she discussed a decreased clarity about her emotions. For
example:
Participant 4: '/ don7 know that Ifeel scared, or that I'm frightened sometimes, Ijust
know I'm really stressed, or I'm really angry about something someone's done, but it
doesn 7 occur to me at the time that behind all that is something really scaredme...'.
The influences from growing up were hypothesised to have led to a lack of clarity
about her emotions. Flowever, even here, within the discussion, participant 4 was able
to pinpoint emotions within her life, such as feeling anger at mealtimes about her
brother's behaviour.
Over-Control of Emotions
As has been discussed on a number of occasions, all the participants shared how they
'over controlled' or suppressed their emotions. Within the analysis, the participants
revealed how they had a number of strategies that were used to suppress or control
their emotions. The two principal strategies were the actual eating disorders and other,
more behavioural, techniques that were used to control their emotions. These included
strategies as 'masking', 'hiding away' and 'using other situations to facilitate
emotional expression'.
A number of participants discussed how they would mask their emotions to stop them
from being expressed/ shown. Again, it was interesting how, upon reflection,
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participants' spoke of how they did not have emotions, but then came to realise that
they did have emotions, but just did not express them. For example, participant 11
stated:
'7 suppose Iwas just sort ofdidn't have any emotions about, well I did, but I never
showed them, never, I kind ofmasked it all and brushed it under the carpet... '.
Another common used technique was to hide away from other people when feeling
negative emotions. This isolation technique was discussed by participant 1:
'ifI'm upset I'm crying, but I try and, I do that on my own, I don't really show it very
much, unless I'm really upset, erm, but I don't talk about my emotions very much, I
find that very difficult to do.'
Likewise, participant 9 discussed how she would hide herself away when upset.
Participant 9: 'IfI was upset, then I'djust go up to my room andjust be in my room on
my own, I wouldn 't talk to anybody.'
As further evidence of participants acknowledging their emotions and trying to find
ways of expressing them was revealed by participant 8. She discussed how she was
aware of her own emotional state, but was not able to share it with anyone. Therefore
she chose to use a more 'acceptable' means of expressing her emotions.
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Participant 8: 'ifIfeel sad about something I'll watch a weepy film, or something daft
like that, at least you know I can let the tears fall now
Eating Disorder Symptoms used to Suppress Emotions
The most striking example of the over control of emotions came when the relationship
between emotions and eating disorder symptoms were discussed. As has already been
touched on already in the discussion of the results, participants were aware of this
relationship to varying degrees, and were especially aware of how weight loss
appeared to rob them of emotional experience. Within the memos, this feature of the
results was reflected upon and it was considered that this participant group were in a
prime location to reflect upon these processes. They were still very close or in the
midst of struggling with their eating disorder, but were sufficiently nourished not to
have the blanket suppression effect of restricting food intake. It was the opinion of the
researcher that this gave an important insight into the relationship between the
symptoms and emotional regulation. It was very difficult for the researcher to
disentangle his clinical experience from his analysis. Throughout the analysis, the
researcher used memos to aid self reflection in order to try and keep the influence to a
minimum. In saying this, it is likely that the researcher's clinical experience did have
an influence and it is hoped that this allowed for a more detailed analysis and
theoretical development.
This total suppression of emotion was discussed by a number of the participants. For
example,
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Participant 9: Ifeel really kind oflike felt numb like some ofthe time, erm, like you 're
justfocused on like food so nothing else really matters so it justfeels you 're like .... ??
So I didn't reallyfeel anything.
Also, participant 11 discussed how she was aware that all of her emotions became
suppressed when at her lowest weight. For example:
Participant 11: 'Erm, when I was at my illest, you kind ofdon't have any....'
It was reflected that these types of emotional suppression/ over control was very much
associated with restricting sub-type of anorexia, and it appeared to play as a primary
avoider of emotion. The interviewer was aware of the literature that discussed how
restriction plays this role of a primary emotional avoider and this seemed to fit with
the data being discussed by the participants. However, unlike the previous literature,
the participants helped to develop a new narrative about this primary avoidance of
emotion, in that; it appeared to be driven by a desire to inhibit anger and/ or sadness
(as discussed previously). For example, participant 2 discussed how restriction was
induced by anger, but if there was any further anger, this was 'removed' by vomiting.
Participant 2: '...I'm upset or angry or both then it does affect my eating, erm, both
because ifI'm angry and upset, I don'tfeel that I can eat, physically, but also erm,
that yeah I can get my anger out by erm, by not eating but also with inducing
vomiting, I do that when I'm angry... '
06/12/2009 142
Doctor ofPhilosophy (PhD) University of Edinburgh John R.E. Fox
This participant shared how, when there was too much anger, she was able to remove
it by vomiting. This 'secondary avoidance' of anger was echoed by many of the
participants and it appeared to be a common emotion regulation/ suppression strategy,
for people who vomited, when there was 'too much emotion'. As discussed above, it
was evident from the analysis that people who vomited often came from backgrounds
that often fluctuated between episodes of anger and a lack of emotion.
The distinction between the primary and secondary avoidance of emotion can be
clearly seen by the following quote from participant 8. This participant was able to
reflect upon the different narratives about emotion avoidance that often occurred for
herself and her fellow clients in the group therapies at the eating disorders unit.
Participant 8: ' ...it's like someone who's in the group who's bulimic, you know when
she gets annoyed orfrustrated she wants to binge and it works the same ifyou 're
anorexic, eating disorder, it's, the longer you internalise it the more you starve,
because you get your own power from bulimia, it's a case ofthe same thing but the
opposite so that they binge and not starve...'
With regards to the other emotions, sadness, under the guise of depression, was also
an emotion that was 'managed' by eating disorder symptoms. Almost all of the
participants discussed how depression and disordered eating were linked in a both
cause and effect way. However, the analysis also revealed how the participants often
used restriction to feel better about themselves and this appeared to be associated to a
lack of disgust towards the body (to be explored later) and pride at the low body
weight. Therefore, it seemed that restriction appeared to be related both to a search for
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feeling better about one's body and having pride in their 'successful' weight loss. This
is shown in the following quote.
Participant 11: '... all you can think about is food, so, yeah, sadness is like the big
thing, when I was sad it's got to be restriction ....' Whilst participant 4 discussed how
she used restriction to feel better about herself,'...It's more hopeless, more
depressed. I used to get very high, well when I was dieting, eating on a diet, I used to
feel a bit positive about life....'
Emotional Coupling
Although the title of this category was a researcher constructed title, the participants
often discussed and alluded to how they managed their emotional states by using
other, more acceptable, emotions to suppress or inhibit their emotions. This category,
as much as possible, was grounded in the data but it was inevitable that some
inference was taken from the data and how people presented in the actual research
interviews. This process will be as transparent as possible so that the reader will be
able to follow and understand the analysis for this section. As discussed above, the
researcher may have been influenced by previous clinical experience prior to the
research interview. However, the notion of coupling of emotions was a new topic for
the researchers who only explored this within the literature once the analysis has been
completed.
As has been discussed above, anger and sadness appeared to be directly related to the
use of eating disorder symptoms to either avoid and/or suppress the particular
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emotion. Related across these discussions, either at the time or later in the interview
were how they disliked their body and they had a strong desire to loose weight. It
became apparent in the interviews that this process almost seemed to happen in an
automatic way, where the participant was becoming angry and then would resort to
restriction and/ or bingeing/ purging. It is difficult to give quotes to support this
process, but participant 9 appeared to demonstrate this automatic coupling within the
dynamic of the interview. This can be seen in the following quote:
Interviewer 1: If something makes you angry for example, was that something you
could express?
Participant 9: Erm, I could on somethings, yeah, erm, yeah I could get angry but erm,
not about like, I don't know, I could get angry at anything but then any time anyone
commented on like my appearance or something, I was just a bit upset and I suppose I
was, not angry, but annoyed that I looked like I did in a way, and I wished I couldjust
change how I looked completely.
The context for this question was discussing anger in general and it was not related to
her physical appearance. As can be seen in the above quote, it was striking that
participant 9 quickly turned the conversation to her physical appearance, how angry
she felt about herself and how this seemed to be linked pathologically high body
dissatisfaction. Within the memos, it was felt that this participant was alluding to how
anger may well be coupled with disgust, and this would explain in vivo coupling that
was apparent in the interview.
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Other examples of emotional coupling seem to be between the anger and sadness. A
number of participants discussed how, when they felt angry, this was turned into
sadness so that she could cry. Within the memos, the notion ofwhere this anger was
left was discussed, but this was not answered within the data for this study.
Participant 9 discussed
'... .If get angry I wouldn't say anything, just like get sad, and that would be it....'
Also, participant 1 discussed: ' Anger, I don't show that at all. I show that by
being upset or crying or being moody '
It is hoped that this category gives a feel of the interviews, where participants gave
evidence, both in their answers to questions and in the dynamic of the interview, that
they were coupling emotions.
'Letting the Emotions out'
Over the interviews and through the analysis, it became apparent that certain emotions
were regarded as being acceptable to be 'let out' or not suppressed. Within the spirit
of this study questions were asked about all the basic emotions, including disgust and
fear. When asking participants about their perception and experience of disgust, it
became apparent that there was some confusion in the use of the term disgust, as its
term is often used in a colloquial way to state anger at an object or person (e.g. 'I am
disgusted that s/he acted in that way'). Therefore, within this study, the interviewer
defined the emotion disgust within the interview by asking about disgust/ repulsion as
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an emotion. This did seem to clarify the discussion in the interviews. Within this
section of the results, the principal emotion that participants were able to express was
disgust, especially towards themselves and their bodies. Participants discussed how
they 'hated their bodies' and this often made them feel disgusted. For example:
Participant 11: '..../ suppose, that's part of it like, I'm just disgusted with my body
before, you know, before I started losing weight, like hated my bum, my legs were just
like horrible, I hated em, and like ifI could have like chopped them offand had
someone else's I would have done, and erm, I hated how, I hatedmy face, I hated
how, Ijust hated how I looked all around, Ijust you know, Ijust, yep, just hated
myself there was nothing that I really liked, the only thing I had any confliction like
my arms and the top, andfrom like there to there, that was the onlypart ofmy body
that I liked, the rest ofme Ijust hated...'
Whilst participant 2 stated: ' ...when I weighed 10 stone, when I didn't like how I
looked, I suppose I was perhaps disgusted really because I never had weighed so
much, it wasn 't erm, wasn 't just how my body shape looked, but that I had allowed
myself in the first place to get to that way. Iwasn'tfearful of it at all, and I wasn't
angry about it, and I wasn 7 sad about it, but yeah I suppose having said that I was
very disgusted towards my body....'
Within the analysis, this proved to be very interesting as participant 2 was able to go
through the emotions and be very sure that she was feeling very disgusted with her
body and this was acceptable. Within the analysis and the associated memos, it was
reflected upon this elevated emotion of disgust towards the body, and how this fits
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with the functional view of the emotion of disgust. According to the literature (e.g.
Oatley, 1987), disgust is regarded as the emotion that creates a psychological (and
physical) distance between the self and the object of disgust. It became apparent in the
interviews that the emotion of disgust was often an important driver for avoiding food
and for dieting (as with participant 2 and participant 11). It was hypothesised that this
was the actual process of creating distance from the object(s) of disgust. Participant 9
discussed how she felt 'weak' when this distance was traversed (i.e. she ate some
food). For example,
Interviewer: What about the emotion of disgust/ repulsion?
Participant 9: 7felt it with myselfsometimes....'
Interviewer: How do you mean?
Participant 9: '....Just like ifI'd eaten something that I didn 't intend to eat or
something, felt like I was weak and disgusting....'
In the interview, the emotion of fear of specifically asked about as it has been
regarded as such an important emotion for the eating disorders. All of the participants
discussed having fear in their lives, and for some participants that was a clear
developmental pathway for the having increased fear in their lives. For example,
participant 4 discussed how her past with a violent ex-husband had left feeling very
fearful.
Participant 4: '....my husband broke my nose andput me in hospital and I thinkfrom
there it really just went downhill. I was already frightened ofhim anyway because he
beat me, but now I waspetrified...'
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However, most of the participants discussed how fear had developed in their lives
because of the eating disorder. They discussed how they had a fear of becoming fat or
of food because it makes them fat. It was reflected upon in the memos, conversations
with colleagues and in the interviews that the participants were actually fearful of
having disgust towards their bodies. This process can be seen in the following quotes.
Participant 1: '.. .fear, yeah, Ifeel that a lot, yeah. Especially this illness, there's a lot
offear with it.'
Participant 6: '... like say like fear and anxiety towardsfood, it kind ofcomes with it; I
wouldn 't say that I was like before....'
Participant 9: '...Yeah, probably, a lot of it's to do with food. IfI wasn 't scared of
eating and things then I wouldn 7 have started like fearing gaining weight and ... '.
3.5.3 Summary of Perception and Management of Emotions
within Anorexia Nervosa
Across this section of the results, participants shared how they had a number of
marked difficulties with certain emotional states, namely anger and sadness. There
were a number of beliefs that led to these difficulties and they appeared to result in the
interviewees being very guarded in their expression of these emotions. Indeed, the
analysis revealed that this avoidance of emotions almost happened on an automatic
basis with the person realising that the emotion had been experienced and then
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avoided once the eating disorder behaviour had 'kicked in'. As discussed above,
participant 8 discusses how she has virtually no recollection of anger being avoided
until it has already happened. For example: '.. .Every time Ifeel angry or what have
you, or life's not beingfair to me, that I'm not going to eat, because then, it just clicks
in so quick you know that, and then you go down again, and start all over again... '
This felt like an important observation and it made the researcher reflect upon this
process of channelling anger onto either the body or onto food. Through this interview
with participant 8, the researcher did not continue with questioning about this topic as
it did not click until after the interview the significance of the statement. The analysis
also revealed a whole host of poor meta-emotional skills that prevented a healthy
relationship with their own emotions.
3.6 Discussion
As discussed in the results section, the data from this study on the perception and
management of emotions appears to offer significant insights into the understanding
of the eating disorders. One of the most significant factors that came out of the
analysis was the fact that the participants were able to talk, discuss and reflect on their
own relationship with their emotions. Given the research that has demonstrated
alexithymic tendencies in people with eating disorders, this study appears to challenge
the notion ofmonolithic alexithymic difficulties in this client group. Related to this
point is how there has been a lack of a basic emotions perspective in the research, and
in particular, the theoretical understanding of anorexia nervosa. This study's findings
demonstrated evidence of different relationships with each of the basic emotions
within anorexia nervosa. Again this finding is in keeping with Waller et al. (2003) and
Geller et al. (2000), but this study's data highlights some of the particular difficulties
06/12/2009 150
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) University of Edinburgh John R.E. Fox
attached to certain emotional states. The emotions of anger and, to a lesser degree,
sadness were discussed as being toxic, shaming and were inhibited for the
participants. Anger seemed to be particularly toxic, and it did appear to play a key role
in the use of eating disorder symptoms to suppress anger and sadness. However, there
were differences in the beliefs about these emotions and why they should not be
expressed. For anger, it was regarded as being 'toxic' and 'dangerous', and it would
harm both the participant and other people, if it was allowed to be expressed. For
sadness, the predominant beliefwas one of 'weakness'. Across the analysis, it was
highlighted how people with anorexia did not regard themselves as being entitled to
be a human being with emotions, or that being emotional would lead to rejection from
significant others. This finding fits with the perspective ofGeller (2000) who argued
that people with anorexia suppressed anger to protect interpersonal relationships. The
analysis also revealed how certain emotions were almost automatically suppressed by
the eating disorder and is perhaps evidence that there was link between certain
emotional states and eating disorder symptoms that works outside conscious
cognition. An interesting aspect of the analysis was category of coupled emotions. It
seemed that for some of participants there was a relation between anger and disgust,
especially body disgust. Although this data was collected and initially analysed before
any significant related readings and involvement in any other similar research, this
finding is in keeping with the predictions from the SPAARS-ED model. Within this
model, it is argued that disgust towards the self is a much less toxic emotion, and
therefore, it was used to suppress the more ego-dystonic emotion of anger.
Furthermore, this study highlighted how there appeared to a significant amount of
anger within the participants, and this was related to their own developmental
histories. Again, this was in keeping with the SPAARS-ED model and this study's
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findings suggest that this 'anger within' may well be present for anorexia nervosa.
Indeed, many of the participants discussed how they would engage in their eating
disorder behaviour when they felt anger.
The notion of certain emotions feeling toxic, dangerous and being egodystonic is very
much in keeping with the model proposed in the introduction. The SPAARS-ED
model also discusses how each of the basic emotions develop in a modularised
manner (akin to many other cognitive constructs), and this development occurs in
relation to environmental influences. According to the theory, when children
experience events and interactions that lead them to view their emotions as being
wrong, they split off and become ego-dystonic. Through this process, their emotions
become alien and very frightening. This theory seems to have been supported by this
study, as participants were able to identify their emotions, but were scared of
expressing anger and sadness (for the reasons identified above). It is also noteworthy
that the data strongly revealed how the eating disorder was used to suppress emotions,
and it became apparent in the analysis that the difficulties with feeling and identifying
emotion were often experienced when people were at low weight. This finding led to
the hypothesis that alexithymia maybe more due to compromised cognitive
functioning than an implicit difficulty with identifying emotions in anorexia nervosa.
This finding is in keeping with the innovative study by Serpell and colleagues (Serpell
et al. 1999) where she analysed 'friend or foe letters' from people with anorexia
nervosa. One of the findings that came out of this study was how restriction could
suppress painful emotions (a positive of anorexia nervosa), but it also went too far as
it suppressed everything and left the person without any feeling (a con of the anorexia
nervosa). In reflecting upon the SPAARS-ED model and the issue of overwhelming
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emotions, it is important to note that are times when emotions may not necessarily
split off and become ego-dystonic. A key factor within this process would be the types
of attachment that the child may have with their care giver and also the type of
experiences as the child grows up. These experiences may actually be corrective for
the person concerned and it may allow the integration of emotion into their sense of
self. In fact, this could be regarded as a core task of therapy (e.g. Greeberg 1989;
Power and Dalgleish, 1999).
When the emotion of disgust was investigated across the analysis, the data suggested
that it was very salient for this group of participants. The ferocity of their disgust was
startling, and participants were able to express this emotion quite freely in the actual
interviews. The emotion of disgust was linked to body dissatisfaction for the
participants, with fear coming in as a secondary emotion. The emotion of fear was
discussed very clearly discussed as a product of the eating disorder and this did seem
to be related to the fear of being disgusted about themselves, their bodies and of food.
Again this finding is very much at odds with the perspective of Pallister and Waller
(2008) who argues that eating disorders should be regarded as an extension of anxiety
disorders. However, findings from Davey, Bickerstaffe and MacDonald (2006) found
evidence for a facilitatory relationship between disgust and fear/ anxiety, using an
experimental methodology. They found that induced disgust led to an increase in
negative interpretational bias which maintained levels of anxiety in their participants,
and these authors argued that this provides evidence for the causal role of disgust in
anxiety psychopathologies. This confusion between fear/ anxiety and disgust has the
potential to be an important theoretical point in the understanding of eating disorders,
because the long reported 'fear of food' or the 'fear of becoming fat' may actually be
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disgust reactions, and hence, may account for the high co-morbidity between anxiety
and eating disorders, and this perspective would certainly fit with this study's data.
Continuing within a co-morbidity perspective, Overton et al. (2008) and Power and
Tarsia (2007) found that disgust, in particular, self-disgust, played a significant role in
depression. In light of this study's data, it may well be that disgust may play a
significant role in the co-morbidity between eating disorders, in particular, body
dissatisfaction, and depression.
In the first section of the results, the analysis revealed that participants felt that they
were often bought up in an environment (home and/or school) that produced
overwhelming emotion. For the participants that grew up where anger was the most
reported salient emotion, there appeared to be much more difficulty with emotions, in
particular, anger. These participants tended to binge and vomit much more than the
other participants (as was the case with participant 6). Theoretically it is significant
that participant 3 witnessed 2 angry confrontations in her family, but spoke much
more of a non-emotional environment at home while she was growing up. This gave
the researcher the sense that there was almost a dose effect, in that, as overt levels of
anger increase so does the need for more extreme measures to cope with their
emotions (which were postulated to be anger). Participant 10's apparent utility of
anger to facilitate care on the unit was also interesting as she seemed to be a very
angry young woman (a view echoed by staff on the unit). In many ways, this anger
seemed to be her way to protect against feelings of sadness and fear. However, in
saying this, it was striking that she appeared to 'contain' a lot of anger about her step
father and, it was hypothesised that she was also angry about the loss of her mum. Her
mother was her main confidant and she spoke of her being the only person with whom
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she could share her emotions. Again, with this much suppressed emotion, it is highly
significant that she started her bingeing-vomiting restriction shortly after her mother
died. These theoretical points do appear to allow for the further development of the
model proposed by Waller and colleagues (e.g. Waller et al, 2007), where they discuss
how restrictive eating is a primary avoider of emotion, whilst bingeing and vomiting
was a secondary avoider of emotion. According to this study's data, the key emotion
appears to be anger that moves people between these two strategies.
The other mainstay of overwhelming emotion was how events seemed to generate a
significant amount of emotion for participants which was not expressed or managed at
the time. The key feature of this part of the analysis was how this emotion was 'too
much' and perhaps, developmentally inappropriate, as it was hypothesised within the
memos that the participants were young when faced with challenging emotions. The
most striking example of this was shared by participants 1 and 5 who were moved
around a number of times as a young child and felt 'resentful'. As discussed above, it
was felt to be significant in reflecting throughout the analysis, that this anger was
maintained in the participants once they had reached adulthood, and it was wondered
if the anorexia also acted as a 'guardian for the this high level of anger within' (for the
reasons identified above).
The other main theoretical point that came out of the data was how the early
environment seemed to be largely devoid of emotions. Even within the families where
there was a high level of anger, the emotional backdrop was often emotionless. A
majority of participants discussed how they had family members had poor meta -
emotional skills and it was hypothesised that these influences would have had a
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profound impact upon the development of these skills in the participants as children.
Likewise, the use of active strategies to deny the experience of an emotion appears to
have been particularly toxic for the developing child as their emotions have not been
validated. Therefore, it seemed that for the participants whilst they were young had a
vast array of difficult and challenging experiences that left them with too much
emotion (particularly anger and sadness), but were not taught the skills to manage and
express these emotions. This study's findings on poor level of meta-emotional skill
adds further evidence to the literature that has discussed how caregiver's empathy
appears to be related to early attunement to emotional states in the self and others (e.g.
Valiente, Eisenberg, et al, 2004; Eisenberg et al. 1998; 2001) and how emotional
inhibition in childhood mediates the relationship between childhood emotional
invalidation (as per Linehan, 1993) and acute psychological distress in adulthood
(Krause et al. 2003). This development of emotional awareness through interactions
with caregivers has been discussed fully in a number of classical theories, ranging
from psychodynamic (e.g. Klein, 1952), modelling (e.g. Kugiumutzakis et al, 2005)
and attachment theory (e.g. Bowlby, 1969) and it is beyond the current scope of this
thesis to consider these large theories in detail. However, this study's findings are
consistent with dialectical behavioural therapy's perspective on invalidating
environments (Linehan, 2003) and the SPAARS idea of ego-dystonic emotion (Power
and Dalgleish, 2008).
There are a number of criticisms of this study that need to be highlighted. The main
one concerns the participants in this study. The participants were recruited from one
site and this may have lead to a bias in the type of data collected. However, this site
was deliberately chosen as it was the region's eating disorder unit and, hence,
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accepted people with severe eating disorders. It was felt that the findings from such a
group of participants would have theoretical significance for the consideration of
anorexia nervosa in general. As can be seen in the participant's section, there were a
number ofwomen who took part in this study who were quite a bit older than the
expected age of the participants (e.g. in their 40s). This may have had a bearing on the
results, but it was felt in the design of this study that having an everyday AN group
was important. Also, having a variety of participants at different stages of their
'illness' allowed for a fuller investigation of emotions in anorexia nervosa. Likewise,
it could also be argued that recruiting only 11 participants would have comprised this
study's ability to achieve data saturation. This may be the case, and the recruitment of
a few more participants may have extended the findings a little further. However, in
keeping with Dey's point (Dey, 1999), qualitative studies rarely use exhaustive
coding, and categories are suggested by data, rather than saturated. Dey proposes that
qualitative studies should seek to have theoretical sufficiency, and this study certainly
felt like it had sufficient data to allow for the development of a grounded theory.
Finally, it could be argued that the researcher's clinical experience may have unduly
influenced the analysis of the data. It is true that the researcher used his knowledge
within the analysis process, but the analysis was well grounded in the data. Also, it is
the contention of the researcher that this experience allowed for a much fuller analysis
that otherwise could not have been achieved. This point was also discussed by Glaser
and Strauss (1967), who argue that the researcher must have a perspective to analyse
the data.
In conclusion, this study has examined the perception of the basic emotions within
participants with anorexia nervosa. This study has also looked at the socio-emotional
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environments within which the participants grew up. Anger, and to a lesser degree,
sadness were identified as being problematic for the participants, with them both
being connected to the actual eating disorder symptoms. Anger seemed to be a key
emotion that appeared to act in a dose like manner, in that, higher the levels of anger
more likely there would be bingeing and vomiting. Disgust was identified as another
key emotion and participants discussed a high level of disgust towards their bodies.
Interestingly, fear was put as secondary to the eating disorder, and participants felt
that fear and anxiety were a consequence of the eating disorder. Early history was
marked with a poverty of emotion, whilst some participants experienced episodes of
overwhelming emotion.
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Chapter 4: The Relation of Anger to Disgust: The
Potential Role of Coupled Emotions within Eating
Pathology
4.1 Introduction
The results from the last chapter identified that certain emotions were perceived to be
particularly challenging for people with anorexia nervosa. Anger and sadness were
found to be the most 'toxic' emotions for participants, and anger seemed to be the
crucial emotion that appeared to move participants between the two symptom clusters,
such as restriction and binge-vomiting. Furthermore, there was some data from the
qualitative study that suggested that the emotion of disgust was important for these
populations, and indeed, it was reflected upon in the results that the level of self-
disgust was quite striking in the accounts and transcripts from the interviews.
However, unlike the emotions of anger and sadness, disgust did not appear to be ego
dystonic, as the participants were able to discuss and reflect upon this emotion for
them. Another potentially important finding from this study suggested that the
emotions of anger and disgust were acting in a coupled way, and this finding offers
some evidence for the SPAARS-ED model proposed in the introduction.
This finding of the toxicity of anger fits with the findings from Waller, Babbs,
Milligan, Meyer, Ohanian and Leung (2003) who reported that women diagnosed
with a DSM-IV (APA, 1994) eating disorder had higher levels of state anger and
anger suppression compared to a control group. Higher trait anger scores were
associated with bingeing and vomiting and anger suppression was associated with
laxative use. Geller, Cocknell, Hewitt, Goldner and Flett (2000) reported that women
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with a DSM-IV diagnosis of anorexia had higher levels of silencing the self schemas
and suppressed anger compared to controls. These results were interpreted as
evidence that negative emotions are suppressed in order to protect interpersonal
relationships around the person with anorexia nervosa. Geller el al also found
evidence for the complexity in the expression of emotions, as they found inhibited
expression of emotions was related to body dissatisfaction. Related to Geller et al's
results, Hayaki, Friedman and Brownell (2002) found that limited emotional
expression predicted body dissatisfaction in an analogue sample (when BMI, non-
assertiveness and depressive symptoms were controlled for in their analysis). In
emotional terms, it is a significant drawback that neither of these authors considered
the emotional underpinning to body dissatisfaction. Miller (1997) discussed how the
emotion of disgust is associated with the rejection of foodstuffs or undesirable
personal characteristics. It would seem that the most fitting emotion behind body
dissatisfaction would be disgust. In keeping with this point, Troop, Treasure and
Serpell (2002) found that people who were symptomatic of an eating disorder were
more sensitive to disgust than the controls (comparing ill, remitted and control
participants within their methodology). Interestingly, this disgust sensitivity was
particularly pertinent for the human body and of certain food stuffs.
This growing evidence that the emotions of anger and disgust may be valenced
within people with eating disorders has not, so far, been considered within the eating
disorder research literature. On the back of this current and previous research it is
argued that the emotions of anger and disgust may act in a 'coupled' way within
females with bulimic symptoms (F-BN). It would appear that considering the salience
of anger and disgust in isolation for individuals with eating disorders, particularly
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bulimia nervosa, has been too simplistic, and it has neglected the theoretical
advancements in understanding emotions and their regulation. Furthermore, the lack
of considering co-morbid difficulties (especially anxiety and depression), within a
covariate analysis, in the research on emotions in eating disorders has prevented the
investigation of whether certain basic emotions (e.g. disgust) potentially underpin
eating disorders and other co-morbid disorders (e.g. depression). These points form
the research questions for this study and test one of the main predictions of the
SPAARS-ED model as proposed in the introduction.
4.2 Aims/ Hypotheses
This study has four aims.
• Exploratory Aim - 1: To investigate the profile of the state and trait emotions
that are experienced by a group of females with probable bulimic style eating
pathology (as measured by the Basic Emotions Scale, Power, 2006).
• Exploratory aim - 2: To investigate, in more detail, the levels of trait anger
present in the F-BN group, using the trait anger measure from the STAXI
(Spielberger, 1996).
Hypotheses
• First Hypothesis: Participants within the F-BN group will have significantly
higher levels of state anger (as measured by the State anger scale from the
STAXI; Spielberger, 1996) in comparison to matched controls.
• Second Hypothesis: Participants within the F-BN group will significantly
higher levels of anger (again measured by the State anger scale from the
STAXI) when compared to matched controls following an anger induction
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exercise, whilst co-varying for anxiety and depression (as measured by the
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983).
• Third hypotheses: Participants within the F-BN group will have a significant
increase in the emotion of disgust (as measured by the Disgust Sensitivity
Scale; Haidt, McCauley and Rozin, 1994) when compared to matched controls
following an anger induction, whilst co-varying for anxiety and depression (as
measured by the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale; Zigmond & Snaith,
1983).
• Fourth Hypothesis: Participants within the F-BN group will have significantly





Participants were recruited from the school of psychological sciences at the
University of Manchester. In total, 321 female participants consented to take part in
this study. The data collection was undertaken by an undergraduate student (AH).
Participants were recruited via 1st year research methodology lectures where 112
students consented to filling out the first stage questionnaires. These students received
course credits for participating in this research project. The remaining students were
registered to study other courses (N=209) and these were invited to participate via an
email sent out to all students at the university. At the time of the research, 26,160
undergraduate students registered with the University of Manchester and there was a
system at the university where researchers could send an invitatory email to them to
participate in the research. The university is multi-cultural and has students from a
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variety of social-cultural backgrounds. The initial email provided a brief introduction
to the study and explained the researchers were looking at emotions in people with
difficulties with their eating. It explained that the study was in two stages, with the
first stage being 3 questionnaires, and the second stage being a mood induction study.
Finally, the email also gave information about with the incentive of a prize draw for a
256MB MP3 player USB data stick for everyone who took part in the first stage of the
study. Although participant expectations for this study were not recorded, it was
envisaged that they may have spent time reflecting on what type of mood induction
this study was going to use (this was not detailed in the participant information sheet).
The email gave a link to a website that contained the screening questionnaires and a
consent form to take part in the second stage of the research. These questionnaires
were the EAT-26 (Garner and Garfinkel, 1979) and a brief screening questionnaire for
bulimic symptoms (For a fuller discussion on the EAT-26, please see below). These
questions asked whether the participant had ever gone on eating binges where they
felt that they may not be able to stop, or if they had ever been sick (vomited) to
control their weight or shape, or if they had ever used laxatives, diet pills or diuretics
(water pills) to control their weight or shape and, finally, if the study participants had
ever been treated for an eating disorder? Previous research has demonstrated that
scores above 20 on the EAT-26 tend to suggest that there is a significant likelihood of
eating pathology, especially if this presented with significant eating disorders
symptoms (e.g. Garner and Garfinkel, 1979). Within the Screening stage, 321
students from the University of Manchester responded to the e-mail and filled out the
above questionnaires. The mean age was 20.35 (SD=3.13). Also, as this was a study
that recruited a sub-clinical participant group, diagnoses were not relevant.
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Experimental Stage
For the experimental stage, 25 female participants with eating pathology (F-BN) were
selected for this study. As detailed above, the F-BN group all scored above 20 on the
EAT-26 (Garner and Garfinkel, 1979) and they all indicated that they had symptoms
of either bingeing, vomiting or abusing laxatives. A control group of 25 participants
was formed from participants scoring below four with bulimic behaviours absent.
This cut off was chosen as it ensured that females recruited in the control arm of this
study would have very little eating disorder cognitions or behaviours. It has been
noted by many authors that a significant proportion of young females demonstrate
some problematic eating behaviours or cognitions (e.g. body dissatisfaction; Grogan,
1999) and it was decided that allowing some score on the EAT-26 would prevent an
over exclusion of potential participants. The descriptive data from these two
participant groups is shown below in table 1.
Age
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Probability
F-BN Control Group
N = 25 n = 25
20.28 21.24 .431
(2.71) (5.40)
EAT-26 29.52 1.88 .001
(8.59) (1.39)
Body Mass Index 21.94 21.09 .476
(5.56) (2.15)
HADS-A (anxiety) 6.92 4.60 .001
(2.37) (1.52)
HADS- D (depression) 3.44 2.04 .001
(1.4) (1.01)
Number of participants that reported
bingeing in the last 6 months
22 0
Number of participants that reported
vomiting in the last 6 months
17 0
Number of participants that 9 0
06/12/2009 164
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) University of Edinburgh John R.E. Fox
reported using laxatives in the last 6
months
Number of participants that reported
ever seeking help from a healthcare
provider for their eating disorder
5 0
Table 1: Shows the demographic data for the participants in this study
4.3.2. Questionnaires and Other Instructions
Eating Attitudes Test (EAT-26) (Garner and Garfinkel, 1982)
The EAT-26 is a self-report measure designed to assess symptoms and attitudes that
have been shown to be present in individuals with eating disorders. It is an extensively
used and standardised measure. EAT-26 is not a scale that can diagnose an eating
disorder by itself, but it is an excellent screening tool that has been shown to detect
probable cases of eating disorders, especially when used with a brief symptom
checklist. As discussed above, this type of symptom checklist was incorporated into
this study (i.e. binge, purge or the use of laxatives). This scale has good test-retest
reliability over a two-three week period of 0.84 (Carter and Moss, 1984) and a strong
internal consistency, with an alpha of 0.94 (Garner et al, 1982).
State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory-2 (STAXI) (Spielberger, 1996)
The STAXI is a 44 item self-report questionnaire used as a tool for measuring five
different types of anger or anger related behaviours. As with the EAT-26, this is a
widely used scale and it has been extensively used in published research. The state
anger scale assesses the 'here and now' intensity of anger, whilst the trait anger scale
measures how often a person generally feels angry. The state and trait anger scales
have demonstrated good psychometric qualities with the state anger scale having a .93
alpha co-efficient and the trait anger scale having a .87 alpha co-efficient
(Speilberger, 1996).
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The anger expression and anger control scales assess four different anger-related traits
which are: the expression of anger towards other people and objects (anger
expression-out); holding in or suppressing angry feelings (anger expression-in),
controlling angry feelings by preventing the expression of anger towards other
persons or objects in the environment (anger control-out) and controlling suppressed
angry feelings by calming down or cooling off (anger control-in). The fifth subscale is
the anger expression index which provides a measure of anger based on the anger
expression and anger control scales. The anger expression subscale have demonstrated
good psychometric qualities with alpha co-efficients of .80 (males) and .77 (females).
Hospital Anxiety andDepression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983)
This HADS questionnaire consists of seven items relating to anxiety symptoms and
seven pertaining to depressive symptoms. It is a widely used and validated measure
of depression and anxiety. This measure has been widely used in clinical research and
a relatively recent review cited that it has been used in 747 studies by May 2000
(Bjelland, Dahl, Haug and Neckleman, 2002). It has good internal consistency on both
of scales, such as 0.83 on the HADS-D and 0.82 on the HADS-A (Bjelland et al,
2002). The same review by Bjelland et al, 2002 also noted that it had good
correlations with other widely used measures, such as the Beck Depression Inventory,
which ranged from 0.49 and 0.83.
Basic Emotions Scale (BES, Power, 2006)
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The Basic Emotions Scale (BES) (2006) was originally constructed from 30
emotional terms, which were made of 6 terms related to each ofOatley's (1987) 5
basic emotions of anger, sadness, disgust, fear and happiness. These 30 terms were
reduced to 21 (4 per emotion, with anger having 5 items) following factor analysis on
data from a student sample of 219 participants. After the redundant terms were
excluded, the subscale showed a high degree of internal consistency, with Cronbach's
alpha ranging from 0.79, on the happiness subscale, to 0.84 on the sadness subscale
between the remaining four items (Power, 2006).
Participants are asked to rate each of the terms on a Likert scale depending on how
they have been feeling over the last week, with 1 indicating that they have not felt like
this at all and 7 indicating that they have felt like this all the time, enabling a measure
of each emotional state. This is repeated in subsequent sections of the questionnaires,
with subjects responding how often they feel like that in general, which is indicative
of trait-like levels of each emotion. Therefore, this enables an objective measure of
state and trait emotion experience.
Disgust Sensitivity Scale (Haidt, McCauley and Rozin, 1994)
This is a 32-item scale designed to assess sensitivity to items of potential disgust.
Participants are presented with statements about potential disgust-eliciting items, such
as 'It would bother me to be in a science class and see a human hand preserved in a
jar.' The questionnaire is split into two parts. In the first 16 questions, the participant
indicates true or false responses. The second set of questions asks how disgusting
specific situations, actions, etc, are to the respondent (e.g. A friend offers you a piece
of chocolate shaped like dog poo). There are also eight sub-scales within the
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questionnaire, each containing four items. The sub-scales are animals, body products,
death, envelope violations, hygiene, food, magical thinking and sex. Haidt, McCauley
and Rozin (1994) report good psychometric data for this scale, with a combined alpha
co-efficients of 0.84 (across 4 different samples).
Modified Velten Mood Induction Technique (Velten, 1968)
The Velten technique was developed to induce a specific mood using 60 statements
written in the first person. The participant reads the statements and is asked to feel a
mood similar to the one they have just read in the statement. Based on this
methodology, participants were asked to recall an event that happened to them
recently that made them feel angry. For each participant, they were asked to think
about what happened, the people involved, what it was that made them feel angry and
to remember how angry they felt at the time of the event. This took place in silence
over the space of 3 minutes. After the anger induction, it was checked that all the
participants had managed to recall a recent example of being angry and that it had
induced anger within them.
This methodology was preferred to the original Velten mood induction technique, as it
has a significant benefit of enabling participants to have ecologically valid emotions
that are similar to their naturally occurring emotions. The main drawback from this
methodology is that it lacks the internal reliability and validity of knowing the stimuli
and hence ensuring that the emotions are accurate and valid. However, all the students
were recruited from the same school in the University and all had similar pressures
and expectations for their work, and were all approximately the same age.
Consequently, it was felt that there were no a priori reasons why either group should
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have encountered more angry eliciting situations that the other group (this point is
considered further in the discussion).
Interference Task
This was formed from 10 lists, each containing seven items. The participant is asked
to indicate which item does not belong in the list. The correct response is the item that
does not fit into the same category as the other 6 items. For example, 'cushion' would
be the item which does not fit in a list containing 6 other items which are colours.
This task was used to allow participants to complete a non-emotive, low-difficulty
task which would prevent them from remembering their questionnaires responses.
Interference tasks have been shown to significantly impact upon levels of forgetting
(e.g. Lustig and Hasher, 2001).
4.3.3. Procedure
The data was collected with the assistance of an undergraduate student (AH). For the
experimental stage, participants undertook the study in groups of 5. They were asked
to sit at a distance from one other to avoid distractions. At time 1, participants
completed the 22-item STAXI, BES, Disgust Sensitivity Scale and the HADS.
Participants were then asked to complete the interference task, followed by the
modified Velten Technique. Once in an angry mood, participants were readministered





University of Edinburgh John R.E. Fox
All statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS version 15 for Windows.
Preliminary analysis was undertaken on the data to ascertain whether it met
parametric assumptions, with the main variables being checked by conducting
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (K-S tests). As is the way with a significant amount of
clinical research, it was anticipated that the data was not going to be normally
distributed, and this instance parametric tests would be undertaken, providing that the
other two tests of parametric assumptions were met. As has been discussed elsewhere
(e.g. Field, 2005), parametric assumptions are much more powerful tests and
therefore, able to withstand one violation. Furthermore, the use of parametric tests
would allow co-variate analyses to be undertaken, which would not be possible with
non-parametric tests. The outcome of the K-S tests can be seen in appendix 4, and
almost all of the variables were shown not to be normally distributed. The non-
normal distribution of the scores did not change after transformations were applied to
the variables. Therefore, it was decided to use the raw data scores. Furthermore, with
the exception of two variables (i.e. BES disgust subscale and state anger), all the
variables were shown to be homogeneous after the data was tested with a Levene's
test of variance. Furthermore, all the groups were the same size, so there was no need
to be concerned about the size of difference between the groups affecting the
statistical analysis. As discussed above, it was decided to use parametric tests on the
data from this study, with the use of one non-parametric test to confirm the analysis
on the BES disgust sub scale and state anger (please see appendix 4). Flowever, it is
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acknowledged that by using parametric tests a certain amount of caution must be
applied to the results, and the reader needs to consider this issue.
The analyses for the Basic Emotions Scale was undertaken by using t-tests (confirmed
by Mann-Whitney U tests) and as 10 tests were taken, a correction was applied to the
alpha levels to ensure that type 1 or type 2 errors were not committed. A bonferoni
correction was considered, but it was felt that it would suppress the alpha level too
much and thereby increase the likelihood of a type 2 error (i.e. potentially missing out
on significant results); therefore the alpha level was set at 0.02. For the remainder of
the analysis, the principal analyses undertaken were mixed-design ANCOVAs (due to
the mixed design), with anxiety and depression scores entered into the analysis as co-
variates. As there were not any comparable studies in the literature, it was designed to
ascertain the power of this study retrospectively.
4.4.2 Exploratory analysis on the Basic Emotions Data
Table 2 displays the mean and standard deviations (SD) for BES state emotion data.
As detailed above, the BES measures each of the five basic emotions (i.e. anger,
















Eating Disordered Group 25 14.25
(4.50)
BES 1 During last week
Sadness
Control Group 25 7.88
(4.18)
0.045
Eating Disordered Group 25 10.80
(5.17)
BES 1 During last week
Fear
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Eating Disordered Group 25 15.44
(4.26)
BES 1 During last week
Happiness
Control Group 25 20.80
(3.31)
0.030
Eating Disordered Group 25 18.44
(4.10)
BES 1 During last week
Disgust
Control Group 25 8.12
(3.43)
0.003*
Eating Disordered Group 25 12.24
(5.62)




As above As above 0.005* 1
Table 2: Shows the mean and standard deviation for each of the basic emotions
within the last week. A higher score denotes that more of that emotion was
experienced over the last seven days. *denotes significance at 0.02. * 1 This test was
undertaken as there was heterogeneity of variance within the data (Levene's test).
Table 2 demonstrates that for all the emotions, there was an overall increase in
negative emotion, with a corresponding reduction in positive emotion. Although all
the emotions neared significance levels, it was only levels of state disgust that showed
a significant difference between the control and the F-BN group.










BES 1 General Anger Control Group 25 11.40
(3.20)
0.084
Eating Disordered Group 25 13.28
(4.24)
BES 1 General Sadness Control Group 25 7.28
(3.43)
0.014*
Eating Disordered Group 25 9.88
(3.80)
BES 1 General Fear Control Group 25 13.44
(4.78)
0.057




Control Group 25 23.04
(4.09)
0.010*
Eating Disordered Group 25 19.88
(4.21)




Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) University ofEdinburgh John R.E. Fox
Eating Disordered Group 25 14.28
(6.50)
■ • f ' ' . . ' . . ' - A. . ' . . .
< - i > J-. ,:;:v M As above As above
BES 1 General disgust
(non-parametric)
Mann-Whitney U Test 0.002*
Table 3: the mean and standard deviation for each of the basic emotions for how often
these emotions are felt (trait measure). A higher score denotes that more of that
emotion was experienced more generally. *denotes significance at 0.02. * 1 This test
was undertaken as there was heterogeneity of variance within the data (Levene's test).
According to these results, it can be seen that the F-BN group generally experienced
more negative emotion, and this was near or at significance levels for all the negative
emotions. Whilst, the F-BN group experienced significantly less positive emotion
generally than controls. However, it was only sadness and disgust that showed
significantly higher levels of trait sadness and disgust within the F-BN group.
4.4.2 Results from the STAXI - Main Hypothesis Testing
Before the principal analyses for the hypotheses are undertaken, the exploratory
analysis was undertaken on the trait measure from the STAXI. The results from this
analysis can be seen in table 4.
Table 4
Participant type - control N Mean Probability
or eating disordered (SD) 0.05
Trait anger scale Control Group 25 17.60 P=0.013*
(4.85)
Eating Disordered Group 25 21.48
(5.70)
Table 4: Shows the mean and standard deviation for trait anger scale from the STAXI
measure. A higher score denotes that more anger was experienced more generally.
*Denotes significance.
As can be seen in table 4, the F-BN group experienced anger much more often that the
control group. This result confirms that the F-BN were generally more angry than the
control group.
06/12/2009 173
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) University of Edinburgh John R.E. Fox
STAXI - State Anger
The principal hypothesis was whether females with bulimic symptoms (F-BN) have
significantly higher levels of anger, following the induction of anger, when compared
to individuals without any eating disorder symptoms. The means and standard
deviations for the State anger scores are presented in table 5.
Table 5
Control Group F-BN Probability
(SP) (SD) (t-test)
Time 1 16.80 17.88 .297
(Prior to manipulation (4.04) (3.14)
Time 2 19.40 27.64 .007*
(post manipulation) (5.90) (13.19)
Table 5: Means and standard deviations for the State anger scores for both conditions
across the participant groups. *Denotes significance.
State anger scores were evaluated according to a two factorial model (group x
condition), and this data was analysed by a mixed model Analysis of Covariance
(ANCOVA), as the analysis co-varied anxiety and depression scores (taken from the
HADS). Effect sizes were calculated using the formula for r|2 (eta-squared) from
Clark-Carter (2004). These r|2 values were interpreted as per protocol from Cohen
(1988) who proposed that r\ values of 0.01 is a small effect, 0.059 is a medium
effect, whilst a r|2 value of 0.138 can be regarded as a large effect. As detailed earlier,
each group (F-BN & Control) undertook the Anger induction task, and each group
was assessed at time 1 (prior to the Induction) and at time 2 (post induction). This part
of the design represented the repeated measures aspect of this study. Where
appropriate, further univariate analyses were undertaken to locate the statistical effect
within the analyses. Analyses indicated a significant main effect for group, F = 6.87
{df=1,48), p = .012, as well as a significant group x time interaction effect, F = 8.29
(<df = 1,48), p = .006. The effect size for this interaction between group and anger was
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large (r| = .173), and with n=25 per group, the power of this analysis was also higher
than 0.8 (power >.80), as shown by the tables presented by Clark-Carter (2004). The
co-variate analyses indicated that HADS anxiety (HADS-A) scores did not have a
significant statistical effect on the anger results, F = 2.195 (df- 1,46); p = .145, whilst
HADS depression (HADS-D) scores did have a significant statistical effect upon the
anger results, F= 10.743 (df= 1,46); p = .002. The effect size from the co-variate
• 2 •
analysis was large (r\ = .24). Due to the heterogeneity in the multi-variate analyses,
these results were confirmed by univariate analyses. The group x time interaction is
illustrated in Graph 1.
Graph 1
Graph 1: Shows the mean scores for the State anger scales for each participant group
before and after the anger induction.
The results from both the uni-variate and multi-variate analyses allow for the
acceptance of the first hypothesis, in that, the participants in the F-BN group showed
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significantly higher state anger, following the anger induction, than the control group.
The significant effect of depression scores in this analysis will be considered in the
discussion below.
Disgust Sensitivity Scale
The second principal hypothesis was whether the F-BN group have significantly
higher levels of disgust sensitivity, following the manipulation of anger, when
compared to individuals without any eating disorder symptom. The means and
standard deviations for the Disgust Sensitivity scale scores are presented in table 3.
Table 6
Control Group F-BN Probability
(SD) (SD) (t-test)
Time 1 14.38 17.90 .015*
(Prior to manipulation (5.13) (4.68)
Time 2 14.96 19.88 .002*
(post manipulation) (5.29) (5.46)
Table 6: Means and standard deviations for the disgust sensitivity scale scores for
both conditions across the participant groups. *denotes significance.
As has been shown in the above table, the F-BN group scored significantly
higher than the control group on the disgust sensitivity scale. This result highlights
that the F-BN group were significantly more sensitive to the emotion of disgust than
the control group prior to any anger induction.
Disgust sensitivity scores were evaluated according to a two factorial model (group x
condition), and this data was analysed by a mixed model Analysis of Co-Variance
(ANCOVA). Analyses indicated a significant main effect for group, F = 8.57 (df =
l,48),p =.001, as well as a significant group x time interaction effect, F = 10.49
-j t
(.df=l,48),p= .002. The effect size for this interaction was large (p = .21) and with
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n=25 per group, the power of this analysis was also higher than 0.8 (power >.80), as
shown by the tables presented by Clark-Carter (2004). The co-variate analyses
indicated that HADS - A scores did not have a significant statistical effect on the
disgust results, F = .250, (df= 1,46); p = .619, whilst HADS-D depression scores did
have a significant statistical effect upon the disgust results, F = 4.423, (df= 1,46); p =
.041. The effect size for the co-variate analysis was large (p = .32). Analyses revealed
that there was homogeneity of variance between the groups, which confirmed that the
multi-variate analyses were reliable. The group x time interaction is illustrated in
Graph 2.
Graph 2
Graph 2: Shows the mean scores for the disgust sensitivity scale for each participant
group before and after the anger induction.
The results from the ANCOVA analyses allow for the acceptance of the second
hypothesis, in that, the participants in the F-BN group showed significantly higher
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disgust sensitivity scores, following the anger induction, than the control group. The
significant effect of the depression scores in this analysis will be considered in the
discussion below.
STAXI - Expression ofAnger
As detailed in the hypotheses section, exploratory uni-variate analyses were
undertaken on the data at time 1. It was felt that this was sufficient to undertake
simple uni-variate analyses, as the expression of anger sub-scales measure
behavioural responses to anger that are unlikely to be affected in such a short-term
experimental study. It was felt that these analyses would be able to suggest which type
of behavioural manifestations of anger is relevant for each group of participants. This
was regarded as an important exploratory analysis, as the first multi-variate analysis
confirmed that the F-BN group were experiencing significantly higher levels of state
anger following the anger induction.
Table 7
Control group FEP group Prob.
(SD) (SD) (t-test)
N=25 N=25
Anger Expression 16.12 17.08 .370
out (3.82) (3.67)
Anger Expression 16.90 22.76 .001*
in (4.66) (4-45)
Anger Control 22.04 21.24 .536
out (5.86) (4.60)
Anger Control 22.52 18.72 .040*
In
_ _ (7.88) _ (4-19)
Anger Expression 37.92 47.08 .013*
index (14.37) (10.40)
Table 7: Shows the means and standard deviations for the four anger expression scale
scores and the Anger Expression Index score for the participant groups prior to the
experimental manipulation of the emotion of anger. *denotes significance at .05.
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As can be seen in table 7, significant differences were observed between the
participant groups on the anger expression-in scale, where the F-BN group reported
significantly higher scores on the anger expression in scale. As detailed in the STAXI
manual, this scale is associated with intense angry feelings, which are suppressed by
the individual. Significant differences were also found on the anger control-in scale,
where the control group reported significantly higher scores on this scale. Again,
within the STAXI manual, it is discussed that this scale is associated with an ability to
'cool off or reduce their anger as soon as possible. Finally, the F-BN group reported
a significantly higher Anger Expression index score, which confirms the emerging
picture from the above findings, as it suggests that the participants in the F-BN group
are experiencing more intense anger feelings, but, as shown above, have a tendency to
suppress their angry feelings.
4.5 Discussion
As has been detailed in the results section, the exploratory analysis revealed that the
females with bulimic symptoms tended to have, at state and trait levels, higher levels
of negative affect when compared to controls. However, it was very interesting that
the levels of disgust were significantly higher for the bulimic group, when compared
to the controls. This result is very much in keeping with the previous research looking
at the role of disgust in eating disorders (e.g. Troop et al., 2002).
Within the principal analysis of the hypotheses of this study, all of them have been
confirmed. Firstly, the F-BN group showed significantly higher levels of state anger
following the emotional induction, than the control group. For the second hypothesis,
the F-BN group demonstrated significantly higher levels of disgust sensitivity than the
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control group at time 1, and disgust sensitivity was also shown to increase
significantly, compared to the control group, after the anger induction. Finally, the F-
BN group demonstrated a pattern of anger expression on the STAXI that showed that
F-BN reported a tendency to experience intense angry feelings, but suppress these
emotions. This result is in keeping with the findings from previous research, such as
Waller et al (2003) and Geller et al (2000).
These results are very interesting as they do provide experimental evidence that the F-
BN group exhibit significantly higher levels of state anger than matched controls. In
fact a closer look at the results highlights the size of the difference. The F-BN group
demonstrated a mean increase in the STAXI state anger score of 8.24. Equally the
significance of the HADS-D co-variate results in the anger analysis highlights the role
of depression in the elevated anger scores and the theoretical underpinnings of this
finding will be considered below.
For the emotion of disgust, there was a significant difference between the control
groups and the F-BN group at time 1. This result is in keeping with the previous
findings of Troop and colleagues (Troop et al, 2002), and it suggests that females with
bulimic symptoms have a significant sensitivity to the emotion of disgust. The finding
that disgust showed a significant increase at time 2, in comparison with the control
group is a potentially important finding, as the results suggest that there are different
emotional processes occurring in the F-BN group, where the emotion of anger is
valenced with the emotion of disgust. These results are even more striking when it is
considered that the Disgust Sensitivity Scale was designed as a trait measure of
disgust, and therefore, it could have been predicted that would be no difference
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between time 1 and time 2 for each group. Indeed, the size of difference between the
scores on the Disgust sensitivity scale for the control group is extremely small. This
result offers direct support for the SPAARS-ED proposed at the beginning of this
thesis, as the emotion of anger appeared to be coupled with the emotion of disgust.
Furthermore the analysis of the trait anger scores highlights how individuals with
bulimic symptoms have a higher propensity to experience anger, which again, is in
keeping with the predictions of the SPAARS-ED model. It does seem, according to
the results of this study, that F-BN have a higher baseline of the anger emotion,
which, when triggered, results in a significant increase in the level of anger for this
clinical population. The significant effect, highlighted via the co-variate analysis, of
the depression scores on the disgust effect in this study is a very interesting finding
and this will be discussed more fully below.
The other main finding from this study shows that females with eating pathology have
a tendency not to express their anger, but they experience it as quite an intense
emotion. Given that this study's other results highlight how F-BN experience
significantly higher levels of anger, it is perhaps not surprising that they report intense
angry feelings when they become angry. This result does offer some confirmatory
evidence for the findings of other studies, such as Waller et al (2003) and Geller et al
(2000). The combined effect of these results suggests that people with bulimic
symptoms experience significantly higher levels of anger, when induced, but have
greater difficulty in expressing this anger.
These findings fit with an emerging picture of the differences in the way that people
with eating disorders experience and manage their emotions. As discussed in the
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introduction, previous research has found evidence that anger is often suppressed and
that the limited expression of emotion is related to poor body satisfaction (e.g. Geller
et al, 2000; Hayaki et al, 2002). When these results are considered in light of this
study's results, the emotion of disgust may well be a more 'acceptable' or a less
'toxic' emotion than anger for people with eating disorders. This then translates to
disgust towards the body and food, which is in keeping with the predictions from the
SPAARS-ED model proposed in the introduction.
This study has found some evidence that depression was significantly contributing to
the effects found in both analyses (i.e. anger and disgust). This finding raises some
potential important theoretical points about the relation of depression, anger and
disgust. Freud (1917/1963) argued that depression originated from a mixture of anger
and sadness at the loss of a significant other, whilst in their review of the relationship
between depression and anger, DiGiuseppe and Tafrate (2007) argued that there is
some evidence that suggests that depression can be a product of an inability to express
anger (e.g. Mook et al, 1990). In light of the results of this study, it is proposed that
anger is perceived as a toxic emotion which is inhibited by the coupled emotion of
disgust. It is argued that the augmentation of disgust and the inhibition of anger lead
not only to the development of eating disorder symptoms, but may also play a role in
the development of co- morbid depression. As discussed in the introduction, a
SPAARS-ED perspective would argue that depression is constituted of the basic
emotions of sadness and disgust (self), and self disgust has been shown in this study
and others (e.g. Troop et al, 2002) to be an important emotion in eating disorders
symptoms. The other co-variate analyses undertaken within the study highlighted that
anxiety did not exert a significant effect in the analysis. This is an interesting finding,
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as many authors are arguing that the role of disgust can be accounted for by anxiety
(e.g. Davey and Chapman, in press), and this study challenges this idea for a near AN
group of females with bulimic symptomatology.
There are a few criticisms of this study, with the main one concerning the modified
Velten technique. As was discussed in the methodology section, the use of
autobiographical memories has a number of potential confounds that need to be
considered. The main potential problem centres upon the lack of control of the actual
anger stimuli, and as such, we do not know whether the levels of anger inducing
stimuli were comparable in each group. Although this is a significant point, it is
important to say that the groups were well matched on demographics, and there is no
apparent apriori reason why there should be a difference between the groups in their
experience of anger eliciting situations. In future research, it would be important to
control for this confound variable, by actually recording the content of the anger
eliciting autobiographical memory.
Another potential confound in this study concerns the actual participants. Although
the people enlisted into the F-BN group are highly likely to have a diagnosis of
bulimia nervosa (please see table 1), a diagnosis was not confirmed by either
interview or specialist service. Likewise, the numbers for the groups are relatively
small. In retrospect, it was an omission not to have included a scale on body
perceptions, so that the relationship between disgust and the perceptions of one's body
could have been investigated. This is now part of an ongoing project.
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In conclusion, this study has found some evidence that the emotions of anger and
disgust are valenced for females with eating pathology. Within the recent research and
clinical literature, it has been theoretically proposed that people use certain eating
disorder symptoms (esp. bingeing) to manage overwhelming negative affect. The
results of this study do suggest that females with eating pathology experience much
higher levels of anger than people without bulimia. Furthermore, disgust may well be
used to manage the 'toxic' emotion of anger and this may represent the coupling of
the anger and disgust. Naturally these results need to be confirmed by further
research. However, the application of the SPAARS model (Power and Dalgleish,
1997; 1999) looks promising in helping to theoretically understand these emotional
mechanisms.
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Chapter 5: Eating Disorders: A Basic Emotion
Perspective
5.1. Introduction
The last two chapters have identified that anger, disgust and sadness are of key
importance in the understanding of anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa. In
particular, they have suggested that there is both a developmental perspective to these
difficulties with emotion, and that they may be coupled together in the
psychopathology of eating disorders. Although these studies have found some
interesting data, it is argued that there is a need to consider all the emotions in eating
disorders. This will allow for a much more detailed examination of the contribution of
each emotion for disordered eating patterns. In considering the need to understand the
relation between the experience of normal emotions and psychopathology, Power and
Tarsia (2007) pointed out that this relationship has only recently started to be explored
within the literature and most models and theories of normal emotion functioning
occur without any mention of emotional disorders. Within the field of eating
disorders, there is often conceptual confusion where diagnostic labels, such as anxiety
and depression are used as emotions in their own right. For example, Power and
Tarsia (2007) undertook a study that looked at emotions in depression and anxiety.
They used four groups in their study, where they compared depressed, anxious,
depressed and anxious, and controls. They found that, using the Basic Emotions Scale
(BES; Power, 2006), the Beck Depression Scores (BDI-II; Beck et al, 1996) were
predicted by sadness, disgust, fear and happiness (entered in the regression model in
this order), whilst state anxiety scores were predicted by fear and then sadness.
Overton et al. (2008) supported these results and found that self-disgust was a key
emotion in depression. According to the SPAARS-ED model and the previous
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research already discussed in this thesis, anger and sadness are key emotions that are
suppressed in the eating disorders, but this suppression is coupled with disgust that
demonstrates itself via revulsion to food and/ or marked body dissatisfaction.
The other main branch of the SPAARS-ED model is that it argues that the early
emotional environment for people with disordered eating patterns is of importance in
understanding the difficulties people with eating disorders have with their emotions.
This is not a new concept within the literature, as dialectical behavioural therapy
argues that 'invalidating experience' (e.g. Linehan, 1993; Corstorphine, 2006) within
the early environment is crucial in understanding how the individual appraises their
own emotional status and their own sense of self. The results from the grounded
theory study reported in chapter 3 indicated that participants with anorexia nervosa
reported a marked difficulty in acknowledging their own emotionality and a number
reported that their emotions were dangerous towards other people. For these people,
their eating disorder was used as a powerful strategy to suppress their emotions.
Although this study and others have given clues about the actual nature of invalidating
environments key empirical questions remain about the process of this invalidating
environment, such as the specific nature of interactions around the emotional
expression from the child. It is important to note that the actual responses to emotions
can be varied and it remains an empirical question whether these different styles lead
to disordered eating patterns. In a more general study of psychopathology, Krause,
Mendelson and Lynch (2003), using a structural equation modelling approach, found
that emotional inhibition mediated the relationship between childhood emotional
invalidation (as per Linehan, 1993) and acute psychological distress in adulthood.
Within their analysis, they used Coping with Children's Negative Emotions Scale
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(CCNES; Fabes, Eisenberg, & Bernzweig, 1990),which was amended to record the
responses of participants as they remember their parents/ carers responses to emotion
eliciting situations (e.g. If I had lost some prized possession and reacted with tears,
my parents would have....). This measure used various domains of parental responses
to the hypothetical situations to see what their relation was to adult psychological
distress (e.g. parental minimisation, parental distress, emotion focused strategies,
problem focused strategies and punitive responses). Krause et al. (2003) found that
perceived parental distress was the most significant contributor to emotional
inhibition and it was argued that the complex emotion of guilt within the child (e.g.
feeling guilt for 'hurting' the parent in some way with their emotion) that helped to
explain the significant effect of parental distress. Coggins and Fox (2009) within a
qualitative study on the role of emotional inhibition and psychopathology found
further support for this idea of parental distress (which they coded as responsibility as
a child) and for traumatic events as a child that appeared to be theoretically linked to
emotional inhibition as an adult. As described in the introduction and in chapter three
and four, emotional inhibition is an important construct in understanding eating
disorders (e.g. Waller et al. 2007; Cooper et al., 2004) and this study was designed to
repeat the Krause et al study using the adapted CCNES (Fabes, Eisenberg, &
Bernzweig, 1990). This measure was deemed to be fit for purpose as it measures the
actual responses to the emotions by the parent/ carer. This formed the second main
aim of this chapter.
5.2 Aims/ Hypotheses
Aim 1
Given the lack of research that has examined the potential role of individual emotions
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within disordered eating; the aim of this current study was to replicate the study by
Power and Tarsia (2007) but for participants with clinically significant eating
disorders. This would be undertaken with state and trait measures of emotion, and
how well they coped with each individual emotion.
Hypothesis 1: It was hypothesised that, in line with the previous research (both
within this thesis and in the general research literature) that disordered eating would
significantly correlate with anger and sadness, whilst controlling for depression and
anxiety within the analysis, for both state and trait measures of emotion.
Hypothesis la: Depending upon sample size, the variables that demonstrates a
significant correlation between disordered eating (as measured by the EAT-26) and
the four negative state-emotion variables (i.e. anger, disgust, sadness, and fear) would
be entered into a multiple regression analysis to determine what significantly
contributes to disordered eating patterns.
Hypothesis lb: Depending upon the sample size, the variables that demonstrate a
significant correlation between disordered eating (as measured by the EAT-26) and
the four negative trait-emotions variables (i.e. anger, disgust, sadness and fear) would
be entered into a multiple regression analysis to determine what significantly
contributes to disordered eating patterns.
Hypothesis lc: To examine the relationships between the participant's ability to cope
with the four negative emotions (coping measure on the Basic Emotions Scale) and
disordered eating patterns (as measured by the EAT-26).
Aim 2
As detailed above, the second aim of this study was to replicate the Krause et al.
(2003) study for people with disordered eating. In order to achieve this aim, an
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examination of different parental response styles to emotion eliciting situations was
undertaken. This was done by looking individual response patterns, such as parental
minimisation, punitive reactions and emotional responses to the situation. As with the
preceding aim, the relation of parental responses to emotions was analysed, whilst
controlling for depression and anxiety.
Hypothesis 2a
Depending upon sample size, the variables that demonstrate a significant correlation
between disordered eating (as measured by the EAT-26) and the 6 carer response style
to participants as children would be entered into a multiple regression analysis to
determine what significantly contributes to disordered eating patterns.
Exploratory Aim
Depending upon sample size, outcome of both the above analyses, and a feasibility
analysis, a mediator-moderator analysis will be carried out to see if there are any
predictive mediator-moderator relationships between the carer's responses to an
emotion, levels of state-emotion and disordered eating patterns.
5.3 Methodology
Design
The study utilised a cross-sectional design that utilised two analytical strategies,
correlational (with associated partialling out of variables) and regression analyses.
These two strategies were chosen so that the contributory effects can be clearly seen
in the results.
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Participants
The participant group was recruited from B-EAT, a non-statutory organisation
providing support to people with an eating disorder in the U.K. B-EAT is an
organisation that provides support, advice and information for people with eating
disorders. It also offers advice and support to carer's of people with eating disorders.
One of their key aims is 'to improve the way services and treatment are provided' (B-
EAT, 2007) and one of the most important ways that B-EAT works to this aim is by
supporting research in this area. One of the ways that they assist with research is by
maintaining a database of people who are willing to take part in research. Within this
database, it is possible to select people who have indicated upon an opt-in
questionnaire that 'they are a person who has an eating disorder' meaning that it is
possible to exclude people who classify themselves as recovered and people who are
carer's of people with eating disorders. Anecdotal evidence suggested that the
database was a heterogeneous group of people with eating disorders. A significant
proportion of the participants were reported to be people with long, chronic histories
of eating disorders. As will be seen below, the mean age of the participants was high,
which suggested that this may have been the case with participants in this study. At
the time of the research, they were 150 people on the database who were eligible to
take part in this study. Out of these potential participants, 79 responded to the initial
invitation to take part and out of these participants, 10 had not completed the
questionnaires properly and 16 were excluded because they did not score over 20 on
EAT-26 questionnaire. This leaved 53 people who were entered into the analysis. No
incentive was offered in this study.
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Only females were included in the analysis, as exploring gender differences in
emotional experience was beyond the scope of the current study and there is some
research which suggests eating disorders in males may be dependent on different
psychological processes (Fernandez-Aranda, Aitken, Badia, Giminez, Solano, Collier
et al. 2004). Respondents were only included in the analysis ifEAT-26 scores were
greater than 20 and this figure strongly suggests that those in the ED group were
experiencing symptoms of a clinically relevant disorder. Although it was possible to
ensure probable caseness, it was impossible to distinguish between different
diagnostic groups of eating disorders (e.g. bulimia nervosa versus anorexia nervosa).
Included in the analysis were 53 participants (mean age = 31.74, SD = 10.6). In terms
of psychopathology, the mean EAT score for the participants was 41.3 (SD = 13.8),
the mean HADS-D was 15.45 (SD = 3.9), the mean HADS-A was 11.30 (SD = 3.8)
and the mean BMI was 18.8 (SD = 3.9). As can be seen from this data, all the
participants had clinically elevated scores on the EAT-26 and on both of the sub
scales of the E1ADS. In order to check whether any of the variables of interest were
related to age, correlation analyses were undertaken and these found that only the
punitive subscale (positive correlation) and the emotion focused subscale (negative
correlation) significantly correlated with age (see appendix 6 for the complete
correlations table). Although it is not possible to establish the diagnosis of the
participants in this study, the BMI data and the scores from the EAT-26 would
suggest that the majority of participants fell into an eating disorder not otherwise
specified (EDNOS) diagnosis.
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Measures
Eating Attitudes Test - 26 (EAT-26; Garner et al. 1982)
The EAT-26 is a well-established measure, made up of 26 statements which
respondents are asked to rate on a 6 point Likert Scale and covers 'symptoms and
concerns, characteristic of eating disorders' (p.175; Garner, 1997). A score is derived
between 0 and 78, with higher scores representing more disordered eating. The
authors present research which suggests that a cut-off score of 20 differentiates
between individuals with eating disordered attitudes and behaviours and those who
have not, and is used to confirm whether participants in the ED group are displaying
clinically significant symptoms. The measure includes items around current height
and weight, which enables calculation of body mass index (BMI). As detailed in
chapter 4, this measure has very good psychometrics.
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983)
This questionnaire consists of 7 items relating to anxiety symptoms, and 7 pertaining
to depressive symptoms. A score of 8 or above out of a possible 21 on both the
depression and anxiety subscales detects 80% of cases (Bjelland et al. 2002). As
detailed in chapter 4, this measure has very good psychometrics.
Basic Emotions Scale (BES; Power, 2006)
This is a 3-part scale constructed from 21 emotional terms which relate to the five
basic emotions of anger, disgust, fear, happiness and sadness.
The BES consists of three sub-scales, these are detailed below:
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State-Emotion Scale: Participants were asked to rate each of the items on a Likert
scale depending on how they had been feeling over the last week, with 1 indicating
that they had not felt like this at all and 7 indicating that they had felt like this all the
time, enabling a measure of each emotional state.
Trait-Emotion Scale: Participants were asked to rate each of the items on a Likert
scale depending on how they often they generally feel an emotion, with 1 indicating
that they had not felt like this at all and 7 indicating that they generally felt like this all
the time, enabling a measure of each emotional state.
Coping Emotion Scale: Participants were asked to rate each of the items on a Likert
scale depending on how they coped with different emotions, with 1 indicating that
they feel that they cope with the emotion item and 7 indicating that they cannot cope
at all with that emotion.
Parent Attitude/Behaviour Questionnaire (PAB)/ Coping With Children's
Negative Emotions Scale (CCNES); Fabes, Eisenberg, & Bernzweig (1990).
This scale was adapted from the Coping with Children's Negative Emotions Scale
(CCNES), and it was adapted in a similar way as by Krause et al (2003). This scale
was originally developed to be used by parents/ carers to evaluate how they responded
to their children's emotions. This scale has 6 sub-scales which are different styles of
responding to the child's emotion, these are punitive, expressive encouragement,
emotion focused reaction, problem focused reaction, minimization reaction and a
distress reaction. Its psychometrics was satisfactory both for reliability, factor
structures and validity (Fabes, Poulin, Eisenberg, Madden-Derdich, 2002). In a similar
vein as Krause et al, (2003), this scale was adapted so that adults could rate their
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memory of their parents/ carers response to their emotions. As much as possible, the
original questions were used within this adapted questionnaire. Two independent
raters were asked to give their opinion on whether the scale had face validity. Both
raters agreed that it was face valid. Also, in order to investigate whether this scale still
had reliability, a Cronbach's reliability analysis was carried out on the scale as a
whole and on the 6 individual sub-scales. Data were collected from students at
Manchester University over the autumn of 2006. The adapted questionnaire was
placed upon a website and an invitation to take part was sent to all undergraduate and
postgraduate students. Within this email there was a link to the online questionnaire.
One hundred and three students responded to the questionnaire and their mean BMI
was 23.12 (SD=5.08) and their mean age was 20.92 (SD = 4.40). The Cronbach













Problem Focused Reaction 0.80
Minimization reaction 0.83
Table 1: Shows the Cronbach alpha co-efficients for both the whole scale and for the
six subscales for the adapted Parent/Attitude Questionnaire.
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As presented above, the Cronbach Alpha co-efficients were all higher than 0.7 and
with the results of the face validity analysis, it was decided that the scale was reliable
and valid for its use in this study.
Procedure
Data was collected with the assistance of a trainee clinical psychologist (KF). The
participant packs containing all the above questionnaires and the participant
information sheets were forwarded to the administrators at B-EAT. B-EAT placed a
note in the pack explaining that they supported the research and sent them all the
eligible participants identified on the database. The participant information letter
from the researcher explained the purpose of the study was included in the pack, as
was a stamped addressed envelope in which to return the measures. The letter to
participants discussed how the aim of the study was to understand how early
experiences impact upon our understanding and management of emotions in
adulthood. It also explained that the study involved filling out questionnaires in the
privacy of their own home.
5.4. Results
Statistical Strategy
In line with the research aims of this study, the analyses were conducted in three
stages. Firstly, the descriptive data was gathered on all the variables used within this
study. Secondly, the emotion variables (state, trait and cope emotions data) were
correlated with the total score for the EAT-26. This was followed by a further
correlational analysis of the relation between the EAT-26 and the four negative
emotions, where depression and anxiety were partialled out respectively. Thirdly,
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depending upon the results of the correlation analysis, the respective variables were
entered into a regression analysis, to see which state and trait emotions would predict
disordered eating, as measured by the EAT-26.
Table 2
BES Data N Mean SD BES Data N Mean SD PAB Data N Mean SD
State Anger 53 15.01 5.19 Anger
Coping
53 19.54 5.43 EXPRESSIVE
ENCOURAGE
47 16.70 9.32
State Sad 53 17.45 5.90 Sadness
.
Coping
52 19.61 5.39 EMOTION
FOCUSED
51 29.19 13.02
State Disgust 53 17.45 5.69 Disgust
Coping
53 22.62 5.13 PROBLEM
FOCUSED
47 33.78 12.21





MINIMIZATION 51 37.13 12.77
State Happiness 52 10.76 4.00 Happiness 51 12.11 4.36 DISTRESS 50 30.70 12.45
Coping
Trait Anger 53 15.37 5.60
■. ■:
1 | PUNITIVE 38 31.50 13.87
Trait Sadness 52 18.03 5.68
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Trait Disgust 53 19.20 5.59
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Trait Fear 52 22.57 5.21 ; --r t - - »
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Trait Happiness 53 12.28 3.59 ""V ' "
Table 2: shows the mean score and its standard deviation for each of the variables
used within this study's analysis.
The descriptive statistics show an interesting pattern of results in that the mean scores
for the basic emotions scales showed an increase from the mean state emotions to the
mean trait emotion scores, to the mean coping with emotions scores. The cope with
J
emotions scores show that participants tended to cope badly with all the emotions, as
the mean score for the items for each scale was five out of seven.
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Results for Hypothesis 1a
Prior to the hypothesis analysis being undertaken, the variables were tested for their
normal distribution using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Please see appendix 5). The
results highlighted that most of the variables were normally distributed, with the state
fear, the anger coping scale, sadness coping scale, the disgust coping sub scale were
not normally distributed. This analysis still used parametric analysis as these analyses
have more power and enable partial correlation analyses. However, the initial
correlation analyses, as detailed in table 1, were also carried out using non-parametric
statistics (i.e. Spearman's Rho). These statistics were identified to be almost identical
correlations to those stated below. Therefore, it was decided that the parametric
analyses would be reliable despite the non-normal distribution. However, the reader
still needs to apply caution to the results reported below.
Correlation analysis - Basic Emotions scale (BES) and the Eating Attitudes Test - 26
(EAT-26).
Table 3
N=52 State State Sad State State Fear State
Anger Disgust H?PPy
Total EAT-26 score .480** .587** .599** .460** -.421**
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Table 3: shows the correlation analysis without Depression or anxiety being partialled
out of the equation.
As can be seen in table 1, the four negative emotions (as measured by the BES)
correlated significantly with the EAT-26. However, the largest correlations were
found between state disgust and EAT-26, and state sadness and EAT-26.
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Table 4
Partial Correlation Analysis (Co-variate - Depression)
N= 52 State
Anger
State Sad State Disgust State Fear State
Happiness
Total EAT-26
scores .378** 398** .438** .210 -.242
Co-variate: HADS-D
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Table 4: Shows the correlations between the five emotions and disordered eating,
with depression partialled out of the analysis.
As can be seen within this table, with the exception of state fear, all the subscales
remained significantly correlated with EAT-26 scores, although the size of the
correlation was much reduced. Disgust still came out with the largest correlation with
the EAT-26
Table 5
Partial Correlation Analysis (Co-Variate - Anxiety)









Scores .361** .445** .464** .340** -.064
Co-variate: HADS-A
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Table 5: Shows the correlations between the five emotions and disordered eating,
with anxiety partialled out of the analysis.
As can be seen in table 3, the HADS-A scores had a small impact upon the size of the
correlation between EAT-26 scores and the four negative basic emotions. The results
from this analysis continued with the pattern of results from the above two correlation
analyses, in that, disgust was the largest correlation, but there was not much between
the size of the correlation between EAT-26 and anger, sadness and disgust.
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Interestingly, it was fear that showed a smaller correlation with EAT-26 scores, and
this finding is very much in keeping with the above results.
Regression Analysis
The second part of the analysis was a multiple hierarchical regression. A hierarchical
regression analysis was chosen so that the experimenter could decide the order of the
variables being entered in the regression analysis (as opposed to a stepwise regression
analysis). This decision process was governed by sample limitations, the above
correlation analysis and background literature. Due to the small sample size,
consideration was given to the issue of statistical power for this analysis. With
statistical power being set at 0.8 (Cohen, 1988) and alpha was set at 0.1 (due to the
conservative nature of the analysis, Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007), a sample size of 40
to 45 was felt to be sufficient (predicting a large effect), using guidelines from Miles
and Shelvin (2005). Furthermore, it was decided that only four variables would be
entered into the regression model to ensure stability and to prevent the ratio of
participants to variables not dropping below 10:1. As neither depression nor anxiety
appeared to have a large effect upon the correlations between the EAT-26 and the four
negative emotions, they were not included in the regression model. Also, because the
correlation between EAT-26 and happiness reduced to a non-significant level after
depression and anxiety were partialled out of the correlation, it was not included in the
regression analysis. The remaining four negative emotions were entered into the
equation in a step-wise fashion. The order of entry into the model was based upon the
literature review and the results of the correlation analyses.
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Assumptions ofregression analyses
As detailed by Field (2005) there are a number of assumptions regarding the
regression model need to be considered, which focus upon how well the regression
model fits with the observed data and the generalisation of the model to the wider
population. To test how well the regression model fits with the observed data,
consideration needs to be given to both the residuals within the regression model, and
the number of outliers potentially exerting undue influence in the regression model.
According to Field (2005) these can be tested by a number of statistics, such as the
standardised residuals and the Cook's distance (i.e. the influence of one case upon the
overall model). For the standardised residuals, 5% of cases should not be higher than
2, and for this regression model, there was only one case with a standardised residual
greater than 2. Furthermore, the Cook distance should not be greater than 1 and this
analysis highlighted that not one case was greater than 1 (range = 0.001 - 0.117).
In order to test for the generalisability of the regression model for the population as a
whole, certain assumptions need to be met. One of the main criteria is that there
should not be perfect multi-collinearity, and as such, the predictor variables should
not correlate too highly. Field (2005) suggests that correlations between the predictor
variables above 0.8-0.9 should be of concern. Within the analysis, the correlations
between the predictor variables range from 0.45-0.56. Therefore, it was decided that
there was no cause for concern about multi-collinearity within this analysis. Finally,
as pointed out by Field (2005) the outcome variable is the only variable that needs to
be normally distributed, and the K-S tests discussed above highlighted that this was
the case. It is not necessary for the predictor variables to be normally distributed, and
state fear was shown not to be normally distributed.
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Variable
N = 52

































Table 6: Shows both the R and the adjusted R for each stage of the regression
analysis, where the outcome variable was EAT-26 scores. Also, it provides the
significance of each variable entered into the regression equation, at each stage of the
analysis, ^denotes significance at 0.1
Within the regression analyses, the variables were entered into the regression analyses
according to the size of both the bi-variate and the partial correlations. These meant
that disgust was entered first, sadness second, anger third and fear fourth. Initially,
disgust demonstrated a significant effect and this was maintained when sadness was
entered into the model. Within the analysis, a decision was taken to keep the variables
in the equation at p<0.1 because of the conservative nature of the procedure
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). On entering fear into the equation, both state disgust and
state fear were reduced to a non-significant effect and were removed from the
regression equation. The final model of state sadness and state anger accounted for
nearly 44% of the variance within the model (adj. R2 ~ .43).
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Results for Hypothesis 1b
The preliminary analysis highlighted that trait emotions were normally distributed and
therefore it was decided that the parametric analyses would be reliable. Table 5 shows
the results of the initial correlations between the total EAT-26 score and the individual
trait emotions (in keeping with hypothesis lb).
Table 7
N=52 Trait Trait Trait Trait Trait
Anger Sad Disgust Fear Happy
Total EAT-26 score .311* .445** .454** .323* -.361**
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Table 7: shows the correlation analysis without depression or anxiety being partialled
out of the equation.
As can be seen in table 7, all the trait emotions (as measured by the BES) correlated
significantly with the EAT-26. However, the largest correlations were found between
trait disgust and EAT-26, and trait sadness and EAT-26. This pattern of results is the
same pattern of results that occurred for the state emotion data.
Table 8
Partial Correlation Analysis (Co-variate - Depression)
N= 52 Trait Trait Trait Trait Trait
Anger Sad Disgust Fear Happiness
Total EAT-2G ' ST ?
scores .190 .180 .239 .050 -.252
Co-variate: HADS-D
Table 8: Shows the correlations between the five trait emotions and disordered eating,
with depression partialled out of the analysis.
As can be seen within this table, all the subscales no longer significantly correlated
with EAT-26 scores. The largest correlation was between the negative correlation
between state happiness scores and the EAT-26. Whilst trait disgust also
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demonstrated a near significant correlation with EAT-26 (.239, p=.09). It is likely that
these two correlations would become a significant if the sample size was bigger.
Table 9
Partial Correlation Analysis (Co-variate - Anxiety)
N= 52 Trait Trait Trait Trait Trait
Anger Sad Disgust Fear Happiness
Total EAT-26 ■■■■■■■II
scores .187 .249 .285* .188 -.067
Co-variate: HADS-A
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Table 9: Shows the correlations between the five trait emotions and disordered eating,
with anxiety partialled out of the analysis.
As can be seen within this table, only trait disgust remained significant once anxiety
had been removed from the analysis. Trait sadness neared significance (.249 p=0.08).
The remaining subscales were no longer significantly correlated with EAT-26 scores.
Although it was evident throughout the correlation analysis for the trait emotions that
the size of relationship between the emotions and disordered eating was quite small, it
was decided to continue with the regression analyses to see if any of the trait emotion
variables were able to predict disordered eating (as measured by the EAT-26).
Regression Analysis
The second part of the analysis was a multiple hierarchical regression. A hierarchical
regression analysis was chosen so that the experimenter could decide the order of the
variables being entered in the regression analysis (as opposed to a stepwise regression
analysis). This decision process was governed by sample limitations, the above
correlation analysis and background literature. Due to the small sample size,
consideration was given to the issue of statistical power for this analysis. With
statistical power being set at 0.8 (Cohen, 1988) and alpha was set at 0.1 (due to the
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conservative nature of the analysis, Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007), a sample size of 40
to 45 was felt to be sufficient (predicting a large effect), using guidelines from Miles
and Shelvin (2005). Furthermore, it was decided that five variables would be entered
into the regression model to ensure stability and to prevent the ratio of participants to
variables not dropping below 10:1. As depression appeared to be exerting a
significant effect within the partial correlations, depression was included in the
regression analysis. In order to keep the ratio between sample size and number of
predictors low, it was decided that happiness would not be included in the regression
analyses. The remaining four negative emotions and depression were entered into the
equation in a step-wise fashion. The order of entry into the model was based upon the
literature review and the results of the correlation analyses. Given that the correlation
analysis suggested that regression analysis would not find not find a strong model, it
was decided that all variables would be included in the model (entered in a
hierarchical manner), in order to see investigate the overall significance of each
predictor within the model.
Assumptions ofregression analyses
As detailed above, there are a number of assumptions that needed to be addressed
before a regression analyses can be interpreted. For this analysis, the standardised
residuals should not have 5% of cases higher than 2, and for this regression model,
there was only one case with a standardised residual greater than 2. Furthermore, the
Cook distance should not be greater than 1 and this analysis highlighted that not one
case was greater than 1 (mean = .017, range = 0.001 - 0.79).
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The correlations between the predictor variables range from .127-.647 and, therefore,







R2 Adjusted R" Significance
.29 .27
.01*
Step 2 .33 .30
HADS-D .01*
Trait Disgust .09*















Table 10: Shows both the R and the adjusted R for each stage of the regression
analysis with the outcome variable being the EAT-26. Also, it provides the
significance of each variable entered into the regression equation, at each stage of the
analysis. *denotes significance at 0.1
As can be seen in table 8, only trait disgust showed significance at step 2 of the
regression analysis. This effect become insignificant when the other trait emotion
variables were entered into the regression equation. No other trait emotion variable
showed a significant predictor effect at any stage of the regression analysis. Only
depression consistently showed a significant effect across the analysis.
The predominance of depression in the above regression model led the researcher to
hypothesise that the trait emotions may play a role in developing depression, which in
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turn would lead to the disordered eating patterns (as measured by the EAT-26). The
analysis of choice for this type of research question is a path analysis. However, given
that the sample size was already small for the regression analysis, it was decided not
to pursue this analysis in this study. This point will be explored further in the
discussion.
Results for Hypothesis 1c
The preliminary analysis highlighted that coping with anger; disgust, fear and
happiness were not normally distributed (tested by the K-S test, full statistics in
appendix 5). This analysis still used parametric analysis as these analyses have more
power and enable partial correlation analyses. However, the initial correlation
analyses, as detailed in table 8, were also carried out using non-parametric statistics
(i.e. Spearman's Rho). Unlike the previous two hypotheses already discussed, the
Spearman's correlations showed a reduction in size to the Pearson correlations.
However, when the Spearman Rho correlations and the Pearson Correlations were
compared there was no change in overall significance. Therefore, it was decided that
the parametric analyses would be reliable despite the non-normal distribution.













scores ..214 .318* .387** .437** .245
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Table 11: shows the correlation analysis without depression or anxiety being
partialled out of the equation.
As can be seen in table 11, difficulties with coping with sadness, disgust and fear (as
measured by the BES) all positively correlated significantly with the EAT-26.
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However, the largest correlations were found between problems with coping with
disgust and EAT-26, and coping with fear and EAT-26.
Table 12












scores .066 .164 .139 .221 .071
^'-"SJ;''c '•
Co-variate: HADS-D
Table 12: Shows the correlations between the cope with emotions subscales and
disordered eating, with depression partialled out of the analysis.
As shown in table 12, all the subscales no longer significantly correlated with EAT-26
scores, when depression was partialled out of the correlation analysis.
Table 13












scores .103 .329* .348* .371** oo
Co-variate: HADS-A
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Table 13: Shows the correlations between the cope with emotions subscales and
disordered eating, with anxiety partialled out of the analysis.
As can be seen within this table, difficulties with coping with sadness, disgust and
fear remained significant with anxiety partialled out of the analysis. Indeed many of
the correlations in table 13 were virtually the same as table 11, and this tends to
suggest that the influence of anxiety upon the difficulties with coping with particular
emotions was negligible.
Although it was evident throughout the correlation analysis for the trait emotions that
the size of relationship between coping with the emotions scales and disordered eating
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were quite small, it was decided to continue with the regression analyses to see if any
of the coping with emotion variables were able to predict disordered eating (as
measured by the EAT-26).
Regression Analysis
The second part of the analysis was a multiple hierarchical regression. A hierarchical
regression analysis was chosen so that the experimenter could decide the order of the
variables being entered in the regression analysis (as opposed to a stepwise regression
analysis). This decision process was governed by sample limitations, the above
correlation analysis and background literature. Due to the small sample size,
consideration was given to the issue of statistical power for this analysis. With
statistical power being set at 0.8 (Cohen, 1988) and alpha was set at 0.1 (due to the
conservative nature of the analysis, Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007), a sample size of 40
to 45 was felt to be sufficient (predicting a large effect), using guidelines from Miles
and Shelvin (2005). Furthermore, it was decided that five variables would be entered
into the regression model to ensure stability and to prevent the ratio of participants to
variables not dropping below 10:1. As depression appeared to be exerting a
significant effect within the partial correlations, depression was included in the
regression analysis. In order to keep the ratio between sample size and number of
predictors low, it was decided that happiness would not be included in the regression
analyses. The remaining four negative emotions and depression were entered into the
equation in a step-wise fashion. The order of entry into the model was based upon the
literature review and the results of the correlation analyses. Given that the correlation
analysis suggested that regression analysis would not find not find a strong model, it
was decided that all variables would be included in the model (entered in a
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hierarchical manner), in order to see investigate the overall significance of each
predictor within the model.
Assumptions ofregression analyses
As detailed above, there are a number of assumptions that needed to be addressed
before a regression analyses can be interpreted. For this analysis, the standardised
residuals should not have 5% of cases higher than 2, and for this regression model,
there were only two cases that had standardised residuals greater than 2. Furthermore,
the Cook distance should not be greater than 1 and this analysis highlighted that not
one case was greater than 1 (mean = .016, range = 0.001 - 0.114). Within the analysis,
the correlations between the predictor variables range from .236-.599. Therefore, it
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2 2Table 14: Shows both the R and the adjusted R for each stage of the regression
analysis with the outcome variable being the EAT-26. Also, it provides the
significance of each variable entered into the regression equation, at each stage of the
analysis. *denotes significance at 0.1.
As can be seen in table 10, only fear showed a significant effect at step 2 of the
analysis. None of the other coping with emotion variables showed a significant
predictor effect at any stage of the regression analysis. Only depression consistently
showed a significant effect across the analysis.
Results for Hypothesis 2
Prior to the hypothesis testing was undertaken, the variables were tested for their
normal distribution using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Please see appendix 5). The
results highlighted all of the PAB sub-scales and the EAT-26 were normally
distributed. Interestingly, there was a sizeable amount of data that was missing from
the completed PABs, and this was especially true of the punitive reaction to emotions
scale where the only 38 participants responded to this item. This was felt to be highly
significant and this will be reflected upon within the discussion section of this chapter.
Given the amount of data missing, it is highly likely that this would have an impact
upon the results of these analyses.
Table 15
Distress Punitive Expressive Emotion Problem minimization
encouragement Focused focused
EAT-26 .222 .131 -.120 -.180





N=50 N=38 N=47 N=51 N=47 N=51
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Table 15: Shows the correlation co-efficients between the EAT-26 and six subscales
of the Parent/ Attitude Behaviour Questionnaire (adapted from the CCNES).
As can be seen from table 15 none of the six sub scales significantly correlated with
the EAT-26, although distress reaction to emotion neared significance (p=. 125).
Given that results were non-significant, no further analyses were undertaken on the
parent/ child questionnaire data.
5.5 Discussion
This study sought to investigate the relation of state, trait and coping with emotions to
disordered eating patterns.
5.5.1 Hypothesis 1a Findings
The first finding was that eating disorder symptoms correlated strongly with the four
'negative emotions', with disgust and sadness demonstrating very large correlations.
These correlations were maintained, even when depression and anxiety were
partialled out of the analysis. Depression did have some impact on the size of the
correlations between disordered eating and the four emotions, but only fear reduced to
a non-significant level. Indeed, as discussed by Cohen (1988) a correlation can also be
regarded as an effect size; with correlations less than .3 can be interpreted as a small
effect, between .3 and .5 as a medium effect, and over .5 as a large effect. Therefore,
according to Cohen (1988), with the exception of fear, all of the partial correlations
(with depression) would be regarded as a medium effect. Interestingly, given the
predominance of anxiety in the current theoretical models (e.g. Pallister and Waller,
2008), both anxiety and the emotion of fear seemed to be of lesser significance in the
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correlation analysis, and removal of depression in the first set of partial correlations
reduced the correlation between disordered eating and fear to a non-significant level.
In considering the correlation between anger and EAT-26 scores, it was interesting
that the relationship was a positive relationship, when there is some evidence that
anger is suppressed for people with eating disorders (e.g. Waller et al, 2003), and
therefore, it may have been expected that anger would negatively correlate with eating
disorder scores. However, this finding of increased anger for people with eating
disorders fits with the findings from chapter 4 where there were increased levels of
the actual emotion of anger in people with bulimia nervosa, but the same participants
also demonstrated an increase in anger suppression scores.
The regression analyses examined the contributory effect of each of the emotions on
disordered eating. The results were broadly as predicted, with anger and sadness
uniquely predicting nearly 50% of the variance in the analysis. For the emotion of
anger, this finding is very much in keeping with the previous research by Waller et al
(2003), Geller et al. (2000) and the results from chapter 4 and 5. The finding that
sadness also contributed significantly to disordered eating also provides some further
supportive findings for the results from chapter 3. It was interesting that the emotions
of disgust and fear did not contribute significantly to the overall model.
5.5.2 Hypothesis lb Findings
In terms of trait emotions, the initial correlation results showed a very similar pattern
as the state-emotion data. Trait disgust and sadness showed large correlations, but all
the trait emotions significantly correlated with disordered eating patterns (EAT-26).
Interestingly, all of these correlations disappeared when the depression scores were
partialled out of the correlation analyses. However, for the trait disgust, the results
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were nearly significant and could be regarded as a small to medium effect (as defined
by Cohen, 1988). In many ways, disgust appears to be the consistent theme across
both state and trait emotions. Interestingly, the partialling out of anxiety had more of
an effect upon the size and significance of the correlations between trait emotions and
disordered eating, than the equivalent analyses for state emotions. However, even
here, disgust maintained its significance and it still represented a small to medium
effect. For trait sadness, the correlation, like trait disgust, was very close to
significance and it also represented a small to medium effect, as discussed by Cohen
(1988). Throughout the analyses of the trait emotion's correlation to disordered
eating, depression and anxiety exerted a significant effect. Only disgust appeared to
be a fairly consistent variable to maintain its effect with disordered eating.
5.5.3. Hypothesis 1c Findings
The analyses from the coping with emotions scale (from the BES) demonstrated a
significant correlation between the coping scale and disordered eating for the
emotions of sadness, disgust and fear. Indeed, all of these significant correlations were
in the medium effect range (Cohen, 1988). However, once depression was partialled
out of the correlation analyses, the significance of these correlations disappeared,
although the correlation between disordered eating and difficulties with coping with
fear was only marginally non-significant, and it still maintained a small to medium
effect (Cohen, 1988). When anxiety was partialled out of the correlation, the
correlations had the same significance pattern as the original correlations without any
partialling out of variables.
5.5.4. Hypothesis 2 Findings
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The final aim of this study was to examine the contributory role of parental responses
to emotions onto disordered eating patterns, whilst controlling for depression and
anxiety. Moreover, depending upon the results of this analysis and sample size, an
exploratory mediator/ moderator analysis was to be conducted that looked at the
relationship between parental responses to emotions, state emotions and disordered
eating patterns. However, the results from this study showed that none of the parental
response styles correlated with disordered eating patterns. These results led to the
decision that no further analysis would be undertaken with the data from the PAB
questionnaire.
5.5.5. Emotions and DisorderedEating
Although limited by the size of the sample, the data pertaining to state emotions
(hypothesis la) supported the SPAARS-ED model as discussed in Chapter 2. This
study's data and the previous literature suggest that people with eating disorders
experience both higher levels of anger and sadness, and also experience these
emotions as being overwhelming. Given that it is likely that the participants in this
study were more bulimic in nature, current theory would suggest that emotions are
suppressed once they enter consciousness. This point is discussed by Waller et al.
(2007), who proposed that the emotion is suppressed once it enters consciousness, and
is often related to more bulimic symptom patterns. Within chapter 3, it was found
that individuals with eating disorders had experienced a high level of anger whilst
they were growing up and it was argued that this increased anger appeared to be
associated with an increased propensity to binge and vomit. In other words, the
experience of increased anger led the individual to use strategies to 'manage' or
'suppress' the emotions from the sense of self. However, the results from PAB
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(hypothesis 2) did not support the hypothesis that parental responses to emotions were
related to disordered eating patterns. This finding will be explored in more detail
below.
The results from the initial correlation analysis and the regression analysis highlighted
how disgust initially appeared to be an important emotion for eating disorders, but
once sadness and anger were entered into the model, the unique effect of disgust
disappeared. This suggests that while the experience of disgust may be heightened in
individuals with eating disorders, it may be linked to other relevant emotions such as
anger or sadness rather than being an independent risk factor for symptoms. This
finding fits with the results from chapter 4 on how anger and disgust may be 'coupled'
within people with disordered eating, in particular, people with bulimic
symptomatology. This study's findings on the potential role of disgust in eating
disorders may help to some explain of the inconsistencies of the research on disgust.
The finding that sadness predicted disordered eating patterns was an interesting
finding, as this is the first time that this emotion has been found to be significant for
people with eating disorders. Within the SPAARS-ED model it is discussed that
sadness was a key emotion for eating disorders, and within chapter 3 it is discussed
how participants with a diagnosis of anorexia nervosa often felt that experiencing and
expressing the emotion of sadness was a sign of 'weakness' and 'damaging to close
family or friends'. Some of the participants in this study discussed how they had
developed strategies that allowed them to express their emotions in a more
'appropriate manner', for example, choosing a 'weepy film'. The limited expression
of sadness was felt to be related to the actual eating disorder, and this study offers
further evidence supporting this relationship. As discussed by Power and Tarsia
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(2007), sadness was the strongest predictor of depression, shortly followed by disgust.
Given this study's data, it may well be that sadness and disgust are important
emotions in understanding the high levels of co-morbidity of disordered eating
symptoms and depression (as predicted by the SPAARS-ED model). The final finding
from the regression analysis for state emotions was that fear becomes a significant
predictor of disordered eating, but its effect was tiny. The overall variance change
following the introduction of the emotion of fear was very small, and therefore, it is
likely to only play a small role in the overall predictive model for disordered eating.
In the qualitative study, it is of note that some of the participants discussed the
secondary aspect of fear, in that, eating disorders almost brought upon the emotion of
fear, rather than it played an aetiological role in the disorder. This study's results offer
some tentative evidence to this hypothesis.
The picture presented for the trait emotions data was a rather complex picture that
demonstrated how depression often exerted a significant influence in the relationship
between disordered eating patterns and trait emotions. Indeed, even in the regression
analysis, only depression consistently predicted disordered eating. As discussed
above, the SPAARS-ED model proposes that disordered eating patterns and
depression share similar underlying emotions, namely sadness and disgust (and to a
lesser degree, anger). The pattern of the results suggests there is an interaction
between depression, disordered eating and all of the trait emotions. These findings not
only fit with the SPAARS-ED predictions, but also with the work ofEric Stice and
colleagues. Stice et al (2001) highlighted that thin body internalisation was an
important construct in understanding both levels of depression and marked body
dissatisfaction and it may be that the emotion of disgust underpins both of these
difficulties. If the sample size was bigger these hypotheses could have been tested via
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a path analysis, where it could be seen if trait disgust and trait sadness lead to
depression, which in turn, would lead to disordered eating patterns. The discussion in
the introduction chapter on emotional warmth and affiliation may offer some pointers
to this discussion, as Jenkins and Oatley's model discusses how a lack of affiliation
and warmth is related to the emotion of sadness. This, if operationalised properly,
could form a part of a path analysis to test this theory. This remains a hypothesis, as
the results of this study cannot confirm the specificity of disgust given the effect on all
the trait emotions.
According to the SPAARS-ED model and the findings from chapter 3 and chapter 4,
it would have been predicted that trait anger would have had a strong correlation with
disordered eating patterns. However, this was not the case for this study. This finding
is at odds with the findings of chapter 4, where trait anger was found to higher in the
participants with bulimic symptomatology. Likewise, it could have predicted that trait
sadness would have had a stronger correlation, given the results of the state emotions
analyses and the previous research in this thesis. There are a couple of potential
explanations for this study's findings. Firstly, the other study's findings were
unreliable, and given the relative size of this study's sample size it maybe that
depression is the key emotional experience that contributes to disordered eating (as
discussed by Crisp, 1980). However, given the findings of the state emotions data, this
appears to be unlikely, as it remains unclear why depression would only exert an
influence on trait level emotion. One possible explanation lies within the self s
interpretation of their own emotionality, in that, people with eating disorders may not
want to acknowledge their own emotionality even to themselves. According to this
view, recent emotions are still clear in the person's mind and they are able to reflect
and answer questions upon them (as with the BES state emotions questionnaire).
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However, as time goes by, the tendency to deny the emotional experience grows and
the true nature of the experience is minimalised. This effect could be heightened by
the probable presence of alexithymia in this sample. It may be that alexithymia,
brought on by low mood, affects the ability to recall emotional experiences, which
would hamper the answering of the trait emotion questions on the BES. This study's
participants exhibited a very high level of depression (HADS-D = 15.45), and the
findings ofBydlowski et al. (2005) and Kessler et al. (2006) showed that there is a
close link between measures of anxiety and depression, and alexithymia. Whilst,
Eisguirrea et al. (2004) found that the relationship between eating pathology and
alexithymia was moderated by levels of depression. In hindsight, it was a mistake not
to include a measure of alexithymia in this study. Despite this limiting factor, it was
interesting that the coping with emotions showed consistent high means for all the
negative emotions, which would indicate that the participants had difficulty with
coping with all the emotions. This theoretical perspective would also help to explain
the findings for hypothesis 2, in that, the non-significant findings between the
emotional histories questionnaires and disordered eating. This will be explored more
fully below. In sum, although they may be many reasons why the trait emotions did
not follow the same pattern of findings as the state emotion findings, it is still
interesting that it appears that it is state emotions that are linked to disordered eating,
and sadness and anger are the emotions that predominantly predicted disordered
eating in this study.
For the coping with emotions findings, it was interesting that the emotions of sadness,
fear and disgust were the emotions that correlated with disordered eating patterns.
These findings fit with the theoretical ideas raised by the SPAARS-ED model and
also some of the 2nd generation CBT models that postulate the affect regulation
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function of eating disorders (e.g. Cooper et al, 2004; Waller et al, 2007). As with the
trait emotion data, these correlations reduced to non-significance levels when
depression was partialled out of the equation. It is likely that depression plays both a
cause and effect of these difficulties with depression. The SPAARS model and the
meta-cognitive model of emotional disorders (Wells, 1997) both discuss how negative
appraisals of emotion states and the wish to not engage with them is often pivotal in
the maintenance of the emotional disorder, such as depression. Likewise, the actual
depression would also play a role in leading the individuals concerned to negatively
appraise their ability to cope with their emotions. In other words, the more depressed
someone is, the more likely they are to report that they are not able to cope with their
emotions, especially negative emotions. Equally, as discussed above, the more
depressed the participants become, the more alexithymic they are likely to become.
This would leave them with an overall difficulty with coping with all their emotions.
This would also help to explain why depression was the only predictor variable to
predict disordered eating in the regression analysis.
There is one final point to make about findings from the analyses from the three parts
of hypothesis 1 and this concerns the role of fear and anxiety. In many contemporary
theories, anxiety has been regarded as a cornerstone of eating disorders (e.g. Pallister
and Waller, 2008). Waller (2008) has even argued that eating disorders should be
regarded as an anxiety disorder and it should be classified as one within the new
classification system from the American Psychiatric Association (DSM V). The
results of this study have highlighted that fear appears to play a minor role in
disordered eating and the partialling out of anxiety in all of the correlation analyses all
showed a small effect. Interesting, the only time fear showed a reasonable correlation
was between coping with fear and disordered eating. It may be that fear is a very
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visual emotion in terms of difficulty with coping, but also, as discussed in the
introduction, fear and disgust play similar functions and it may be that the role of
disgust may account for what is actually perceived as anxiety within eating disorders.
Early Responses to Emotions
The other main aim of this study was to investigate the relation of different responses
to emotions whilst the participants were still young. The results were stark, as they did
not demonstrate any significant correlations between the carer responses to emotional
styles and disordered eating patterns. This result is a direct contrast to the results of
chapter 3, where all of the participants discussed different parental responses to their
emotions and these had the effect of reducing the expression of those emotions. It is
not clear why there were not any clear significant correlations, as it could be due to
either or both methodological and theoretical reasons. The findings from the punitive
scale which showed that there were a high number of participants who did not
complete the punitive subscale were felt to be highly significant by the researchers.
One hypothesis was that the participants who had experienced this form of parental
interaction around their own emotions avoided these answers to the questions as it
was too difficult to answer. Related to this, was the above theoretical hypothesis that
alexithymia may have played a role in the trait and coping with emotions subscales
results. It would seem likely that if alexithymia has exerted an influence across the
trait emotions and coping with emotions data, then it is likely that it would interface
with the memories of how parents/ carers responded to their emotions.
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An alternative explanation could have been that the adapted questionnaire in this
study may not be sensitive enough to detect the nuances in the interactions between
care givers and the participants (as children). The interactions discussed in chapter 3
were often subtle and, perhaps, not easily accessible by a quantitative measure.
Despite this, distress reaction neared significance (although this was not marginal)
and this type of reaction would fit theoretically within the SPAARS-ED model and
the results of chapter 3, as well as previous research (e.g. Krause et al, 2003; Coggins
and Fox, 2009). Indeed a correlation of .22 would represent a small to medium effect
as detailed by Cohen (1988).
Limitations and critique ofthis study
As with all research, this study is not without its drawbacks. The participants in this
study did not undertake a formal assessment of their eating disorder (e.g. Eating
Disorders Examination; Cooper, Cooper and Fairburn, 1989), so it is impossible to
conclude that all the participants in this study met diagnostic criteria for an eating
disorder. Despite this lack of formal interview assessment, all the participants reported
high levels of eating pathology on the EAT-26 and felt able to place themselves on a
research volunteer list via a national eating disorders charity, B-EAT. The second
point to reflect upon within this study is how the data is of cross-sectional nature. In
other words, causality cannot be inferred from this study's findings. It may well be
that the actual eating disorder creates these emotions within the sufferer, and this was
what was picked upon within the results.
However, an alternative interpretation of hypothesis 1 a could be that the effect of
disgust on disordered eating disappeared because of the low sample size. Given the
strong correlations between disgust and eating disorders, it is quite possible that the
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predictive value of disgust would increase with a larger sample size. In saying this, it
is noteworthy that disgust has been shown to be an emotion that is quite complex in
the study of eating disorders, and other authors have shown that it often has a relation
to other emotions (e.g. Davey, in press). This is an area that certainly would benefit
from further studies with larger sample sizes.
As detailed above, it was an omission not to have included a measure of alexithymia
in this study. Although the participants appeared to be able to reflect and fill out
measures on emotions, it would have been prudent to have investigated alexithymia in
a study of emotions and eating disorders. Likewise, the B-EAT dataset was much
larger than the numbers recruited for this study and it would be interesting to
understand why people refused to take part in this study. The actual participant group
for this study was much older than was expected and it is likely that a more complex,
chronic group of participants took part in this study. This may have an effect upon
how representative this sample is of people with disordered eating.
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Chapter 6: An Investigation into Emotional Regulation,
Core Beliefs and Emotional Coupling in Anorexia
Nervosa
6.1. Introduction
Over the last few chapters, this thesis has argued that problems with emotions and
their regulation lay at the heart of eating disorders. In particular, anger and sadness
has been shown to predict disordered eating, and the qualitative study demonstrated
key difficulties with sadness and anger. Furthermore, the grounded theory study also
demonstrated some interesting developmental factors that have the potential to help
understand the pathway that leads to the development of eating disorders. So far, with
the exception of the parent/ carer's response to emotions data presented in the last
chapter, the findings have been broadly supportive of the SPAARS-ED model
presented in chapter 2. Although these studies have produced some very interesting
data, there are still key theoretical points from the model that need to be tested. With
the exception of the qualitative data presented in chapter 3, the clinical caseness of the
participants has not been ideal, and it is imperative that any model needs to be tested
on a clearly defined clinical group. Furthermore, there is a need to investigate the
more cognitive aspects of the model by exploring core beliefs and their emotional
associates within the eating disorders. So far, within the research literature, the
linkage between the basic emotions and core beliefs has not been investigated and it is
argued that a clearer understanding of these cognitive-affective relationships will help
to further develop the theoretical account of the eating disorders.
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As presented in chapter 4, there are some data that suggests that anger and disgust
may be acting in a coupled way in individuals with bulimic symptoms. However, it
was not clear whether this increase in disgust was associated with changes in
perception of how people with eating disorders view their own bodies, or their view of
what they would ideally like their bodies to look like. The untested hypothesis from
chapter 4 is that the increase in levels of disgust following the anger induction would
lead to an increase in perceived body shape. This would fit with the findings of
Hayaki et al (2002) and Geller et al. (2000) who found that suppressed emotion led to
an increase in body dissatisfaction.
Finally, there has been no objective test of emotional regulation strategies within this
thesis so far. Both implicitly and explicitly within the SPAARS-ED model, it is
predicted that people with eating disorders will have markedly internal and
dysfunctional emotional regulation strategies. Furthermore, it is also predicted that
people with eating disorders will have a tendency to suppress emotions and the
associated thoughts. To date, research has only suggested that these strategies are in
place, but it has not been tested explicitly.
6.2 Aims/ Hypotheses
This Chapter consists of two sister studies that both examine two principal aims:
emotional regulation and core beliefs; and emotional coupling, with associated body
image estimations in participants with a diagnosis of anorexia nervosa.
Aim 1
Given the lack of research that has explicitly examined emotional regulation strategies
within anorexia nervosa, the aim of this current study was to examine both the types
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of emotional regulation across four domains (internal-external/ functional-
dysfunctional) and emotional/ thought suppression. Within this section of the study,
an investigation of the type of core beliefs and their relation to the five basic emotions
was investigated.
Hypothesis la: It was hypothesised that, in line with the previous research (both
within this thesis and in the general research literature) that the anorexia nervosa
participants would score significantly higher on the internal-dysfunctional subscales
of the emotional regulation questionnaire than the control group participants, when
co-varying for depression and anxiety.
Hypothesis lb: It was hypothesised that, in line with the previous research (both
within this thesis and in the general research literature) that the anorexia nervosa
participants would score significantly higher on the white bear suppression inventory
(WBSI) than the control group participants, when co-varying for depression and
anxiety.
Hypothesis lc: It was hypothesised that, in line with the previous research that the
anorexia nervosa participants would score significantly higher on the negative self and
others scales of the Core Beliefs Scale than the control group participants, when co-
varying for depression and anxiety.
Exploratory Hypothesis: To undertake an exploratory analysis of the relationships
between basic emotions (as measured by the Basic Emotions Scale) and the Core
Beliefs (as measured by the Core Beliefs Scale) for the anorexia nervosa group.
Aim 2
The second aim of this study was to replicate and enhance the study reported in
chapter 3, by both enhancing the methodology and using a bona fide AN group of
participants.
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Hypothesis 2a: It was hypothesised that participants with anorexia nervosa would
report higher levels of state anger (as measured by the State anger scale from the
STAXI; Spielberger, 1996) in comparison to matched controls following an anger
induction.
Hypothesis 2b: It was hypothesised that an anger induction would lead to a
significant increase in the emotion of disgust (as measured by the Disgust Sensitivity
Scale; Haidt, McCauley and Rozin, 1994 ) in participants with anorexia nervosa,
when compared to matched controls. In keeping with chapter 3, there would be a
secondary co-variance analysis, which was designed to investigate the potential
impact of depression and anxiety on the above anger and disgust hypotheses (as
measured by the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983).
Hypothesis 2c: It was hypothesised that a rise in the emotion of anger (measured by
the state anger scale from the STAXI) would lead to a significant increase in the
estimation of body size (as measured by a body shape silhouette scale) and a
significant increase in the desire to be thinner (as measured by a body shape silhouette
scale) in participants with anorexia nervosa, when compared to matched controls. In
keeping with chapter 3, there would be a secondary co-variance analysis, which was
designed to investigate the potential impact of depression and anxiety on these
hypotheses (as measured by the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale; Zigmond &
Snaith, 1983).
Exploratory Hypothesis: To undertake an exploratory analysis of the relationships
between state disgust (as measured by the Basic Emotions Scale, the shape concern
measure, weight concern measure (from the EDE-Q) and the estimation of body size
(as measured by the body shape silhouettes) for the anorexia nervosa group.
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6.3 Methodology
Design of this Study
The study utilised a cross-sectional design that utilised two analytical strategies, a
between subjects design and a mixed design that incorporated both between and
within subjects design. For the sake of clarity, the results will be presented in two
stages, with the between subjects design being presented first, with the mixed design
being presented second.
Participants
For the anorexia nervosa group (AN), participants were recruited from three clinical
services in a major city in the North of England (one inpatient/day service; and an
outpatient service) and a major city in Scotland (outpatient service), whilst control
participants were recruited from University students. Only females were included in
the analysis, as exploring gender differences in emotional experience was beyond the
scope of this current research and there is some research which suggests eating
disorders in males may be dependent on different psychological processes (e.g.
Fernandez-Aranda, Aitken, Badia, Giminez, Solano, Collier et al. 2004). Data
collection lasted 9 months. As will be detailed below, this study was undertaken in
two parts. A number of participants only undertook the 1st part of the study, however,
the majority of participants undertook both parts of the study. For the AN group, 33
females took part in the first part of the study, with 23 of this group taking part in the
second part of the study. For the control group, 22 females took part in the first part of
the study, with 19 females taking part in the second part of the study.
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Service I - Inpatient Unit
The inpatient unit in Manchester was split into two sections; intensive care (ITU) and
acute. The ITU's patients were typically very low weight and were often on a non-
solid diet and used nasal gastric tubes for refeeding, whilst the acute patients were
much more physically stable. There are 15 beds on the ITU and 13 beds on the acute.
There are approximately 30 places at the day service. This service was the same
service that was used for recruitment in the study presented in chapter 3. The vast
majority of patients on this unit suffer from anorexia nervosa and they are often
admitted because their anorexia nervosa has put their physical health in danger.
People are referred to the service from around the whole of the North of England.
Within this service, all the patients were invited to take part in this study and, in
practice, this meant that 72 patients were approached. Out of these 72 people, 26
people consented to part in the study. Out of these 26 people from the inpatient unit, 7
only took part in the first part of the study (questionnaires) and 19 took part in both
the first and second part of the study (mood induction part of the study).
Service II and III - Outpatient Service
The two outpatient services used in this study were the principal NHS outpatient
services for their respective cities. These services offered a variety of psychological
therapies, including CBT and CAT. Both of these services see people with a variety
of eating disorders, including anorexia nervosa (down to BMI's of 14) and bulimia
nervosa. Patients in receipt of services at these services tended to be a heterogeneous
group, with a mixture of length of time with their anorexia nervosa and varying
degrees of severity. Recruitment from the outpatient services was slow, and staff
feedback that patients did not want to be involved in the project as it concerned
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emotions. Although it is not clear how many patients were approached as the actual
clinicians approached the patients, an approximate was given as 30-35 people
approached to take part in the study. The diagnosis of anorexia nervosa was
confirmed by the responsible clinician involved in their care. Out of these
participants, 5 agreed to take part in both the first and second stages of the research.
As can be seen below, table 1 shows the demographic data for both participant
groups. This data includes mean age, mean BMI and mean HADS scores for both





Age 23.70 23.38 .27
(4.20) (3.03)
BMI 15.49 22.81 .01*
^ 'yt (2-55) (4.37)







Table 1: Shows the mean scores and standard deviations for age, BMI, HADS-A and
HADS-D for both the clinical and control groups, ^denotes significance at 0.05
As can be seen from table 1, there was not a significant difference between the
participant groups on age. However, there was a significant difference between the
participant groups on BMI, anxiety and depression. Interestingly, the difference for
the depression scale was contrary to expectation, as the control group was
significantly more depressed than the AN group. In saying this, both groups reached
probable clinical caseness for both anxiety and depression (scores greater than 8).
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For the AN group, a diagnosis of anorexia nervosa was confirmed with the lead
clinician for that person. As detailed above, recruitment occurred in dedicated eating
disorders services where access could only be achieved with a specific eating disorder
diagnosis. However, to ensure clinical caseness within this study, caseness was
confirmed with the Eating Disorders Examination Questionnaire (EDE-Q). Clinical
participants were only included in the analysis if their EDE-Q scores were in the
clinical range. Mond et al. (2004) found that a score of 3.09 on the global scale on the
EDE-Q indicated clinical caseness. On the basis of these data, a cut off of 3.0 was
used to ensure clinical caseness for the AN group. The majority of participants were
recruited from an inpatient facility which meant that many of the behavioural
indicators of eating disorders were not possible (e.g. avoiding food). Therefore, it is
highly likely that the levels of eating pathology were significantly under reported by
the EDE-Q. However, there are a paucity of scales that directly measure eating
disorder symptoms within specialist/ eating disorder inpatient units.
For the control group, Mond et al. (2004) reported a mean EDE-Q score of 1.19,
however, participants were recruited if their scores were below 3.0 on the global scale
of the EDE-Q. As detailed below, the scores on this sub-scale were, in practice, much
lower than this cut offwith the mean score not being greater than 1 (.937, SD=.66).
This mean score is comparable to the data reported by Mond et al (2004).
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Group








AN group 30 2.65 (1.48) 4.23 (1.31)
control group 22 1.19(1.21) .87 (.96)
eating disorders
concern score
AN group 31 2.02 (0.95) 3.71 (1.41)
control group 22 0.49 (0.74) .39 (.43)
shape concern AN group 31 4.01 (0.98) 4.96 (.95)
control group 22 2.03 (1.38) 1.42 (0.87)
weight concern AN group 31 3.68 (1.08) 4.50 (1.26)
control group 22 1.49 (1.20) 1.12 (.91)
Global eating score AN group 30 3.09 (0.83) 4.33 (.82)
control group 22 1.19 (1.21) .94 (.66)
Table 2: Shows the results of the EDE-Q scores for all its subscales for both the
AN group and control group. Table 2 also shows the mean scores from the Mond et al
(2004) study for both clinical cases and non-clinical participants.
Control Participants
Control participants were recruited from Lancaster University students. The
University of Lancaster is a big campus university which has over 15,000 students. It
is multi-cultural university with students from a variety of different social economic
backgrounds. Once ethics had been granted to this study, an administrator emailed a
short invitation to take part in this study to all the students on campus. This short
invitation gave a brief summary ofwhat the study was about by saying that it was a
study that was designed to look at emotions and emotional processing in people with
anorexia nervosa. It explained that the study was in two parts, with the first part being
undertaken on the website at Stellar Survey and the second part would be undertaken
at a venue at the University in small groups of 4-5 participants. The EDE-Q was used
to ensure that the participants did not have an identifiable eating disorder, and the data
for this analysis is presented in table 2. 135 students undertook the first part of the
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study, but 113 were found to have elevated scores on the EDE-Q and were therefore
unable to take part in the study. This left 22 participants, 3 took part in just the first
part of the study and 19 took part in both the first and second part of the study. Each
student participant was paid £5 for taking part in both parts of the study.
Measures and Stimuli
Eating Disorders Examination-Questionnaire (EDE-Q) - Fairburn and Beglin,
1994)
In the development of this research study, consideration was given to deciding upon a
measure that could be used to ensure clinical caseness or non-caseness for both the
clinical and control participant groups. According to Garner (2002) the EDE is the
'gold standard' for assessing eating disorders. However, as it is an interview based
measure, it is time consuming and, as participants were being recruited via clinical
service, it was decided that a measure was needed that either confirmed diagnosis or
ensured non-caseness (for control participants). On the basis of this decision, the
EDE-Q was used within this study. The EDE-Q is a self-report measure that is based
upon the EDE, and it subscales map directly onto the EDE. These subscales are eating
disorders restraint scale, eating disorders concern scale, body shape concern, body
weight concern and an overall global eating scale. Across these subscales, there are 36
items, and a number of studies have shown a high level of agreement between the
EDE-Q and the EDE (e.g. Fairburn and Beglin, 1994, Mond et al, 2004). In keeping
with the EDE, scores on each item of 4 or over are regarded as reaching clinical
levels. As discussed above, the majority of the data was collected from participants
who were currently inpatients on an eating disorders unit in South Manchester. On
reflection, it was felt that the score of 4 on each item to denote clinical caseness would
be too conservative, as the refeeding regime would prevent the uptake of some
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behaviours whilst on the unit (e.g. bingeing, limiting the amount of food, etc).
Therefore, data from the Mond et al. (2004) study was used as an indication of clinical
caseness, as these data were based upon clinical cases but is not as strict in describing
caseness. As will be seen below, the EDE-Q findings from this study showed that the
means for the each of the subscales were either above or just below 4. Given the
constraints present on the EDU, it is argued that these scores would under represent
the eating psychopathology in the clinical participant group. Peterson et al. (2007)
reported satisfactory psychometrics for the EDE-Q with alpha co-efficients ranging
from .70 to .90.
Brief Core Schema Scales (BCSS; Fowler, Freeman, Smith, Kuipers,
Bebbington, Bashforth, Coker, Hodgekins, Gracie, Dunn and Garety, 2006)
The BCSS has 24 items concerning beliefs about the self and others that are assessed
on a five-point rating scale (0^T). Four scores are obtained: negative-self (six items),
positive self (six items), negative-others (six items) and positive-others (six items).
Individuals were asked to indicate in a dichotomous No/Yes format whether they held
each belief. Then, if they answered in the affirmative, they were then asked to indicate
their degree of belief conviction by circling a number from 1 to 4 (believe it slightly,
believe it moderately, believe it very much, believe it totally). Good psychometric
properties for the four subscales were reported by Fowler et al (2006), with alpha co¬
efficients ranging from .78 to .88 for both clinical and non-clinical subscales.
State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory-2 (STAXI; Spielberger, 1996,)
The STAXI is a 44 item self-report questionnaire used as a tool for measuring five
different types of anger or anger related behaviours. The state anger scale assesses the
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'here and now' intensity of anger, whilst the trait anger scale measures how often a
person generally feels angry. The anger expression and anger control scales assess
four different anger-related traits which are: the expression of anger towards other
people and objects (anger expression-out); holding in or suppressing angry feelings
(anger expression-in), controlling angry feelings by preventing the expression of
anger towards other persons or objects in the environment (anger control-out) and
controlling suppressed angry feelings by calming down or cooling off (anger control-
in). As detailed in chapter 4, this measure has very good psychometric properties.
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983)
This questionnaire consists of 7 items relating to anxiety symptoms, and 7 pertaining
to depressive symptoms. A score of 8 or above out of a possible 21 on both the
depression and anxiety subscales detects 80% of cases (Bjelland et al. 2002). As
detailed in chapter 4, this measure has very good psychometric properties.
Basic Emotions Scale (BES; Power, 2006)
This is a 3-part scale constructed from 21 emotional terms which relate to the five
basic emotions of anger, disgust, fear, happiness and sadness. As detailed in chapter
4, this measure has very good psychometric properties. However, for this study, only
the state emotion measure was used. As reported in previous chapters, this scale has
good psychometric qualities.
The White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994) is a 15-
item self-report measure of tendency to suppress thoughts. Each item is scored on a
five-point Likert scale consisting of: "strongly agree" (5), "agree" (4), "neutral or do
not know" (3), "disagree" (2), "strongly disagree" (1). Total scores can range from 15
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to 85. Higher scores indicate a greater tendency to suppress thoughts. Muris and
Merckelbach (1997) reported good psychometric properties for this scale with an
alpha coefficient of .86.
Regulation of Emotion Questionnaire (REQ; Phillips and Power, 2007)
The REQ has 21 items that measure across four domains of emotion regulation;
namely, internal-functional, internal-dysfunctional, external-functional and external-
dysfunctional. Each item is measured on a five point Likert scale ('never' to 'always')
where participants indicate how often they use the corresponding method of emotion
regulation. Each subscale gives a score for analysis. Phillips and Power (2007) report
satisfactory alpha co-efficients for the four subscales, ranging from .66 to .76.
The Disgust Scale (DS-R; Olatunji, Tolin, Sawchuck, Williams, Abramowitiz,
Lohr and Elwood, 2007) The DS is a 25 item scale that measures across three
domains of disgust, namely core disgust (a sense of offensiveness and threat of
contamination), animal reminder disgust (an aversion of stimuli that serves as a
reminder of the origins of humans) and contamination disgust (contamination based
disgust sensitivity). The scale is broken down into 2 sections, with the first section
being a 'true' and 'false' section, where participants indicated they either agreed or
disagreed with a disgust eliciting situation. The second section utilises a 5 point Likert
scale which runs from 'not at all disgusting' to 'extremely disgusting'. This scale was
developed from the Disgust Scale devised by Haidt, McCauley and Rozin (1994). The
revised scale was initially redeveloped in line with the Rozin et al. (2000) 2 factor
model of disgust, which consisted of two forms of disgust, namely, core and animal
reminder. However, Olatunji et al. (2007) conducted a factor analysis on their data
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from the DS-R scale, and uncovered a third factor that related to contamination fear.
For the purposes of this study, the total score from the scale was used in the analysis.
Olatunji et al. (2007) reported good internal consistency for the DS-R, with alpha co¬
efficient of .84.
Body Shape Silhouettes (BSS; Romieu, I., Avenel, B., Leynaert, F., Kauffmann,
F. and Clavel-Chapelon, F. (2003). The BSS has two parts, which asks participants
to choose a body shape that maps directly onto how they currently feel about their
body size. The second part relates to how they would ideally like their body to look.
This scale was developed to show incremental larger body shapes from very thin to
very large body shapes on both measures. The participant had to circle which body
silhouette they feel represents them at that time.
Initial Mood Induction I
Video Clips ( Hewig et al (2005) Hewig and colleagues produced a set of
standardised video clips that have been shown to elicit individual basic emotions.
Hewig et al (2005) produced a number of standardised film clips in the language of
German. Therefore, a question remained about the translation of one set of stimuli that
had been standardised in one language to another language. Therefore, a pilot study
was undertaken that used the same methodology as Hewig et al (2005) but within the
UK and in English (please see appendix 10 for a report of this pilot study). It was
found anger was the hardest emotion to elicit out of the five basic emotions and the
proposed anger inducing clip taken from the film of Witness did not significantly
differ from the emotion of disgust. This seemed, in part, due to the ambiguous use of
the word of disgust in the English language. In asking the participants after the study,
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there was a clear distinction between the emotions of anger and disgust, but when
disgust was renamed, repulsion. It was therefore decided to use the film clip from
Witness as an induction task which would then be followed up by an adapted Velten
technique. This clip was shown on a laptop computer. Once this task had been
completed, participants were asked to undertake the second stage ofmood induction.
Mood Induction II
Modified Velten Mood Induction Technique (Velten, 1968) The Velten technique
was developed for the study reported in chapter 4 and it was repeated for this study.
However, the main drawback from this methodology was that it lacked the internal
reliability and validity of knowing the stimuli and hence ensuring that the emotions
were accurate and valid. In order to address this potential limitation, each participant
was asked to write down their anger provoking situation and these were then
independently rated for their potential anger inducing qualities. These were rated by
an independent raters and are reported below (please see appendix 13 for examples of
the scenarios, as reported by the participants). Each participant was asked to report
their written account to rehearse and elicit the emotion of anger.
Interference Task (Weschler, 1999) In order to provide a distraction and prevent
rehearsal of answers at time 1 of the study, an interference task was included in the
design of this study. Interference tasks have been shown to significantly impact upon
levels of forgetting (e.g. Lustig and Hasher, 2001). The Coding-Digit Symbol task
(taken from the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale-3rd edition (WAIS III)) was used in
this study. Within this test, Numbers 1 - 7 are paired with symbols on a key presented
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to the participants. The participant has 120 seconds to go through a grid of 90
numbers and place the correct symbol above each number.
Procedure
This research study was given a favourable ethical decision by Scotland A ethics
committee and Division of Elealth Research Ethics Committee, Lancaster University.
Recruitment
Within the inpatient unit, each participant from the two eating disorders units were
written to and invited to take part in the study. This letter contained all the
questionnaires in a sealed envelope. The participant information sheet and consent
form were attached to this sealed envelope containing the questionnaires and
participants were instructed to only open the letter if they agreed to take part in the
study. The participant information sheet explained to the potential participants that
this study was designed to look at the experiences of emotions in people with an
eating disorder and that there were two main questions being investigated in this
study. The first one involved questionnaires on how the participants experience their
own emotions and beliefs that they may hold about themselves. The second research
question asked how people with an eating disorder manage and experience real life
thoughts and feelings. These research packs were left with the potential participants
and a week later a research assistant made contact with each of the patients and
collected the completed (or non-completed) questionnaires and asked if they would
like to consent to take part in the second study (i.e. mood induction).
Participants from the two outpatient clinics: Potential participants from the outpatient
services were given a Participant Information Sheet by their appointed Clinician. As
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detailed above, the Participant Information Sheet, information was given about the
Study and a link was also be given to the stellar survey web site where participants
filled out a consent form and completed the questionnaires. The same web site also
gave further information about the 2nd stage of this study (e.g. the mood induction
research) and asked if they would like to consent to taking part. The research
interviews either took part in Edinburgh University or in nominated rooms in the
respective clinical services.
Control participants:
At Lancaster University, once ethics had been given for the running of this study,
Undergraduate students were emailed a short invitation to take part in this study (as
detailed above). Students were required to log onto the website to fill out the
questionnaires for the first part of the study. Prior to the participant accessing the
questionnaires, participants were given information sheets and consent forms. As with
above, participants were then asked to complete questionnaires online and asked
whether would like to consent to take part in the experimental part of this study.
The study was conducted in two stages.
Stage 1 In this stage, each participant was required to complete the EDE-Q, REQ,
HADS, BES, BCSS and the WBSI.
Stage 2 In order to keep the HADS scores as close to the experiment as possible, the
second stage data was collected within a week of the stage 1 measures being
completed. For the second part of the study, at time 1, participants completed the
STAXI, DS-R, DPSS-R, and BSS. Participants were then asked to complete the
Coding-Digit Symbol task. Once this was completed each participant was required to
watch the nominated Witness film clip which was then followed by the modified
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Velten Technique (as detailed above). Once in an angry mood, participants were
readministered the STAXI, DPSS-R, DS-R and BSS. Once these were completed the
participants were debriefed and thanked for their time. Appendix 11 shows the
instruction sheet used by all the participants to ensure standardised instructions were
given to each participant.
6.4. Results
6.4.1 Statistical Strategy
All statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS version 15 for Windows.
Preliminary analysis was undertaken on the data to ascertain whether it met
parametric assumptions, with the main variables being checked by conducting
Kolmogorov-Smimov tests (K-S tests). As is the way with a significant amount of
clinical research, it was anticipated that the data was not going to be normally
distributed, and this instance parametric tests would be undertaken, providing that the
other two tests of parametric assumptions were met. As has been discussed elsewhere
(e.g. Field, 2005), parametric assumptions are much more powerful tests and
therefore, able to withstand one violation of these assumptions. Furthermore, the use
of parametric tests would allow co-variate analyses to be undertaken, which would not
be possible with non-parametric tests. The outcome of the K-S tests can be seen in
appendix 7 which showed that almost all of the variables were shown to be normally
distributed. Only state fear, external dysfunction and external function on the REQ,
and the positive self-scale on the BOSS were non-normally distributed.
The analyses for the hypothesis 1 were carried out using ANCOVAs, so that the co-
variate analyses could be conducted upon the data. For hypothesis 2, the principal
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analyses undertaken were mixed-design ANCOVAs (due to the mixed design), with
anxiety and depression scores entered into the analysis as co-variates.
6.4.4. Power Analysis for Hypothesis 1
It was decided in the construction of this chapter's hypotheses that hypothesis 2 would
be the principal hypothesis for the power analysis. In considering the issue of
statistical power, it was felt that the two hypotheses in this study would have quite
different levels of power in their analyses (field vs. experimental methodologies) and
this could cause type 1 or type 2 errors in either of the hypotheses, if one power
analysis was undertaken to give sample size for both hypotheses. Furthermore, the
data for chapter 4 would provide good pilot data for the power analysis for hypothesis
2, whilst no such comparable data exists for the measures used in hypothesis 1. Given
these issues, it was decided to complete a retrospective power analysis for hypothesis
1, which would enable a clearer view of the effect size and the levels of statistical
power, which would enable a careful consideration of alpha levels to prevent type II
errors.
Given that hypothesis 1 consisted of two sub-hypotheses, a power analysis was
conducted for each one. The power analysis was conducted as per protocol and the
tables presented in Clark-Carter (2004).
On the internal-dysfunction subscale of the Regulation of Emotion Questionnaire
(REQ) an effect size was calculated to be d=.49 (using the descriptive data given
below), which according to the conventions marked down by Cohen (1988), was
deemed to a medium effect. With d=.49, on a one-tailed t-test, power was calculated
06/12/2009 241
Doctor ofPhilosophy (PhD) University of Edinburgh John R.E. Fox
to be .54 (power =.54), which is .26 below the .8 convention for statistical testing.
According to Clark-Carter (2004) a sample size of 50 in each group would be
necessary to reach .8 power in the analysis. On the negative-self subscale of the Brief
Core Schema Scales (BCSS), an effect size was calculated to be d=.28 (using the
descriptive data given below), which according to the conventions marked down by
Cohen (1988), was deemed to a small effect. With d=.28, on a one-tailed t-test, power
was calculated to be .27, which is 0.53 below the .8 convention for statistical testing.
According to Clark-Carter (2004) a sample size of 140 in each group would be
necessary to reach .8 power in the analysis. Given that this part of the study was
underpowered, it was decided to use an alpha level of. 1 (a=. 1) in order to help
prevent type II errors from occurring through the analysis for hypothesis 1.
6.4.5 Power analysis for hypothesis 2
The power analysis for hypothesis 2 was based upon the results from the study
reported in chapter 4. It was decided that the power analysis calculations should be
based upon the actual disgust x group interaction, which produced a large effect (p2 =
.21). According to the tables presented by Clark-Carter (2004), with a=0.05, a sample
size over 19 per group would have .86 power. Therefore, probability was set at .05.
6.4.6. Main Hypothesis Testing - Regulation of Emotion
Questionnaire, Brief Core Belief Schema Scale and the White Bear
Suppression Inventory.
Table 3 displays the mean and standard deviations (SD) for Emotion Regulation
questionnaire (REQ), White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI) and the Brief Core
Schema Scale (BCSS). As detailed above, only a handful of variables were found not
to be normally distributed. Due to the power present within parametric tests, it was
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decided to continue with the parametric tests, providing that other assumptions had
not been violated. Each variable within the initial t-test analyses was tested for
heterogeneity of variance and only emotional regulation - external dysfunction and
negative self beliefs from the BCSS were found to be heterogeneous within the
Levene's test of variance. However, the negative self-belief scale was normally
distributed and, therefore, it was decided that parametric tests were still appropriate
for this sub-scale. For the external dysfunction subscale data from the REQ, as two
parametric assumptions had been broken, this data was tested with a non-parametric
test of difference, a Mann-Whitney U test.
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Table 3: shows the results of the t-tests for the tests conducted upon the regulation of
emotion questionnaire, white bear suppression inventory and the basic core schema
scale. *denotes significance at .1, **denotes significance at .05, and ***denotes
significance at .01. Cohen's d is the effect size (.2 = small effect, .5 = medium effect,
.8 = large effect).
As can be seen from the above table, the initial analyses broadly confirmed
hypotheses la-c, as the AN group demonstrated that they used less external-functional
strategies and less internal-functional strategies for managing their emotions.
However, the AN group reported significantly more internal-dysfunctional strategies
for managing their emotions. This finding fits with the findings from the analysis on
the White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI), as the AN group reported
significantly more thought suppression than the control group. On the BSCC measure
of core beliefs, the results showed that the AN group reported significantly more
negative self-beliefs and fewer positive self-beliefs, whilst the AN group reported
significantly more negative beliefs about other people. In order to check for effects of
depression and anxiety, a co-variate analysis was conducted on the entire hypothesis 1
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3.43 2.10 18.05 .001* .530
(.72) (.59)
Emotion Regulation - 3.75 .060*
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Core Beliefs - Positive
Self
(Model)
4.27 14.55 16.368 .001* .511
(5.18) (5.31)





























Core Beliefs - Positive
Others
(Model)
10.76 12.09 .343 .794 .022
(6.25) (6.14)












Table 4: shows the co-variate analyses of the Regulation ofEmotions Scale, White
Bear Suppression Scale, and the Basic Core Schema Scales, where depression
(HADS-D) and anxiety (HADS-A) were co-varied from the ANOVA analyses. R2 is
effect, R2 = .09 being a medium effect, and R2 =/> .25 being a large effect.
06/12/2009 246
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) University of Edinburgh John R.E. Fox
As can be seen in table 4, the differences found in the t-tests were supported by the
results of the co-variate analysis. Across all the analyses, HADS-A was found not to
be a significant co-variate, whilst EtADS-D had a significant effect upon the internal
dysfunction scale, the internal function scale and the negative self-beliefs scale.
Although the HADS-D scale exerted significant effect, the overall significant effect
was maintained. The negative others scale demonstrated an interesting pattern of
results through the analysis, initially the result was non-significant, but the alpha level
reduced to a significant level once depression and anxiety had been partialled out.
With regards to the effects size (size of r2), all of the analyses, the effect sizes were
medium to large, with only the external dysfunction scale and the positive others scale
producing a small effect. These effect sizes do mirror the reported a levels within
these analyses.
6.4.7. Results for Exploratory Hypothesis 1
As detailed in the hypothesis section above, an exploratory analysis was undertaken
that investigated the relationship between the core belief scales and levels of state
emotion as measured by the basic emotions scale (BES). In order to protect against
type II errors, the alpha levels were set at 0.01 and the analyses were based upon 2










.155 .486* .628* .280 -.274
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beliefs
Table 5: shows four subscales of the Brief Core Schema scale (negative self beliefs,
positive self beliefs, negative other beliefs and positive other beliefs), and the five
basic state emotions taken from the Basic Emotions Scale. *Denotes significance at
.01.
The results from table 5 highlight strong correlations between negative self beliefs
and state sadness, and state disgust, whilst, state anger showed a significant
correlation with negative others beliefs. It is worth noting that the negative others
scale showed a relatively strong correlation with the state disgust sub scale (p=.034),
but due to the correction applied to the analysis it did not reach significance. These
patterns of correlations will be considered in more detail in the discussion section.
6.4.8 Main Hypothesis Testing - Effects of anger on levels of
anger, disgust and estimation of body size.
Statistical Strategy
As detailed above, only two variables were found not to be normally distributed and
these were ideal body shape (Tl) and core disgust (Tl). Due to the power present
within parametric tests, it was decided to continue with the parametric tests, providing
that no other assumptions had not been violated. Each variable within the initial t-test
analyses was tested for heterogeneity of variance and only body shape perception
(Tl), disgust propensity (Tl) and disgust sensitivity (Tl) showed significance on the
Levene's test of variance. Given that these variables were shown to be normally
distributed upon the K-S test (as detailed above), it was decided to use parametric
tests for all the hypotheses in hypothesis 2.
In order to test that the written reports of the anger eliciting material generated by the
participants would actually lead to an increase in anger, each participant report sheet
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was assessed by two independent assessors. These assessors were blind to the
hypotheses of this study and were asked if they felt that these scenarios would make a
person angry. Both assessors agreed that 93% of the scenarios would elicit anger. For
the remaining 7%, the assessors reported that there was not sufficient information to
guarantee that they felt the respective scenarios would elicit anger. In practice, this
meant that 3 out of 41 were not agreed. Despite this, 93% was felt to be a good
agreement level to allow the analyses to be made according to the hypotheses.
STAXI - State Anger, trait anger and anger expression scales
The first sub hypothesis of hypothesis 2 was females with anorexia nervosa (AN)
would have significantly higher levels of anger, following the induction of anger,
when compared to individuals without any eating disorder symptoms (controls). The
means and standard deviations for the State anger scores are presented in table 6.
Table 6
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Time 1 16.58 21.75 P=.046* .76











Table 6: Means, standard deviations and effect sizes for the State anger scores for
both conditions across the participant groups. *Denotes significance.
State anger scores were evaluated according to a two factorial model (group x time),
and these data were analysed by a mixed model Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA),
as the analysis co-varied anxiety and depression scores (taken from the HADS). Effect
sizes were calculated using the formula for r|2 (eta-squared) from Clark-Carter
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(2004). These r|2 values were interpreted as per protocol from Cohen (1988) who
proposed that r|2 values of 0.01 is a small effect, 0.059 is a medium effect, whilst a p2
value of 0.138 can be regarded as a large effect.
As detailed earlier, each group (AN & Control) undertook the Anger induction task,
and each group was assessed at time 1 (prior to the Induction) and at time 2 (post
induction). This part of the design represented the repeated measures aspect of this
study. Where appropriate, further univariate analyses were undertaken to locate the
statistical effect within the analyses. The size of n for the mixed ANCOVA was
slightly smaller as 3 people from the AN group did not complete the anger measures
from the second stage of the experiment (AN group n=21). This had some effect upon
the means, the mean for the AN group at time 1 22.62 (SD = 11.102) and at time 2,
the mean for the AN group at time 2 was 30.95 (SD = 15.351). For the control group,
the means were the same as reported above. Analyses indicated a significant main
effect for group, F = 18.179 (df=1, 38), p = .01. However, there was not a significant
group x time interaction effect, F = 1.228 (df= 1,38), p = .275. The effect size for
this interaction between group and anger was small (p2= .03). As there was not a
significant effect for group x time, the co-variate analysis was not conducted upon the
state anger data. The group x time interaction is illustrated in Graph 1.
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Graph 1: Shows the mean scores for the State anger scales for each participant group
before and after the anger induction.
The results from analyses allowed for the rejection of the first sub hypothesis of the
second hypothesis, in that, the participants in the AN group showed did not show a
significantly greater increase in state anger score, following the anger induction, than
the control group. Although the state anger results demonstrated a non-significant
interaction effect, it did highlight that both participant groups demonstrated significant
anger increases between time 1 and time 2, thereby confirming anecdotal reports from
participants that they experienced an increase in anger resulting from the anger
induction.
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Trait Anger andAnger Expression Scores
Although not a part of the hypotheses, it was decided to investigate the trait and
expression scales from the STAXI, as the results from the trait emotion sub-scales in






AN group 21.83 7.26 .09
Control group 18.79 3.82








Anger expression - Out
AN group 17.00 6.21 .30
Control group 15.11 5.39
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Anger Control - In
AN Group 17.79 5.25 .01*
Control Group 23.16 4.82








Table 7: shows the trait anger and the anger expression subscales means and standard
deviations. *denotes significance at 0.05.
As can be seen in table 7, trait anger showed a near significant difference between the
AN group and the control group. Furthermore, the pattern of the results reported in
table 7 highlighted that the AN group showed a higher propensity to suppress their
anger and not to express it with other people.
Disgust Sensitivity Scale
The second sub-hypothesis of hypothesis 2 was whether the anorexia nervosa group
would have significantly higher levels of disgust sensitivity, following the
manipulation of anger, when compared to individuals without any eating disorder
symptom. The means and standard deviations for the Disgust Sensitivity scale scores
are presented in table 8.
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Table 8: Means and standard deviations for the disgust sensitivity scale scores for
both conditions across the participant groups. *denotes significance.
As has been shown in the above table, the AN group scored significantly higher than
the control group on the disgust sensitivity scale. This result highlights that the AN
group were significantly more sensitive to the emotion of disgust than the control
group prior to any anger induction.
Disgust sensitivity scores were evaluated according to a two factorial model (group x
time), and this data was analysed by a mixed model Analysis of Co-Variance
(ANCOVA). Analyses indicated a non-significant main effect for group, F = 3.573 (df
= 1, 37),p <.067, as well as a significant group x time interaction effect, F = 6.557
(df=l, 37),p< .015. The effect size for this interaction was large (r| = .177). The co-
variate analyses indicated that FIADS - A scores did not have a significant statistical
effect on the disgust results, F = .124, {df- 1, 37); p = .727, whilst HADS-D
depression scores also did not have a significant statistical effect upon the disgust
























pre anger induction post anger induction
Graph 2: Shows the mean scores for the disgust scale for each participant group
before and after the anger induction.
The results from the ANCOVA analyses allow for the acceptance of the second sub
hypothesis of the second hypothesis, in that, the participants in the AN group showed
significantly higher disgust sensitivity scores, following the anger induction, than the
control group.
Estimation ofBody Size
The third sub-hypothesis of hypothesis 2 was whether the anorexia nervosa group
would have significantly higher levels of body size perception, following the
manipulation of anger, when compared to individuals without any eating disorder
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symptomatology. The means and standard deviations for the estimation of body size




















Time 2 4.11 7.48 .001* 1.33
(post manipulation) (1.91) (3.146)
N=19 N=23
Table 9: Means and standard deviations for the estimation of body size scale scores
for both conditions across the participant groups. *denotes significance.
As has been shown in the above table, the AN group scored marginally higher than
the control group on the estimation of body size scale, however, this difference was
not significant at 0.05. The reported effect size was a medium effect.
Estimations of body size were evaluated according to a two factorial model (group x
time), and this data was analysed by a mixed model Analysis of Co-Variance
(ANCOVA). Analyses indicated a significant main effect for group, F = 10.277 (df=
1, 37), p <.003, as well as a significant group x time interaction effect, F = 17.836
(idf=l, 37), p< .001. The effect size for this interaction was large (r|2 = .480). The co-
variate analyses indicated that HADS - A scores did not have a significant statistical
effect on the disgust results, F = .693, (df- 1, 37); p = .411, whilst HADS-D
depression scores also did not have a significant statistical effect upon the disgust
results, F = .543, (df= 1, 37);p = .466. The group x time interaction is illustrated in
Graph 3.
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Graph 3
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pre anger induction post anger induction
Graph 3: Shows the mean scores for the estimation of body size scale for each
participant group before and after the anger induction.
The results from the ANCOVA analyses allow for the acceptance of the third sub-
hypothesis of the second hypothesis, in that, the participants in the AN group showed
significantly higher estimation of body size scores, following the anger induction,
than the control group.
Estimation ofIdeal Body Size
The fourth sub-hypothesis of hypothesis 2 was whether the anorexia nervosa group
would have significantly lower ideal body size following the manipulation of anger,
when compared to individuals without any eating disorder symptom. The means and
standard deviations for the estimation of ideal body size scores are presented in table
10
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Time 1 3.21 1.92 .001* 1.15












Table 10: Means and standard deviations for the estimation of ideal body size scale
scores for both conditions across the participant groups. * denotes significance.
As has been shown in the above table, the AN group scored significantly lower than
the control group on the estimation of ideal body size scale. The reported effect size
was a large effect.
Estimations of ideal body size were evaluated according to a two factorial model
(group x time), and this data was analysed by a mixed model Analysis of Co-Variance
(ANOVA). Analyses indicated a significant main effect for group, F = 10.277 (df= 1,
40), p <.001. However, there was not a significant effect for any group x time
interaction effect, F = .490 (df=l, 40), p< .486. The effect size for this interaction was
small (r|2 = .01). As there was not a significant interaction between group and time,
the co-variate analysis was not undertaken. The group x time interaction is illustrated
in Graph 4.
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Graph 4




















pre anger induction post anger induction
Graph 4: Shows the mean scores for the estimation of ideal body size scale for each
participant group before and after the anger induction.
The results from the ANOVA analyses allow for the rejection of the fourth sub
hypothesis of the second hypothesis, in that, the participants in the AN group did not
show a significant lower estimation of ideal body size scores, following the anger
induction, than the control group.
6.4.9. Exploratory Analysis
As detailed in the hypothesis section above, an exploratory analysis was undertaken
that investigated the relationship between state disgust and estimation of body size,
shape concern and weight concern. As the analyses were based upon a model and
previous findings, the correlation analyses used a 1 tailed test. The results of these
analyses are presented below in table 11 below:
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Table 11
Clinical Anorexia Shape Weigh State State State State State
group Concern concern Anger sadness disgust fear happy
N=22
Estimation of Body .589** .626** .358* .209 .455* .189 -.135
Shape
Ak 5: h>
Table 11: shows the correlation analyses between state disgust, state sadness, state
anger, state fear, state happiness, estimation of body size, shape concern and weight
concern for the anorexia nervosa group (*denotes significance at 0.05, **denotes
significance at 0.01).
The results from table 11 highlight strong correlations between estimations of body
perceptions and, state disgust, state anger, shape concerns and weight concerns. The
correlations were tested using one-tailed tests, as the direction of the correlations was
anticipated prior to the analyses being undertaken (e.g. estimation of body size would
positively correlate with state disgust). These patterns of correlations will be
considered in more detail in the discussion section.
6.4.9. Summary of Results
As detailed above, hypotheses la to lc were supported by the data from this study.
The results from the emotional regulation - internal dysfunction scale showed both a
highly significant difference and a large effect, and although depression significantly
co-varied, it did not reduce the significance of the results for this hypothesis. The
other results from the emotion regulation scale highlighted that the control group had
significantly more internal functional strategies to manage their emotions, and this
finding also had a medium effect size. Likewise, control participants also had
significantly more external functional strategies to manage their emotions, and this
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again produced a medium effect. The results from the White Bear Suppression
Inventory showed a strong significant difference between the control and the AN
group on this measure, with the AN group demonstrating much more thought
suppression than the controls. The effect size for this result was very large. The core
beliefs scale results showed that the AN group had significantly more negative
internal beliefs when compared to the control group. Depression co-varied
significantly within the negative internal beliefs analysis, but this did not affect the
significance of the effect size. Likewise, the control group had significantly more
positive beliefs about the self than the AN group. The results for the negative others
beliefs were interesting, as the initial analysis using t-test produced a significant
result, but this was initially supported by the results of the ANOVA. Elowever, when
depression was co-varied out, this result just met significance at the pre-set level. On
the exploratory analysis, negative self beliefs strongly correlated with state sadness
and, interestingly, state disgust. For negative other beliefs, there was a strong
correlation with state anger and a near significant correlation with state disgust.
For hypothesis two, both participant groups demonstrated an increase in their anger
scores on the STAXI following the anger induction, but there was not a significant
effect for condition x group. For the disgust hypothesis, the clinical anorexia nervosa
group demonstrated a significant increase in disgust scores, when compared to the
control group. This was also true of the estimation of body size and this group by
condition interaction showed a large effect within the analysis. The estimation of ideal
body size showed a trend to preferring thinner bodies post the anger induction,
however, this effect was not significant, and the effect size was small. The
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correlations between the estimation of body size and state emotions showed
significant correlations between state anger, state disgust and estimation of body size.
6.5. Discussion
As detailed at the end of the results section, the majority of the hypotheses for this
study were supported by the data of this study. The anorexia group demonstrated
much more dysfunctional internal directed emotion regulation strategies than the
control participants, and this suggests that people with eating disorders use more
critical or harmful ways to manage their emotions. This finding was also supported by
the data from the white bear suppression inventory, where the AN group demonstrated
significantly more suppression of thoughts than the control group. These findings are
very much in keeping with the hypotheses from the SPAARS-ED model and from
previous research, in that, people with anorexia nervosa suppress their thoughts and
emotions and punish themselves if they experience an emotion. Likewise, the results
from the other emotional regulation strategies demonstrate that people with anorexia
nervosa also have a poverty ofmore functional strategies to manage their emotions,
such as talking to others or self-compassion. A key part of the SPAARS-ED model is
that it proposes that emotions (especially negative emotions) are ego dystonic, and are
therefore quite separate to the sense of self. The findings from this study appear to
support this theoretical hypothesis. Furthermore, other authors in the field have
acknowledged how individuals with eating disorders experience high levels of shame
and often lack skills to be able to be compassionate to the self (e.g. Goss and Allan, in
press). Interestingly, like the SPAARS-ED model, Goss and Allen argue that this lack
of self-care skills has developmental origins, as they consider that sexual abuse,
bullying and teasing, and some parenting styles may play an important role in the
absence of self-compassion skills. Indeed, these findings have some support from the
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findings in chapter 3, although the results from chapter 5 did not find any further
evidence for the role of parental styles. Goss and Allen (in press) have developed a
number of specific interventions that focus on teaching the client self-compassionate
skills.
As detailed in the introduction to this chapter, this thesis has not given much attention
to the actual cognitions within eating disorders. Within the literature, there has been a
significant amount of consideration of cognitive accounts of eating disorders (e.g.
Waller et al, 2007; Cooper, 2005), but as discussed in the introductory chapter of the
thesis, this discussion has often left out any overt consideration of emotion. In
SPAARS-ED terms, these more cognitive aspects of eating disorders can be
accounted for both within the propositional and within the schematic arm of the
model. The Brief Core Schema Scale (BCSS) was chosen as it most closely represents
the proposed domains of knowledge that are discussed through the more general
SPAARS model (Power and Dalgleish, 2008), in that, they propose that knowledge is
organised around three mental domains, self, others and the world. Although the
BCSS only has two of these domains, it was felt that this would give some
preliminary data to test this branch of the SPAARS-ED model. The size of the
difference between the anorexia nervosa group and the control group on the negative
- self beliefs was highly significant, and the effect size was also very large. It was
interesting that the negative self-belief scale strongly correlated with state sadness and
state disgust, given that these emotions were predicted by SPAARS-ED model.
Furthermore, these results add further support to the findings from the previous
chapters within the thesis. Given that the prediction from the SPAARS-ED model
about the role of anger, it was, perhaps, surprising that state anger did not correlate
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significantly with negative-self beliefs. It could have been hypothesed that self anger
may have been associated with negative-self beliefs. It is likely that issues to do with
statistical power and sample size may have played a role in the lack of significance,
but also the implicit heterogeneity of eating disorder symptoms within the anorexia
nervosa group. The results from chapter 3 suggest that anger is an important emotion
that differentiates between people who have a restricting eating disorder, and people
who have a binge-purge sub-type of anorexia nervosa. In other words, if a purely
binge-eating group was recruited, this may have been a much larger correlation. This
remains an empirical question.
The negative others scales just showed a significant difference between the anorexia
nervosa group and the control group, and it was interesting that this difference became
significant with the co-varying of depression from the analyses. This finding is
slightly contrary to the anticipated results, but it would suggest that depression
somewhat clouds the role of negative others beliefs in anorexia nervosa, and when
this is removed, the effect is enhanced. It may be that the depression actually leaves
the person more likely to blame themselves for how they have been treated by other
people, but once this is removed, the individual can see how others are perceived to be
treating them. It was interesting that negative other beliefs were correlated with state
anger, and this finding gives further evidence to the findings of chapter 3, in that,
people with anorexia nervosa have an internal anger that has originated from how they
perceive other people have treated them. It is important to note that none of the data in
this thesis allows us to conclude that these events have actually occurred, or whether it
is the actual perception of events that is important. According to the SPAARS-ED
model, anger is a key emotion in understanding eating disorders, and this instance
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anorexia nervosa, and the correlation between negative-other beliefs and state anger is
theoretically significant, and supportive of the model. Furthermore, this result fits
with the findings from the previous chapters within this thesis and previous research,
such as Waller et al (2003) and Geller et al (2000).
The results from hypothesis 2 broadly support the results from chapter 4 and further
develop their theoretical implications. The only result from hypothesis 2 that was not
supported was the fact that there was not a significant effect for the condition x group
interaction on levels of anger at the post anger induction stage. This is an interesting
result as it does map the common clinical picture of the person with anorexia nervosa
being totally unable to express negative emotion. However, in saying this, the results
from both the t-tests and the mixed ANOVA (between subjects analysis) highlight
that there were significant differences on the STAXI state anger measure at both time
1 and time 2 and this provides some additional evidence that the anorexia nervosa
group were more angry than the control participants. This is especially true, in light of
the findings detailed above from hypothesis 1, where the anorexia nervosa
participants reported significantly more negative beliefs (both self and others) and
these were associated with increased levels of negative emotion. On the expression of
anger scales and the trait anger scales; there was a near significant difference between
the AN group and the control group on the trait anger scale, whilst there was a
significant difference on the propensity to express anger towards others. This score
highlighted that the AN group were significantly more likely to suppress their anger
and this result fits the findings from chapter 3 and 4.
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The main finding of hypothesis 2 was the finding that disgust sensitivity significantly
increased after the anger induction when compared to the control group. Furthermore,
anxiety or depression did not exert a significant co-variate effect within the analysis.
Given the results from the state anger hypothesis described above, this finding gives
support to the idea that anger and disgust may operate in a coupled way, but unlike
bulimia nervosa, this coupled relationship does not have a mutual facilitation, in that,
anger did not significantly increase in the same way disgust, post anger induction.
This data suggests one hypothesis, where disgust could be used to inhibit anger prior
to consciousness and thereby, preventing the self from realising that they are angry (as
per Waller et al, 2007). The findings on the disgust scale are even more interesting
when these results are considered in relation to the findings on body size estimation.
The size of the effect between group and condition was very large, and it
demonstrated that the anorexia nervosa group reported feeling much larger than
before the anger induction. The final correlation analyses demonstrated that state
disgust and state anger were strongly correlated, with weight and shape concerns, to
estimations of body shape. This result showed that as disgust went up for the clinical
anorexia group, so did the estimation of body size. This was also true for body shape
concern and weight concern. This finding has theoretical significance, in that, it
connects level of disgust to the size of the body for people with anorexia nervosa.
Although causation cannot be inferred from a correlation, the series of results from
hypothesis 2 suggest that anger leads to increase in disgust, and this is also a
significant factor in the increase in estimation of body size. It is important to note that
the causation may go the other way, in that disgust follows the perceived increase in
body size. Likewise, anger may directly work on body size estimation, as one
hypothesis could be that anger may lead to bias in the perception of body image. The
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correlation between state anger and estimation of body size offers some support for
this hypothesis. However, the results of this study do suggest that whatever the
process is in play, it is particular to eating disorders, especially anorexia nervosa.
Critique and Limitations of the Study
As has been discussed in all the chapters of this thesis, all research has its drawbacks
and this study is no exception. However, in saying this, in the designing of this study,
the drawbacks from the study reported in chapter 4 were addressed as far as was
feasibly possible. The main drawback from this study was the lack of an objective
measure of emotion. This could have been a galvanic skin response (GSR). However,
as with previous studies reported in this thesis, the inclusion of this type ofmeasure
could have had a deleterious effect upon recruitment of clinical participants. As has
been reported both within this thesis and the wider research literature, emotions are a
feared phenomena in the life of someone with an eating disorder, it was decided that
participants with a diagnosis of anorexia nervosa may have been too wary of having
to be connected to a GSR machine that measures emotion arousal. In saying this,
verbal reports following the anger induction in the second stage of the study informed
the researchers that they were experiencing some emotional arousal, such as increased
heart rate and some 'churning' in their stomachs.
It would have been preferable to have assessed each participant with the eating
disorders examination (Fairburn et al, 1993). However, the practical constraints on
this study prevented such an intensive way of assessing eating pathology, and it was
decided to use the next best strategy which was to ask the responsible Consultant
Psychiatrist (who both had many years of experience of working with people with
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eating disorders) to confirm diagnosis. Furthermore, the inclusion of the EDE-Q
(based upon the EDE) also allowed a close proximate to be used in this study which
was used to confirm the presence of anorexia nervosa symptomatology. Another unit
ofmeasurement that was not ideal was the body shape silhouettes, as it would have
been preferable to have had some of form computer software that would allow the
participants to accurately draw their estimations of their body size. This could have
been compared with time 1 data. Furthermore, the actual anger induction
methodology could have been improved by using more ecologically sound
methodology, such as Ecological Momentary Assessments (e.g. Palm Pilots). This
represents the next stage for this mood induction research. Finally, the relatively small
sample size did not allow a comparison of different symptom patterns (e.g. restrictors
vs. binge-vomiting). Again, this should form one of the research aims of any follow
up studies to this research study.
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Chapter 7: General Discussion
Through this thesis, the role of emotions within eating pathology has been considered
and examined by various methodologies and with different samples. Through this
discussion a brief summary of the findings from each study will be presented and
these findings will be then considered in light of the SPAARS-ED model proposed in
chapter 2 and with the other main theoretical accounts presented in the introduction.
As the strengths and weaknesses of the studies presented in this thesis have been
discussed in each of the chapters they will not be repeated in this chapter. Finally, the
clinical implications of the findings will be presented and this chapter will finish by
offering some suggestions for future research.
7.1 Qualitative study's results
This study was a grounded theory study with 11 participants. It had two principal
research questions, one on the nature of their emotions in the 'here and now' and the
other concerned more developmental aspect of the participants, as it pertained to their
emotions. The qualitative study found some very interesting results about how people
with anorexia nervosa understand and experience their emotions and their memories
and understandings of how their own and other people's emotions were experienced
whilst growing up. The most striking finding was that the participants viewed the
emotion of anger as 'toxic' and 'dangerous', whilst sadness was viewed as an emotion
of 'weakness'. For anger, there was a strong suggestion from the data that increasing
levels of the emotion of anger increased the likelihood of vomiting, in an almost dose¬
like effect. It was interesting that participants discussed their sense that they were 'not
allowed' to experience their emotions, as they were not entitled to be an 'emotional
human being'. Related to this point was how participants discussed that they felt
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expressing emotion would put them at risk of being rejected by other people. In terms
of the actual management of emotions, the participant's discussed how they almost
had an automatic suppression of emotions and there was a strong allusion of emotions
becoming coupled, in order to protect interpersonal relationships and to not allow
themselves to experience emotion.
In terms of their developmental histories, it was very interesting that the participants
gave a sense that they had experienced 'too much emotion' as they were growing up,
and one of the more contentious ideas to rise from this chapter was that there was a
high level of anger within the participants. Related to this point was the theme of how
there appeared to be poor emotional skills within the family home, and participants
discussed that they were often confused about the emotional overtones to events as
they were growing up.
7.2. Coupling Study for Participants with Bulimic Symptoms
This study was an experimental study that compared 25 females with probable
bulimia nervosa to 25 control participants within an anger induction study. Measures
of anger and disgust were taken prior to an anger induction and then these were then
taken after the induction.
This study found that females with bulimic symptoms reported a significant increase
in both state anger and disgust sensitivity following an anger induction, when
compared to controls. Furthermore, the bulimic symptomatology group reported that
they were significantly less likely to express their anger than the control groups.
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7.3. Basic Emotions Study
This study was a single participant group study of 52 participants. These participants
belonged to a database held by B-EAT (formally known as the Eating Disorder
Association) and reported significant difficulty with their eating. This study
investigated levels of state, trait and the perception of coping with individual emotions
in people with significant disordered eating. The second aim of this study was to also
investigate parent/ carer response styles to displays of emotions whilst the participants
were children. For the state emotions, the results were clear as sadness and anger,
predicted disordered eating patterns. The picture for the trait emotions data was far
less clear cut, as depression exerted a significant influence across the relationship
between disordered eating and all of the trait emotions. This was also true for all
coping with emotions sub-scale. A number of different theoretical explanations were
offered as to why there was this difference between state and trait emotions, with one
explanation focusing on how individuals with eating disorders may not want to
acknowledge their own emotionality and, hence, minimalised the reporting of their
general sense of how often they feel particular emotions. Related to this point was the
finding that participants reported a consistent difficulty coping with their emotions
across all of the negative emotions. It was also tentatively hypothesed that alexithymia
may also be playing a part in these results, and this played a role in the difficulty in
teasing apart the significance of particular trait emotions in disordered eating. In terms
of the responses to emotions, none of the variables significantly correlated with each
other (i.e. between the subscales on the emotion measures and the disordered eating
measures).
7.4. Core Beliefs, Basic Emotions and Coupling Study
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This study was a clinical study that compared participants with a diagnosis of
anorexia nervosa with a control group. It was the final study of this thesis and, in
many ways, represented the accumulation of the work undertaken so far through the
thesis. This study had two parts, with the first part looking at emotion regulation
styles, core beliefs and state emotion in people with diagnosed anorexia nervosa. The
results showed that participants with anorexia nervosa had an internal dysfunctional
emotional regulation style, and this finding suggests that people with AN manage
their emotions in a ruminatory, repressive style. Within the co-variate analysis,
depression showed a significant effect, but this did not affect the overall result. These
results concerning emotion regulation style was supported by the findings from the
white bear suppression inventory (WBSI). The WBSI showed that people with
anorexia nervosa had a strong tendency to suppress their thoughts and emotions. For
the Brief Core Schema Scale (BCSS), the results showed that participants with
anorexia nervosa had significantly more negative internal beliefs than controls, and
these beliefs were correlated with state sadness and state disgust. On the negative
others scale from the BCSS, the AN group had significantly more negative beliefs
about others and this was correlated with state anger. Interestingly, for the internal
scales, depression significantly co-varied, but this did not remove the overall effect.
On the second part of the study, the mood induction showed a significant effect upon
both overall levels of disgust and estimation of body size. Although the anorexia
nervosa group had significantly higher levels of state anger, there was not a
significant condition x group effect.
7.5. Theoretical Implications
This section of the discussion will consider the broader theoretical implications of
findings from this thesis. This discussion shall start off by returning to the SPAARS-
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ED model proposed in chapter 2. This will then consider how well the results fit with
the broader theoretical positions proposed within the literature.
7.5.1. The SPAARS-ED model
In order to consider the model, it is represented below:
The SPAARS-ED model was developed from a narrative review of the literature
independent to any research being undertaken (please see the footnote below). From
this review, it was proposed that eating disorders have the principal function of
suppressing emotion (as per Waller et al. 2007, and Cooper et al. 2004). Related to
this point was that the SPAARS-ED model made specific predictions about which
emotions would be important, and where these emotions operate within disordered
eating. For example, a recurring theme across this thesis has been the consideration of
the emotion of anger. Within the SPAARS-ED model, it was proposed that certain
developmental factors would leave the individual with experienced levels of anger. As
discussed in chapter 2, DiGiuseppe and Tafrate (2007) argue that adverse experiences
06/12/2009 272
Doctor ofPhilosophy (PhD) University of Edinburgh John R.E. Fox
in early life leave the developing child with a 'significant hurt', which leaves a sense
of unfairness about the World. They go onto argue that these experiences also leave
the developing child with a number of cognitive errors, such as expectation of threat
and suspicion from others. This developmental angle of the SPAARS-ED model was
considered via the qualitative study4. Within this study, it was clear that many of the
participants had a number of difficult life events whilst they were growing up, and it
was hypothesed that these events left the participants with a sense of anger and
unfairness about the World. This finding was supported by the findings from the
BCSS in chapter 6, where negative beliefs about others were significantly correlated
with state anger. Equally, across chapter 4 and Chapter 6, the eating disorder groups
reported significantly (or near significance) more trait anger than the controls. The
results of the anger induction studies showed that once anger is induced, this leaves
the individual with a significant increase in anger, when compared to controls. This
convergence of all this evidence is in keeping with the findings of Waller et al. (2003)
and the theoretical perspective of Hilde Bruch (1962). As was reflected upon within
the qualitative study, this 'anger within' poses a significant challenge for people with
eating disorders, as it also perceived as being 'very toxic' and 'dangerous' both for
the existential self (a theme that will be returned to later in this discussion) and for
their interpersonal relationships (e.g. Geller et al. 2000). These emotions were
suppressed almost automatically, and some of the participants spoke of how they only
realised that they have suppressed emotion once they have suppressed it (in keeping
with Waller et al's primary avoidance hypothesis). In keeping with this finding from
the qualitative research were the results from chapter 4 and 6, where the AN groups
demonstrated significant levels of anger suppression and significantly lower anger
4
This study was completed before the complete development of the SPAARS-ED model, so that it would not interfere with the
coding and theory development. Although the author endeavoured to undertake the literature review without allowing the results
of the qualitative study to influence its construction too much, it is likely that it had some impact.
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expression. This mixture of higher levels of anger and its reduced expression helps to
explain, perhaps, why the participants in the qualitative study spoke of their anger
being 'toxic' and dangerous'.
As discussed in chapter 2, one of the main tenants of the SPAARS-ED model is that
the ED works as an emotion suppression vehicle and this theoretical point is in
keeping with many contemporary theories in the literature (e.g. Waller et al, 2007;
Cooper et al, 2004). However, the hypothesis to rise from the qualitative study that
suggests that as anger increases so does the propensity to vomit is a new and slightly
contentious idea. According to this hypothesis, as anger increases the self needs more
extreme emotion regulation strategies to help them to suppress their emotions. This
theoretical point is important when it is considered that one of the findings to emerge
from the qualitative study was that the participants had poor meta-emotional skills.
The participants also spoke about how they felt that their parents or significant others
did not have good meta-emotional skills. Thus, it seems that not only is the anger is
experienced as 'toxic' and 'dangerous', but the person with the eating disorder does
not have the skills or expertise to manage their emotions. It is important to note that
the results from hypothesis 2 did not show the same results as the qualitative study
and this will be discussed more fully below. This theoretical point is supported by the
findings of the emotion regulation scale in chapter 6, where people with anorexia
nervosa had significantly higher internal dysfunctional emotional regulation
strategies. This theoretical point has many parallels in the literature, with Linehan
(1993) discussing similar themes in her consideration of 'invalidating environments'
and Briere (1996) discussing how early adverse experiences also affect the child's
ability to learn how to 'self-soothe'.
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The other two emotions that were found to be significant across the research within
this thesis were sadness and disgust. Sadness was found to be significant in all the
studies and the qualitative results from chapter 3 gave some further insights into this
sadness and how it was also a difficult emotion to express, as it was a sign of
'weakness'. In chapter 5, the results showed that sadness (with anger) was the biggest
predictor of disordered eating patterns and chapter 6 negative beliefs about the self
were significantly correlated with state sadness and state disgust. As discussed in the
introduction, previous research has identified difficult attachment patterns between
mothers and daughters with anorexia nervosa (Ward et al, 2000, 2001). Related to this
point was that these attachment patterns may have alluded to difficulties in affiliation
and parental warmth, which, according to Jenkins and Oatley, is associated to the
emotion of sadness. Although it remains an empirical question, the parental styles
identified in the qualitative study and the predominance of sadness may be accounted
for by this affiliation difficulty in childhood. These findings regarding sadness fit with
the prediction of the SPAARS-ED model and it also helps to explain the co-morbidity
with depression, especially when it is considered with the findings of state disgust. At
the start of this thesis, disgust was considered a prime candidate for a primary emotion
within eating disorders due to its food and gustatory emphasis (e.g. Haidt et al. 1997).
However, it became apparent through the research that although it is important, it does
appear to be secondary to anger and sadness. This was shown in the results from
chapter 5. It is important to note that the sample size led to restrictions in the analyses
in chapter 5, and this does mean that the results need to be treated with caution. In
chapter 4 and chapter 6, the relation between anger and disgust was stark and
theoretically important. The key emotion within these studies was anger, but its
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induction led to an increase in disgust. This coupling effect was also proposed to play
a significant role in the increase in body estimation at time 2 in the study reported in
chapter 6 (as demonstrated by the correlation between body size estimation and state
disgust). This relation between body shape size and disgust was also discussed by the
participants in the qualitative study, where they often used disgust terms to discuss
their bodies.
In terms of the results that did not support the model or were contrary to prediction,
the findings from the analysis on the trait emotion data in chapter 5 were not as
predicted. This was especially true, given the results from the state emotion data in the
same chapter. This contradiction in the findings meant that some explanations could
be ruled out, such as measurement problems, or that people with eating disorders
could not answer questions about their own emotional status. Equally, the results from
hypothesis two in chapter 5 were surprising, as the results from the qualitative study
suggested that there would some interesting and theoretically important findings from
the responses to emotions questionnaire. It was the researcher's sense that the
questionnaire did not tap into subtle interactions that were discussed in chapter 3. The
other main hypothesis from chapter 5 that attempted to explain these findings was
may be due to the participants not wanting to acknowledge their own emotionality.
This theoretical perspective fits with some of the qualitative themes that were
discussed in chapter 3, where one aspect of the grounded theory discussed that the
participants did not feel that they were entitled to be a 'human being with emotions'.
According to the literature on normal emotion processing, Oatley, Keltner and Jenkins
(2006) discuss that emotions are the basis for social relationships. In other words,
emotions are the guide that allows the self to develop and understand both itself and
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other people. Within the eating disorders literature, one of the main challenges for
recovery has been how people with eating disorders define their self by their eating
disorder. Higbed and Fox (in press), in a grounded theory study on illness perception
in anorexia nervosa, found that participants did not hold a true illness view of their
anorexia nervosa, but regarded it as an extension of the self. A struggle within
recovery for people with eating disorders, especially anorexia nervosa, is that putting
on weight is associated with both a changing physical form and also the return of their
emotions. Given the results discussed through this thesis, it is anticipated that this
must be a huge challenge for people with eating disorders and it must raise questions
regarding their existential nature.
In summary, the results of the studies presented in this thesis have broadly supported
the SPAARS-ED model, both in terms of the actual emotions in play and the
processes within the model. The findings regarding the proposed coupling effect
between disgust and anger are a new and novel finding, which is emphasised by the
finding that anger induction leads to an increase in the estimation of body size. The
results from the core beliefs scale give an indication of the types of propositional level
statements that occur within the SPAARS-ED and which emotions they are connected
to. It was interesting, and slightly against prediction, that negative self beliefs did not
correlate with anger, as it could have been hypothesed that self-anger may have been
an important theoretical construct in eating disorders. A key finding of the research
presented in this thesis has been that depression has often been noted to exert a co-
variate effect across a number of the analyses, both within actual emotion data and
core beliefs data. However, none of these co-variate effects removed the overall effect
within the analysis. This finding sits with the dual processing model of Stice and
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colleagues (Stice et al, 2001), in that, depression could be considered as both the
cause and consequence of the other processes underpinning eating disorders. These
findings were predicted by the SPAARS-ED model and also fit with the findings from
other CBT models that were discussed in the introduction (e.g. Waller et al. 2007;
Cooper et al. 2004; and Wonderlich et al. 2001).
7.6 Clinical Implications
The research undertaken for this thesis has shown that the SPAARS-ED model holds
promise in offering both a theoretical perspective and a framework for developing
clinical approaches for people with eating disorders. As discussed in the introduction,
this research has taken a pan diagnosis approach and it is interesting that different
populations have some distinct similarities in their findings (e.g. coupling between
anger and disgust for EDNOS/ bulimic presentations versus anorexic presentations).
Although further research is necessary, these findings support the view and
perspective of Chris Fairburn that we need to think about eating disorders from a
trans-diagnostic perspective. One of the strengths of the SPAARS-ED model is that it
is immersed in theory from both normal and abnormal psychology and, as a result, it
offers a much more comprehensive theory for clinicians, theorists and researchers to
build upon in the pursuit in understanding and treating eating disorders. In order to
allow for clarity in the discussion of the clinical implications of the SPAARS-ED
model and the research upon which it is built, this discussion shall be written around
the three main principal areas of clinical work; namely assessment, formulation and
intervention.
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7.6.1 Assessment and formulation
In the assessment of eating disorders, the clinical presentation is often striking with
the patient explaining that they have either a very distressing relationship with food
(as in bulimia), or they resent the fact that professional are trying to get them to eat,
despite the fact that they are losing weight. Within either of these assessment
scenarios, the actual eating disorder symptoms tend to be the focus and often a war of
attrition can ensue between the clinician and the patient. The SPAARS-ED model
builds upon the 2nd generation cognitive theories (e.g. Waller et al. 2007 and Cooper
et al. 2004), in that, it helps to highlight the functionality of the eating disorder and
change may not be possible until these underlying emotional factors have been
addressed. Strober (2004) discussed how the clinician working with eating disorders
faces a number of significant hurdles and challenges and the therapist needs a large
repertoire of personal skills to manage the therapy of someone with an eating
disorder.
One of the main strengths of the SPAARS-ED model is that it is a useful model to
assist in the formulation of patients with eating disorder's difficulties. Many clinical
approaches still only use single route explanations to explain the eating disorder,
where one set of beliefs/ automatic thoughts (e.g. overvalued ideas ofweight and
shape) lead to the actual eating disorder. However, these models miss the complexity
of presentation, such as co-morbid anxiety and depression. Only schematic
interventions (e.g. Waller) currently focus on the schematic modules of emotion, in
that they focus on goals, aspirations and beliefs about the self and others. Other
models, such as ACT (Hayes et al. 2003) and DBT (Linehan, 1993) have addressed
some of these difficulties, in that, they have focused upon the underlying issues
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pertaining to eating disorders, such as emotional avoidance. However, they offer very
little to explain the array of symptoms that are present in eating disorders (e.g. very
poor body satisfaction, perfectionistic tendencies). The SPAARS-ED model offers an
architecture for understanding both the underlying emotional difficulties and how this
manifests itself as an eating disorder. For example, the findings concerning the
coupling of anger/ disgust and body size shape estimation highlight how events that
provoke anger are likely to increase how the body is viewed and create further
disgust, which would have a deleterious impact upon mood. Furthermore, the idea that
emotion can exist in different representations can also help to understand why there
may be a denial of an emotional experience (due to it being ego dystonic), but the
patient experiences their jeans feeling tighter, or an increase in visual images of being
'fat'. Likewise, the theoretical notion of associative emotions can explain why
emotions for people with eating disorders seem to happen outside the awareness of the
patient concerned. Although these are interesting theoretical perspectives, they remain
empirical questions.
A key feature of the SPAARS-ED model is that it offers a basic emotion perspective
that can explain co-morbidity in a clinically meaningful way. Therapy for people with
eating disorders can often be faced with the dilemma of treating the actual eating
disorder, whilst their depression is steadily getting worse. The SPAARS-ED model, in
keeping with Crisp's clinical observations (Crisp, 1990), offers the clinician pointers
about the emotional processes that may be in play for the patient. This helps the
clinician to predict and warn the patient of what is likely to happen, and also to use
the idea of coupled emotions as a pointer for developing the formulation even more.
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Robert Leahy (2003) and Steven Hayes (2004) have discussed that the implicit search
by ourselves and our patients for happiness often benign the fact emotional responses
to deeply difficult and traumatic events are healthy and normal. However, both of
these authors fall foul of the fact that they have developed theories and models of
emotional distress that does not draw from normal emotional processes. The
SPAARS-ED model offers the clinician an insight into the everyday processing of
emotions and how these emotional processes are linked in the appraisal of events,
experiences and memories. This allows the clinician to not pathologise the emotions
in the room, but to allow their expression and working through. This point is of
importance when it is considered how staff on eating disorders units may fail to
understand why their patients are very angry and/ or sad. In this instance, they may
attempt to 'quieten them down' or for themselves to feel attacked by the patient. The
SPAARS-ED model allows for a shared formulation to be developed where normal
emotional processes are understood rather than suppressed.
7.6.2. Intervention
Traditional CBT approaches have tended to focus on the propositional levels of the
SPAARS-ED (e.g. by challenging NATS), and thus fail to address the higher level
schematic models. Not only will this prevent any real emotional change, it can
paradoxically reinforce the schematic model. A good example offered by Power and
Dalgleish (1999) concerns how the therapist may work to challenge the clients
assumptions about being a failure, thereby reinforcing that very belief, as the person is
'incapable of doing it on their own'. As proposed by more traditional models ofCBT
(e.g. Fairburn et al, 2003), there is a directive manner in the treatment of bulimia
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nervosa, and the outcome studies have only demonstrated approx. 50% improvement
rates. The points above may suggest that there is a risk that this type of manualised
approach may reinforce schematic representations of the self as a 'failure' because the
focus is the propositional statements occurring as negative automatic thoughts.
The above discussion on unhealthy preoccupation with the avoidance of negative or
painful emotions highlighted the need for the clinician to understand that one of the
core aims of therapy for a patient is to accept his or her emotions and to leam to live
with them in a more productive manner. Thus, in theoretical terms, this would
involve the teaching and/ or facilitation of the development of cognitive skills that
allows the person to experience painful overwhelming emotion (and/ or associated
traumatic event), whilst being held in the consciousness of the experiencer. This
allows the individual to become aware of the self-as-experiencer of the emotion. This
reflective state could allow the individual to develop a new schematic model of what
may have previously been overwhelming, but now it is experienced as painful, but
contained within the self.
Within the SPAARS model, Power and Dalgleish (1997; 2008) discuss fast and slow
change processes in therapy. They give the example of panic disorder in which
therapy helps the person to reframe or reappraise his or her beliefs about imminently
having a panic attack to one of understanding that it is symptoms of anxiety/ panic.
However, panic sufferers may still have marked symptoms after therapy, and Power
and Dalgleish argue that this is due to the over-learnt associative route taking longer
to change than the fast route for therapeutic change. Within the eating disorder field,
it is argued that therapy will need to work with the emotion of disgust that is directed
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at the body, and with the schematic model of the unacceptability of certain emotions,
especially anger. Power and Dalgleish (1997; 1999) argue that exposure and the use
of'behavioural experiments' are much more useful than purely cognitive or linguistic
methods for associative route change and it has long been argued by some authors that
behavioural change is an essential component of the treatment plan for someone with
an eating disorder (e.g. Waller et al. 2007). Moreover, the notion of working with
disgust towards the body, in the guise of marked body dissatisfaction, would need to
be incorporated into any treatment option. This would enable the person to start to re-
learn, via the associative route, a non-disgust emotion attached to his or her body.
This is an empirical question, but recent work by Jansen et al on attentional training in
body image distortion in eating disorders tends to suggest that this could be a
productive way to work with individuals with eating disorders (Jansen, Nederkoorn,
& Mulkens, 2005). According to this point, the individual is trained to attend to parts
of their body they do not dislike (by using a mirror) in order to help the person gain a
more balanced perspective of their body. Within the SPAARS understanding of eating
disorders, it is argued that this would allow the individual to learn to associate
alternative emotions to their bodies and, thereby, reduce the relation of disgust
towards the body and food. Indeed, this may be an important theoretical point why
exposure work to new or banned foods may help to break down the associated disgust
attached to the foods.
7.7. Research Implications
The research in this thesis has not covered all the predictions made by the SPAARS-
ED model. For example, there has been a reliance on verbal report when the
SPAARS-ED model proposes that emotions are present in different modalities (e.g.
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olfactory, tactile, etc.). It is the sense of the author of this thesis that there is a need to
develop creative methodologies that would allow the testing of these aspects of the
model. Although the methodologies in chapter 6 allowed testing of some of the
predictions from the associative route from the SPAARS-ED model, this would need
further research. As with the above point, this would need to be done quite creatively
by using different, less verbal methodologies. The author is currently developing a
programme of research that will be based upon fMRI scanning methodologies and
looking at emotion priming procedures to test the predictions that anger would leave
the participant primed to respond to self-disgust stimuli. This would use a stroop
methodology. Furthermore, there is need to test some of the laboratory findings in
more ecological way, such as the use of palm pilots (EMA). This could be done by
looking at the interface between anger, body disgust and other eating disorder
phenomena (as discussed below) within the context of the participant's everyday life.
Eating disorders are often associated with other patterns of cognition and behaviour.
For example, Fairburn et al. (2003) discusses the importance of perfectionism and
control in eating disorders. One hypothesis that could help to explain the relation
between the findings of this thesis and these clinical phenomena is that perfectionism
is actually a 'red herring', as it the fear of failure that drives unrelenting standards. In
other words, the fear of failing and then experiencing the emotions of sadness and
self-disgust drives the person with the eating disorder to be 'perfect' in everything she
does. Likewise, the need for control can be understood within a similar process where
the person with the eating disorder desires control in order to protect the emotions that
are so overwhelming to their sense of self. Future research could address these
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questions and, hopefully, expand the theoretical understanding of these challenging
disorders.
The final test of any clinical model is how well it works in the treatment of the
problem in question. Although more research is needed to develop and refine the
model, it is hoped that it will be used to develop clinical interventions (in keeping
with the discussions above) that would need to be thoroughly tested by appropriate
methodologies (e.g. randomised control trials).
7.8. Conclusions
The research reported throughout this thesis has shown that emotions and their
functioning are of central importance in understanding eating disorders. It is
interesting that Hilda Bruch (1962) discussed that emotions, and in particular, anger
are key in formulating the main difficulties of eating disorders, especially restricting
anorexia nervosa. It does appear as if the literature is going through a cycle where it is
now moving away from purist CBT approaches that predominantly focus on
cognitions and behaviours. This research has many parallels with other research and
theory development in psychological treatments, with Stephen Hayes using a more
behavioural theory back drop to develop his Action and Commitment therapy (ACT).
ACT focuses on problematic way in which language is used by people who have
psychological difficulties, and how this is central to emotional avoidance.
Underpinning this perspective, Hayes argues that the acknowledgement that
emotional distress is entirely normal and psychological growth involves facing these
difficulties. These theoretical perspectives has many echoes in this thesis's argument,
in that, people with eating disorders often have a significant amount of emotional
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distress but will use their eating to suppress their emotions. Interestingly across the
thesis, research has demonstrated that similar emotional processes are in play for
many different eating disorder groups (e.g. emotional coupling) and this offers further
evidence for a transdiagnostic perspective. It does seem that the different eating
disorder groups are closer to one another in the underlying processes, but may
manifest themselves in differing ways. These reflections remain empirical questions.
The main finding that anger is potentially coupled to disgust/ body size estimation
was a striking finding and can help to explain the often clinical reported phenomena
of an increase in body dissatisfaction/ ED symptoms following an interpersonal
confrontation/ row. Through the literature, it has often been discussed that eating
disorders are a female difficulty because of the thin body ideal that is prevalent in
modern society (e.g. Stice, 2001). It is interesting to also reflect upon how female
anger is often not seen favourably in contemporary society and this may be the
'elephant in the room' when it comes to understanding eating disorders. This may
well be the legacy of this doctoral research.
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Appendix 1: DSM-IV Criteria for the Eating Disorder
DSM-IV Criteria for Anorexia Nervosa
A. Refusal to maintain body weight at or above a minimally weight for age and
height (e.g. weight loss leading to maintenance of body weight less than 85%
of that expected; or failure to make expected weight gain during a period of
growth, leading to body weight less than 85% of that expected).
B. Intense fear of gaining weight or becoming fat, even though underweight.
C. Disturbance in the way in which one's body weight or shape is experienced,
undue influence of body weight or shape on self-evaluation, or denial of the
seriousness of the current low body weight.
D. In postmenarcheal females, amenorrhea, i.e., the absence of at least three
consecutive menstrual cycles. (A woman is considered to have amenorrhea if
her periods occur only following hormone, e.g. estrogen, administration).
Specify Type:
Restricting type: during the current episode of anorexia nervosa, the person has not
regularly engaged in binge-eating or purging behaviour (i.e. self-induced vomiting or
the misuse of laxatives, diuretics, or enemas).
Binge-Eating/ Purging Type: during the current episode of anorexia nervosa, the
person has regularly engaged in binge eating or purging behaviour (i.e. self-induced
vomiting or the misuse of laxatives, diuretics, or enemas).
DSM-IV Criteria for Bulimia Nervosa
A. Recurrent episodes of binge eating. An episode of binge eating is
characterized by both of the following:(l) Eating, in a discrete period of time
(e.g., within any 2-hour period), an amount of food that is definitely larger
than most people would eat during a similar period of time and under similar
circumstances.(2) A sense of lack of control over eating during the episode
(e.g. a feeling that one cannot stop eating or control what or how much one is
eating).
B. Recurrent inappropriate compensatory behaviour in order to prevent weight
gain, such as self-induced vomiting; misuse of laxatives, diuretics, enemas or
other medications; fasting or excessive exercise.
C. The binge eating and inappropriate compensatory behaviours both occur, on
average, at least twice a week for 3 months.
D. Self-evaluation is unduly influenced by body shape and weight.
E. The disturbance does not occur exclusively during episodes of anorexia
nervosa.
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Specify type:
• Purging type: During the current episode of bulimia nervosa, the person has
regularly engaged in self-induced vomiting or the misuse of laxatives,
diuretics or enemas.
• Nonpurging type: During the current episode of bulimia nervosa, the person
has used inappropriate compensatory behaviours, such as fasting or excessive
exercise, but has not regularly engaged in self-induced vomiting or the misuse
of laxatives, diuretics or enemas
Eating Disorder not Otherwise Specified
The eating disorder not otherwise specified category is for disorders of eating that do
not meet the criteria for any specific eating disorder. Examples include:
1. For females, all of the criteria for anorexia nervosa are met except that the
individual has regular menses.
2. All of the criteria for the anorexia nervosa are met except that, despite
significant weight loss, the individual's current weight is in the normal range.
3. All of the criteria for bulimia nervosa are met except that the binge eating and
inappropriate compensatory mechanisms occur at a frequency of less than
twice a week or for a duration of less than 3 months.
4. The regular use of inappropriate compensatory behaviour by an individual of
normal weight after eating small amounts of food (e.g. self-induced vomiting
after the consumption of two cookies).
5. Repeatedly chewing and spitting out, but not swallowing, large amounts of
food.
6. Binge eating disorder: recurrent episodes of binge eating in the absence of the
regular use of inappropriate compensatory behaviours characteristic of bulimia
nervosa.
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Appendix 2 - A copy of the Ethics Approval Letter for the
Qualitative Study presented in chapter 3.
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Appendix 3 - Transcript of Participant 3's interview
Memo Notes Transcript Codes
Just to, the first question is how long have you been in
the day service?
Erm, Ed say 11, no about 10 weeks probably. Two or
three months.
So about two and a half?
Yeah, yeah.
Did you come in via the inpatient route?
Yeah, yeah.
•
And how long were you in the inpatient?
Five months, I think, yeah, yeah, from the beginning of
this year, so I've been in, in like, involved in this whole
service since the beginning of January.
Length of time with
service
So you came in just after Christmas?
Yeah.
Ok, and was that your first admission onto an eating
disorder clinic?
Yeah, yeah. Number of admissions
I just want to check which term you feel comfortable,
whether it's a diagnostic term, like an anorexia, or
bulimia, or if you would prefer me using a term like
an eating disorder, how would you like me to refer
...?
ondered if this was
in indication that she




Could you tell me a little bit about your eating
disorder before you came into hospital?
*Vhy the need for
:ontrol at this time? Is
here anything else
?oing on???
Erm, I don't know, it was, it just, I suppose it just got a
bit of control I suppose, erm, with a think the pressure of
exams, set it off a bit, the downrolling, things just
spiralled and I just ended up here.
Perceived cause of ED
Need for control
Ok, were you a student?
Yeah.
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Where were you studying?
Erm, at you know college, not college, in the high school
and it kind of, it kind of started offwhen I like, I did my
mock exams, cos I was doing my GCSE's, I did my
mocks and I got, not as good grades as I expected, so then
I went, right, Em doing, I'm doing better than that, so I
kind of set full ??(counter 48) into my studies, and I
suppose I kind of dropped my eating at the same time.




And how old are you now if you don't mind me
asking?
17.
And when was your seventeenth birthday?
Erm, it was last October, I'm 18 in like this October.
So, after your mock exams, were they the mocks for
what, A levels or no GCSE's sorry, you did say.
Erm, you stopped eating,..
s there a fragile sense
)f self that needs to
ichieve to be
vorthwhile????
I don't know, I suppose I started controlling it a bit more,
erm, I started being quite obsessive over counting
everything what I ate. Like, erm, I actually set up a, like
a kind of like on my computer, like a kind of like a
database, with erm, it had like this little book was on
which would show how I've eaten and stuff, and I
counted everything what I'd eaten during the day into this
database what counted it all at the end of the day, like all
the calories, the fat content, the protein and just this
whole thing on excel like, what I like went to every night
checking and working out and it was, it became quite
obsessive really. And that was around the time I was
studying so I kind ofjust went from one thing to the other
thing, studying, to kind of this database to the studying
and looking out what I was eating and it just, that was all
I was, life seemed to revolve around. And it just got








So that was really the, when things became sort of
more and more focussed on what you were eating?
Yeah.
How did you feel about your own body weight at the
time?
s this driven by the
leed of perfection, or
)oor body image
Well I felt bad, I felt like I needed to loose weight really,
so and then I don't know, I cant really remember, I just
remember like the feeling better every time I looked at
the scales and thought yes!
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It was very much as though a downward, in terms of
reducing what you were eating to reduce your weight?
Yeah, yeah, and it was never, it never seemed good
enough. Like I had a target in my head, I was saying
something a couple of weeks ago, and it was like my
actual target is like 8 stone, which was only about half a
stone less than what Ed started out at, but I just carried
on, I just thought, well I'll loose a bit more and it just
kind of, just never ended, basically it just didn't stop.
Never enough weight
loss
Moving goal post - on
the scale
Do you know what your weight went down to when
you came in?
Erm, oh, just under 5 stone, I think, I'm not sure. But I
know, I lost about, er nearly 4 I think.
Marked restriction
And it never felt that you would ever reach that
point?
No, I never really realised, oh that's enough now, stop. It
would never, I don't think it would have ever enough. I
suppose now, it seems ridiculous but, I suppose as you





What I was wondering is around, that there are other
associated behaviours, which sometimes go alongside
an eating disorder, people use the phrase bingeing,
vomiting and such, were any of those, did you ever use
any of those?
No. Only exercising really, that was the only, I never
made myself sick, I never binged, I never used laxatives,
I never used slimming pills, no.
Restriction
symptomatology
Denial of bingeing and
vomiting
So it was very much about just reducing what you
were eating?
I did, I don't know if it is anything to do with slimming,
but have you ever heard of ??(counter 93 - sounds
like a brand name/medicine?) or something, what people
use for their cholesterol? They're herbal things what
people, I used to eat lots of that, I thought that might
help, but I don't know whether, I did that, but that's all.
Use of diet aids
Did it feel like it was helping?
I don't know, but I think, I think it didn't contribute to
when I came in, my liver was very badly damaged, and I
got it scanned and I think, I think that'd probably
contributed to that I suppose, I don't know.
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It felt like things got quite difficult, was it Christmas
time last year?
Yeah, yeah.
How long, when did it start, do you think?
Probably about, I'd say about, it started getting
noticeably worse about a year ago, last summer, at the
beginning of last summer, because I was looking back on
pictures last night, and you wouldn't tell anything was
wrong last year, but it's just gone downhill within this
year I think.
Quick deterioration
So from about summer last year to Christmas, it's
only really kicked in?
Yeah.
Was there anything last summer, in particular
looking for, anything stressful or ..?
Tiven the above
iiscussion - wondered
f P.3 was worried
ibout failing or 'not
-eaching the required
standard.'
I did my GCSE's, which it probably got worse then, erm,
I was on holiday so I had more time to be like obsessive
about what I ate and spend more time blocking
everything out. Erm, I had more time to like go on bike
rides, go and do things in the garden and exercise a lot
more and, and I don't know, I suppose, I just had more
time to do things what didn't contribute, I don't know.
Stress from GCSE's
Blocking out emotions
as well as food
(metaphor?)
So it was an amalgamation of different things, not just
one particular event?
f P.3 blocked out the
stress, I guess that it is
lot surprising that she
loes not feel stressed -
lypothesis ?
No, no. There was nothing what really, you know was
stressed about.
Denial of emotions?
Did you notice if your eating disorder sort of
fluctuated...?
v^ery confused part of
he conversation. Not
>ure about help. Mother
ried to help, but in
ight of the
conversation below, I




Erm, there is at one time, I mean I don't know if it, I did
like, just my mum something's gone wrong, I said I don't
know what's happening but it's definitely not right, and
then like, I went to the doctors and like, I started like
having like sort of kind of therapy, oh no that was a lot
later on, but at one point, me and my mum like said right,
we're gonna like organise some kind ofmenu and we're
gonna, things are gonna get back on track, and I managed
to gain a bit of weight during then, but I think one week
I'd drunk a lot ofwater before, before I got, well my
mum was weighing me, I was weighed and I kind of
shocked myself into how much I'd gained and then things
Confusion of mother's
help
Started some help, but
unclear
Mother help with food
- concrete help???
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just plummeted, completely from there.
....?? (counter 130) with your mums help or ...?
I don't know, I just.
Ok, are you ok so far?
Yeah.
Ok, one of the other things I'm interested in, and one
reason why I'm sort of having these interviews, is I'm
kind of interested how people who have suffered an
eating disorder felt about expressing their emotions.
And I was wondering if, as a general question, how do
you feel about your own expression of emotion, do you
feel you can express emotions?
s this a clear that P.3 is
not au fait with talking
ibout her emotions???




I guess yeah, a good question, I mean emotional
expression by whether it's speaking, behavioural and
non verbally, such as facial expressions of emotion.
How are you emotionally?
Still some confusion -




nteresting that she first
alks about is anger?
I suppose I'm kind of like, I have strong views sometimes
of that I shouldn't be ..., but there's times when I'm
annoyed when I think oh I shouldn't be saying that, I
shouldn't be expressing my opinion, and I suppose
sometimes, but most, erm, I feel like I shouldn't be like






I'm wondering if you could tell me a little bit more
about that, or maybe to help me understand is can
you give me an example of when you feel you're able
to express an emotion and when you feel you're not
able to express?
Er, I suppose when I would is when someone asks me
kind of for my opinion, maybe, if I'm asked like they
expect you to sort of talk back to them, but if no-one's





not allowed to express
yourselfwith someone.
So it feels almost like a permissive thing, so if someone
actually asks you ...?
Yeah, yeah.
In situations we can sometimes feel angry, we can feel
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sad, or we can feel fearful, we can feel disgusted and
we can feel happy. Do you think that some of those
emotions are more difficult to express than others?
Vo permission to
express for P.3 to
express her own needs?
Yeah, I suppose it's a lot easier to express being happy
than it is like expressing that you're sad, that you've got a
problem, that something's gone wrong for you, it's a lot
harder to tell people that something's gone wrong than
tell them it's gone right.
Positive emotion is OK
to express
No permission to talk
about negative
emotions
So it feels like the negative emotions, ifwe use that
term, are much more difficult to express than others?
Yes.
But out of those, which ones would be the most
difficult of say anger, disgust, sadness and fear?
\nger onto the self-
2D????
Probably sadness. Anger is probably isn't, I don't know,
I, sadness probably is the one probably the most. I'm not
sure really, because I think when you're angry as well
that's quite a, the one what, I quite, the chances are like,
you can keep it to yourself and take your anger out on






Are you ok with these questions? but what I was
wondering is about feeling angry, what would it be
like, it sounds like both the anger and sadness it feels





And I wonder why that is. I mean, you've touched on
it a bit earlier there about permission, but I was
wondering why it was so difficult to express those
particular emotions?
I suppose because it shows there's something going
wrong and I don't know, it, I don't like being angry at
people, because it makes people feel bad, it felt if you
.. ,??(counter 188) people constantly it makes them feel,
it's like .. ,.??(counter 189) but if you're sad, it's gonna
make, it's gonna rub off on other people, it's gonna make
them sad, if you're angry you're gonna take it out on
other people, it's gonna even make them angry and you
get something back at you, or, it's not gonna be good









means you are at risk
or vulnerable
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Trying to avoid that bad feeling?
[t is almost a complete
attempt to deny oneself
any emotions. It is like
she does not think she
is entitled to any sense
of self to be expressed.
Yeah, it's alright if you can keep it to yourself because I
mean it's not as bad, you're not affecting anyone, you can
kind of feel bad about yourself, you can be angry about
yourself and like kind of punish yourself but when you're
taking it out on other people, it kind of makes you feel
worse, so it kind of makes you feel worse than you









Do you feel that you'd be entitled to be angry?
Listening to what you've just said, I was wondering if
...?
Um, I don't feel like no, I shouldn't be angry with these
people unless it some kind of specific valid reason, if
they've clamped my car and I'd paid, and the ticket was
stuck on my window, then I'd be angry, and I'd feel
alright being angry, but if I'd woke up in a bad mood,
and someone'd like, someone had just like, I don't know,
like, hit me on back of the head like joking me or
something, if someone'd done something like joking me
and I'd snapped on them, that's not a valid reason to be





OK to express anger
Inhibited emotion to
protect others
Not entitled to express
emotion
Can you remember the last time you were sad or
angry?
Oh, I don't know, erm, I don't know, I've been on






I'm asking at the wrong time?
Yeah. erm..
Does it feel like a long time ago?
It's probably not, but I cant remember, erm, I felt sad
when we come back home I suppose, off holiday, I don't
know if that's a valid sad, but I don't know ...
Confusion about
emotion.
??(counter 215) mum and dad you were sad?
No. I suppose, no they wouldn't have done, I didn't like
to oh I'm sad to be back home ??(counter 125)
Denial of emotion
Where did you go?
Erm, oh on holiday? When to Wales.
06/12/2009 Page 319
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) University of Edinburgh John R.E. Fox
It sounds like you had a good time?
Yeah, yeah, it was alright and I'm going again on
Saturday.
That sounds great, sounds good. So it feels like,
there's something around not feeling entitled, not,
people not giving you permission to experience or to
express those emotions. That feels kind of important,
does that feel important, do you think?
I suppose it's important that like you can talk at the right
time and like you don't, you don't make people feel
worse than they should.
Responsible for how
other's feel
I suppose what I'm left with, I'm left with a word in
my mind of responsibility. It's almost that you're
feeling, and I don't want to put words in your mouth,
I'm just trying to offer a suggestion, if it's wrong then
just say, but it feels like in a way, if you are angry and
you make someone else angry, or if you're sad and
you make someone else sad, it almost feels that you're
feeling very responsible?
Yeah, yeah, it is in a way really. Like it's kind of like






That responsibility feels very difficult for you, and I
was kind ofwondering why that was?
I don't really know, I don't know I suppose I feel alright
if I'm happy and you're spreading like happiness and
enjoyment, but in a way like you are responsible for
people around you I suppose, and you kind of do feel
responsible for if you're making them feel worse in any
way, you do feel that kind extra like oh I shouldn't, if I'm
feeling bad I shouldn't be, it's my problem not theirs.
Responsible for other's
emotions
Need to protect others
from feeling worse
Not entitled to share
emotion
And you talked about earlier, you talked a bit about,
if I feel angry, if I feel sad then I'll take that away and
hold it, you used the word punishing yourself, and I
was wondering what you meant by that, and how
you've done that in the past?
/his seems to be an




he feels the need to
)unish herself and to
top eating.
Erm, I suppose it's kind of, it sounds crazy, but you carry
yourself off and like you, you make yourself feel like I
don't know, things you're going to, doing work or you go
quiet and carry yourself off, well you kind of pull
yourself, keep it quite, don't say anything, cos then you
might affect people like, and like you kind of you keep it
to yourself, like, you tell yourself off kind of thing, inside
your head, and like you don't, I suppose like I don't eat
Inhibited expression of
emotion
'keep it to yourself
Punish self by not
eating
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comes into it, like you punish yourself, like if you've
done something wrong, if you're bad about something,
you cant really say, or like, you get off your food or




I appreciate that it may feel difficult sharing some of
this, and that's why I stress, while we're here, that it's
entirely confidential, you know the information
doesn't leave this room, well it does in effect, it
doesn't leave it with your name attached, I'm aware
just from what you're sharing there, that it feels like
you use quite powerful methods of almost like
punishing yourself, by using a pair of scissors for
example, telling yourself off and denying yourself
food, are you ok to continue?
Yeah.
What I was wondering a little bit about is, if you could
tell me something about your family, just first off,
who's there? Where were you brought up?
Erm, in Wigan, erm, with my mum, my dad, and my
brother. My brother's been at university for 3 years, but
he's come back home now. Erm, and that's it really.
Ok, what did your brother study there?
He studied motorsport (?) engineering.
Oh where was that?
That was at Farnborough (?) in London. He's been like
in London, he lived down there, not at home.
How about your folks? What do they do?
My dad's got a business what's next door to us, erm,
fixing cars and selling car types and stuff like that and my
mum used to work at a factory down the road from us but
she finished last year I think it was, erm, due to like the
stresses of it and depression she ended up with, so
.. ..??(counter 290 - mumbling quietly).
Very concrete job for
father
Maternal depression
Sounds like your mum went through a difficult patch?
Yeah.
How did that affect home life?
/his answer gives a
/ery strong sense that
he environment at the
amily home was
argely devoid of
It was difficult cos I suppose my mum wasn't like she
should be really, she were scared of going out sometimes
she wouldn't answer the door, erm, she had various like
bad like low points really and there was a lot of upset
really, like, but at the time we were living in a caravan in
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amotions. our back garden, we were having a house being built, this
was about four years ago, and erm, we were all like
confined closely and I think my mum didn't want the
house to be built, but my dad was going ahead with it, so







Sounds like a difficult time.
Same time as when the
2D really 'took off.
Mm, I suppose, I've only just realised what actually was
going on, but like at the time I weren't really, I were just
enjoying living in a caravan to be honest, I weren't like
taking a great deal of notice what was going on in family
round me. And I don't, I think it might have been more
than 4 years ago, so I don't think I were really old enough
to understand what was happening until, until probably
about a year or so ago, and I've only just kind of realised





So it came to a head for your mum what about last
year?
About 2 years ago I think it was.
And she left work what the beginning of 2005, so it
will have been the end of last year?
Oh I don't know.
Don't feel it has to be exact, I'm just what I'm trying
to do is just to get, and it sounds like there's a few
time frames, so four years ago you had the house
built?
Yeah, about 4 or 5 years ago the house was built.
And then your mum started having problems with
depression about 2 years ago?
Yeah.
Then it came to a head ...?
Well she started, she started a lot more than two years
ago with depression, she started probably about 6 years
ago, 6 or 7, and it just got gradually worse I think.
I wonder, did that have a bearing on how emotions
were expressed at home?
Yeah, probably, cos she kept a lot like bottled up I think
and just I think we didn't really understand what was
going on because she'd never talk to us about what was
happening, it was just a lot of her keeping herself to
herselfbasically I think. I think that was why we didn't
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And that sounds like a difficult time where, it feels
like your mum, and I mean this with all due respect
here, but it feels like she was quite distant?
Yeah.
Do you see your parents ever, did they get emotional,
quiet, did they get upset, did they get angry, did they
get scared, how was that?
P.3 very upset in this
Dart of the interview
Eut no tears).
Alludes to two very big
angry confrontations.
Vlaybe this makes them
much more 'toxic'
I think they used to get, well yeah, I suppose yeah they
did, but not, not like big arguments in front ofme, I can
only remember one or two incidences where there's been





And how were you doing growing up through that?
Because I was wondering how you felt about your own
emotions, with everything else going on around you?
Don't believe her -
think this is evidence of
a lack of awareness of
low much this did
effect her, but unaware
of it all.
spoken vs unspoken'.
I don't think it affected, I don't know if I noticed, maybe
I don't notice if it affected me, I don't know, maybe it
just got normal really, so I don't really.
Denial of impact of
maternal depression
Because, I mean I'm being transparent, we talked
earlier about some of your earlier difficulties with
emotions, and you know I don't want to add one and
one and get four, but it's about difficulties with
emotions now, it's interesting when you talk a little bit
about growing up, you talked a bit about when your
mum was quite distant because of her own difficulties,
we haven't talked much about your father, and I was
wondering a bit about how he is and if...?
Erm, he's just ??(counter 357). Erm, if anything's
going wrong, erm it's not! It's like, it'll be alright, it's
not got to be talked about kind of thing, it'll sort itself
out, I suppose that kind of feeling.
Lack of
communication




So if you were upset as a child, would you have been
able to get to your father?
It depends what kind of upset, if it were kind of like, hurt
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emotions weren't something what are talked about really,
they're not, it was just like, it was something we didn't
talk about really, we don't talk things through, we just, if





Feels like in a sense that that, I'm wondering in a way
if that may have been responsible for ...?
Mmm, maybe yeah.
I mean that's really, I suppose, all the questions, I've
just got one left really, it feels like as you were saying
it sounds like, you were saying there were times where
your family didn't talk about emotions, they were
kept very much, it was almost an unspoken rule, you
deal with them yourself, you just take them away,
what would happen, or what did happen when, if
there were examples, if you felt angry or you were
upset or....? How was it managed?
Erm, I cant remember, I think, (laughter). Now if get
angry it kind of, if comes out like, well, if you feel bad, I
don't remember being angry at people but, I suppose
before all this, if I was angry, don't know I cant
remember having any like any confrontation or anything
with my mum and dad, apart from once, I don't know I
suppose like, it like, if I were angry or kind of like have a
big fall out and then it probably be a bit like we just
wouldn't speak to each other for a couple of days and like
then we'd get speaking to each other, but it, it wouldn't
be anything that we talked to or anything, it's not, you
know we weren't talked to while we were angry or




toxicity of anger for
interpersonal
relationships
Just wait for it to blow over?
Yeah.
Are there any final comments you'd like to say?
There don't have to be.
No, not really.
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Appendix 4 - tests of normal distribution for the analyses in
chapter 4
Kolmoqorov-Smirnov(a) Shapiro-Wilk
Statistic df Sip. Statistic df Sip.
Disgust sensitivity scores
1st time .125 49 .053 .943 49 .020
State anger scale time 1 .282 49 .000 .662 49 .000
Feeling angry time 1 .243 49 .000 .782 49 .000
Feel like expressing anger
verbally time 1 .429 49 .000 .396 49 .000
Feel like expressing anger
physically time 1 .490 49 .000 .250 49 .000
Trait anger scale time 1 .137 49 .023 .956 49 .063
Angry temperament time 1
.225 49 .000 .837 49 .000
Angry reaction time 1 .217 49 .000 .904 49 .001
Anger expression out time
1 .098 49 .2000 .981 49 .591
Anger expression in time 1
.076 49 .2000 .980 49 .572
Anger control out time 1 .148 49 .009 .959 49 .087
Anger control in time 1 .160 49 .003 .818 49 .000
Anger expression index
time 1 .099 49 .2000 .956 49 .062
BES 1 During last week
Anger .116 49 .100 .962 49 .113
BES 1 During last week
Sadness .208 49 .000 .846 49 .000
BES 1 During last week
Fear .104 49 .2000 .957 49 .072
BES 1 During last week
Happiness .136 49 .024 .959 49 .089
BES State disgust time 1 .168 49 .001 .865 49 .000
BES 1 General Anger .107 49 .2000 .955 49 .059
BES 1 General Sadness .190 49 .000 .897 49 .000
BES 1 General Fear .108 49 .2000 .961 49 .106
BES 1 General Happiness
.198 49 .000 .902 49 .001
BES trait disgust time 1 .204 49 .000 .864 49 .000
BES 1 coping Anger .124 49 .058 .957 49 .073
BES 1 coping Sadness .122 49 .067 .977 49 .430
BES 1 coping Fear .096 49 .2000 .972 49 .285
BES cope disgust 1 .135 49 .025 .932 49 .007
BES 1 coping Happiness .246 49 .000 .727 49 .000
Disgust sensitivity scores
2nd time .100 49 .2000 .973 49 .313
State anger scale time 2 .222 49 .000 .734 49 .000
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Appendix 4 - Levene's test for the t-test results for Chapter 4
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
BES 1 During last week
Anger
Equal variances
assumed 1.198 .279 -1.889 47 .065
Equal variances
not assumed -1.881 44.316 .067
BES 1 During last week
Sadness
Equal variances
assumed 1.250 .269 -2.061 48 .045
Equal variances
not assumed -2.061 43.997 .045
BES 1 During last week
Fear
Equal variances
assumed 2.638 .111 -1.754 48 .086
Equal variances
not assumed -1.754 47.086 .086
BES 1 During last week
Happiness
Equal variances
assumed 2.382 .129 2.236 48 .030
Equal variances
not assumed 2.236 45.977 .030
BES State disgust time 1 Equal variances
assumed 6.127 .017 -3.125 48 .003
Equal variances
not assumed -3.125 39.673 .003
BES 1 General Anger Equal variances
assumed 1.196 .280 -1.767 48 .084
Equal variances
not assumed -1.767 44.615 .084
BES 1 General Sadness Equal variances
assumed .077 .782 -2.538 48 .014
Equal variances
not assumed -2.538 47.515 .014
BES 1 General Fear Equal variances
assumed .904 .347 -1.947 48 .057
Equal variances
not assumed -1.947 47.097 .058
BES 1 General Happiness Equal variances
assumed .599 .443 2.687 48 .010
Equal variances
not assumed 2.687 47.961 .010
BES trait disgust time 1 Equal variances
assumed 8.624 .005 -3.485 48 .001
Equal variances
not assumed -3.485 37.070 .001
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Appendix 4 (cont'd) - Tests of heterogeneity for the multi¬
variate analyses and the confirmatory non-parametric
analyses in chapter 4







Tests the null hypothesis that the observed covariance matrices of the dependent variables are equal
across groups,
a Design: Intercept+group
Within Subjects Design: anger







Tests the null hypothesis that the observed covariance matrices of the dependent variables are equal
across groups,
a Design: Intercept+group
Within Subjects Design: disgust
The table below tests the hypothesis that there is a significant difference between
state anger at time 1 and state anger at time 2 for the eating disorder group.
State anger







a Based on negative
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
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Appendix 4 (cont'd) - Tests of heterogeneity for the multi¬
variate analyses and the confirmatory non-parametric
analyses in chapter 4
The table below tests the hypothesis that there is a significant difference between the participant






Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .010
a Grouping Variable: Participant type - control or eating disordered
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Appendix 5- A copy of the Ethics Approval Letter for the

































Thank you for your recent submission to the Departmental Ethics Committee.
This research now has FINAL APPRO VAL and you may proceed with your investigation.
Please ensure the following minor changesare made:
— no changes necessary —
Please ensure that the ethics committee reference number for this project appears on all documentation.
It is your responsibility to inform the Committee of all new research that you undertake. Please note that
any research that you undertake (including research undertaken by your students or research
assistants) that has not been submitted to the committee has not been approved by either the Ethics
Committee or the Psychology Department. In the event of an investigation into the ethics of such
research being undertaken by the British Psychological Society, neither the department nor the Ethics
Committee can be held responsible. You will also not be covered by the insurance policies taken out by
the University to provide protection for members carrying out research with human participants.
Yours sincerely,
Dr Catherine Hodgson (Chair)







Combining the stengths of UMIST anc
The Victoria Universityof Manchester
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Appendix 6 -Tests ofNormality from Chapter 5
Kolmogorov-Smirnov(a)
Statistic df Sig.
DISTRESS .104 34 .2000
PUNITIVE .130 34 .154
EXPRESSIVE
.191 34 .003ENCOURAGEMENT
EMOTION FOCUSED .111 34 .2000
PROBLEM FOCUSED .108 34 .2000
MINIMIZATION .087 34 .2000
State Anger .111 34 .2000
State Sad .127 34 .178
State Disgust .127 34 .179
State Fear .185 34 .005
State Happiness .146 34 .064
Trait Anger .130 34 .157
Trait Sadness .129 34 .168
Trait Disgust .129 34 .164
Trait Fear .144 34 .070
Trait Happiness .135 34 .120
Anger Coping .217 34 .000
Sadness Coping .171 34 .013
Disgust Coping .192 34 .003
Fear Coping .142 34 .079
Happiness Coping .147 34 .059
Total Eat .110 52 .162
* This is a lower bound of the true significance,
a Lilliefors Significance Correction
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Appendix 7 - Correlations between age and the main
variables in the analysis, for the study presented in chapter 5.
Variable Correlation test age
TraitAnger Pearson Correlation -.120
Sig. (2-tailed) .392
TraitSadness Pearson Correlation mo
Sig. (2-tailed) .459
TraitDisgust Pearson Correlation -.102
Sig. (2-tailed) .466
TraitFear Pearson Correlation .063
Sig. (2-tailed) .655
hadsd Pearson Correlation .110
Sig. (2-tailed) .434
hadsa Pearson Correlation .066
Sig. (2-tailed) .639
StateAnger Pearson Correlation -.192
Sig. (2-tailed) .169
StateSad Pearson Correlation .068
Sig. (2-tailed) .627
StateDisgust Pearson Correlation -.122
Sig. (2-tailed) .383
StateFear Pearson Correlation .159
Sig. (2-tailed) .255
StateHappiness Pearson Correlation -.090
Sig. (2-tailed) .525
TraitHappiness Pearson Correlation -.035
Sig. (2-tailed) .801
DISTRESS Pearson Correlation .224
Sig. (2-tailed) .118





■HHHI Sig. (2-tailed) .248
EMOTIONFOCUSE Pearson Correlation -.307(*)
Sig. (2-tailed) .028
PROBLEMFOCUSED Pearson Correlation -.283
Sig. (2-tailed) .054
MINIMIZATION Pearson Correlation .126
Sig. (2-tailed) .379
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Appendix 8 - A copy of the Ethics Approval Letter for the




School of Psychological Sciences























Thank ysu for your recent submission to the Departmental Ethics Committee.
The Committee has made the following decision regarding the project:
Approved
Please address thefolbwing commenfe:
1. There should be a wider represent^ion of the of the questions thatwill be asked in the PIS.
2. Remove the sentence "Read the question below and mdc.." on the PIS and amend th<
sentenceabove to read" Bebwarea numberof examples of the type of questions you can be
expected to answer by indicating howyou have been feeing in the past week'
3. Scale and oolumns are missing from the Basic Emotions Scale
4. Send copies of the revised documents to the committee for our records
What to do now:
If the deasion is: Approved
Correct any minor points mentioned and submt copies of any amended documentaton to the
SREC. Ensure that the project reference number appears on all documentatbn. The project
may commence.
If the deasion is: Conditional approval
Overall, the project is satisfactory but some changes are required. The project may not start
until you receive FinalApproval.
1. Download the Amendments Gbversheetfrom the Intranet. Detail the changes you have
made in the space provided. Submit the documents you have been asked to amend
or
include.
2. Leave the documents in the Ethbs AmendmentsResubmissions pigeon
hole.
Amendments are reviewed every Tuesday.
If the deasion is: Resubmission required
There are several mapr concerns wth the project.
1. Re-submit all documents, including the application form and cover sheet, making the
changes requested by the SREC. Use the original reference number unless
instructed
otherwise,
2. Leave the documente in the Ethics Amendmente/Resubrrissions pigeon hob by 5pm on the
Tuesday one week prior to the meeting in whichyou would likeyour resubmission reviewed.
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Appendix 9 - Shows the statistics for the K-S test of normality
for the variables reported in chapter 6
Tests of Normality
Kolmogorov-Smirnov(a) Shapiro-Wilk
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig.
White bear suppression
inventory .078 17 .2000 .981 17 .966
state anger .102 17 .2000 .960 17 .640
state sadness .131 17 .2000 .918 17 .137
state disgust .121 17 .2000 .927 17 .191
state fear .239 17 .011 .874 17 .025
state happy .146 17 .2000 .925 17 .182
trait anger .156 17 .2000 .921 17 .153
trait sadness .161 17 .2000 .919 17 .141
trait disgust .129 17 .2000 .962 17 .678
trait fear .256 17 .004 .900 17 .069
trait happy .339 17 .000 .541 17 .000
coping anger .153 17 .2000 .932 17 .232
coping sadness .087 17 .2000 .980 17 .957
coping disgust .140 17 .2000 .951 17 .474
coping fear .116 17 .2000 .938 17 .292
coping happy .137 17 .2000 .955 17 .540
emotional regulation -
internal dysfunctional .108 17 .2000 .976 17 .912
emotional regulation -
internal functional .127 17 .2000 .955 17 .536
emotional regulation -
external dysfunctional .240 17 .011 .883 17 .035
emotional regulation -
















.135 17 .2000 .940 17 .314
Body Shape perception -
now - Time 1 .140 17 .2000 .943 17 .353
Ideal Body Shape - Time
1 .347 17 .000 .663 17 .000
Disgust proponsity - time
1 .144 17 .2000 .976 17 .914
Disgust sensitivity - time
1 .153 17 .2000 .962 17 .668
Core Disgust - time 1 .207 17 .051 .869 17 .021
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animal reminder disgust-
time 1 .150 17 .2000 .894 17 .054
Contamination disgust -
time 1 .169 17 .2000 .919 17 .142
total disgust score - time
1 .145 17 .2000 .923 17 .168
* This is a lower bound of the true significance,
a Lilliefors Significance Correction
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assumed 1.008 .320 6.980 51 .000
Equal variances




assumed .287 .594 -2.669 52 .010
Equal variances




assumed 8.760 .005 2.047 52 .046
Equal variances




assumed .039 .845 -2.420 52 .019
Equal variances
not assumed -2.405 44.317 .020
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower
Body Shape perception -
now - Time 1
Equal variances
assumed 11.047 .002 1.740 41 .089
Equal variances
not assumed 1.859 36.610 .071
Ideal Body Shape - Time
1
Equal variances
assumed .042 .839 -3.706 41 .001
Equal variances
not assumed -3.814 40.998 .000
total disgust score - time
1
Equal variances
assumed 1.226 .275 3.266 41 .002
Equal variances
not assumed 3.325 40.695 .002
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F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Age Equal variances
assumed .857 .359 1.122 47 .267
Equal variances
not assumed 1.255 39.791 .217
BMI Equal variances
assumed 3.818 .056 -7.565 49 .000
Equal variances




assumed 3.133 .083 6.387 52 .000
Equal variances





















































State Anger - time 1 Equal variances
assumed 10.846 .002 2.061 41 .046
Equal variances
not assumed 2.285 27.048 .030
state anger - time 2 Equal variances
assumed 20.985 .000 2.466 38 .018
Equal variances
not assumed 2.550 28.630 .016
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Appendix 11 - A copy of all the measures, questionnaires and
procedures used in the research presented in this thesis.
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The Basic Emotions Scale
The purpose of this scale is to find out about how much or how often you experience
certain emotions and then to ask some questions about how you feel actually during
particular emotions themselves.
The first part of the scale is designed to explore how you have felt DURING THE
LAST WEEK. For each emotion, please circle ONE number only between 1 and 7,
to indicate how you have felt.
OVER THE PAST WEEK I HAVE FELT:
Not at all Some of the time All of the time
ANGER 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
DESPAIR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SHAME 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ANXIETY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
HAPPINESS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
FRUSTRATION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
MISERY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
GUILT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
NERVOUSNESS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
JOY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
IRRITATION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
GLOOMINESS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
HUMILIATED 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TENSE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
LOVING 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
AGGRESSION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
MOURNFUL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
BLAMEWORTHY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
WORRIED 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CHEERFUL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
DISGUST (i.e., repulsion) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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In the second part of this questionnaire we would like to know about how you feel
IN GENERAL.
The question asks HOW OFTEN you feel the emotion.
Again, for each question please circle ONE number only between 1 and 7 to indicate
how you feel.
IN GENERAL, I FEEL THIS EMOTION:
Never Sometimes Very often
ANGER 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
DESPAIR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SHAME 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ANXIETY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
HAPPINESS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
FRUSTRATION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
MISERY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
GUILT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
NERVOUSNESS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
JOY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
IRRITATION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
GLOOMINESS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
HUMILIATED 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TENSE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
LOVING 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
AGGRESSION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
MOURNFUL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
BLAMEWORTHY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
WORRIED 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CHEERFUL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
DISGUST (i.e., repulsion) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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In the third part of this questionnaire we would like to ask you for some information
about HOWWELL YOU FEEL YOU COPE when you experience that emotion.
For example, you might feel completely out of control of the emotion, or
overwhelmed by the emotion in some other way.
Please note: even if you never experience a particular emotion, please answer the
question by imagining how you think you would feel if you did experience that
emotion.
Again, for each part of the question, please circle ONE number between 1 and 7 to
indicate how well you feel you cope with the emotion.
Cope very well Cope very badly
ANGER 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
DESPAIR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SHAME 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ANXIETY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
HAPPINESS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
FRUSTRATION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
MISERY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
GUILT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
NERVOUSNESS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
JOY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
IRRITATION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
GLOOMINESS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
HUMILIATED 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TENSE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
LOVING 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
AGGRESSION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
MOURNFUL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
BLAMEWORTHY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
WORRIED 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CHEERFUL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
DISGUST (i.e., repulsion) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Thank you very much for your help with this questionnaire
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The Disgust Scdle - As used in the study presented in chapter 4.
Please circle T (true) or F (false):
T F 1. It bothers me to see someone in a restaurant eating messy food with their fingers.
T F 2. Seeing a cockroach in someone else's house doesn't bother me.
T F 3. It bothers me to hear someone clear a throat full ofmucous.
T F 4. I think it is immoral for people to seek sexual pleasure from animals.
T F 5. It would bother me to be in a science class, and to see a human hand preserved
in ajar.
T F 6. I would go out ofmy way to avoid walking through a graveyard.
T F 7. I never let any part ofmy body touch the toilet seat in public toilets
T F 8. Even if I was hungry, I would not drink a bowl ofmy favourite soup if it had
been stirred by a used by a thoroughly washed flyswatter.
T F 9. I might be willing to try eating monkey meat, under some circumstances.
T F 10. It would bother me to see a rat run across my path in a park.
T F 11. If I see someone vomit, it makes me sick to my stomach.
T F 12.1 think homosexual activities are immoral.
T F 13. It would not upset me at all to watch a person with a glass eye take the eye out of
the socket.
T F 14. It would bother me tremendously to touch a dead body.
T F 15.1 probably would not go to my favourite restaurant if I found out that the cook
had a cold.
T F 16. It would bother me to sleep in a nice hotel room if I knew that a man had died of
a heart attack in that room the night before.
Please rate (0,1, or 2) how disgusting you would find the following experiences.
0 = not disgusting at all
1 = slightly disgusting
2 = very disgusting
If you think something is bad or unpleasant, but not disgusting, you should write "0".
17. You see someone put ketchup on vanilla ice cream, and eat it.
18. You see maggots on a piece ofmeat in an outdoor rubbish bin.
19. While you are walking through a tunnel under a railroad track, you smell urine.
20. You hear about a 30 year old man who seeks sexual relationships with 80 year
old women.
21. You see someone accidentally stick a fishing hook through his finger.
22. Your friend's pet cat dies, and you have to pick up the dead body with your bare
hands.
23. You take a sip of soda, and then realize that you drank from the glass that an
acquaintance of yours had been drinking from.
24. A friend offers you a piece of chocolate shaped like dog poo.
25. You are about to drink a glass ofmilk when you smell that it is off.
26. You are walking barefoot on concrete, and you step on an earthworm.
27. You see a bowel movement left unflushed in a public toilet.
28. You hear about an adult woman who has sex with her father.
29. You see a man with his intestines exposed after an accident.
30. You accidentally touch the ashes of a person who has been cremated.
31. You discover that a friend of yours changes their underwear only once a week.
32. As part of a sex education class, you are required to inflate a new unlubricated
condom using your mouth.
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EAT-26
Please Circle a Response for Each of the Following Statements for the last 7
days:
Question Always Usually Often Sometimes Rarely Never
1. Am terrified about being
overweight
3 2 1 0 0 0
2. Avoid eating when I am
hungry.
3 2 1 0 0 0
3. Find myself preoccupied with
food.
3 2 1 0 0 0
4. Have gone on eating binges
where I feel I may not be able to
stop.
3 2 1 0 0 0
5. Cut my food into small pieces. 3 2 1 0 0 0
6. Aware of the calorie content of
foods I eat.
3 2 1 0 0 0
7. Particularly avoid food with a
high carbohydrate content (bread,
rice, potatoes, etc.)
3 2 1 0 0 0
8. Feel that others would prefer if
I ate more.
3 2 1 0 0 0
9. Vomit after I have eaten. 3 2 1 0 0 0
10. Feel extremely guilty after
eating
3 2 1 0 0 0
11. Am preoccupied with a desire
to be thinner.
3 2 1 0 0 0
12. Think about burning up
calories when I exercise.
3 2 1 0 0 0
13. Other people think I'm too
thin.
3 2 1 0 0 0
14. Am preoccupied with the
thought of having fat on my
body.
3 2 1 0 0 0
15. Take longer than others to eat
my meals.
3 2 1 0 0 0
16. Avoid foods with sugar in
them.
3 2 1 0 0 0
17. Eat diet foods. 3 2 1 0 0 0
18. Feel that food controls my
life.
3 2 1 0 0 0
19. Display self-control around
food.
3 2 1 0 0 0
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20. Feel that other pressure me to
eat.
3 2 1 0 0 0
21. Give too much time and
thought to food.
3 2 1 0 0 0
22. Feel uncomfortable after
eating sweets.
3 2 1 0 0 0
23. Engage in dieting behavior. 3 2 1 0 0 0
24. Like my stomach to be
empty.
3 2 1 0 0 0
25. Have the impulse to vomit
after meals.
3 2 1 0 0 0
26. Enjoy trying new rich foods. 0 0 0 1 2 3
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INTERFERENCE TASK - From the study reported in chapter 4
In the following task, read each list ofwords and circle the word you think is the odd
one out:











Table Door Bench Chair Desk Shelf Car
Yellow Pink Blue Orange Green Striped Red
Canada Ireland Paris Mongolia India Australia England
Vodka Cranberry Wine Beer Cider Sherry Whiskey
Vacuum Duster Cloth Brush Computer Washing
up liquid
Scourer
Skirt Dress Boy Blouse Tie Jumper Cardigan
Necklace Ring Bracelet Drive Bangle Broach Choker
Cough Belt Sneeze Itch Graze Cut Scratch
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MODIFIED VELTEN MOOD INDUCTION TECHNIQUE
Please recall an event that has happened to you recently that made you feel angry. It
doesn't matter if the event was small or large but it has to be one that made you feel
really angry at the time. Over the next few minutes, think about what happened, the
details of the event, why it angered you and how angry you felt.
You do not need to write anything down about the event, you only need to think about
it.
Now, after thinking about this event, how angry do you currently feel?
Please circle the number that corresponds to how angry you feel.
Not angry Extremely angry
123456789 10
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Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS)
Clinicians are aware that emotions play an important part in most illnesses. If your
clinician knows about these feelings, he or she will be able to help you more. This
questionnaire is designed to help your clinician to know how you feel. Read each
item below and underline the reply which comes closest to how you have been
feeling in the past week.
Don't take too long over your replies. Your immediate reaction to each item will
probably be more accurate than a long, thought-out response.
A) I feel tense or wound up:
Most of the time
A lot of the time
From time to time, occasionally
Not at all
B) I still enjoy the things I used to enjoy:
Definitely as much
Not quite so much
Only a little
Hardly at all
C) I get a short of frightened feeling as if something awful is going to happen:
Very definitely and quite badly
Yes, but not too badly
A little, but it doesn't worry me
Not at all
D) I can laugh and see the funny side of things:
As much as I always could
Not quite as much now
Definitely not so much now
Not at all
E) Worrying thoughts go through my mind:
A great deal of the time
A lot of the time
Not too often
Very little




Most of the time
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Not at all
H) I feel as if I am slowed down:









J) I have lost interest in my appearance:
Definitely
I don't take as much care as I should
I may not take quite as much care
I take just as much care as ever





L) I look forward with enjoyment to things:
As much as I ever did
Rather less than I used to
Definitely less than I used to
Hardly at all










Now check that you have answered all the questions.
HADS © R.P. Snaith and A. S. Zigmond, 1983, 1992, 1994.
06/12/2009 Page 349
Doctor ofPhilosophy (PhD) University ofEdinburgh John R.E. Fox
Parent Attitude/Behaviour Questionnaire
Instructions: In the following items, please indicate on a scale from 1 (very unlikely)
to 7 (very likely) the likelihood that your parents would have responded in the ways
listed for each item. Please read each item carefully and respond as honestly and
sincerely as you can. For each response, please circle a number from 1-7.
Response Scale: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Very unlikely Medium Very likely
1. When I was a child and I was prevented from
going to a fun outing, (e.g. a friend's birthday
party), because I was sick or hurt, my parents
responded to my anger by:
a) sending me to my room to cool off
b) getting angry with me
c) helping me to think about ways that I could
have still been with my friends (e.g., invite
some friends over after the party)
d) telling me not to make a big deal out ofmissing
the party
e) encouraging me to express my feelings of anger
and frustration
f) soothing my feelings and doing something fun
instead so I would feel better about missing the
party
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. If I had broken a special toy, and became upset
and cried, my parents would have:
a) remained calm and not let themselves get
anxious
b) comforted me and helped me to try to forget
about the accident
c) told me that I was over-reacting
d) helped me to figure out how to get the toy fixed
e) told me that it is OK to cry and be sad
f) told me to stop crying or I wouldn't be allowed
to play with my toys anytime soon
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. If I had lost some prized possession and reacted
with tears, my parents would have:
a) got upset with me for being so careless and then
crying about it 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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b) told me that I was over-reacting
c) helped me to think of places where we hadn't
looked yet
d) distracted me by talking about happy things
e) told me that it's OK to cry when you feel
unhappy
f) told me off for not being careful enough.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4 . If I was being taken to the doctors' for an
injection (which I was afraid of) and I became, for
example, quite shaky and tearful while waiting for
my turn, my parents would:
a) tell me to shape up or I wouldn't be allowed to
do something I liked to do when I got home
(e.g., watch TV)
b) encourage me to talk about my fears
c) tell me not to make a big deal of the injection
d) tell me not to embarrass them by crying
e) comfort me before and after the injection
f) talk to me about ways to make it hurt less (such
as relaxing or taking deep breaths)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. If I had eaten something that I thought was
disgusting and spat it out onto the side ofmy plate,
my parents would have:
a) comforted me and tried to make me feel better
b) told me that I was over-reacting
c) appear to be disgusted and uncomfortable with
me
d) told me that if I did that again I would have my
food taken away
e) explained that it was OK not to like certain
foods
f) suggested that I have some drink to wash away
the taste
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. If I was about to appear in a school play or sports
activity and I became visibly nervous about people
watching me, my parents would have:
a) helped me to think of things that I could do to
get ready for my turn (e.g., to do some warm-
ups or not to look at the audience)
b) suggested that I could think about something
relaxing so that my nervousness would go away
c) remained calm and not get worked up
themselves
d) told me that I was being a baby about it
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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e) told me that if I didn't calm down, we would
have to leave and go home right away
f) encouraged me to talk about my nervous
feelings
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. If I had been looking forward to watching my
favourite TV programme and the TV stopped
working, my parents would have responded to my
anger by:
a) Suggesting that I do something relaxing to feel
better, such as have a hug, play a game, etc.
b) telling me to telephone a friend so that they can
video it for me
c) getting angry themselves
d) telling me that I was over-reacting
e) scolding me for getting angry
f) Told me that it was Ok to feel angry when
something frustrating happens
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. If I had trodden in some dog mess in the front
garden without any shoes on, my parents would
have reacted to my disgust by:
a) encouraging me to talk about what it was that
disgusted me
b) getting upset with me for being so disgusting
c) telling me that I was over-reacting
d) helping me to sort out the problem (e.g., getting
my foot washed, cleaning the front garden)
e) telling me that I have to go to my room
f) doing something fun with me to help me forget
the whole experience
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. If I had been playing a sport in front of a crowd
(e.g. netball, rounders, football) and I made a
mistake that meant that my team lost the game, my
parents would have reacted to my sense of shame
by:
a) comforting me and trying to make me feel
better
b) telling me that I was I was overreacting
c) appear to feel ashamed themselves, and look
uncomfortable
d) tell me to 'sort it out', or they would take me
home there and then.
e) After the game, encourage me to talk about my
feelings of shame
f) Tell me to practice more so that I don't make
the same mistake next time
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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COPINGWITH CHILDREN'S NEGATIVE EMOTIONS SCALE (CCNES)i
Purpose: To measure the degree to which adult's recall their parent's reaction
to emotional situations whilst they were children (Primary school through to
Secondary School).
Six subscales are derived that reflect the specific types of coping response
parents tend to use in these situations.
SUBSCALES
1. Distress Reactions (DR). These items reflect the degree to which parents
experience distress when children express negative affect.
Scoring: Mean of: IB, 2A*, 3A, 4D, 5C, 6C*, 7C, 8B, 9C,
* = REVERSED SCORING
2. Punitive Reactions (PR). These items reflect the degree to which parents
respond with punitive reactions that decrease their exposure or need to deal
with the negative emotions of their children.
Scoring: Mean of: 1A, 2F, 3F, 4A, 5D, 6E, 7E, 8E, 9D
3. Expressive Encouragement (EE). These items reflect the degree to which
parents encourage children to express negative affect or the degree to which
they validate child's negative emotional states (i.e., "it's ok to feel sad.")
Scoring: Mean of: IE, 2E, 3E, 4B, 5E, 6F, 7F, 8A, 9E
4. Emotion-Focused Reactions (EFR). These items reflect the degree to which
parents respond with strategies that are designed to help the child feel better
(i.e., oriented towards affecting the child's negative feelings).
Scoring: Mean of: IF, 2B, 3D, 4E, 5A, 6B, 7A, 8F, 9A
5. Problem-Focused Reactions (PFR). These items reflect the degree to which
parents help the child solve the problem that caused the child's distress (i.e.,
oriented towards helping the child solve his/her problem or coping with a
stressor).
Scoring: Mean of: 1C, 2D, 3C, 4F, 5F, 6A, 7B, 8D, 9F
6. Minimization Reactions (MR). These items reflect the degree to which
parents minimize the seriousness of the situation or devalue the child's
problem or distressful reaction.
Scoring: Mean of: ID, 2C, 3B, 4C, 5B, 6D, 7D, 8C, 9B
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EDE-Q
Instructions
The following questions are concerned with the PAST FOUR WEEKS ONLY (28
days). Please read each question carefully and circle the appropriate number on the
right. Please answer all the questions.
)N HOW MANY DAYS OUT OF















1 Have vou been deliberately trvina to limit the amount of
food you eat to influence your shape or weight? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
2. Have you gone for long periods of time (8 hours or more)
without eating anything in order to influence your shape
or weight?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
3. Have you tried to avoid eating any foods which you like
in order to influence your shape or weight? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
4. Have you tried to follow definite rules regarding your
eating in order to influence your shape or weight; for
example, a calorie limit, a set amount of food, or rules
about what or when you should eat?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
5. Have you wanted your stomach to be empty?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
6. Has thinking about food or its calorie content made it
much more difficult to concentrate on things you are
interested in; for example, read, watch TV, or follow a
conversation?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7. Have you been afraid of losing control over eating?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
8. Have you had episodes of binge eating?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
9. Have you eaten in secret? (Do not count binges.)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
10. Have you definitely wanted your stomach to be flat?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
11. Has thinking about shape or weight made it more difficult
to concentrate on things you are interested in; for example
read, watch TV or follow a conversation? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
12. Have you had a definite fear that you might gain weight
or become fat? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
13. Have you felt fat?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
14. Have you had a strong desire to lose weight?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
OVER THE PAST FOUR WEEKS (28 DAYS)
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5. On what proportion of times that you have eaten have 0 - None of the times
you felt guilty because of the effect on your shape or 1 - A few of the times
weight? (Do not count binges.) 2 - Less than half the times
3 - Half the times
(Circle the number which applies.) 4 - More than half the times
5 - Most of the times




Over the past four weeks (28 days), have there been any times when you have felt that you have eaten
what other people would regard as an unusually large amount of food given the circumstances? (Please
circle YES or NO and put appropriate number in box.)
How many such episodes have you had over the past four weeks?







Have you had other episodes of eating in which you have had a sense of having lost control and eaten
too much, but have not eaten an unusually large amount of food given the circumstances?





Over the past four weeks have you made yourself sick (vomit) as a means of controlling your shape or
weight?





Have you taken laxatives as a means of controlling your shape or weight?





Have you taken diuretics (water tablets) as a means of controlling your shape or weight?





Have you exercised hard as a means of controlling your shape or weight?
How many times have you done this over the past four weeks?
YES NO
( )
)VER THE PAST FOUR WEEKS (28 DAYS) (PLEASE




ALL SLIGHTLTY MODERATELY MARKEDLY
9. Has your weight influenced how you think about (judge)
yourself as a person? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0. Has your shape influenced how you think about (judge)
yourself as a person? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. How much would it upset you if you had to weigh
yourself once a week for the next four weeks? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
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2. How dissatisfied have you felt about your weight?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
3. How dissatisfied have you felt about your shape?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
4. How concerned have you been about other people seeing
you eat? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
5. How uncomfortable have you felt seeing your body; for
example, in the mirror, in shop window reflections, while
undressing or taking a bath or shower?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
6. How uncomfortable have you felt about others seeing
your body: for example, in communal changing rooms,
when swimming or wearing tight clothes?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
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The Brief Core Schema Scales: Beliefs about Self and Others
This questionnaire lists beliefs that people can hold about themselves and other people. Please
indicate whether you hold each belief (NO or YES). If you hold the belief then please indicate
how strongly you hold it by circling a number (1-4). Try to judge the beliefs on how you have
generally, over time, viewed yourself and others. Do not spend too long on each belief. There











I am unloved NO YES - 1 2 3 4
I am worthless NO YES -»■ 1 2 3 4
1 am weak NO YES -*■ 1 2 3 4
1 am vulnerable NO YES -*■ 1 2 3 4
I am bad NO YES —*■ 1 .2 3 4
1 am a failure NO YES - 1 2 3 4
1 am respected NO YES - 1 2 3 4
1 am valuable NO YES -► 1 2 3 4
I am talented NO YES 1 2 3 4
I am successful NO YES - 1 2 3 4
I am good NO YES - 1 2 3 4
1 am interesting NO YES -► 1 2 3 4
OTHER PEOPLE
Other people are hostile NO YES -* 1 2 3 4
Other people are harsh NO YES -► 1 2 3 4
Other people are unforgiving NO YES -► 1 2 3 4
Other people are bad NO YES 1 2 3 4
Other people are devious NO YES - 1 2 3 4
Other people are nasty NO YES 1 2 3 4
Other people are fair NO YES 1 2 3 4
Other people are good NO YES -*• 1 2 3 4
Other people are trustworthy NO YES - 1 2 3 4
Other people are accepting NO YES 1 2 3 4
Other people are supportive NO YES - 1 2 3 4
Other people are truthful NO YES -*• 1 2 3 4
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White Bear Suppression Inventory
Please select a number from 1 'strongly disagree' to 5 'strongly




2 3 4 5
strongly
agree
1. There are things
I prefer not to
think about
c r c r c
2. Sometimes I
wonder why I have
the thoughts I do
r r r r c
3. I have thoughts
I cannot stop
r r r r c
4. There are
images that come
to mind that I
cannot erase




r r r r r
6. I wish I could
stop thinking of
certain things
c c r r r
7. Sometimes my
mind races so fast
I wish I could stop
it
r r c r r
8. I always try to
put problems out
of mind





r r c r r
10. Sometimes I




r r r r r
11. There are
things I try not to
think about
c r r r r
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12. Sometimes I
really wish I could
stop thinkinq
r r c r c




r r r r r
14. I have
thoughts that I try
to avoid
r r c r r
15. There are
many thoughts
that I have that I
don't tell anyone
r r c c r
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Emotion Regulation Questionnaire 2
We all experience lots of different feelings or emotions. For example, different
things in our lives make us feel happy, sad, angry and so on...
The following questions ask you to think about how often you do certain
things in response to your emotions. You do not have to think about
specific emotions but just how often you generally do the things listed below.
Please tick the box corresponding to the answer that fits best. We all respond
to our emotions in different ways so there are no right or wrong answers.
In GENERAL how do you respond
to your emotions?
Never Seldom Often Very Always
1. I talk to someone about how I
feel
O O O O O
2. I take my feelings out on others
verbally
(e.g. shouting, arguing)
O O o O o
3. I seek physical contact from
friends or family (e.g. a hug,
hold hands)
O o o o o
4. I review (rethink) my thoughts
or beliefs
O o o o o
5. I harm or punish myself in
some way
O o o o o
6. I do something energetic
(e.g. play sport, go for a walk)
O o o o o
7. I dwell on my thoughts and
feelings
(e.g. It goes round and round
in my head and I can't stop it)
O o o o o
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In GENERAL how do you respond
to your emotions?
Never Seldom Often Very Always
8. 1 ask others for advice o o o o o
9. 1 review (rethink) my goals or
plans
o o o o o
10.1 take my feelings out on others
physically
(e.g. fighting, lashing out)
o o o o o
11.1 put the situation into
perspective
o o o o o
12.1 concentrate on a pleasant
activity
o o o o o
13.1 try to make others feel bad
(e.g. being rude, ignoring them)
o o o o o
14.1 think about people better off
and make myself feel worse
o o o o o
15.1 keep the feeling locked up
inside
o o o o o
16.1 plan what 1 could do better
next time
o o o o o
17.1 bully other people
(e.g. saying nasty things to them, hitting
them)
o o o o o
18.1 take my feelings out on
objects around me
(e.g. deliberately causing damage to my
house, school or outdoor things)
o o o o o
19. Things feel unreal
(e.g. I feel strange, things
around me feel strange, I
davdream)
o o o o o
20. I telephone friends or family o o o o o
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21. I go out and do something nice o o o o o
(e.g. cinema, shopping, go for
a meal, meet people)
Thank you for your help.
The Revised 21-Item Measure: Scales, Items & Strategies
1) Internal-Dysfunctional: -'I harm or punish myself in some way' {self-harm)
-'I dwell on my thoughts and feelings (e.g. it goes round
and round in my head and I can't stop it)' {rumination)
-'I think about people better off than myself and make
myself feel worse' {negative social comparison)
-'I keep the feeling locked up inside' (repression)
-'Things feel unreal (e.g. I feel strange, things around
me feel strange, I daydream)' (de-realisation)
2) Internal-Functional: -'I review (re-think) my thoughts or beliefs'
(positive re-apprasial)
-'I review (re-think) my goals or plans' (modification
of goals)
-'I plan what I could do better next time' (planning)
-'I put the situation into perspective' (perspective)
-'I concentrate on a pleasant activity' {concentration)
3) External-Dysfunctional: -'I bully other people (e.g. saying nasty things to them,
-'I take my feelings out on other people verbally (e.g.
shouting, arguing)' {verbal assault)
-'I take my feelings out on other people physically (e.g.
fighting, lashing out)' (physical assault)
-'I try to make others feel bad (e.g. being rude, ignoring
them)' (making othersfeel bad)
-'I take my feelings out on objects around me (e.g.
deliberately causing damage to my house, school or
outdoor things)' {lashing out at objects)
4) External-Functional: -'I talk to someone about how I feel' {expression of
feelings)
-T ask others for advice' (advice seeking)
-'I seek physical contact from friends or family (e.g. a
hug, hold hands)' {physical contact))
-'I do something energetic (e.g. play sport, go for a
walk)' {exercise)
-1 telephone friends or family (new item 1)
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-1 go out and do something nice (e.g. cinema, shopping,
go




lumber of statements that people use to describe themselves are given below. Read each
itement and then circle the number which indicates how you feel right now. There are no right or
Dng answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement. Mark the answer that best
scribes your present feelings.
Not at all Somewhat Moderately so Very much so
1 2 3 4
»w I Feel Right Now
I am furious 1
I feel irritated 1
I feel angry 1
I feel like yelling at somebody 1
I feel like breaking things 1
I am mad 1
! feel like banging on the table 1
I feel like hitting someone 1
I feel like swearing 1
I feel annoyed 1
I feel like kicking somebody 1
I feel like cursing out loud 1
I feel like screaming 1
I feel like pounding somebody 1
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Part 2 Directions
Read each of the following statements that people have used to describe themselves, and then cir
the appropriate number to indicate how you generally feel or react. There are no right or wrong
answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement. Circle the answer that best describe
how you generally feel or react.
Almost never Sometimes Often Almost always
1 2 3 4
How I Generally Feel
16.1 am quick tempered 1
17.1 have a fiery temper 1
18.1 am a hotheaded person 1
19.1 get angry when I'm slowed down by others' mistakes 1
20.1 fee! annoyed when I am not given recognition for doing good work 1
21.1 fly off the handle 1
22. When I get mad, I say nasty things 1
23. It makes me furious when I am criticized in front of others 1
24. When I get frustrated, I feel like hitting someone ; 1
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Part 3 Directions
eryone feels angry or furious from time to time, but people differ in the ways that they react when
;y are angry. A number of statements are listed below which people use to describe their reactions
ien they feel angry or furious. Read each statement and then circle the appropriate number to
licate how often you generally react or behave in the manner described when you are feeling angry
furious. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement.
Almost never Sometimes Often Almost always
1 2 3 4
>w I Generally React or Behave When Angry or Furious...
. I control my temper..... 12 3 4
. I express my anger 12 3 4
. I take a deep breath and relax 12 3 4
. I keep things in 12 3 4
. I am patient with others 12 3 4
. If someone annoys me, I'm apt to tell him or her how I feel 1 2 3 4
. I try to calm myself as soon as possible 1 2 3 4
. I pout or sulk 12 3 4
. I control my urge to express my angry feelings 12 3 4
. I lose my temper 12 3 4
. I try to simmer down 12 3 4
. I withdraw from people 12 3 4
. I keep my cool 12 3 4
. I make sarcastic remarks to others 12 3 4
. I try to soothe my angry feelings 1 2 -3 4
. I boil inside, but I don't show it 12 3 4
. I control my behavior.." 12 3 4
. I do things like slam doors 1 2 3 4
. I endeavor to become calm again 12 3 4
. I tend to harbor grudges that I don't tell anyone about 12 3 4
. I can stop myself from losing my temper 1 2 3 4
. I argue with others 12 3 4
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Almost never Sometimes Often Almost always
1 2 3 4
low I Generally React or Behave When Angry or Furious...
8.1 reduce my anger as soon as possible 12 3
9.1 am secretly quite critical of others 1 2 3
0.1 try to be tolerant and understanding 12 3
1.1 strike out at whatever infuriates me 12 3
2.1 do something relaxing to calm down 12 3
3.1 am angrier than I am willing to admit 12 3
4.1 control my angry feelings 12 3
5.1 say nasty things 12 3
6.1 try to relax 1 2 3
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temple Items
2 1 3 7 2 4 8 2 1 3 2 1 4 2 3 5 2 3 1 4
5 6 3 1 4 1 5 4 2 7 6 3 5 7 2 8 5 4 ' 6 3
7 2 8 1 9 5 8 4 7 3 I6 2 5 1 9 2 8 3 7 4
6 5 9 4 8 3 7 2 6 1 5 4 6 3 7 9 2 8 I1 7
9 4 6 8 5 9 7 1 8 5 2 9 4 8 a 3 7 9 8 6
2 7 3 6 5 1 9 8 4 5 7 3 1 4 8 7 9 1 4 5
7 1 8 2 9 3 6 7 2 8 5 2 3 1 4 8 4 2 7 6
t
Perceived Body Image Questionnaire
These questions ask about how you look now, and how you would best
like to look. Please circle the figure that best answers the following:
1. Right now I look like:
8
*******
12 15 14 15 16 17 18
2. I would like it best if I looked like:
t
*******
12 13 14 IS 16 17 18
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Appendix 13: Emotion elicitation using film clips: A
replication ofHewig et al, (2005) study on an English speaking
sample
Introduction
Experimental research into emotion has advanced considerably in recent decades with
researchers developing new mood induction techniques with which to study emotional
processes in the laboratory. Self statements, autobiographical recall, hypnosis, facial
expression, social feedback, music, pictorial slides and film clips are but a selection of
procedures utilised in emotion research, (see Martin, 1990, for review). The benefits
ofMood Induction Procedures (MIPs) have been twofold; firstly, in terms of having a
standardised and reliable means of eliciting an emotion and, secondly, to do this in an
ethically acceptable manner without the need for deception.
A multitude of techniques have been used, each having varied levels of emotional
differentiation which would impact on the results gained from participants (see
Christie and Friedman, 2004). The researcher's choice of affect induction procedure
is diverse, with Christie and Friedman (2004) highlighting the importance of selecting
the correct procedure according to the underlying structural model on which the
emotion research is based, and the differential results that may be drawn from such
procedural considerations.
An MIP which has a distinct practical advantage and that is increasingly utilized by
many researchers is the use of film clips (Davidson et al, 1990, Philippot, 1993, Gross
and Levenson, 1995). Briefly, this method involves presenting participants with short
film segments considered relevant to a target emotion. To determine the success of a
chosen clip in its ability to elicit the targeted emotion, participants would complete an
06/12/2009 Page 374
Doctor ofPhilosophy (PhD) University ofEdinburgh John R.E. Fox
inventory of emotion terms by indicating the intensity of each emotion felt after
viewing.
Not only does this method provide researchers with a standardised set ofmaterials but
it is culturally relevant, easily administered to large groups, and realistic in terms of
events which would naturally evoke an emotional reaction. The popularity of this
method ofMIP has resulted in a bank of film clips taken from commercially available
feature presentations found to be effective across studies, (Tomarken et al„ 1990;
Hagemann et al„ 1997; Christie and Friedman, 2003).
Hewig and colleagues (2005) undertook a study in which a number of well known
clips from feature presentations, including 'neutral' clips, were presented to validate
the utility of clips in eliciting selected target emotions. With at least two clips for
each target emotion they found that they reliably induced the target emotions of anger,
sadness, fear, disgust, and happiness selectively, which the research group were able
to condense into a smaller but more selective bank. These researchers argued that the
reduction of stimulus material would be beneficial to researchers by lessening
participant fatigue, whilst the use of equivalent neutral stimuli may also be utilised in
distracter tasks between emotional manipulations.
However, emotional variation across different cultures in terms of recognition,
experience and expression has been documented across the years, (Ekman 1972,
Matsumoto et al, 1989, Matsumoto 1993, Vrana and Rollock 2002), and as the recent
2005 paper by Hewig and colleagues had been conducted on a German speaking
population the reliability and validity of the revised film set must be established
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before using the materials as part of a controlled investigation within other countries
and/or cultures.
The aims of the present study were twofold. Firstly, to confirm the reliability and
validity of the film clips in their ability to elicit the five basic emotions anger, fear,
happiness, disgust and sadness within an English speaking population. Secondly, to
confirm the reliability and validity of this film set in the exclusivity of particular clips
in eliciting a single emotion.
METHOD
Participants
Thirty seven participants (M=14, F=23) were recruited by means of a convenience
sampling method. The mean age of the sample was twenty-nine, with all participants
having English as their first language.
Stimulus Material and Rating Scales
A set of 11 clips taken from those proving most successful in the study by Hewig et
al, (2005) was presented to participants on a laptop computer with 12 inch screen. All
clips were taken from commercially available feature presentations and intended to
elicit each of the target emotions anger, sadness, fear, disgust, happiness and also
included one clip found by Hewig et al, (2005) to elicit a neutral valence. The clips
used to elicit happiness were from "An Officer and a Gentleman" and "When Harry
Met Sally", for the neutral clip "Hannah and her Sisters" was used. "Witness" and
"My Bodyguard" were used to elicit feelings of anger while "The Godfather" and
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"Pink Flamingos" were shown when targeting the emotion of disgust. For the fear
condition "Silence of the Lambs" and "Halloween" were shown. Lastly, a second clip
from "An Officer and a Gentleman" and one from "The Champ" were used for the
sadness condition.
The length of each clip shown varies from 29 to 236 seconds, and as outlined in
previous emotion research using film clips the set was presented in silence in order to
avoid any confounding effects. In order to gain a quantitative measure of the
emotion elicited by the film clip, participants were given a set of 12 rating style
questionnaires- one to complete after each clip.
The questionnaire used contains 17 unipolar scales with a range of 0 (not at all) to 9
(very strongly) to assess the strength of each rating. The emotion labels used for these
scales were Happiness, Pleasure, Amusement, Hope, Affection, Desire, Relief,
Frustration, Anger, Rage, Sadness, Fear, Disgust, Shame, Guilt, Boredom and
Empathy, (see appendix I) The questionnaire also included 2 bipolar scales, if the
emotion experienced is pleasant (+4) to unpleasant (-4), and whether this feeling is
weak (-4) to strong (+4). This was included to follow Russell's (1980) Valence X
Arousal circumflex theory of emotion and as in the original paper by Hewig et al,
(2005). The questionnaire also asked participants to indicate whether they have seen
the film prior to the study and whether they looked away at all during the presentation
of that particular clip. Before taking part in the experiment, all participants were
given a brief description of how the experiment would run, and asked to sign a
consent form.
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Procedure
To reduce order effects, each participant was allocated in alternating sequence to one
of two viewing conditions in which clips varied in sequence. The order had been
established in accordance to the previous study using this method of MIP (Davidson
et al, 1990, Hagemann et al, 1999, Hewig et al, 2005). The first clip shown was
neutral in valence in order to accommodate participants to the requirements of the
task. This also assisted in re-establishing a baseline level and avoided any additive
effects of residual mood states. As a further control of additive effects, no two clips
of the same target emotion were shown consecutively. Clips were shown in colour
and in silence. In order to reduce any demand characteristics participants were given
simple instructions, "Watch each film clip carefully. Afterwards you will have two
minutes in which to complete the items on the questionnaire provided".
RESULTS
Cluster analysis
A cluster analysis was first conducted on the data to determine whether film clips of
each target emotion were distinguishable from the film clips of other target emotions.
Using the 17 unipolar rating scales on the questionnaires as distance measures and
using the Ward method based on squared Euclidean distances as in the study by
Hewig et al, (2005), the cluster analysis revealed that the distance between clips of the
same target emotion was always much smaller than the distance between clips of
differing target emotions. Therefore, the results of the study by Hewig et al, were
confirmed by formation of 6 groups.
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Place figure 1 about here
Emotional rating offilm clips
Subsequently, analyses were performed to examine the ability of each film clip to
elicit the targeted emotion without also eliciting a non-target emotion. Items from the
unipolar rating scales which most closely resembled the target emotion were included
in these analyses, 8 in total. Items included were rage, anger, pleasure, happiness,
amusement, sadness, disgust and fear.
A FILM (11 levels) X EMOTION (8 levels) repeated measures analysis of variance
was performed with significant main effects of FILM, F(10, 350)= 36.203, p<0.001,
and EMOTION, F(9, 350)= 19.472, p<0.001, and with a significant interaction of the
two, F(90, 3150)=48.054, p<0.001. These results confirm that the rating profiles of
each film clip differed from one another significantly, the degrees of freedom
although high are of a comparable level to those stated in the 2005 paper by Hewig
and colleagues.
Post hoc t tests were then conducted in which the target emotion for each clip was
compared to the highest rated non-target emotion. Alpha levels were adjusted using
the bonferoni correction to 0.0045.
Disgust clips
The highest rated emotion for both clips 'Pink Flamingos' and 'The Godfather' was
disgust (M=7.78, SD=1.97), (M=4.27, SD=2.8). For Pink Flamingos, the rating of
disgust was significantly higher than the highest rated non-target emotion of
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amusement (MO.81, SD=2.84), t(36)=8.967, pO.OOl. For The Godfather, the rating
of disgust was significantly higher than the highest rated non-target emotion of
sadness (MO.86, SD=2.43), t(36)=6.133, p<0.001.
Happiness/Amusement clips
The highest rated positive emotion for When Harry Met Sally was amusement,
(M=5.89, SD=1.2). For An Officer and a Gentleman, the highest rated positive
emotion was happiness (M=4.54, SD=2.5). For When Harry Met Sally, the lowest
rated positive emotion of pleasure (M=3.49, SD=2.41) was still significantly higher
than the highest rated negative emotion of disgust (MO. 16, SD=0.60), t(36)=8.708,
p<0.001. For An Officer and a Gentleman the lowest rated positive emotion of
amusement (M=3.43, SD=2.12) was still significantly higher than the highest rated
negative emotion of sadness (M=0.19, SD=0.62), t(36)=8.614, pO.OOl.
Fear clips
For both clips of Halloween and Silence of the Lambs, the highest rated emotion was
for the target emotion of fear (M=6.49, SD=3.01), (M=3.22, SD=3.08). For
Halloween, the highest rated non-target emotion of disgust (M=1.24, SD=2.13) was
rated significantly lower than that of fear, t(36)=6.291, pO.OOl, whilst for Silence of
the lambs, fear was rated significantly higher than the highest rated non-target
emotion of rage (M=1.30, SD=2.17), t(36)=3.561, pO.OOl.
Sadness clips
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For both The Champ and An Officer and a Gentleman, the target emotion of sadness
was given the highest rating from participants, (M=6.49, SD=2.33), (M=4.73,
SD=2.82). For The Champ, the highest rated non-target emotion was that of fear
(M=1.08, SD=2.24), which was significantly lower than that of sadness, t(36)=l 2.075,
p<0.001. For An Officer and a Gentleman, sadness was rated significantly higher
than the highest rated non-target emotion of fear (M=1.49, SD=2.19), t(36)—6.965,
pO.OOl.
Anger clips
For both the clips 'Witness' and 'My Bodyguard', the target emotion of anger was
given the highest rating from participants (M=4.32, SD=2.65), (M=6.54, SD=2.43);
rage being rated only slightly lower (M=3.70, SD=2.96), (M=5.78, SD=2.81). For
both clips, the highest rated non-target emotion was that of disgust and p values did
not reach significance when tested, both t s<1.5, both ps>0.14.
Additional Ratings
The intensity ratings for the neutral clip 'Hannah and Her Sisters' (M=-0.14,
SD=1.437) were significantly lower than the intensity ratings than emotional stimuli
(all t s>4, all ps <0.002).
Similarly, valence ratings for this clip were neutral, (M=0.05, SD=1.104), and were
significantly less than for positively rated emotional clips and significantly more than
the negatively rated emotional clips (all ts>2.1, all ps<0.043)
Post studyfeedback data
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The non-significant findings that indicated the lack of specificity in the ratings of the
anger clips raised questions regarding participant's interpretations of the emotion
labels used. In the follow up section of the study, the hypothesis of whether the
definition intended by the investigators for the emotions being investigated did not
match that of the participants was explored.
In order to investigate this hypothesis in more depth, participants were re-approached
and asked to complete a follow up questionnaire asking for their definitions of
'disgust', 'repulsion', 'disgust at a person's behaviour' and 'anger'. They were then
asked to reflect back on the 2 anger clips used and the disgust clip with the highest
rating (Pink Flamingos) and indicate which label term they thought most appropriate
(see appendix II).
Of the 37 participants originally recruited for the study, 11 feedback forms (see
appendix II) were returned fully completed. For the definition of disgust, overall
consensus was towards 'shock', 'disapproval', 'moral offence', 'dislike',
'unhappiness'. For repulsion, definitions were given such as 'revulsion', 'stomach
turning', 'sickened', several participants stating it was a feeling 'worse than disgust'.
It is interesting to note that the definition of the word repulsion appears to resemble
the semantics of disgust as used in the basic emotions research and elicitation, whilst
the word disgust appears to have a number of heterogeneous lay definitions. It does
seem that it is mixed with labels for anger and sadness, as well as repulsion.
In defining anger, participants gave a wider range of responses such as 'losing
control', 'annoyed', 'hostile', 'confusion', 'frustration', 'stress'. Several participants
did show agreement in that anger was felt in reaction to offensive behaviour from
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another person, and in light of the above point, the term 'disgust' was also used as a
definition for anger.
In order to address the hypothesis that these heterogeneous lay definitions of emotions
led to the insignificant findings for the anger clips, participants were asked to indicate
which of the above terms would describe the clips from the films 'Witness' (W), 'My
Bodyguard' (MB), 'Pink Flamingos' (PF).
Graph 1 goes about here
The graph displays the clear consensus for the repulsion felt towards the 'Pink
Flamingos' clip, whilst the reactions to the two clips targeting the emotion of anger do
not attain this consensus on any emotional term. For the anger clips, the
heterogeneous nature of the definitions was confirmed. Not one term was reliably
used by participants to describe the emotion induced in the clips. As previously
discussed, this may be due to the issue of lay definitions of emotion labels, or it may
be that the clips used by Hewig (2005) are not reliable for inducing specific anger
emotions within an English speaking culture.
DISCUSSION
The results taken from this study support the previous findings from the study using a
German speaking population by Hewig and colleagues (2005) in that the emotion
ratings of the clips reliably form into six distinct groups, and can be reliably
distinguished from one another in terms of eliciting one of the basic emotions of
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anger, sadness, happiness, disgust and fear on a self report measure. Further
investigations into the accuracy with which a film clip can elicit one basic emotion
without simultaneously eliciting a second basic emotion proved successful in the
targeted emotions of fear, happiness, sadness and disgust. However, in the case of
anger it was found that the anger emotion was not reliably induced and there is some
evidence from the follow up study that the emotion of anger may also be defined by
disgust.
In comparison with the results of this study, Christie and Friedman (2004) found
anger did not differ from sadness and disgust items, despite differing from all the
ratings of positive emotions. Interestingly, difficulties were encountered in a similar
study conducted by Philippot and colleagues (1993) using 2 clips for each of five
target emotions. Despite most clips reliably eliciting the target emotion, they were
unable to selectively elicit the emotions of anger and disgust.
Such results, alongside those collected from the present study, highlight basic
concerns regarding the validity of using film clips to elicit anger in the laboratory and
our ability to elicit anger selectively. Although not using the term repulsion in
response to the anger clips, the selection of terms used by participants to describe their
emotional reactions to the clips intended to elicit anger were diverse and further
suggests the inability of such clips to elicit anger selectively.
The differing results of the paper by Hewig and colleagues (Hewig et al, 2005) to the
findings of the present study may be in part due to essential implications of the labels
used being lost in the translation from German into English. For instance when the
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word 'Disgust' is translated into German it becomes 'Der ekel' however on
translating back into English the description is that of 'aversion' and 'distaste'. It may
be argued that the German 'der ekel' is more similar to the English 'repulsion', and as
already outlined, the use of such a term may have been more appropriate and
indicative of the actual experiences of the participants. Reported levels of disgust
during the clips intended to target the emotion of anger may have been, in part, due to
interpretation of the label given to it.
A study conducted by Hagemann (1999) used only the labels happiness, pleasure,
amusement, fear, anger and disgust in the post film rating scales. The success of such
a design would suggest the possibility that the inventory used in the present study
proved to be too exhaustive and had the effect of diluting the participant's scorings.
Therefore, in future investigations, especially where materials used have been
influenced by studies using different language speaking participants, the results of this
study suggest that it would be useful for participants to be directed towards the
meaning of the labels used, and for the list of emotion labels used to avoid being
overly exhaustive.
In sum, this study has shown that the Hewig et al, (2005) list of basic emotion
inducing film clips was broadly reliable in a English speaking culture. However, the
clips that Hewig et al, identified for anger were shown not to reliably induce anger on
their own and it has been argued and shown that the terms used in this study may
actually lead to confusion in the response patterns for participants on the clips with
the highest anger scores. As discussed above, it may be that the emotion of anger is
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too difficult to induce in the laboratory with film clips, as for its induction a strong
personal investment is required for its elicitation. This remains an empirical question.
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Figure 1
* + * * * * hierarchical CLUSTER ANALYSIS*"****
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Legend of Figures
Figure 1: Dendogram of the cluster analysis on the film clips using the Ward Method
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Legend for Graphs
Graph 1: Participant's interpretation of emotional labels used in this study.
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Appendix 14: The order and instructions for the Experimental
Stage of the Study presented chapter 6.
1. After settling the participant down, give them the time 1
questionnaires (please randomly give the questionnaires
to the participants to avoid order effects). These are the
following:
• Staxi-2
• Both disgust questionnaires
• BSS
2. Please administer the WAIS III digit symbol. The
instructions are as follows. Tell each participant that the
legend on the top gives the symbol for each number.
The participant has to work as quickly as possible
within a two minute time limit. They have seven sample
items to practice, and for you to check that they have
understood the instructions. Once they have completed
the seven practice items, and you are satisfied that they
are know what to do. Start the timed exercise. Each
participant has 2 minutes. It is important to remind each
participant that hardly anyone finishes this task.
3. Once they have completed the digit symbol task. Set up
the Witness video clip and give the following
instructions to the participant.
INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO PARTICIPANT PRIOR TO
WATCHING FILM CLIP(s)
You are about to watch a short clip which will be shown in
silence. The clip you are about to watch has been taken from a
commercial feature film and consequently may have been seen
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prior to participating in this study. Do not worry about this, as it
will not affect your results on the task.
Participants are asked to pay close attention to the presentation
throughout its duration.
4. Once they have watched the clip, give them the
instructions for the second part of the mood induction.
These are:
INSTRUCTIONS FOR DIRECTED RECALL TASK
Now, please try to recall from memory one event from your past
that have made you angry, writing down a description of the
event once it has come to mind. Try to remember the event as
vividly as when it happened before writing it down, including
how you felt at the time. Please write down on the paper how
angry you feel out of 10 now. Your responses will be kept
strictly confidential.
5. Once they have completed the mood induction, give
them the time 2 questionnaires (please randomly give
the questionnaires to the participants to avoid order
effects). These are the following:
• Staxi-2
• The disgust questionnaire
• BSS
6. Once they have completed the questionnaires, please
debrief the participant and check that they are OK
before they go.
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Appendix 15: The sheet for participants in the study
presented in chapter 6 to write about the incidents that made
them angry.
Please give a brief outline of the event that has made you feel
angry (only if you are comfortable to do so).
How angry do you currently feel? /10
06/12/2009 Page 394
Doctor ofPhilosophy (PhD) University ofEdinburgh John R.E. Fox
Appendix 16- Examples of the scenarios that participants
used to induce anger in the study reported in Chapter 6.
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Please write below details of an experience that has made you
angry. Try to put yourself back in the mind-set that you were in at
the time, what you were thinking and how it felt. Your response
will be kept confidential.
4b WJJCX WvQt WSu- C
Ir ^ CLWW cvtdOvS
^b \\a_S AS^QS OJQ'\yQ_
V)Q£l>Y_ Q Iq o^_0l/5^) J_ t 1
OoW CJWa -V' cyx OL>YJl J, ^3ax ^ejcL W 5,0 4oX
to AW, AoJ-^OlWL OW >b cXwX
uOOL^ reoJijA uOv tW V t <x£ fexOoW 5
W ^VoajW Wa^ -yWb Qx(i>vja^ 4o \ei|(Wcl cWv A VqjWvQ/^) ,
KWOA(^ I/CLA^ W AW WrWW A£\ AWl, oWlOV OoWl oXo -for w_ot
vXW^v^JWt. 4^0. &CXA
^ vOoWA VLO loYarX |W wt_X_ oJcVftxeW
xWA W IvaJl WxA
y£0 QuJt Wf a-yW_ W OoW adualU
WwXvX WW W^v. uoW\ oxd-^W
W ■ X -fWt w4H; ^so-t, fW>
ts^X \ x axvcjAcWvCjo aW wW^xqJLm, WW
VWr-u^) qa, AW ^Ktv^si—QcJJ (XxXoXx oboLi11
Ov WW \V)Wc Oj^OubW ^XC_W dojLi ( CvTcxuXuv^q 4W_
W oW gl AWrW'A t / AT Xlc
bCWW WjTbWv AW WW> . -f)s ZL PPMOJw AaT
l, ^ a>^aAs vogW X WboW -7 o
Please write below details of an experience that has made you
angry. Try to put yourself back in the mind-set that you were in at
the time, what you were thinking and how it felt. Your response
will be kept confidential.
f 'KQ md q$ & rs&hf fco0?uiQb^f
.JiiiA i Wckd k<2QA rjlMuj U'lhd^fy -jbf vaY'!^U3
'jl&JcMS b do i/XtXAuj bs\$<\SL\b G/io? Gtu
i'vouJMADckW -• 1. UUXt Q\A. dJ?^\b cyld
\c hi OTVdt&AJ to PAAAOKOJjQ 1 ^tolaIM/V
■ ' IkQ pfe.CP AAQoL< fUjQ. Q/\^\J
_U POP foiled M IOMJ2 SJ^X' / CacX 1VX/A u£X2
rj ad uowiQA Qaa XAO
iolx CJoxwou payx(9A,d UrXcij
a
, k\tF <X ( YVP-AO odao
MA|^ i f~ UcU olc b
jyo oL(b3 d LoPUiP /(\r\$ ^u^ufVvp -jVf
XQ> i\ Vxoa2 u0aa
)0yyA > 0 dt>Av.t UVlA Xje/:x aCCuX/y) 7W2
)la^ otoaLP^'AA attkU.doyth 93 vft-^ir/v^
uad ae-at?, If xji go^aa/ f kP-Ajx
p 0 loop 'tPu2y Ad ix (JXU4J2 I U'e^{ <3
)(tdPu/iP Xxl X2AX/'X' _
\ \o<iV 0OO|p!pjx) QA?i tAV'ixA -^C/J2_£/YV AJ aKAXJWa. <M fAa'-St- AAck/Ha^ ^ /
^'^AXoj tfet ksXOtA tXj2A.AX CPJXj / Aid J uU
^dluAf ii/vp a^AQy^J a-hxte ./TVjk 1J
TOA QsV-JCuj ^wX VvtA+ (O d hAtAXf A I t^j2/ S
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Appendix 17- Copies of the published papers that have
arisen out of the work presented in this thesis.
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The Relation ofAnger to Disgust:
The Potential Role of Coupled
Emotions within Eating Pathology
John R. E. Fox1,2* and Amy Harrison1
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Hospital, Cheshire, UK
Objective: difficulties with anger and disgust have been highlighted
within females with eating pathology (FEP). However, research has
not investigated whether FEP experience greater levels of anger com¬
pared to controls or how these two emotions may interact in FEP. It
was predicted that FEP would show significantly higher levels of state
anger and this would also lead to a significant increase in disgust for
FEP. Method: the experimental group (« = 25) had significant levels
of eating pathology. Data from the State-Trait Anger Expression
Inventory-2 and a disgust measure was collected before and after the
induction of an angry state. Results: the bulimic group, in comparison
to normal controls, demonstrated a significant increase in the state
anger scores at time 2 and on the Disgust Sensitivity Scale. Conclu¬
sion: the findings demonstrate that the emotions of anger and disgust
may be 'coupled', and disgust may be used to manage the 'egodys-
tonic' emotion of anger in people with eating pathology. Copyright
© 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
Recent research has started to propose that eating
disorder symptomology, in particular bulimic
symptomology, has the function of helping the
self escape from aversive self-awareness and emo¬
tional distress (Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991).
This research has a number of theoretical links
with Grilo and Schiffman (1994), who described a
model where binge eating was predicted by cogni¬
tive state. Root, Fallon, and Friedrich (1986) also
discussed how binge eating had the function of
helping the self to deal with or dissociate from
'painful' or negative thoughts and feelings. Build¬
ing on this empirical basis, Cooper, Wells, and Todd
(2004) developed a model of bulimia nervosa that
"Correspondence to: John R. E. Fox, Academic Division of
Clinical Psychology, University of Manchester, 2nd Floor,
Zochonis Building, Brunswick Street, Manchester, M13 9PL,
UK.
E-mail: john.fox@manchester.ac.uk
postulated the presence of positive beliefs about
eating/bingeing, as bingeing helps the self to dis¬
sociate from the emotional distress caused by the
triggering of beliefs/schemas about the self as 'not
being acceptable'. However, distress is caused by
the presence of negative beliefs about eating (e.g.,
eating will make me fat). This provokes a con¬
flict within the individual, creating cognitive dis¬
sonance (Festinger, 1957), which is subsequently
reduced by having beliefs that their eating is out of
their control. Although this model is a useful start
in highlighting the emotional function of bulimic
symptomology, it is not clear whether there is dif¬
ficulty with managing everyday emotions or if an
individual with bulimic symptoms actually experi¬
ences significantly more negative emotions.
A drawback of the Cooper model is that it overly
focuses on the cognitions surrounding the emotion,
and thus it says nothing about which emotions are
of key importance in underlying bulimic sympto¬
mology. There is now a growing body of research
that has started to demonstrate that the emotions
of anger and disgust may be important. Waller
Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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et al. (2003) reported that women diagnosed with
a DSM-IV (APA, 1994) eating disorder had higher
levels of state anger and anger suppression com¬
pared to a control group. Higher trait anger scores
were associated with bingeing and vomiting and
anger suppression was associated with laxative
use. Geller, Cocknell, Hewitt, Goldner, and Flett
(2000) reported that women with a DSM-IV diag¬
nosis of anorexia had higher levels of silencing
the self-schemas and suppressed anger compared
to controls. These results were interpreted as
evidence that negative emotions are suppressed
in order to protect interpersonal relationships
around the person with anorexia nervosa. Geller
et al. also found evidence for the complexity in the
expression of emotions, as they found that inhib¬
ited expression of emotions was related to body
dissatisfaction. Related to Geller et al.'s results,
Hayaki, Friedman, and Brownell (2002) found
that limited emotional expression predicted body
dissatisfaction in an analogue sample (when Body
Mass Index, non-assertiveness and depressive
symptoms were controlled for in their analysis).
In emotional terms, it is a significant drawback that
neither of these authors considered the emotional
underpinning to body dissatisfaction. Miller (1997)
discussed how the emotion of disgust is associated
with the rejection of foodstuffs or undesirable per¬
sonal characteristics. It would seem that the most
fitting emotion behind body dissatisfaction would
be disgust. Indeed, there is sufficient clinical evi¬
dence of patients with eating disorders discussing
their disgust towards their own bodies. In keeping
with this point, Troop, Treasure, and Serpell (2002)
found that people who were symptomatic of an
eating disorder were more sensitive to disgust than
the controls (comparing ill, remitted and control
participants within their methodology). Interest¬
ingly, this disgust sensitivity was particularly
pertinent for the human body and of certain food¬
stuffs. Schienle et al. (2004) undertook an interest¬
ing study that looked at disgust sensitivity within
bulimia nervosa using fMRI methodology. They
found that participants with bulimia nervosa did
not significantly differ from controls on subjec¬
tive accounts of distress to disgust-eliciting photos
(with the one exception of poor hygiene photos);
nor did they differ on brain activation patterns. A
closer look at the stimulus presented to the partici¬
pants revealed that there were not any stimuli that
focused upon either body shape or food within this
study. The findings of Troop et al.'s study suggest
that it was an omission not to include body and
food stimuli, and it is possible that self-disgust
emotions may have differing brain activation pat¬
terns when compared to general disgust.
The growing evidence that the emotions of anger
and disgust may be valenced within people with
eating disorders has not, so far, been considered
within the eating disorder research literature.
Within this literature, emotions have tended to
be considered in isolation, which has prevented
a real development in a theoretical analysis of
emotions within eating disorders. It is argued that
for this advancement to occur, the eating disor¬
der field needs to consider theory from the study
of normal emotional processes. One such model
of emotional processing that may be useful is the
SPAARS model (the letters act as a mnemonic to
the different levels of representation in the model,
Schematic, Propositional, Associative and Analogi¬
cal; Power & Dalgleish, 1997, 1999). This model
argued that emotions are generated via two cog¬
nitive levels, with one route being an appraisal
route where emotions are generated in response
to a person's processing of internal or external
stimuli. The second pathway to emotions is a direct
route where emotional responses to certain stimuli
can become automatic, such as a spider phobic's
reaction to a spider. (For a fuller discussion of the
SPAARS model, please see Power & Dalgleish,
1997, 1999).
Importantly, the SPAARS model argued that
emotional processing occurs across five basic emo¬
tions (sadness, anger, disgust, happiness and fear),
and our emotional experiences are made up from
these basic emotions. According to the model, the
principal appraisal route can also adopt a central
executive function within SPAARS, as it moni¬
tors the output of emotions and, it is argued, this
monitoring decides whether certain emotions are
deemed acceptable or 'ego syntonic' to the self (due
to the person's socio-emotive learning history).
As a consequence, certain emotions may become
coupled with another emotion, where one emotion
is used to facilitate or inhibit a 'toxic' emotion. This
coupling of emotions can also account for common
co-morbid symptom patterns. For example, Power
and Dalgleish (1997, 1999) argued that depression
is a combination of the basic emotions of sadness
and self-disgust, while disgust has shown (as dis¬
cussed above) to be an important emotion in eating
pathology. Research has also consistently shown
that there is a high co-morbidity between depres¬
sion and eating disorders (e.g., Brewerton et al.,
1995; Geist, Davies, & Heinman, 1998; Halmi, 1995;
O'Brien & Vincent, 2003; Rastam, 1992) and thus,
it is theoretically possible that the primed disgust
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module is underpinning both depression and
eating disorders. This type of approach to under¬
standing eating disorders has been lacking in the
literature, as research has considered depression
and eating disorders as entirely separate disorders
and thereby potentially overlooking common psy¬
chological/emotional processes.
It is argued that the emotions of anger and
disgust may act in a 'coupled' way within females
with eating pathology (FEP) for the reason outlined
above. Itwould appear that considering the salience
of anger and disgust in isolation for individuals
with eating disorders, particularly bulimia nervosa,
has been too simplistic, and it has neglected the
theoretical advancements in understanding emo¬
tions and their regulation. Furthermore, the lack of
consideration of co-morbid difficulties (especially
anxiety and depression) within a covariate analysis
in the research on emotions in eating disorders
has prevented the investigation of whether certain
basic emotions (e.g., disgust) potentially underpin
eating disorders and other co-morbid disorders
(e.g., depression). These points form the research
questions for this study.
Aims/Hypotheses
This study has three aims. First, to investigate
whether FEP have a propensity to experience
greater levels of state anger (as measured by
the State Anger Scale from the State-Trait Anger
Expression Inventory-2 [STAXI]; Spielberger, 1996)
in comparison to matched controls. The second
aim for this study was to investigate whether a
rise in the emotion of anger (again measured by the
State Anger Scale from the STAXI) would lead to
a significant increase in the emotion of disgust (as
measured by the Disgust Sensitivity Scale; Haidt,
McCauley, & Rozin, 1994) in FEP when compared
to matched controls. In keeping with the above
discussion on covariance, the secondary aim of this
study was to investigate the potential impact of
depression and anxiety on the above anger and
disgust hypotheses (as measured by the Hospital
Anxiety and Depression Scale [HADS]; Zigmond
& Snaith, 1983).
The final aim was to investigate whether FEP
express the emotion of anger by using the STAXI at
time 1 within the study.1 This measure (as detailed
1 It was felt that there were no theoretical reasons why pat¬
terns of expression of anger would change between time 1
and time 2 in the study.
below) measures the expression of anger towards
other people or objects, the suppression of anger
within the self, the ability to control the outward
expression of anger and the ability to control the




Study participants were approached via an e-
mail within the University of Manchester's e-mail
system. Potential participants who were interested
in taking part in this research project were directed,
via a web link, to a web site that contained the
screening questionnaires and a consent form to
take part in the second stage of the research. These
questionnaires contained the Eating Attitudes Test
(EAT-26) (Garner & Garfinkel, 1979) and a brief
screening questionnaire for bulimic symptoms
(for a fuller discussion on the EAT-26, please see
below). These questions asked whether the partici¬
pant had ever gone on eating binges where they
felt that they may not be able to stop, or if they had
ever been sick (vomited) to control their weight or
shape, or if they had ever used laxatives, diet pills
or diuretics (water pills) to control their weight or
shape and, finally, if the study participants had
ever been treated for an eating disorder. Previous
research has demonstrated that scores above 20
on the EAT-26 tend to suggest that there is a sig¬
nificant likelihood of eating pathology, especially
if this presented with significant eating disorders
symptoms (e.g., Garner & Garfinkel, 1979). Within
the screening stage, 321 students from the Univer¬
sity of Manchester responded to the e-mail and
filled out the above questionnaires. The mean age
was 20.35 (Standard Deviation [SD] = 3.13).
Experimental Stage
For the experimental stage, 25 female partici¬
pants with eating pathology (FEP) were selected
for this study. As detailed above, the FEP group
all scored above 20 on the EAT-26 (Garner &
Garfinkel, 1979) and they all indicated that they
had symptoms of either bingeing, vomiting or
abusing laxatives. A control group of 25 partici¬
pants was formed from participants scoring below
4 with bulimic behaviours absent. This cut-off was
chosen as it ensured that females recruited in the
control arm of this study would have very little
eating disorder cognitions or behaviours. It has
been noted by many authors that a significant pro-
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Table 1. Shows the scores for EAT-26, participant eating disorder symptoms levels and Body Mass Index (BMI)
mean scores for each participant group
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Probability
FEP control group
n- 25 n =25
Age 20.28 21.24 p > 0.05
(2.71) (5.40)
EAT-26 29.52 1.88 p < 0.001
(8.59) (1.39)
BMI 21.94 21.09 p > 0.05
(5.56) (2.15)
Number of participants that reported bingeing in the last 6 months 22 0
Number of participants that reported vomiting in the last 6 months 17 0
Number of participants that reported using laxatives in the last 9 0
6 months
Number of participants that reported ever seeking help from a 5 0
healthcare provider for their eating disorder
SD = Standard Deviation. FEP = females with eating pathology. EAT-26 = Eating Attitudes Test.
portion of young females demonstrate some prob¬
lematic eating behaviours or cognitions (e.g., body
dissatisfaction; Grogan, 1999), and it was decided
that allowing some score on the EAT-26 would
prevent an overexclusion of potential participants.
The descriptive data from these two participant
groups is shown in Table 1.
Questionnaires and Other Instructions
EAT-26 (Garner & Garfinkel, 1979)
The EAT-26 is a self-report measure designed
to assess symptoms and attitudes that have been
shown to be present in individuals with eating dis¬
orders. It is an extensively used and standardized
measure. The EAT-26 is not a scale that can diag¬
nose an eating disorder by itself, but it is an excel¬
lent screening tool that has been shown to detect
probable cases of eating disorders, especially when
used with a brief symptom checklist. As discussed
above, this type of symptom checklist was incor¬
porated into this study (i.e., binge, purge or the
use of laxatives).
STAXl (Spielberger, 1996)
The STAXI is a 44-item self-report questionnaire
used as a tool for measuring five different types
of anger or anger-related behaviours. As with the
EAT-26, this is a widely used scale and it has been
extensively used in published research. The State
Anger Scale assesses the 'here and now' inten¬
sity of anger, while the Trait Anger Scale mea¬
sures how often a person generally feels angry.
The Anger Expression and Anger Control Scales
assess four different anger-related traits, which are:
(1) the expression of anger towards other people
and objects (anger expression-out); (2) holding in
or suppressing angry feelings (anger expression-
in); (3) controlling angry feelings by preventing
the expression of anger towards other persons or
objects in the environment (anger control-out) and
controlling suppressed angry feelings by calming
down or cooling off (anger control-in). The fifth
sub-scale is the anger expression index, which
provides a measure of anger based on the anger
expression and anger control scales.
HADS (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983)
This HADS questionnaire consists of seven items
relating to anxiety symptoms and seven items per¬
taining to depressive symptoms. It is a widely used
and validated measure of depression and anxiety.
Disgust Sensitivity Scale (Haidt, McCauley, &
Rozin, 1994)
This is a 32-item scale designed to assess sensi¬
tivity to items of potential disgust. Participants are
presented with statements about potential disgust-
eliciting items such as 'It ivould bother me to be in a
science class and see a human hand presented in a jar'.
The questionnaire is spilt into two parts. In the
first 16 questions, the participant indicates true or
false responses. The second set of questions asks
how disgusting specific situations, actions etc. are
to the respondent (e.g., a friend offers you a piece
of chocolate shaped like dog poo). There are also
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eight sub-scales within the questionnaire, each
containing four items. The sub-scales are animals,
body products, death, envelope violations, hygiene,
food, magical thinking and sex.
Modified Velten Mood Induction Technique
(Velten, 1968)
The Velten technique was developed to induce
a specific mood using 60 statements written in the
first person. The participant reads the statements
and is asked to feel a mood similar to the one
they have just read in the statement. Based on this
methodology, participants were asked to recall an
event that happened to them recently that made
them feel angry. For each participant, they were
asked to think about what happened, the people
involved, what it was that made them feel angry
and to remember how angry they felt at the time
of the event. This took place in silence over the
space of 3 minutes. After the anger induction, it
was checked that all the participants had managed
to recall a recent example of being angry and that
it had induced anger within them.
This methodology was preferred to the origi¬
nal Velten mood induction technique, as it has
a significant benefit of enabling participants to
have ecologically valid emotions that are similar
to their naturally occurring emotions. The main
drawback from this methodology is that it lacks
the internal reliability and validity of knowing the
stimuli and hence ensuring that the emotions are
accurate and valid. However, all the students were
recruited from the same school in the university
and all had similar pressures and expectations for
their work and were all approximately the same
age. Consequently, it was felt that there were no
a priori reasons why either group should have
encountered more anger-eliciting situations than
the other group (this point is considered further
in the discussion).
Interference Task
This was formed from 10 lists, each containing
seven items. The participant is asked to indicate
which item does not belong in the list. The correct
response is the item that does not fit into the
same category as the other six items. For example,
'cushion' would be the item that does not fit in
a list containing six other items that are colours.
This task was used to allow participants to com¬
plete a non-emotive, low-difficulty task that would
prevent them from remembering their question¬
naire responses. Interference tasks have been
shown to significantly impact upon levels of for¬
getting (e.g., Lustig & Hasher, 2001).
Procedure
For the experimental stage, participants undertook
the study in groups of five. They were asked to
sit at a distance from one other to avoid distrac¬
tions. At time 1, participants completed the 22-
item STAXI, the Disgust Sensitivity Scale and the
HADS. Participants were then asked to complete
the interference task, followed by the modified
Velten technique. Once in an angry mood, par¬
ticipants were readministered the STAXI and the
Disgust Sensitivity Scale.
Data Analysis
All statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS
version 11 for Windows. As the design for this
study was a mixed design, the principal analysis
undertaken were mixed-design Analysis of Cova-
riance (ANCoVAs), with anxiety and depression
scores entered into the analysis as covariates.
RESULTS
STAXI—State Anger
The principal hypothesis was whether FEP have
significantly higher levels of anger, following the
induction of anger, when compared to individuals
without any eating disorder symptoms. The means
and SDs for the state anger scores are presented
in Table 2.
State anger scores were evaluated according to a
two-factorial model (group x condition), and these
data were analysed by a mixed-model ANCoVA,
as the analysis covaried anxiety and depression
scores (taken from the HADS). As detailed earlier,
each group (FEP and control) undertook the anger-
induction task, and each group was assessed at
time 1 (prior to the induction) and at time 2 (post-
induction). This part of the design represented
the repeated measures aspect of this study. Where
appropriate, further univariate analyses were
undertaken to locate the statistical effect within
the analyses. Analyses indicated a significant main
effect for group, f = 6.87 (degrees of freedom [df]
= 1), p = 0.012, as well as a significant group x
condition interaction effect, f = 8.29 (df = 1), p =
0.006. The covariate analyses indicated that HADS
anxiety (HADS-A) scores did not have a significant
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Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations (SDs) for the state anger scores for
both conditions across the participant groups
Control condition FEP Probability
(SD) (SD) (f-test)
Time 1 16.80 17.88 p < 0.05*
(Prior to manipulation) (4.04) (3.14)
Time 2 19.40 27.64 p < 0.05*
(Post-manipulation) (5.90) (13.19)
•Denotes significance.














Figure 1. The mean scores for the State Anger Scales
for each participant group before and after the anger
induction
STAXI = State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory-2.
statistical effect on the anger results, f = 2.195 (df
= 1); p = 0.145, while HADS depression (HADS-D)
scores did have a significant statistical effect upon
the anger results, f = 10.743 (df = 1); p = 0.002. Due
to the heterogeneity in the multivariate analyses,
these results were confirmed by univariate analy¬
ses. The group x condition interaction is illustrated
in Figure 1.
The results from both the univariate and mul¬
tivariate analyses allow for the acceptance of the
first hypothesis, in that the participants in the FEP
group showed significantly higher state anger,
following the anger induction, than the control
group. The significant effect of depression scores
in this analysis will be considered in the discus¬
sion below.
when compared to individuals without any eating
disorder symptom. The means and SDs for the
Disgust Sensitivity Scale scores are presented in
Table 3.
As has been shown in the above table, the FEP
group scored significantly higher than the control
group on the Disgust Sensitivity Scale. This result
highlights that the FEP group was significantly
more sensitive to the emotion of disgust than the
control group prior to any anger induction.
Disgust sensitivity scores were evaluated accord¬
ing to a two-factorial model (group x condition),
and this data was analysed by a mixed model
ANCoVA. Analyses indicated a significant main
effect for group, F = 8.57 (df = 1), p < 0.001, as well
as a significant group x condition interaction effect,
F = 10.49 (df = 1), p < 0.001. The covariate analy¬
ses indicated that HADS-A scores did not have a
significant statistical effect on the disgust results,
f = 0.250 (df = 1); p = 0.619, while HADS-D scores
did have a significant statistical effect upon the
disgust results, f = 4.423 (df = 1); p = 0.041. Analy¬
ses revealed that there was homogeneity of vari¬
ance between the groups, which confirmed that
the multivariate analyses were reliable. The group
x condition interaction is illustrated in Figure 2.
The results from the ANCoVA analyses allow
for the acceptance of the second hypothesis, in
that the participants in the FEP group showed sig¬
nificantly higher disgust sensitivity scores, follow¬
ing the anger induction, than the control group.
The significant effect of the depression scores in





The second principal hypothesis was whether the
FEP group has significantly higher levels of disgust
sensitivity, following the manipulation of anger,
STAXI—Expression ofAnger
As detailed in the hypotheses section, exploratory
univariate analyses were undertaken on the data at
time 1. It was felt that this it sufficient to undertake
simple univariate analyses, as the expression of
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Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations (SDs) for the Disgust Sensitivity
Scale scores for both conditions across the participant groups
Control condition FEP Probability
(SD) (SD) (t-test)
Time 1 14.38 17.90 p < 0.05*
(Prior to manipulation) (5.13) (4.68)
Time 2 14.96 19.88 p < 0.05*
(Post-manipulation) (5.29) 5.46
'Denotes significance.




















Figure 2. The mean scores for the Disgust Sensitivity
Scale for each participant group before and after the
anger induction
anger sub-scales measure behavioural responses
to anger that are unlikely to be affected in such
a short-term experimental study. It was felt that
these analyses would be able to suggestwhich type
of behavioural manifestations of anger is relevant
for each group of participants. This was regarded
as an important exploratory analysis, as the first
multivariate analysis confirmed that the FEP group
was experiencing significantly higher levels of state
anger following the anger induction.
As can be seen in Table 4, significant differences
were observed between the participant groups
on the anger expression-in scale, where the FEP
group reported significantly higher scores on the
anger expression-in scale. As detailed in the STAXI
manual, this scale is associated with intense angry
feelings, which are suppressed by the individual.
Significant differences were also found on the anger
control-in scale, where the control group reported
significantly higher scores on this scale. Again,
within the STAXI manual, it is discussed that this
scale is associated with an ability to 'cool off' or
reduce their anger as soon as possible. Finally, the
FEP group reported a significantly higher anger
expression index score, which confirms the emerg¬
ing picture from the above findings, as it suggests
that the participants in the FEP group are experi¬
encing more intense anger feelings, but as shown
above, have a tendency to suppress their angry
feelings.
DISCUSSION
As has been detailed in the results section, the
hypotheses of this study have been confirmed. First,
the FEP group showed significantly higher levels
of state anger following the emotional induction
than the control group. For the second hypothesis,
the FEP group demonstrated significantly higher
levels of disgust sensitivity than the control group
at time 1, and disgust sensitivity was also shown
to increase significantly, compared to the control
group, after the anger induction. Finally, the FEP
group demonstrated a pattern of anger expression
on the STAXI that showed that FEP reported a ten¬
dency to experience intense angry feelings but sup¬
press these emotions. This result is in keeping with
the findings from previous research, such as those
of Waller et al. (2003) and Geller et al. (2000).
These results are very interesting as they do
provide experimental evidence that the FEP group
exhibits significantly higher levels of state anger
than matched controls. In fact, a closer look at
the results highlights the size of the difference. The
FEP group demonstrated a mean increase in the
STAXI state anger score of 8.24. Equally, the sig¬
nificance of the HADS-D covariate results in the
anger analysis highlights the role of depression
in the elevated anger scores, and the theoretical
underpinnings of this finding will be considered
below.
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Table 4. Means and Standard Deviations (SDs) for the four anger expression
scale scores and the Anger Expression Index score for the participant groups
prior to the experimental manipulation of the emotion of anger
Control group FEP group Prob.
(SD) (SD) (t-test)
N = 25 N = 25
Anger expression out 16.12 17.08 p > 0.05
(3.82) (3.67)
Anger expression in. 16.90 22.76 p <0.01'
(4.66) (4.45)
Anger control out 22.04 21.24 p > 0.05
(5.86) (4.60)
Anger control in 22.52 18.72 p < 0.05'
(7.88) (4.19)
Anger expression index 37.92 47.08 p < 0.05'
(14.37) (10.40)
"Denotes significance at 0.05.
For the emotion of disgust, there was a signifi¬
cant difference between the control groups and
the FEP group at time 1. This result is in keeping
with the previous findings of Troop and colleagues
(Troop et al., 2002), and it suggests that FEP have
a significant sensitivity to the emotion of disgust.
The finding that disgust showed a significant
increase at time 2, in comparison with the control
group, is a potentially important finding, as the
results suggest that there are different emotional
processes occurring in the FEP group, where the
emotion of anger is valenced with the emotion of
disgust. These results are even more striking when
it is considered that the Disgust Sensitivity Scale
was designed as a trait measure of disgust, and
therefore, it could have been predicted that there
would be no difference between time 1 and time
2 for each group. Indeed, the size of the difference
between the scores on the Disgust Sensitivity Scale
for the control group is extremely small. The signif¬
icant effect, highlighted via the co-variate analysis,
of the depression scores on the disgust effect in this
study is a very interesting finding, and this will be
discussed more fully below.
The other main finding from this study shows
that FEP have a tendency not to express their anger,
but they experience it as quite an intense emotion.
Given that this study's other results highlight how
FEP experience significantly higher levels of anger,
it is perhaps not surprising that they report intense
angry feelings when they become angry. This result
does offer some confirmatory evidence for the find¬
ings of other studies, such as those of Waller et al.
(2003) and Geller et al. (2000). The combined effect
of these results suggests that people with bulimic
symptoms experience significantly higher levels of
anger when induced but have a greater difficulty
in expressing this anger. These results offer some
supporting evidence to the Cooper et al. (2004)
model that proposed that bulimic symptoms are
used to reduce emotional distress.
These findings fit with an emerging picture of
the differences in the way that people with eating
disorders experience and manage their emotions.
As discussed in the introduction, previous research
has found evidence that anger is often suppressed
and that the limited expression of emotion is
related to poor body satisfaction (e.g., Geller
et al., 2000; Hayaki et al., 2002). When these results
are considered in light of this study's results, the
emotion of disgustmay well be a more 'acceptable'
or a less 'toxic' emotion than anger for people with
eating disorders. This then translates to disgust
towards the body and food. Although these theo¬
retical ideas would need to be confirmed by further
empirical research, they are in keeping with the
findings of Troop and colleagues (e.g., Troop et al.,
2002). This notion of 'toxic emotions' and coupled
emotions fit with some of the ideas present in the
SPAARS model (Power & Dalgleish, 1997, 1999).
Leahy (2003) also discussed how emotional dis¬
orders can develop when emotions are viewed as
being dangerous towards the individual. Power
and Dalgleish (1999) also argue that an indivi¬
dual's learning history could lead them to believe
that certain emotions are ego dystonic and cou¬
pling can occur due to the use of another less
threatening emotion being used to manage an ego
dystonic emotion.
This study has found some evidence that depres¬
sion was significantly contributing to the effects
found in both analyses (i.e., anger and disgust). This
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finding raises some potential important theoretical
points about the relation of depression, anger and
disgust. Freud (1917/1963) argued that depression
originated from a mixture of anger and sadness at
the loss of a significant other, while in their review
of the relationship between depression and anger,
DiGiuseppe and Tafrate (2007) argued that there
is some evidence that suggests that depression can
be a product of an inability to express anger (e.g.,
Mook, Van Der Ploeg, & Kleijn, 1990). In light of
the results of this study, it is proposed that anger
is perceived as a toxic emotion that is inhibited
by the coupled emotion of disgust. It is argued
that the augmentation of disgust and the inhibi¬
tion of anger lead not only to the development of
eating disorder symptoms, but may also play a role
in the development of co-morbid depression. As
discussed in the introduction, a SPAARS perspec¬
tive would argue that depression is constituted of
the basic emotions of sadness and disgust (self),
and self-disgust has been shown in this study and
others (e.g., Troop et al., 2002) to be an important
emotion in eating disorders symptoms. The first
author is currently working on a model of eating
disorders that incorporates these theoretical inter¬
actions between disgust, anger and sadness (Fox &
Power, in preparation).
There are a few criticisms of this study, with
the main one concerning the modified Velten
technique. As was discussed in the methodology
section, the use of autobiographical memories has
a number of potential confounds that need to be
considered. The main potential problem centres
upon the lack of control of the actual anger stimuli,
and as such, we do not know whether the levels
of anger-inducing stimuli were comparable in
each group. Although this is a significant point,
it is important to say that the groups were well
matched on demographics, and there is no appar¬
ent a priori reason why there should be a difference
between the groups in their experience of anger-
eliciting situations. In future research, it would be
important to control for this confound variable by
actually recording the content of the anger-eliciting
autobiographical memory.
Another potential confound in this study con¬
cerns the actual participants. Although the people
enlisted into the FEP group are highly likely to
have a diagnosis of bulimia nervosa (please see
Table 1), a diagnosis was not confirmed by either
interview or specialist service. Likewise, the
numbers for the groups are relatively small. In ret¬
rospect, it was an omission not to have included a
scale on body perceptions, so that the relationship
Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
between disgust and the perceptions of one's body
could have been investigated. This is now part of
an ongoing project.
In conclusion, this study has found some evidence
that the emotions of anger and disgust are valenced
for FEP. Within the recent research and clinical
literature, it has been theoretically proposed that
people use certain eating disorder symptoms (espe¬
cially bingeing) to manage overwhelming negative
affect. The results of this study do suggest that FEP
experience much higher levels of anger than people
without bulimia. Furthermore, disgust may well
be used to manage the 'toxic' emotion of anger,
and this may represent the coupling of the anger
and disgust. Naturally, these results need to be
confirmed by further research. However, the appli¬
cation of the SPAARS model (Power & Dalgleish,
1997, 1999) looks promising in helping to theoreti¬
cally understand these emotional mechanisms.
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Recent research and theory have started to highlight how eating disor¬
der symptoms are often used to regulate painful emotions. However,
there has not been one study that has looked at the contributory
effect of all the basic emotions onto disordered eating patterns. This
study was designed to address this gap within the literature with
a detailed examination of the five basic emotions (anger, sadness,
disgust, fear and happiness) in relation to disordered eating patterns.
This study used the Basic Emotions Scale and the Hospital Anxiety
and Depression Scale to explore levels of emotions within 53 female
participants with disordered eating patterns who were recruited from
the B-EAT research database. The results showed strong correlations
between disordered eating and the four negative emotions, but only
anger and sadness were left as significant contributors to disordered
eating within the regression analysis. These findings were discussed
in relation to the literature, with particular reference being made to
the new Schematic Propositional Analogical Associative Representa¬
tion System for Eating Disorders (SPAARS-ED) model. Copyright ©
2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Key Practitioner Message:
• Anger and disgust appear to be pivotal emotions in eating
disorders.
Keywords: Basic Emotions, Eating Disorders, SPAARS-ED
INTRODUCTION
Over recent years, the significant role emotions play
within eating disorders has been identified (Fox &
Harrison, 2008; Geller, Cockell, Hewitt, Goldner,
& Flett, 2000; Waller et al., 2003). Cooper (2005)
discussed how cognitive-behavioural therapy for
eating disorders has gone through a number of
recent developments, which she coined as a second
generation cognitive model. The commonality
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100 Wilmslow Road, Cheadle, Cheshire, SK8 3DG, UK.
E-mail: jfox@affinityhealth.co.uk
between these models is that all discuss how eating
disorder symptoms, such as bingeing and vomit¬
ing, act as an emotion suppressor (e.g., Cooper,
Wells, & Todd, 2004; Fairburn, Cooper, & Shafran,
2003; Waller et al., 2007b). However, despite these
theoretical developments, the term emotion has
been used generally, without defining which spe¬
cific emotions are significant. This has been com¬
plicated by the well-established finding that eating
disorders often present with comorbid depression
(Lewinsohn, Striegel-Moore, & Seeley, 2000; Santos,
Richards, & Bleckley, 2007; Zaider, Johnson, &
Cockell, 2000) and/or anxiety disorders (e.g., Pal-
lister & Waller, 2008), meaning that the nature
of the relationship between eating disorders and
Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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emotions is poorly understood. Finally, the literature
on emotions within eating disorders has not incor¬
porated the theoretical and empirical findings from
the literature on normal emotional processes, and,
it is argued, this has compromised the theoretical
integrity of the current models of eating disorders.
So before considering the application of emotional
theory to eating disorders, a general overview will
be given of the debates and theories of normal
emotional processing. This will allow for a much
more careful consideration of emotional processing
within the eating disorders and also point out the
theoretical underpinnings for this current study.
In recent years, there has been a broad debate in
the literature on whether emotion can be under¬
stood as being comprised of and built from a core
group of basic emotions (e.g., Ekman, 1982; Izard,
1971; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Plutchik, 1962,
1990). According to this view, a small number of
basic emotions act as building blocks for more
complex emotions. Despite the development of a
basic emotions theory, there has been no agree¬
ment between different theorists about what such
a list might be and the proposal itself has not been
without its critics (e.g., Ortony & Turner, 1990).
Despite these criticisms, there is a building con¬
sensus of a minimum set of basic emotions, which
would include anger, disgust, anxiety, happiness
and sadness (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Power
& Dalgleish, 1997). In keeping with the above dis¬
cussion on the role of basic emotions within more
complex emotions, it is proposed that complex
emotions can be derived from these either through
'cognitive elaboration' of the relevant basic emotion
(e.g., 'irritation' or 'annoyance' when derived from
the basic emotion of 'anger'; see Johnson-Laird
and Oatley, 1989) or through combinations of basic
emotions (e.g., 'nostalgia' derived from the basic
emotions of 'sadness' and 'happiness'). According to
contemporary models of emotional process, such as
the Schematic Propositional Analogical Associative
Representation System (SPAARS) model (Power &
Dalgleish, 2008), each basic emotion state is linked
to an appraisal of an event, which results in the
generation of a particular emotion as a means of sig¬
nalling to an individual into action. For example, the
experience of blocking a goal leads to the emotion of
anger, as it leaves the individual with a propensity
to remove the obstacles towards a goal. Likewise,
the experience of food being seen as bad, noxious
or toxic creates the emotion of disgust, which leaves
the individual with a very strong propensity to keep
a physical and psychological distance between the
self and the object of disgust.
Power and Tarsia (2007) pointed out that the
relation between the experience of normal emo¬
tions and psychopathology has only recently been
explored within the literature and most models
and theories of normal emotion functioning
occur without any mention of emotional disorders.
Within the field of eating disorders, there is often
conceptual confusion where diagnostic labels,
such as anxiety and depression, are used as emo¬
tions in their own right. It is argued that these
two disorders are made up of different 'blends'
of basic emotions. For example, Power and Tarsia
(2007) undertook a study that looked at emotions
in depression and anxiety. They used four groups
in their study, where they compared depressed,
anxious, depressed and anxious, and controls. They
found that, using the Basic Emotions Scale (BES;
Power, 2006), the Beck Depression Scores (BDI-
II; Beck et al., 1996) were predicted by sadness,
disgust, fear and happiness (entered in the regres¬
sion model in this order), whilst state anxiety scores
were predicted by fear and then sadness. Overton,
Markland, Taggart, Bagshaw, and Simpson (2008)
supported these results and found that self-disgust
was a key emotion in depression.
Within the eating disorders literature, the relative
contribution of each of the basic emotions, has not
been investigated, as per Power and Tarsia (2007).
However, there have been a number of studies that
have looked at the relevance of certain emotional
states within eating disorders. Anger has been
seen to be a particularly difficult emotion, with a
number of studies demonstrating that people with
eating disorders experience both higher levels of
anger, but also demonstrate higher levels of anger
suppression (Geller et al., 2000; Waller et al., 2003).
However, in an analogue study by Fox and Har¬
rison (2008). But, following an anger induction pro¬
cedure, the participants demonstrated a significant
increase in anger scores compared with the control
group. These data suggest that people with eating
disorders may not necessarily have perpetually
high levels of anger, but may be prone to experi¬
ence high levels of anger, once it has been trig¬
gered by an event. In a review, Fox and Power
(2009) argue that particular early life experiences
may leave individuals with a sense of unfairness
about the world and are therefore more prone to
experience elevated anger within interpersonal sit¬
uations. However, due to a perception that experi¬
encing anger is dangerous, it is inhibited. This may
leave these individuals vulnerable to the develop¬
ment of eating disordered symptoms as a means
of coping with the 'threatening emotion'. Geller
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et al. (2000) found, when they compared people
with anorexia nervosa with control participants,
the females with anorexia nervosa had inhibited
anger and this was related to suppression of need.
The authors argued that their data suggested that
they suppressed their anger in order to 'protect'
the interpersonal relationships around them. In a
recent study, Ioannou and Fox (2009) found that
reduced emotional expression was predicted, in
part, by anger being perceived as threatening. This
result was supported by Fox (2009), who found
in his qualitative data, that participants discussed
that anger was 'threatening', 'toxic' and 'danger¬
ous'. Moreover, in support of Geller, participants
also discussed that they suppressed their anger
which they perceived would prevent damage to
relationships around them.
For disgust, the evidence has been a bit more
mixed, with the majority of studies finding that
self-disgust (in particular, in relation to food and
body shape) being of importance in eating disorders
(e.g., Troop, Treasure, & Serpell, 2002). A number
of authors have started to propose that the disgust
found in eating disorders is actually accounted for
by anxiety (e.g., Davey, & Chapman, 2009). Like¬
wise, the role of disgust has been suggested to be
pivotal in the more complex emotion of shame,
and shame has been shown to be of importance
in eating disorders (e.g., Goss & Gilbert, 2002).
Fear has been regarded as a hallmark emotion of
eating disorders, and some authors have labelled
this as a 'morbid fear of fatness' (Russell, 1979).
Often the literature discusses fear within the label
of anxiety, and the findings of Power and Tarsia
(2007) suggest that this may be confused concep¬
tually as other emotions may be in play. When
the actual functionality of the individual emo¬
tions is considered, the relation between anxiety
and disgust becomes clearer. For example, Uher
et al. (2005) found that measures of anxiety and
disgust often correlate highly (+0.7) and it could
be argued that they both have the function of
distancing oneself from a feared object or
outcome.
Fox and Power (2009), in line with the above
research, have proposed a new emotions-based
model of eating disorders, based upon the SPAARS
model of emotion (SPAARS-ED; Fox & Power,
2009). This model postulates that as a result of
developmental factors, anger becomes modular¬
ized and ego-dystonic, whilst as a result of 'over-
learning' and 'preparedness', disgust becomes
an automatic emotion. The coupling of the two
emotions creates a 'locking' of the emotional
representation system, a 'default mode' of operat¬
ing where disgust becomes a dominant emotion
elicited as to 'suppress' or 'redirect' ego-dystonic
feelings of anger. The results of Fox and Harrison
(2008) suggested that following the anger induc¬
tion procedure, in those participants with bulimic
symptoms, disgust scores were impacted by levels
of depression, which is consistent with a trans-
diagnostic emotional approach. That is, the same
emotions underpin different symptoms within a
person's clinical presentation (e.g., eating disorder
symptoms and depression). Fox and Power (2009)
argue that the emotions of disgust and sadness,
and to a lesser degree anger, underpin both eating
disorders and depression.
Given the lack of research that has examined the
potential role of individual emotions within disor¬
dered eating, the aim of this current paper was to
examine the contributory effects of the five basic
emotions on levels of disordered eating, whilst
controlling for depression and anxiety within the
analysis. This analysis of emotions data for an
eating disorder participant group would allow for
an examination of the SPAARS-ED model, as it
would predict that both sadness and anger would
significantly contribute to levels of disordered
eating (as measured by the Eating Attitudes Test
[EAT-26]).
METHODOLOGY
Design of this Study
The study utilized a cross-sectional design that uti¬
lized two analytical strategies, correlational (with
associated partialling out of variables) and regres¬
sion analyses. These two strategies were chosen so
that the contributory effects can be clearly seen in
the results.
Participants
The participant group were recruited from B-EAT,
a non-statutory organization providing support to
people with an eating disorder in the UK. Only
females were included in the analysis, as exploring
gender differences in emotional experience was
beyond the scope of the current paper and there
is some research which suggests eating disorders
in males may be dependent on different psycho¬
logical processes (Fernandez-Aranda et al., 2004).
Respondents were only included in the analysis
if EAT-26 scores were greater than 20 and this
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figure strongly suggests that those in the eating dis¬
orders (ED) group were experiencing symptoms of
a clinically relevant disorder. Although it was pos¬
sible to ensure probable caseness, it was impossible
to distinguish between different diagnostic groups
of eating disorders (e.g., bulimia nervosa versus
anorexia nervosa).
Included in the analysis were 53 participants
(mean age = 31.74, Standard Deviation = 10.6). In
terms of psychopathology, the mean EAT score for
the participants was 41.3 (SD = 13.8), the mean hos¬
pital anxiety and depression scale-anxiety subscale
(HADS-A) was 15.45 (SD = 3.9), the mean (hospital
anxiety and depression scale-depression subscale
(HADS-D) was 11.30 (SD = 3.8) and the mean BMI
was 18.8 (SD = 3.9). As can be seen from these data,
all the participants had clinically elevated scores
on the EAT-26 and on both of the subscales of the
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS).
Measures
EAT-26 (Garner, Olmsted, Bohr,
& Garfinkel, 1982)
The EAT-26 is a well-established measure, made
up of 26 statements which respondents are asked
to rate on a six-point Likert Scale and covers
'symptoms and concerns, characteristic of eating
disorders' (Garner, 1997, p. 175). A score is derived
between 0 and 78, with higher scores represent¬
ing more disordered eating. The authors present
this research which suggests that a cut-off score
of 20 differentiates between individuals who have
eating disordered attitudes and behaviours and
those who do not, and is used to confirm whether
participants in the ED group, are displaying clini¬
cally significant symptoms. The measure includes
items around current height and weight, which
enables calculation of body mass index (BMI).
HADS (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983)
This questionnaire consists of seven items relat¬
ing to anxiety symptoms, and seven pertaining to
depressive symptoms. A score of 8 or above out of
a possible 21 on both the depression and anxiety
subscales detects 80% of cases (Bjelland, Dahl,
Haugh, & Neckelmann, 2002).
BES (Power, 2006)
This is a three-part scale constructed from 20
emotional terms which relate to the five basic
emotions of anger, disgust, fear, happiness and
sadness. Analyses have suggested a high degree
of internal consistency with Cronbach's alpha
ranging from 0.79 to 0.84 on the individual sub-
scales. Participants were asked to rate each of the
items on a Likert Scale dependiiag on how they had
been feeling over the last week, with 1 indicating
that they had not felt like this at all and 7 indicat¬
ing that they had felt like this all the time, enabling
a measure of each emotional state. Although the
BES has a trait and coping subscale, these were not
included in this study's analysis.
Procedure
Participants completed the measures detailed
above. They were sent a pack of questionnaires
in the post, along with a memo advising that they
had been contacted via B-EAT, a covering letter
from the researcher explaining the purpose of the
study and the participant information sheet, and




In line with the research aims of this study, the
analyses were conducted in two stages. First,
the emotion variables were correlated with the
total score for the EAT-26. This was followed
by a further correlational analysis of the relation
between the EAT-26 and the four negative emo¬
tions, where depression and anxiety were partialled
out respectively. Finally, a regression analysis was
undertaken to look at which of the four negative
emotions predicted disordered eating, as measured
by the EAT-26.
Correlation Analysis—BES and EAT-26
Correlation Analysis without Depression or
Anxiety being Partialled Out of the Equation
As can be seen in Table 1, the four negative
emotions (as measured by the BES) correlated sig¬
nificantly with the EAT-26. However, the largest
correlations were found between state disgust and
EAT-26, and state sadness and EAT-26.
Partial Correlation Analysis
(Co-variate—Depression)
As can be seen within this table, with the excep¬
tion of state fear, all the subscales remained signifi¬
cantly correlated with EAT-26 scores, although the
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Table 1. Shows the correlations between the five basic
emotions, as measured by the (Basic Emotions Scale) BES
and the Eating Attitudes Test (EAT-26)
n = 52 State State State State State
anger sad disgust fear happy
Total 0.480" 0.587" 0.599" 0.460" 1 o K> M *
EAT-26
score
"Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
'Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Table 2. Shows the correlations between the four
negative emotions and disordered eating, with depres¬
sion partialled out of the analysis
11 = 52 State State State State State
anger sad disgust fear happiness




"Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
'Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
EAT-26 = Eating Attitudes Test.
size of the correlation was much reduced. Disgust
still came out with the largest correlation with the
EAT-26 (see Table 2).
Partial Correlation Analysis
(Co-Variate—Anxiety)
As can be seen in Table 3, the HADS-A scores had
a small impact upon the size of the correlation
between EAT-26 scores and the four negative basic
emotions. The results from this analysis continued
with the pattern of results from the above two cor¬
relation analyses, in that, disgust was the largest
correlation, but there was not much between the
size of the correlation between EAT-26 and anger,
sadness and disgust. Interestingly, it was fear that
showed a smaller correlation with EAT-26 scores,
and this finding is very much in keeping with the
above results.
REGRESSION ANALYSIS
The second part of the analysis was a multiple hier¬
archical regression. The process of deciding which
variables were entered into the regression analysis
was governed by sample limitations, the above cor¬
relation analysis and background literature. Due to
Table 3. Shows the correlations between the four
negative emotions and disordered eating, with anxiety
partialled out of the analysis
n = 52 State State State State State
anger sad disgust fear happiness




"Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
'Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
EAT-26 = Eating Attitudes Test.
the small sample size, consideration was given to
the issue of statistical power for this analysis. With
statistical power being set at 0.8 (Cohen, 1988) and
alpha was set at 0.05 (as per convention), a sample
size of 40 to 45 was felt to be sufficient (predict¬
ing a large effect), using guidelines from Miles
and Shelvin (2005). Furthermore, it was decided
that only four variables would be entered into the
regression model to ensure stability and to prevent
the ratio of participants to variables not dropping
below 10:1.
As neither depression nor anxiety appeared to
have a large effect upon the correlations between
the EAT-26 and the four negative emotions, they
were not included in the regression model. Also,
because the correlation between EAT-26 and
happiness reduced to a non-significant level after
depression and anxiety were partialled out of the
correlation, it was not included in the regression
analysis. The remaining four negative emotions
were entered into the equation in a step-wise
fashion. The order of entry into the model was
based upon the literature review and the results of
the correlation analyses (see Table 4).
As can be seen from the regression analysis,
the final model consisted of state sadness and
state anger, and these two variables combined
accounted for nearly 50% of the variance within
the analysis. However, due to the small number
of participants (in regression terms), the findings
from step 3 cannot be entirely ruled out. All the
variables were significant and the overall variance
accounted for model was just over 42% (adjusted
R2 = 0.423).
DISCUSSION
This study sought to investigate the relation of the
individual emotions to disordered eating patterns.
The first finding was that eating disorder symp-
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Table 4. Shows both the R2 and the adjusted R2 for each
stage of the regression analysis. Also, it provides the
significance of each variable entered into the regression
equation, at each stage of the analysis
Variable
n = 52





























toms correlated strongly with the four 'negative
emotions', with disgust and sadness demonstrat¬
ing very large correlations. These correlations were
maintained, even when depression and anxiety
were partialled out of the analysis. Depression did
have some impact on the size of the correlations
between disordered eating and the four emotions,
but only fear reduced to a non-significant level.
Indeed, as discussed by Cohen (1988) a correla¬
tion can also be regarded as an effect size, with
correlations less than 0.3 can be interpreted as a
small effect, between 0.3 and 0.5 as a medium effect
and over 0.5 as a large effect. Therefore, according
to Cohen (1988), with the exception of fear, all of
the partial correlations (with depression) would be
regarded as a medium effect. Interestingly, given
the predominance of anxiety in the current theo¬
retical models (e.g., Pallister & Waller, 2008), both
anxiety and the emotion of fear seemed to be of
lesser significance in the correlation analysis, and
removal of depression in the first set of partial
correlations reduced the correlation between dis¬
ordered eating and fear to a non-significant level.
In considering the correlation between anger and
EAT-26 scores, it was interesting that the relation¬
ship was a positive relationship, when there is
some evidence that anger is suppressed for people
with eating disorders (e.g.,Waller et al, 2003), and
therefore, it may have been expected that anger
would negatively correlate with eating disorder
scores. However, this finding of increased anger for
people with eating disorders fits with the finding
from Fox and Harrison (2008) where there were
increased levels of the actual emotion of anger in
people with bulimia nervosa, but the same par¬
ticipants also demonstrated an increase in anger
suppression scores.
The regression analyses examined the contribu¬
tory effect of each of the emotions on disordered
eating, and the results were, as predicted, with
anger and sadness uniquely predicting nearly 50%
of the variance in the analysis. For the emotion of
anger, this finding is very much in keeping with
the previous research by Waller et al. (2003), Geller
et al. (2000), Fox and Harrison (2008), Fox (2009)
and Ioannou and Fox (2009). This study's data
and the previous literature suggest that people
with eating disorders experience both higher levels
of anger and also experience this emotion as being
overwhelming. As discussed byWaller et al. (2007),
the key point in these situations is that the emotion
is suppressed once it enters consciousness, and is
often related to more bulimic symptom patterns.
Fox (2009) found within a qualitative study that
individuals with eating disorders had experienced
a high level of anger whilst they were growing
up. Fox found within his data that increased anger
appeared to be associated with an increased pro¬
pensity to binge and vomit. In other words, the
experience of increased anger led the individual to
use strategies to 'manage' or 'suppress' the emo¬
tions from the sense of self. The results from the
initial correlation analysis and the regression anal¬
ysis highlighted how disgust initially appeared
to be an important emotion for eating disorders,
but once sadness and anger were entered into the
model, the unique effect of disgust disappeared.
This suggests that whilst the experience of disgust
may be heightened in individuals with eating dis¬
orders, it may be linked to other relevant emotions
such as anger or sadness rather than being an inde¬
pendent risk factor for symptoms. This finding fits
with the results of Fox and Harrison (2008) on how
anger and disgust may be 'coupled' within people
with disordered eating, in particular, people with
bulimic symptomatology. This study's findings on
the potential role of disgust in eating disorders
may help to explain some of the inconsistencies of
the research on disgust. However, an alternative
interpretation could be that the effect of disgust
on disordered eating disappeared because of the
low sample size. Given the strong correlations
between disgust and eating disorders, it is quite
possible that the predictive value of disgust would
increase with a larger sample size. In saying this,
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it is noteworthy that disgust has been shown to be
an emotion that is quite complex in the study of
eating disorders, and other authors have shown
that it often has a relation to other emotions (e.g.,
Davey, & Chapman, 2009). This is an area that
certainly would benefit from further studies with
larger sample sizes.
The finding that sadness predicted disordered
eating patterns was an interesting finding, as this
is the first time that this emotion has been found to
be significant for people with eating disorders. Fox
and Power's SPAARS-ED model discussed that
sadness was a key emotion for eating disorders,
and Fox (2009) discussed how participants with
a diagnosis of anorexia nervosa often felt that expe¬
riencing and expressing the emotion of sadness
was a sign of 'weakness' and 'damaging to close
family or friends'. Some of the participants in this
study discussed how they had developed strategies
that allowed them to express their emotions in a
more 'appropriate manner', for example, choosing
a 'weepy film'. The limited expression of sadness
was felt to be related to the actual eating disorder,
and this study offers further evidence support¬
ing this relationship. As discussed by Power and
Tarsia (2007), sadness was the strongest predictor
of depression, shortly followed by disgust. Given
this study's data, it may well be that sadness and
disgust are important emotions in understanding
the high levels of comorbidity of disordered eating
symptoms and depression.
As with all research, this study is not without its
drawbacks. The participants in this study did not
undertake a formal assessment of their eating dis¬
order (e.g., Eating Disorders Examination; Cooper,
Cooper, & Fairburn, 1989), so it is impossible to
conclude that all the participants in this study met
diagnostic criteria for an eating disorder. Despite
this lack of formal interview assessment, all the
participants reported high levels of eating pathol¬
ogy on the EAT-26 and felt able to place them¬
selves on a research volunteer list via a national
eating disorders charity, B-EAT. The second point
to reflect upon within this study is how the data is
of cross-sectional nature. In other words, causality
cannot be inferred from this study's findings. It
may well be that the actual eating disorder creates
these emotions within the sufferer, and this was
what was picked upon within the results. Although
this is a very real possibility, the available evidence
would suggest that this is not the case. For example,
Fox (2009) found a similar pattern in his qualita¬
tive data that stems back through someone's own
developmental history. These findings are also in
keeping with the pioneering work of Hilde Bruch
(1962, 1973 and 1978) and her analysis of many
different cases that she had worked with over a
number of years.
In conclusion, this study has found that it is a
fruitful avenue of research to explore the contribu¬
tory nature of emotions to eating disorders. The
regression analysis found that anger and sadness
uniquely predicted disordered eating, which sup¬
ports the prediction of the new SPAARS-ED model
(Fox and Power, 2009) and the previous work
of Waller et al. (2003) and Geller et al. (2000).
However, it may be that role of disgust would
become a significant predictor in the regression
model when the sample size was larger.
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Difficulties in emotional processing have long been regarded as a core
difficulty within anorexia nervosa. Recent research and theory have
started to highlight how eating disorder symptoms are often used to
regulate painful emotions. However, there has been a lack of theoreti¬
cal sophistication in how emotions have been considered within the
eating disorders. This study was designed to use qualitative method¬
ologies to address these inadequacies and provide a richer, more thor¬
ough account of emotions within anorexia nervosa. It used a grounded
theory methodology to gather and analyse interview data from 11
participants who had a diagnosis of anorexia nervosa, being seen at
a regional eating disorder service (both inpatient and day patient).
The results highlighted two main overarching themes regarding the
perception and management of emotions within anorexia nervosa: (1)
development of poor meta-emotional skills; and (2) perception and
management of emotion in anorexia nervosa. These two categories
comprised of a significant number of components from the qualita¬
tive analysis, including difficulties with anger, meta-emotional skills
and poverty of emotional environments while growing up. Once the
data had been collected and analysed, links were made between the
findings of this research and the current literature base. Copyright ©
2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Key Practitioner Message:
• Practitoners needs to consider the importance of poor meta-
emotional skills within anorexia nervosa. These meta skills appears
to be more complicated than the simplistic notion of alexithymia.
• The routes to these difficulties in emotion appear to be drawn from
a complicated developmental picture.
• The role of anger needs to be considered more fully in the psycho¬
therapeutic work with people with anorexia nervosa. This study's
findings suggest that increasing levels of anger may play a role in
increased eating disorder symptomatology, especially vomitting.
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INTRODUCTION
The explicit consideration of emotions within
psychopathology has long been a neglected area
for both theorists and researchers (e.g., Holland,
2003). However, recent research, theory and clinical
initiatives have started to formulate a clearer role
for emotion within psychopathology (e.g., Hayes,
Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999). Within eating disorders,
it has been noted by many authors that people
with anorexia often present as if they are devoid
of emotions, and they appear, at first sight, to be
very confused and unsure about their own emo¬
tional status (e.g., Bruch, 1978). This uncertainty
of emotion has been given the term alexithymia
(Stefnos, 1973), which refers to the person's dif¬
ficulty in describing, recognizing and expressing
their own emotional states. A number of studies
have found high degrees of alexithymia, typically
assessed by the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS;
Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994), within the main
eating disorders (e.g., Pinaquy, Chabrol, Simon,
Louvet, & Barber, 2003; Schmidt, Jiwany, & Trea¬
sure, 1993). Although it could be argued that these
sets of findings highlight a relatively robust con¬
struct in understanding eating disorders, alexi¬
thymia within anorexia nervosa is not without its
critics. As alluded to above, alexithymia research
is almost totally reliant on the TAS, and it could be
regarded as poor science to have a literature almost
based on one measure. Likewise, the construct
itself has a confused conceptual underpinning, in
that some authors refer to it as a trait phenom¬
enon (Taylor, Bagby, & Parker, 1997), while others
use it as a state construct (Honkalampi, Hintikka,
Laukkanen, Lehtonen, & Viinamaki, 2001). Other
researchers have suggested that alexithymia may
actually be more related to mood than the actual
eating disorder. For example, research has high¬
lighted a close relationship between alexithymia
and measures of anxiety and depression (Byd-
lowski et al., 2005), while Eizaguirrea et al. (2004)
found that depression actually accounted for the
majority of the alexithymia in people with eating
disorders. One of the most significant criticisms of
this construct comes from a broader consideration
of the literature, where other authors have found
difficulties with specific emotional states, such as
anger or fear (e.g., Fox & Harrison, 2008; Geller,
Cockell, Hewitt, Goldner, & Flett, 2000; Harvey,
Troop, Treasure, & Murphy, 2002). It could be
argued that it is incompatible to have a literature
that proposes that people with eating disorders
cannot distinguish between their emotional states,
while having another literature that highlights
how people with eating disorders appear to have
difficulty with identified individual emotions (e.g.,
anger). The notion of exploring this apparent con¬
tradiction in the literature was an aim of this study,
as there has been a dearth of studies that have
taken an in-depth investigation of emotions within
eating disorders.
Over the recent years, there has been much
discussion in the literature about how the actual
symptoms of eating disorders operate as a means
of escaping painful affect. For example, Cooper,
Wells and Todd (2004) propose a model that postu¬
lated the presence of positive beliefs about eating/
bingeing, as bingeing helps the self to dissociate
from the emotional distress caused by the pres¬
ence of negative beliefs. However, further distress
is caused by the presence of negative beliefs about
eating (e.g., eatingwill make me fat). This provokes
a conflict within the individual, creating cognitive
dissonance (Festinger, 1957), which is subsequently
reduced by having beliefs that their eating is out
of their control. Waller, Kennerley and Ohanian
(2007) also proposed a model that attempted to
explain why there are two types of eating disor¬
der symptoms. According to the model, restriction
of food is a primary avoider of emotion, in other
words, it is used to prevent the feeling of emotion,
while bingeing and vomiting (as with Cooper
et al., 2004) suppresses the negative emotion once
it has been activated. Although these models are
a useful start to consider how emotions relate to
eating disorder symptomology, they tell us very
little about the actual emotions in play within these
disorders or the associated beliefs and interpreta¬
tions of these states. As discussed above, research
has highlighted how people with eating disorders
appear to have difficulty with certain emotional
states. Geller et al. (2000) found that people with
anorexia nervosa suppressed anger much more
than controls, and the suppression of 'negative
emotion' predicted body dissatisfaction. Waller
et al. (2003) found that women with a diagnosed
eating disorder had higher state anger scores
and anger suppression scores than controls. The
reasons for why anger is a difficult emotion remain
unclear, although Geller et al. (2000) found some
evidence that this suppression of emotion may
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be related to protecting the participant's relation¬
ships. Other researchers have found higher levels
of other emotions within eating disorders, such as
fear/ anxiety (e.g., Bulik, Sullivan, Fear, & Joyce,
1997; Swinbourne & Touyz, 2007) and disgust (e.g.,
Fox & Harrison, 2008; Troop, Murphy, Bramon, &
Treasure, 2000; Troop, Treasure, & Serpell, 2002).
For disgust, Troop and colleagues found that
there was increased disgust sensitivity for people
with eating disorders, but only for their bodies
and food (e.g., Troop et al., 2002). Empirical ques¬
tions remained after this study about the nature of
disgust in eating disorders, and whether this does
map directly on to the marked body dissatisfaction
that is seen in all the eating disorders (Fairburn &
Harrison, 2003). As can be seen from the above
discussion, the research has identified that certain
emotions may be important in understanding
eating disorders. However, through this previous
research, emotions have tended to be considered in
isolation, which has prevented real development in
the theoretical analysis of emotions within eating
disorders. It is argued that for this advancement
to occur, the eating disorders field needs to con¬
sider theory from the study of normal emotional
processes. One such model of emotional process¬
ing that may be useful is the SPAARS model (the
letters act as a mnemonic to the different levels
of representation in the model: Schematic, Propo-
sitional, Associative, Analogical, Representational
Systems; Power & Dalgleish, 2008). This model
argued that emotions are generated via two cog¬
nitive levels, with one route being an appraisal
route where emotions are generated in response
to a person's processing of internal or external
stimuli. The second pathway to emotions is a direct
route where emotional responses to certain stimuli
can become automatic (e.g., as with an automatic
fear reaction to spiders for someone with a spider
phobia). This model considers emotions from a
basic emotions perspective (i.e., sadness, anger,
fear, disgust and happiness), and it argues that
emotions can become coupled with each other,
in either a facilitatory or inhibitory manner (for a
fuller discussion of the SPAARS model, see Power
& Dalgleish, 2008). Fox and Harrison (2008), using
a SPAARS perspective, found evidence that anger
and disgustmay be coupled in people with bulimic
symptomatology. One of the key aspects of the
SPAARS model is that it proposes that people can
have different relationships with their individual
emotions, due to their learning histories, and it is
for this reason that this theory is regarded as being
relevant for this study.
As discussed by the SPAARS model, early life
experiences are of key importance to understand¬
ing how an individual relates and manages their
own emotions. Corstorphine (2006), within the
spirit of the above discussion, proposed a cog¬
nitive-affective model of eating disorders that
was broadly based upon dialectical behavioural
therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993). The main points of
this model are that individuals learn in their child¬
hoods that certain emotions and individual traits
are not tolerated by their caregivers. Therefore, the
young females who are destined to develop eating
disorders grow up learning that certain emotions
are not 'acceptable' and/or are 'dangerous'. In
keeping with the other cognitive-affective models
discussed above, bingeing-purging/restriction
is used to distance or prevent an emotion from
occurring, however, the avoidance of a primary
emotion is then related to the emergence of a sec¬
ondary emotion. For example, feeling angry at a
betrayal (primary emotion), which is suppressed,
the individual then develops guilt at having expe¬
rienced anger (secondary emotion). Corstorphine
(2006) argued that it is the secondary emotion that
causes much of the distress that is present in eating
disorders. This model, although very interesting,
has not been tested via research and it also lacks
a comprehensive theory of emotional processing
within eating disorders. Indeed, it sidesteps the
whole literature on how caregiver's empathy is
related to early attunement to emotional states in
the self and others (e.g., Valiente et al., 2004). For
example, Barnett, Howard, King and Dino (1980)
found evidence of how parental empathy and
affection were related to high and low empathy in
the participants. Following on from this research,
Eisenberg, Cumberland and Spinrad (1998)
and Eisenberg et al. (2001) found that parental
responses to children's emotions had a powerful
effect on the child's ability to perceive, express and
regulate their own emotions. Linehan (1993) also
discussed the role of 'invalidating environments',
where the principal caregiver rejected and dis¬
missed emotional expression by the child. Krause,
Mendelson and Lynch (2003), using a structural
modelling approach, found that emotional inhibi¬
tion mediated the relationship between childhood
emotional invalidation (as per Linehan, 1993) and
acute psychological distress in adulthood. Within
their study, Krause et al. (2003) found that per¬
ceived parental distress was the most significant
contributor to emotional inhibition. The authors
postulated that it was the complex emotion of guilt
within the child (e.g., feeling guilt for 'hurting'
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the parent in some way with their emotion) that
helped to explain the significant effect of parental
distress. These pointers from the literature have
not been fully considered within a study that has
examined eating disorders, especially anorexia
nervosa. This examination forms a key aim of this
study. Over this review, the studies discussed
have used a small set of methodologies, which has
limited the opportunities for a detailed explora¬
tion of individual emotions in eating disorders (as
suggested by the SPAARS model). For all of these
studies, the use of questionnaires and standardized
measures has prevented a fuller investigation of
what makes certain emotions difficult for people
with eating disorders. It is argued that this field
needs an inductive methodology that allows par¬
ticipants to discuss their emotional states and to
explore their understanding and meanings that
they attach to them. This inductive methodology
would also allow the researcher to consider theory
and its explicit development, as this would assist in
the broader understanding of the role of emotion
in the eating disorders. It is for these reasons that
this study has adopted a qualitative methodologi¬
cal approach.
STUDY AIMS
The above review of the literature has highlighted
how emotional inhibition is now starting to be
recognized as an important construct within the
development and maintenance of eating disorders,
especially anorexia nervosa. However, despite the
recent advances in understanding emotional inhi¬
bition, there has been a lack of consideration of
basic emotion processes (e.g., Oatley & Johnson-
Laird, 1987; Power & Dalgleish, 1997). Given that
there is a growing consensus in the emotions lit¬
erature that emotions are the product of modu¬
larized, goal-directed cognitive processes (e.g.,
Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Power & Dalgleish
2008), this is a significant omission in the research
and theoretical understanding of eating disorders.
Moreover, there is little discussion in the litera¬
ture about the subjective experience of inhibiting
emotions in eating disorders, which leaves ques¬
tions, such as how do people account for their
difficulties with their emotions and what is the
developmental pathway for these emotional pro¬
cesses, remain unanswered. The work of Eisen-
burg et al. (1998; 2001) and Krause et al. (2003)
has highlighted a need to understand emotional
inhibition from a developmental perspective, and
the role of parental responses (especially parental
Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
distress) to children's expressed emotions appears
to be important. However, it is not known what
pathways (if any) are important in the eating dis¬
orders, and it is for this reason that it is argued that
deductive methodologies are limiting the research
in this field.
The study presented here aims to examine
accounts of individuals with a current diagnosis
of anorexia. It was designed to focus on their expe¬
riences of emotion and their management from a
basic emotions and developmental perspective.
As discussed by Elliott, Fischer and Rennie (1999),
exploratory qualitative methods are recommended
for research areas where there are significant gaps
in the knowledge base of a particular issue or
problem. This methodology is particularly useful
in attempting to understand particular phenomena
from the perspective of interviewees (Hodgetts &
Wright, 2007). Qualitative methodology also has
the distinct advantage of employing an inductive
approach, which explores the subject matter in as
much detail as possible while preserving the sub¬
tlety and ambiguity of the issue or problem under
study (e.g., Elliott et al., 1999). Although there are
a number of potential qualitative approaches that
could have been used, a grounded theory per¬
spective was chosen due to the current theoretical
limitations in understanding emotional inhibition
in eating disorders. It is hoped that this choice of
methodology will aid further theoretical devel¬
opment around emotional inhibition, which will
hopefully lead to further research and study of
this subject area.
METHODOLOGY
Version of Grounded Theory Used
Since the inception of grounded theory in 1967 by
Glaser and Strauss, there have been many differ¬
ing interpretations of the key analytic principles
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Glaser himself disagreed
with the publication of Strauss and Corbin's (1990)
work, where he argued that Strauss and Corbin
were bringing quantitativemethods in to grounded
theory because they were attempting to 'force' data
into a theory rather than letting a theory emerge
with no preconceptions (Coyne & Cowley, 2006).
Within this study, grounded theory is being used
in an abbreviated, descriptive form in order, to rep¬
resent systematically the participants' experiences
and understand their perceptions and experience
of emotions within anorexia nervosa. The process
of grounded theory involves the recognition of
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the role of the researcher in the analysis of the
data (Strauss & Corbin, 1990), which also draws
on social constructionist ideas (Charmaz, 1990).
This perspective on the analysis was a crucial
aspect of the treatment of the results, because it
was felt that the researcher's perspective on how
the emotions were displayed and acknowledged
by the participant would need to be interpreted
by the researcher. This acknowledgement of the
researcher's perspective has been regarded as
a vital component to data analysis and theory
generation, and it is in keeping with Charmaz's
point that 'any theoretical rendering offers an
interpretative portrayal of the studied world, not
an exact picture of it' (Charmaz, 2006, p. 10).
Reflexivity
In keeping with the theoretical background
described above, the term reflexivity refers to the
need of the grounded theorist to acknowledge his
or her own philosophical and conceptual stance of
the world and how this interacts with their own
knowledge base and the interview with the par¬
ticipants. The researcher in this study is a 38-year-
old male clinical psychologist. He is married and
could be regarded as being middle class. He has
been qualified as a clinical psychologist for 6 years
and has spent the majority of his qualified life
working with adult women with eating disorders.
It is acknowledged that this clinical experience will
have had an impact upon the analysis, but it is
the contention of this paper that this experience
would have facilitated the analysis and allowed for
improved theoretical development. His interest in
the topic of emotional processes in eating disorders
was directly born out of his clinical experiences,
where it seemed that difficulties with emotions lay
at the centre of his clients' clinical formulations.
DATA COLLECTION
The data were collected and analysed over 2006
prior to any significant reading or writing of
papers. It was intended that this would prevent
any undue bias influencing the data collection and
analysis. Data were collected from a regional eating
disorder unit. This unit offers both inpatient and
day treatments, and the researcher, at the time of
data collection, did not work clinically at the unit.
However, the researcher had a good working rela¬
tionship with the lead consultant at the unit and
he actively supported recruitment into this project.
The unit had 28 inpatient beds and approximately
30 places in their day service.
Participants and Recruitment Process
Participants
Ethical approval was first granted from the Local
National Health Service ethics committee and
research governance was sought from the hospi¬
tal research and development committee (R&D).
Once approval was gained, the researcher went to
a number of community meetings where patients
met with staff to discuss issues that pertain to tire
ward. The inpatient unit was split into two sections:
intensive care (ITU) and acute. The ITU's patients
were typically very low weight and were often
on non-solid diet and used nasal gastric tubes for
refeeding, while the acute patients were much more
physically stable. There were 15 beds on the ITU
and 13 beds on the acute. In conversations with
the consultant, it was decided that the researcher
should focus on acute and day patients, because the
ITU patients would not be physically able to engage.
The researcherwas mindful of this externally placed
restriction on the study, and this was reflected upon
throughout the Results section. The researcher pro¬
vided information about the study and gave out
participant information sheets. Patients were then
left to decide whether they would like to take part
and, if they decided to take part, they informed
nursing staff, who informed the researcher of their
decision. The day service was run in a similar vein
to the inpatient unit, with an emphasis on supported
eating. Patients in the day unit tended to need longer
term, more intensive support and were still symp¬
tomatic. There were approximately 30 places at the
day service. For the day service, the same proce¬
dure was followed because the researcher attended
the community meeting with patients and gave out
participant information sheets. Patients who were
interested in taking part gave their signed consent
forms to the nursing staff. Data collection and first
stage analysis was undertaken over a 7-month
period (January 2006 to July 2006).
Within this stage of the study, 30 participant
information sheets were given out and 17 people
expressed an interest in taking part. One person
was excluded because he was a male patient. Five
changed their minds or were discharged before
the interview could be arranged, and 11 consented
to participate. Five people were inpatients at the
time of the interview, and the remaining six were
taken from the day service. All the participants
had a diagnosis of anorexia nervosa and this was
confirmed by the consultant psychiatrist on the
unit, who used the International Classification
of Diseases-10 criteria to diagnose the eating
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Table 1. Demographic data for the 11 participants
Participant number Age Diagnosis BMI at admittance BMI at interview
1 26 AN-R 12.8 15.0
2 51 AN-B/P 14.3 16.2
3 18 AN-R 12.8 17.0
4 42 AN-B/P 15.3 17.1
5 36 AN-B/P 14.3 16.9
6 21 AN-R 13 16.3
7 46 AN-B/P 17.5 20.1
8 46 AN-B/P 16.3 17.0
9 24 AN-R 12.2 15.1
10 32 AN-B/P 10.9 13.3
11 19 AN-R 14.9 16.6
AN-R = anorexia nervosa restricting sub-type. AN-B/P = anorexia nervosa-binge-purge sub-type. BMI = body mass index.
Table 2. Questions used in the semi-structured interview
'Could you tell me about your eating disorder?' (e.g., symptoms, duration of the disorder etc.)
'What do you understand about emotions?' (check out if this is distinguished from drives, such as sex, hunger etc.)
'How do you express these emotions? (be mindful of non-verbal communication, such as behavioural expressions);
Do you ever feel angry? Examples
Sad? Examples? (This was done for each basic emotion)
If the person denies feeling any of the emotions ask, what would it be like to experience—emotions?
Do you think that it would be comfortable to express these emotions?
Would they be overwhelming?
'Was your family an emotional family? Did they show their emotions? (If so, how?) (Be mindful about the
respondent calling their family emotional, as they were always happy, sad etc.)
disorder. Details of the 11 participants can be seen
in Table 1.
Each participant was interviewed for approxi¬
mately 60 minutes, and the interviews were
undertaken by the author. All the interviews
were recorded and they all took place in a private
room at the hospital. All interviews were analysed
using a qualitative data analysis software package
(QSR NUDIST Vivo, QSR International Play Ltd.,
Melbourne, Australia) to facilitate organization of
the data. Field notes were also made after each
interview, alongside a research diary. Participants'
awareness of how they understood and engaged
with emotions differed. However, the 11 inter¬
viewees were aware on some level of their emo¬
tions and they could discuss their relationships
with them. Therefore, although there was some
inevitable inference drawn about the participant's
relationships with their emotions, the researcher
sought at all times to keep the analysis grounded
within the data.
Grounded Theory Interview Schedule
Eleven participants were interviewed. Partici¬
pants were aware that the focus of the study was
on the perception of emotions, having been intro¬
duced to the concept at the unit meeting and at
the start of each interview. However, it was found
that some participants had a better understanding
and awareness of their own emotions as a process
than others. With this in mind, an in-depth inter¬
view schedule was used to guide the researcher's
questions during the interviews and capture the
range of a participant's experiences, including
beliefs about expression and developmental his¬
tories of emotional expression in the family. This
was designed during discussion with colleagues
and through reflection upon the researcher's clini¬
cal work. The researcher was conscious of using
general questions that allowed the interviewee to
access beliefs, ideas, etc. about their individual
emotions (e.g., sadness, anger etc.). The questions
asked about their current understanding and expe¬
rience of emotions were based on the study aims.
Specifically, questions included are in Table 2.
In line with grounded theory principles of
theoretical sampling, the schedule was regularly
reviewed and updated alongside emerging theo¬
ries. This took place formally in discussion with
colleagues after three interviews, where the ques-
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tion 'what do you understand about emotions?'
was removed, as all the participants had an under¬
standing about their emotions and were able to
distinguish and discuss these in the research inter¬
views. Furthermore, questions were added that
actually asked about mealtime experiences, to see
if conflict occurred around mealtimes.
As will be seen within the Results section, there
is a relationship between the overall themes and
the interview schedule. To some extent, this is an
inevitable outcome of asking each participant a
similar set of questions. For example, based on the
study aims, all participants were asked about their
experiences of emotions in childhood; therefore,
'emotions in childhood' is a core category within
the final results.
Data Analysis and Grounded Theory Process
Interview transcripts were analysed by the
researcher using the principles of grounded theory
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967), but, as discussed above,
also incorporated a social construction element
(e.g., Charmaz, 2006). A brief overview of the
process of grounded theory follows:
• Data are first gathered (interviews) and tran¬
scribed from the audio tape.
• The transcripts are first analysed using a
process called open coding. This involves
going through each line, capturing meaning
and comparing data instances for similarities
and differences.
• While open coding is taking place and codes
are being formed, new data are sampled in
light of these codes. This means that data anal¬
ysis takes place alongside data collection, and
questions asked at interview change according
to the findings of the open coding process. This
is known as theoretical sampling.
• Throughout the whole process of analysis,
the researcher writes memos. Memos are
thoughts that arise regarding the analysis, for
example, emerging concepts or links to existing
theories.
• After the initial stage of open coding is com¬
plete, these codes are then compared, grouped
and lifted into core categories, which attempt to
capturewhat is happening in the data (i.e., 'axial
coding'). Core categories are given conceptual
definitions, therefore moving them beyond
descriptive tools to analytic units. This process
continues until no new relevant insights can be
made, known as data saturation.
• Core categories are then built into conceptual
models and theories by using memos made
to link them to each other and the existing
literature.
• Throughout the process, field notes were
taken and were used to direct and guide the
analysis.
(Charmaz, 2003; Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003)
While this process was taking place, emerging
themes were reflected upon with conversations
with colleagues, and this informed both interview
schedule changes and decisions as to who to invite
to interview (as much as possible). For example, a
particularly consistent well-evidenced theme found
midway through the analysis described challeng¬
ing beliefs about anger being a 'toxic'/dangerous
emotion. This led to a fuller discussion of anger
occurring in the interviews. Where it was possible
to engage in negative case analysis, this was done.
Although, due to the pragmatic nature of recruit¬
ment, this case analysis was limited, contrasting
cases occurred in the more advanced analysing
and theorizing.
VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY
Recent qualitative validity and reliability guide¬
lines published by Elliot et al. (1999) were fol¬
lowed. These included addressing subjectivity
through situating the research and highlighting
the authors' backgrounds, presenting results in an
explicit and understandable way while providing
direct interview quotes and checking credibility
via a number of different methods. It also included
auditing of analysis by two researchers separate
from the research study, and triangulation of quali¬
tative themes with quantitative results. The two
separate researchers cross-checked two transcripts
with their accompanying codes and memos. These
two researchers were experienced clinical psy¬
chology qualitative researchers.
RESULTS
As detailed at the end of the Introduction, there
were two principal aims of this study. The first
was to consider the actual perception of emotional
states from a basic emotions perspective, while
the second was to investigate the socio-affective
environment within which participants grew up.
The Results section is organized around these
two principal aims. The analysis revealed that the
participants in this study witnessed and experi-
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enced a significant amount of negative affect in
their earlier lives. Furthermore, participants also
discussed how these early emotional environments
were paradoxically non-emotional and subdued. It
became apparent through the analysis that the par¬
ticipants were often left feeling ill-equipped to deal
with their emotions from these early histories, and
these influences were organized under the heading
of 'development of poor meta-emotional skills'.
DEVELOPMENT OF POOR META-
EMOTIONAL SKILLS
Overwhelming Affect
Within this section of the study, participants
appeared to discuss two broad themes, with one on
the actual emotions generated over their childhood,
and another on how the family of origin managed or
exhibited emotions. In terms of the actual emotions
generated over childhood, participants discussed a
number of categories that related to specific expe¬
riences as they were growing up, and these fed
directly into the development of two overarching
categories, which were (1) 'experiencing anger as
overwhelming'; and (2) 'too much emotion'. It is
important to say at this stage that these overarching
categories were not discreet, as some of the lower
order themes contributed to two or more categories
in the analysis. This broad model has been repre¬
sented diagrammatically in Figure 1. Each category
was made up of a number of components, which
will be discussed in more detail.
Experiencing Anger as Overwhelming
Although the interview schedule only used a
broad question to ask about early history, it was
striking how often the role of anger appeared to be
present in interviewees' upbringing. A significant
number of participants shared how they witnessed
or experienced anger, which was often coupled with
violence. The researcher wasmindful of not only the
words spoken but also the way participants talked
about their experiences, for example, tone and speed
































Figure 1. Shows the grounded theory for the development of poor meta-emotional skills.
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Within the interview transcripts, the analysis
revealed that two themes made up this overarch¬
ing category, which were: 'Jekyll and Hyde anger'
and 'witnessing violence'.
'jekyll and Hyde anger'. A number of participants
discussed how they lived with someone who was
unpredictable and would often get angry at the
'drop of a hat'. For example, participant 10 dis¬
cussed how her stepfather was a violent man:
P.10:1 didn't get on very well with my stepfather,
he wasn't very nice
Interviewer: Why was that?
P. 10: He was physically and verbally violent to
my mother, he zvas nasty you know.
On another occasion, participant 9 stated, 7 mean
he zvere like Jekyll and Hyde, when he was nice, he were
nice, and he was bad, he was bad'.
Participant 6 discussed how her father was very
volatile and violent towards her mother and she
was often scared to come home from school, as
she did not know what 'type of mood' he would
be having:
P.6: It was very tense around my mum and dad,
especially my dad. He was very jealous, very
aggressive and you never knew what to expect. I
was sometimes scared to come home from school
and find out -what mood he was in.
For participant 6, she also discussed how she had
been in a violent relationship, where she experi¬
enced repeated assaults and violence. The nature
of these experiences coupled with her early life
experience left participant 6 with the experience of
anger as being overwhelming and dangerous.
The crucial part of this category appeared to be
the unpredictability of the anger and how frighten¬
ing it was for the participants. They almost seemed
to be hyperaroused every time they went home.
Even in the interview, both the participants seemed
initially wary of talking to a male researcher (they
were aware that the interviewer would be male
prior to the interview). Although this will be
discussed later in the Results, it appears that the
participants learnt that anger was a scary and dan¬
gerous emotion that needed to be avoided.
Witnessing anger. Although related to the above
category, this category was different in a number
of key codes, as participants witnessed a wide
array of what they perceived as being 'destruc¬
tive' or 'damaging anger'. For a number of partici¬
pants, they often witnessed the apparent futility of
anger, in that it just caused distress and upset. For
example, participant 4 discussed:
P.4:... and then of the five children, there was
one girl and one boy who were very angry and
slammed doors, they'd express those sorts ofemo¬
tions, erm, so yeah, that was expressed. Erm, but
it never led anyzvhere, never got resolved, and
basically it ivas not a good thing...
P.4:. . . you knew that expressing an emotion was
not a good thing... .
Participant 4 discussed how there was a lot of
conflict around mealtimes and did discuss how
her eating disorder was not related to her experi¬
ences with her eating. For example, P.4: 7 don't
think it has anything to do with my eating disorder,
but there zaas massive, massive conflicts at meal times'.
She continues, 'my brother lost the plot big time and
mealtimes zoas time that they sazv him, he would come
and join us for tea, but he'd sit with his back to the table
and he'd just be abusive to my parents'. It struck the
interviewer that this was an interesting point in
the interview, as participant 4 felt angry with her
brother for ruining the meals, but could not say
anything about it, for example: 7 could not express
that I really hated it (participant 4 looks really angry
in the interview), and ask why he was here and zvhy
can't we have our meals on our ozvn ...'. I was left
with the sense that participant 4 just kept her head
down and concentrated on her eating, while the
anger and the row ensued. This concentration on
her food was felt to be significant because eating
appeared to help her cope with the experiences at
mealtime. Participant 4 suffered from episodes of
binge eating to manage her emotions.
Participant 3 also discussed how her family was
largely 'without emotion', but alluded to two big
arguments that left their mark upon her.
P.3:... There was not much emotion in front of
me, but I do remember one or two incidents where
there's been like a big confrontation. .. . Partici¬
pant 3 looked visibly emotional as she dis¬
cussed this point.
Although this overarching theme only consisted
of two categories, it was striking in the interviews
that strong displays of anger were perceived to be
very damaging to the child. They often felt afraid
and alone, and a number (approximately half of
the participants) seemed to develop a narrative
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about anger being an overwhelming and almost
toxic emotion that needed to be avoided at all
costs. This belief about anger being overwhelming
appears to be particularly challenging, as a number
of participants also discussed feeling a lot of anger
as a child, at events that occurred around them.
'Too Much Emotion'
One branch of the analysis revealed how partici¬
pants discussed a sense of loss in their early life.
This sense of loss seemed to interface with a sense
of how participants, as children, felt that they had
not had their own care needs addressed by their
own caregivers. Therefore, this sense of loss and
perceived lack of care seemed to create a high level
of emotion in the participants, which appeared to
centre on the feelings of sadness and anger. Within
the discussions with the participants, it was appar¬
ent that there was only minimal mention of frank
abuse (e.g., sexual and physical), and the partici¬
pants often appeared confused by the lack of an
event or series of events that they could 'blame' for
having an apparent high level of 'trapped emotion'
that could not be let out. Within this section, the
results will be presented around the key events and
themes that seemed to emerge from the data, which
included: 'bereavement and the process of grief';
'divorce/'transition and loss'; and 'bullying'.
'Bereavement and the process of grief. About a
quarter of the participants discussed how they had
lost a close family member. Participant 8 discussed
losing her father and her baby in a 3-year period,
when she was a teenager.
Interviewer: when did your dad pass away ?
P.8: erm, he was only 45, so 1976, I was 16'
Interviewer: that must have been a difficult
time?
P.8: Oh God, yeah, yeah, definitely!!
Participant 8 also disclosed how she had lost a
baby at the age of 19.
P.8:.. . and then, when I was 19, erm, 1 had a
baby, which lived then died so, you know it's like
I had a lots of issues to deal with it.
Participant 8 discussed how she did not manage
her emotions from these events until much later
in her life.
P.8: I didn't really admit to my self till 1 was 30,
when I was on my knees, that I had a problem
with how 1 was feeling.
Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Although, participant 8 did not verbally state
which emotions she had felt in response to her
losses, she appeared to alternate between being
very sad (quite tearful) and being quite angry in
the interview. Interestingly, participant 8 also dis¬
cussed how she had a number of health issues
as a child that prevented her from expressing her
emotion (especially anger), as it would provoke
her asthma and/or eczema. For example:
Interviewer: As a child if you zuould become
angry?
P.8: Erm, more than likely I'd have an asthma
attack as a child.
Another example of interplay between emotion
and loss was shared by participant 10. As dis¬
cussed above, participant 10 had a stepfather who
was violent and aggressive towards her mother.
This participant's parents separated when she was
10 and she discussed how her life was quite idyllic
before her parents split up. Once participant 10's
mother remarried, life appeared to change for the
worse and she seemed to be quite angry and fright¬
ened by this transition. However, she stated that
she was very close to her mother and she felt very
angry with her stepfather about how he treated
her. For example:
P.10: He was physically and verbally violent to
my mother, not me, he ivas nasty, you know, like
a disgusting fella, he really angered me.
In the interviewer's memos after the interview, it
was postulated that participant 10 felt anger about
her mum and dad splitting and ruining her idyllic
life. However, she could not tell her mum how
she felt. When we considered care more generally
in the interview, she appeared to have some enti¬
tlement beliefs about deserving care from people
around her. For example:
Interviewer: When was the last time you felt
angry about something?
P.10: About some treatment I was having here, I
didn't feel that 1 was getting the right treatment,
so I got quite emotional and angry.
Although the researcher did not request the infor¬
mation, staff volunteered how they found her to be
an angry woman, especially if they did not meet
her requests promptly. When discussing her rela¬
tionship with hermother, she shared how close she
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felt they were and how she was the only one who
she could share her emotions to. However, in her
late teens, her mother became ill with cancer and
died. Even here, we discussed how she suppressed
her emotions to nurse her mother and she would
not let her stepfather be involved in her care or the
subsequent funeral.
P.10: I didn't zvant my step dad to arrange or do
anything. I did it all, I looked after my mum while
she was poorly in the house.
She continued later in the conversation, 'sadness
is a difficult emotion, and I'd think, well, I'm ok now,
you know, put on a smile and get on with things, like
looking after mum'. Interestingly, she discussed how
she started to restrict her eating once her mother
had died.
All through the interviews with participants who
had experienced the loss of loved ones was a sense
of anger and sadness at their loss. As has been
discussed, these emotions were strong within the
participants. These emotions were not seen favour¬
ably and were often suppressed for a variety of
reasons. This will be explored in later sections of
the Results.
Divorce and transitions in early life. As with the
above category, about a quarter of the participants
discussed how their parents split up and their early
life involved many transitions and changes. Some
participants discussed openly that they felt resent¬
ful and angry for the changes that were forced upon
as a result of their parent's divorce. For example,
participant 6 stated that: 'my mum and dad divorced
when I was 5, and then I like lived ivith me dad till I was
probably about 8, as my mum did not have any where to
live, so she lived with her parents'. She continued by
stating that there were two or three further moves
and her father met a new partner. She then said, 'I
found it hard to tell my dad that I wanted to live with
my mum, and my sister took the place ofmy mum for a
bit. I felt quite resentful and angry about all of this, and
it did cause problems with my sister later on.'
At the age of 8, participant 6 moved back with
her mum, but was not able to see much of her,
as she worked and left her with babysitters. This
caused a lot of anger for her, but she felt unable to
say anything to her mother:
P.6: When 1 lived with my mother, I stayed at
the cottage for a while, we didn't spend much
time with her and we, like, with babysitters and
nannies a lot. I could not tell my mum I was not
happy and resentful, as I was so grateful to be
living zvith her again.
Another example of how divorce and transition
had an impact upon levels of affect came from
participant 1, who stated that:
there was lots of upset in my life, like my parents
divorced and ive used to move around a lot, so I
changed school quite a few times, so I was quite
emotional and angry about that and I was not
really settled until I moved to where I live nozv
zvhen I was about 7 or 8.
For participants, the experience of change
and transition following both bereavements and
divorce appeared to be very challenging. It often
left them feeling very angry with the situation the
change had left them in, and feeling angry at the
loss of a loved one. At the same time, the changes
left participants feeling sad for their loss. These
emotions were often perceived to be wrong and
they were often suppressed. Significantly, for all
the examples offered above, the start of the eating
disorder could almost be pinned to these critical
events in their lives.
Bullying. The last category that appeared to contrib¬
ute to die overarching theme of 'too much emotion'
was one of 'bullying'. Participants discussed how
being bullied by other children left them feeling
very sad and alone, fearful, disgusted widi their
own body and feeling very angry with how they
were treated. For example, participant 11 discussed
how one girl had made her feel all of these emo¬
tions, but in particular, anger and disgust:
P.11: One girl commented on hozv I looked and
she described me as like, chubby zvith spots and
just not pretty, and this girl came up to me laugh¬
ing, 1 could have said something really funny, but
I just stood there.
Later, she became angry in the interview, 'I think
nozv I'd probably tell her, or go up to the other girl and
given her a good smack nozv to be honest. I'd love to
find her today and tell her, look what the bloody hell you
hai'e done, to me, you know, it makes me really upset
(interpreted as angry) such like bitchy comments and
stuff like that...'.
Participant 1 discussed how bullying was both
verbal and physical, and she struggled at school
due to this bullying. Across this bullying was how
it affected her sense of self. For example:
Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Clin. Psychol. Psychother. 16, 276-302 (2009)
DOI: 10.1002/cpp
Perception of Emotions in Anorexia Nervosa 287
Interviewer: Did the bullying have an impact?
P.l: Definitely! Cos I was always criticised, it
was always about me that I was criticised, so I
did take it on board, took it all to heart and then
criticised myself.
Interviewer: (Interviewee zvas quite animated in
the interview) You sound like you became angry
with yourself, you turned it inzvards?
P.l: Yeah, yeah.
Summary of Overwhelming Affect
Almost all the participants described their socio-
emotional environments as being challenging while
they were growing up. Throughout the analysis of
the interviews, it was apparent that the emotion of
anger was a difficult emotion for the participants,
because they had often experienced anger as being
overwhelming and dangerous from people around
them. In comparison, a number of participants also
discussed how events had significantly increased
their levels of emotions, in particular, anger and
sadness, which were often suppressed in order to
protect them or another key individual in their life.
With the exception of two of the participants dis¬
cussed above, all the other interviewees who expe¬
rienced overwhelming affect and/or witnessed
this high level of emotion either binged and/or
vomited. Although this will be covered later in
the Results section, it was apparent that the use of
bingeing and vomiting was a powerful strategy to
suppress the apparent high level of affect present
in these participants. This dynamic of too much
emotion, which was unable to be expressed, was a
key construct in the analysis and itwill be returned
to throughout the Results section.
Poverty of Emotional Environments
Within this section of the study, participant's
appeared to discuss two broad themes, which
were Tow level emotions in family' and 'denial of
emotion'. This overarching category, at first sight,
may seem to be in conflict with the above cat¬
egory of 'overwhelming emotions'. However, this
conflict shows the complexity of the data for this
participant group. Interviewees who experienced
high levels of emotions often had an emotional
backdrop of little or no emotions being expressed/
shared. Within the memos, it was reflected that this
contrast in the experience of emotions was poten¬
tially the most toxic of them all. A good example
of this emotional dynamic was shared by partici¬
pant 3, who witnessed two big angry confronta¬
tions, but for the rest of the time, her home life was
largely devoid of emotion.
Lack ofMeta-Emotions Skill within the Family
A significant proportion of the participants
described their families as either having low level
or no emotions while they were growing up. This
lack of emotion did not feel like an active process
within the family, because it appeared to be almost
the default mode for the families of participants.
Four participants discussed how they felt that their
fathers were totally unable to discuss anything
emotional. This seemed to be highly significant
to the development of a poor emotional environ¬
ment for these participants as a child. Given these
apparent difficulties with how families managed
and expressed their emotion, it was interesting in
the interviews that some participants struggled to
find the language to describe the emotional envi¬
ronment as they were growing up. For example,
participant 3 stated:
P.3: I don't think that emotions zveren't some¬
thing what we talked about really, they're not,
it zoas just like, it zvas something we didn't talk
about really, we don't talk things through we
just, if you've got any problems just keep them
to yourself kind of thing.
In considering the principle theme of this cat¬
egory, participants discussed how their fathers
often appeared not to have the skills to express or
manage their own emotional states. For example:
P.11:... I think he has been really sad about like
hozv I'm feeling upset about it, and I don't know,
but he kind ofnever showed it, he's just silent, but
I know zvhat that means that he just doesn't know
what to say and that he's upset and....
For participant 11, her father was almost without
any expression of emotion, while participant 9 dis¬
cussed quite sadly how her father did not show
any emotions, even after the death of one of his
friends:
P.9: a friend that we alzvays sat zuith at football,
he died recently, like quite suddenly, and I just
thought, you're not, he didn't seem to show any
emotion and 1 thirlk it ivas his way ofjust dealing
with it.
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The difficulties were not solely related to fathers,
because participant 3 discussed how her mother
struggled to express her emotions. It was felt
within the analysis that it was significant that par¬
ticipant 3's mother had a number of mental health
problems (mainly depression, with some anxiety),
and these seemed to impact directly her emotional
life and her ability to share her emotions or to
facilitate emotional expression within the family.
For example:
P.3:1 suppose my mum zvasn't like she should be
really, she were scared ofgoing out sometimes she
wouldn't answer the door, erm, she had various
like bad like low points really and there was a lot
of upset really.
Later on in the interview, participant 3 said the
following:
Interviewer: Did that have a bearing on how
emotions were expressed at home?
P.3: Yeah, probably, cos she kept a lot like bottled
up I think and just I think we didn't really
understand zvhat was going on because she'd
never talk to us about what was happening, it
was just a lot of her keeping herself to herself
basically I think.
As discussed above, participant 3's family did not
share emotions with each other, and it felt that the
environment must have been devoid of emotions.
As will be seen later, participant 3 had marked
beliefs about the toxicity of certain emotions.
Denial of Emotions
In contrast to the above category, this category
was felt to be an active process whereby families
actively suppress the expression of emotions. A
decision was made at the analysis stage about
which type of poor expression of emotion was due
to poor meta-emotional skills versus a denial of
emotion. It could be argued that these two catego¬
ries are overlapping, which may well be true of the
data. However, it was felt that there were different
emphases between these categories, and it is for
these reasons that they have been kept separate
and not collapsed together.
Denial of emotion appeared to be relevant to
almost all of the participants, but especially rel¬
evant to four participants. These interviewees felt
that even their own emotions were often denied by
family members and this caused a lot of confusion
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for them. It was considered within the analysis
to split the category between 'denial of emotion
within family' and 'family denial of emotion
within the self', but the overlap between the two
constructs was too high and hence, it was decided
to keep them together.
This category really speaks for itself, in that
the family effectively denied that they were expe¬
riencing any emotions, even though they were
clearly present. For example, participant 5 stated
very clearly how emotions were denied in the
family.
P.5: this is just my take on it, is that I was brought
up in a family where, again it's so clicked but
it's so true, where you didn't have emotions, you
didn't have feelings, and if you did, if they were
happy emotions, that's quite acceptable, but it you
had any er, obscure, feeling about anything that
you aired, it would be ignored or dismissed, so
there was cheerfulness, happiness, but it xvas all
obviously unreal and superficial, but that's how
the family dealt with everything.
This striking example, taken from the inter¬
view transcription, highlights how emotions were
actively denied or 'covered up', especially true
when traumatic events were going on within the
family. For example, participant 5 discusses: 'there
was drink in the family, there was violence, there was
sexual abuse, and lots ofsecrets about the older members
of the family, my aunt lives next door, which 1 think
she knew what went on because I've had close contact
with my aunt and been able to unravel some of the
stuff, some of the family dynamics and why, I'm, I'm
the way I am
As highlighted above, participant 4 had two
siblings who expressed a high level of anger,
especially around mealtimes. For participant 4,
however, her parents responded with anger to her
brother, but this use of anger did not resolve the
situation, it appeared that it would continue. In
the interview, it was discussed how the family did
their best to limit the amount of emotion being
expressed by negative means, such as ridicule or
anger. For example:
P.4: there was one girl and one boy who were
very angry and slammed doors, they'd express
those sorts of emotions, erm, so yeah, that was
expressed. Erm, but it never led anywhere, never
got resolved, and basically it wasn't a good thing,
because when I cried I would be laughed at and
when the other two used to slam doors and shout,
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they'd be told off, so you knew that expressing
emotions wasn't good, not worth the effort.
In another part of the interview, participant 4
shared how she learnt that emotions were bad and
to be avoided by witnessing and experiencing her
parents' reactions:
P.4: Well it's what I saw, ifyou express your anger
that's bad, you're naughty. If you cry, you're a
fool, you're silly, cos everybody else doesn't cry,
it's zorong, and best is to be my like my parents,
or you could be happy.
The vast array of experiences that seemed to lead
to the same place is demonstrated quite clearly by
the experiences of participant 8. She grew up in
an overtly emotional environment where it was
reported that her family expressed their emotions
normally. However, in contrast to this environ¬
ment, participant 8 described her upbringing as
being 'cosseted' because of her physical health dif¬
ficulties, especially her asthma. This can be seen in
the next quote:
P.8: Erm, 1 was cosseted a lot as well, erm, so
I kind of say, I mean I would imagine that rest
of them shozved normal emotions, you knozv
it weren't, I mean I'm not saying it were the
Waltons, but it zveren't abusive or, but as I say I
tend to get cosseted cos there zvas always some¬
thing up ivith me.
However, this cosseting prevented participant 8
from learning about her own emotions and she
was actively prevented from expressing any dif¬
ficult emotion, such as anger:
P.8: 1 don't think I had the chance to really
express myself properly, cos it were you know,
you can't do this and you'll not be able to do that,
and what have you, so, I suppose that's been part
of me not being able to, know my own emotions
really as well.
Participant 8 went on to explain that she avoided
situations that led to arguments, for example, 'I'm
not one for confrontation or, so I can't, it takes a lot for
me to lose me temper, you knowfight.' The interviewer
then asked, 'What do you think would have happened,
as a child, ifyou would have become angry?', to which
participant 8 responded, 'Erm, more than likely I'd
have had an asthma attack as a child'.
Summary of Development of Poor
Meta-Emotional Skills
Across this part of the analysis, it was apparent
that the participants were often brought up in envi¬
ronments were there was a conflict between too
much emotion and environments that were devoid
of emotional expression. A number of participants
witnessed a high level of anger and this appeared
to have a profound effect upon them. For others,
there were apparent difficulties for the caregivers
in managing their own emotions. Certain inter¬
viewees had some initial difficulty finding the lan¬
guage to express their emotions, but all were able
to engage in this discussion after a little prompting;
at first sight, participants may have been labelled
alexithymic, but with careful interviewing, they all
were able to discuss their emotions. As shall be
seen later in the Results section, all of the partici¬
pants had self-confessed difficulties in their experi¬
ence, expression and beliefs about emotions.
PERCEPTION AND MANAGEMENT
OF EMOTION
As discussed at the end of the Introduction, the
second main aim of this study was to investigate
the actual perceptions of emotional states and
how the participants managed them within their
life. The analysis revealed that the results for this
section of the study revolved around four principal
categories, namely, 'inhibition of emotion', 'meta-
emotional skills', 'facilitation of emotion' and 'use
of symptoms to suppress emotions'. In keeping
with a grounded theory tradition, each of these cat¬
egories was made up of subordinate categories. As
with the above analysis, all aspects of the interview
were used to facilitate the data analysis, including
presentation and apparent emotion in the inter¬
view (Figure 2).
'Inhibition of Emotion'
This category is made up of two principal emotions
being inhibited within the participants, anger and
sadness. All the participants discussed how they
inhibit either or both anger and/or sadness within
their emotions. This can be seen in the following
quote, which was a typical answer to the question
about expressing emotions.
Interviewer: how do you express emotions?
P.l: I find it hard to talk about them, erm, if I'm
upset I do cry a lot (laugh), erm, again, Igenerally
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Figure 2. Shows the grounded theory for how people with a diagnosis of anorexia nervosa perceive and manage
their emotional states.
don't express my emotions very much, erm, I keep
them to myself a lot.
'Anger'
This category is made up of five subordinate cat¬
egories that highlight the views and beliefs partici¬
pants held about the emotion of anger. With the
exception of two subordinate categories, the par¬
ticipants discussed how their inhibition of anger
was related to interpersonal factors, such as not
being rejected by loved ones, or not engaging in
conflict. These theoretical points will be considered
in more detail at the end of the section.
'Toxicity of anger'. With the exception of two par¬
ticipants, everyone in this study discussed how
the actual emotion seemed dangerous and almost
toxic to them and people around them, and it was
to be avoided at all costs. In many ways, this cat¬
egory was a core category for the inhibition of
anger, because the beliefs about anger appeared
to fuel the overarching belief that anger was a toxic
emotion. For example, participant 3 stated: 'I don't
like being angry at people, because it makes people feel
bad, it feels as if you are responsible. It's like it's trans¬
ferred. Like it's kind of like you're ifyou feel bad (anger)
then you're like spreading that to other people.' In a
later part of the conversation, participant 3 shared
her view that having a negative emotion was fun¬
damentally wrong and she was a bad person for
having something that could be spread to other
people. Significantly, she felt the need to punish
herself for having that emotion, by not eating. This
is clearly demonstrated in the following quote: par¬
ticipant 3: 'well you kind ofpull yourself, keep it quite,
don't say anything, cos then you might affect people like,
and like you kind ofyou keep it to yourself, like, you tell
yourselfoff kind of thing, inside your head, and like you
don't, I suppose like I don't eat comes into it, like you
punish yourself, like if you've done something wrong.'
As discussed in the above section, participant 2
witnessed her own mother struggle with depres¬
sion and it seemed within the analysis that this did
play a significant role in the development of the
beliefs about the toxicity of sharing emotions, such
as anger. A very similar discussion occurred with
participant 2, when she stated that, T would never
knowingly upset another person, because I'm, probably
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because 1 know how equally upset I am, I zvould avoid
upsetting other people because when I'm upset (anger) I
find it such a distressing way to be.' Again, it is argued
that this demonstrates how the emotion of anger
appears to be dangerous and distressing, and the
participants have 'no right to share this emotion'
with other people.
'Causing rejection'. Four participants discussed
how they believed that the expression of anger
would ultimately lead to being rejected by those
people closest to them. Participant 2 stated: 'part of
the reason that I don't er, express anger very often at
home with my husband is erm, because I'm afraid that
he zooidd leave me'.
As discussed earlier, participant 5 was angry at
her parents after they split up, and at one point,
she explained that she became angry and this had
a consequence for her, as it caused difficulties in
her relationship with her father. Participant 5: 'I
felt quite angry towards my stepmum at one point, but
when I did actually express that once, but then it kind of,
like had consequences, like so then I have always like felt
a bit worried about doing that again.' This statement
from participant 5 was interesting, as it highlighted
how her upbringing led her to feel angry (as dis¬
cussed before), but when she attempted to express
it, it caused more problems that it solved. This
thereby led to further inhibition of this emotion.
'Automatic avoidance'. Across the data, there was
repeated mention of an almost automatic avoid¬
ance of emotion, but in particular, anger. For
example, participant 8 discusses how she has vir¬
tually no recollection of anger being avoided until
it has already happened:
. . . Every time I feel angry or zohat have you, or
life's not being fair to me, that I'm not going to
eat, because then, it just clicks in so quick you
know that, and then you go dozen again, and start
all over again....
This is in an interesting example of how par¬
ticipant 8 automatically blocks her anger emotion
and this is directly linked to restriction of food,
a point that is covered later in this part of the
Results. When considering this theme within the
data, the interviewer hypothesized how these pro¬
cesses seem to occur outside of conscious aware¬
ness, however, participant 9 discussed how she
was aware of her emotion, but did not expresses it.
Indeed, she reported how she changed the emotion
into sadness:
I feel angry, like I like everyone to be on time and
things like that, so I get angry if they were late
or my mum said she was coming and she didn't
come, but I wouldn't say anything, just like get a
bit sad, and that would be it.
This relation of sadness to anger was felt to be
a significant theoretical point, and it was reflected
upon within the research memos. The researcher
considered whether this relation between sadness
and anger could start to account for the high co¬
morbidity between eating disorders and depres¬
sion. Likewise, the relation between anger and
restriction could suggest that there are couplings
occurring at an emotional level that fuel the eating
disorder.
Avoidance of conflict. Through the analysis, there
was repeated mention that participants would
avoid conflict with other people. Some participants
discussed how they did not believe that their view
or emotion was legitimate. For example, partici¬
pant 8 stated: 'I feel sometimes 1 have trouble er zvith
my opinion being zvorthy, even though I knozv it is, but a
lot of the time if simply ivont because it's erm, it's like I
don't want the confrontation, so I just pooh pooh it...'.
Participant 2 discussed how she would avoid con¬
flict at almost any cost, and, indeed, suppressed
her own view/need in order to prevent conflict, 'I
would have, erm, I erm, avoid conflict alnwst at any cost
zvith another person, even if I know that they have been
in the zvrong and I really don't want to'.
'The anger within'. A significant feature of the anal¬
ysis that arose from the data was how a signifi¬
cant proportion of the participants kept their anger
within themselves, and this caused a significant
amount of difficulty for them. Not only was this
anger apparently challenging to experience as it
was perceived as being toxic (as discussed above),
it was also directly related to eating disorder symp¬
toms for a number of participants. This category
felt to be another core category within the anger
category because it highlighted a direct emotional
link between the experience of an emotion and the
eating disorder symptoms. For example, partici¬
pant 2 discussed how she used vomiting to release
her anger:
P.2: but certainly if I'm upset or angry or both
then it does affect my eating, erm, both because
if I'm upset and angry I don't feel that I can
eat, physically, but also erm, that yeah I can get
my anger out by erm, by not eating but also
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particularly with inducing vomiting, 1 do that
when I'm angry.
Participant 6 discussed how her eating disor¬
der was a way of managing her anger in a way
that did not require it being expressed, and par¬
ticipant 8 described how 'toxic' her anger was to
herself, and how it provoked and maintained her
anorexic restricting. What was very interesting
from participant 8's account was another potential
dynamic between anger and the need for control
over oneself. It was noted in the research memos
that anger was seen as unpredictable and uncon¬
trollable, which also adds to the perceived toxicity
of this emotion. For example:
P.8: if your anorexic, eating disorder, it's, the
longer you internalise it (anger) the more you
starve, because you get your own pozver and
control from starving yourself.
Lastly, participant 11 discussed very succinctly
that the experience of coming into the hospital for
her eating disorder was associated with a high level
of anger and then sadness. Again, in the interview
memos, the researcher reflected upon how coming
into hospital removes the powerful way an eating
disorder suppresses emotions, and it seemed for
participant 11 that this had led to her experiencing
a markedly increased amount of emotion that was
being experienced:
P.ll:. . . Well in my first admission, erm, I zvas
just angry, erm, all the time, like and then a fezu
zveeks on I just got really upset because I felt like
my college, like my A levels and everything zvere
just like slipping away and I zvas, xvasn't going to
get anywhere, so I zvas just upset about that....
Difficulties with the emotion of anger were one of
the most salient categories in the analysis. Partici¬
pants spoke about how it was the most challenging
emotion which was to be avoided at all costs. The
interviewer was struck both by its apparent toxicity
to the participants, how this was directly related to
both restriction and vomiting, and how it appeared
it could be coupled with other emotions. Again,
it was reflected upon in the memos that although
sadness was a challenging emotion, it was less chal¬
lenging than anger. It was hypothesized that the
dynamic of coupling may well be a process in eating
disorders where toxic emotions are managed. This
hypothesis was returned to throughout the analysis,
and it will be discussed further.
'Sadness'
This category was the second inhibited emotion
that emerged from the analysis. It was a much
smaller category, but, nevertheless, it was still
deemed to be a significant inhibited emotion for
the majority of participants. In terms of it being the
principal emotion avoided, two participants spoke
quite candidly about how sadness was the tough¬
est emotion to feel and express, while others spoke
about sadness being an ever present emotion, but
not feeling comfortable to share this emotion with
other people. The analysis of sadness would be
incomplete if it did not include some discussion
of depression. Almost all of the participants dis¬
cussed how they had struggled with low mood,
both prior to and during their eating disorder. For
example, participant 11 stated that she felt like she
had been depressed for a long time: 'I think, sadness
ivas important for me because I'd realised that it's kind
of like because I was being sad zvell probably depressed
for so long and just by being like this and not being
comfortable with myself that being what I feel crappy
and sad .. .'. However, the majority of participants
were well aware of how restriction played a role in
the lowering of mood, although most participants
were never really sure whether the low mood came
first or prior to the eating disorder. For example,
participant 6 discussed:'. .. I was never sure whether
it started like with being depressed and then, but I didn 't,
I think I got, I tend to get more depressed when I cut back
on my eating because I think I actually lose more weight,
you do, and I had to be on anti-depressant, zvhenever I
come off them, I've kind ofgone downhill again . ..'. It
does appear that participant 6 was postulating that
the antidepressants kept her mood stable, which
in turn, protected her against her eating disorder.
This dynamic of depression predating the anorexia
certainly came through the data analysis, but it
was a very 'cloudy' dynamic. In many ways, the
complexity of the relation between depression and
anorexia nervosa was demonstrated, as the data
suggest that depression is both a precipitating and
consequence of the anorexia nervosa. In terms of
expressing sadness, this category broke down into
two more subcategories, namely, 'protection of
others' and 'appearing weak'.
Protection of others. This category related to the
points raised by the participants about how they
felt that sadness was a difficult emotion for others,
especially loved ones, to see. Participant 4 discussed
how she felt shame and guilt for how her emotions
would affect her own family. Participant 4: 'I'm
frightened erm my husband, that he'll, zvell just sort of
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realises how sad I am, and it'll think I've made him sad
as well. And the children seeing how sad I am, would
ruin their childhood . .This theme was present in
a number of participants' responses.
'Appearing weak/shame at expressing sadness'. This
category was also felt to be tinged with shame.
Participant 10 openly discussed how she viewed
sadness and any expression of sadness as a sign
of weakness. As was discussed previously, par¬
ticipant 10 grew up with a violent stepfather and
she also cared for her mother while she was in the
terminal stages of cancer. These seem to have a
significant impact upon her beliefs about sadness
being a sign of weakness, as the following quote
implies:
P.10: I just see it, if I start crying it's a sign of
weakness and something that 1 don't like doing
really.
Participant 9 appeared to share a behavioural
sign of shame of expressing sadness, as she dis¬
cussed how she would hide herself away if she
cried:
P.9: Sadness, if it was really bad then I'd probably
cry but, then I'd probably go away from people.
This example of shame was also discussed by
participant 1, '... if I'm upset I'm crying, but I try
and, I do that on my own, I don't really show it very
much, unless I'm really upset. . .'. Participant 8
mentioned how context was often very important
in allowing her to become sad and cry. She dis¬
cussed an example of where crying is regarded
as the norm: this allowed participant 9 to express
her emotions in a non-interpersonal manner, and
therefore not be so wary of allowing her emotions
to be expressed.
P.8:... if I feel sad about something or if I'm
watching a weepy film, or something daft like
that, at least you know I can let the tears fall
now....
As with the inhibited anger section above, it was
striking within the analysis that there was a large
amount of sadness, under the guide of depression
(although this was not confirmed by clinical diag¬
nostic interview). But this sadness was a largely
inhibited emotion, as it was regarded as an emotion
of weakness and shame, and hence, it could be
portrayed as a trapped emotion. This, however,
did not appear to be as severe as for anger, as
participants often discussed ways (whether it was
intentional or not) of letting their sadness out. They
spoke of being tearful on their own, or finding situ¬
ations where they could cry without feeling shame
or weakness.
Meta-Emotional Skills
This overarching category relates to participants'
sense of skill in managing their own emotional
states. As discussed already, anger and sadness
were the most challenging emotions for partici¬
pants, and they often struggled to know how to
manage them skilfully. Related to this point was
how a number of participants did not feel that
they had permission to express certain emotional
states, which appeared to be related to the notion
of whether their sense of self was acceptable as an
emotional being. Permission to express their emo¬
tions was also related to whether they had some¬
body with whom they felt able to express their
emotional states. Another category that emerged
from the analysis on meta-emotional skills was
on the actual skills to express emotions, as there
was often confusion about the emotions they were
feeling and apparent lack of knowledge in the best
way to share emotions. Given the historical factors
for the participants, it was not surprising that there
was this lack of meta-emotional knowledge and
skill. The final category that comes under the meta-
emotional skills was one of emotional coupling.
This was briefly discussed above, and it became
apparent in the interviews that anger and disgust
appeared to be connected in someway. This will be
discussed more fully below.
Permission to Express Emotions
The permission to express emotions appeared to
be driven by two factors, one that centred upon
the acceptability of the self as an emotional being,
while another focused on having a person with
whom the participant could be emotional. Only a
few participants felt that they had someone with
whom they could discuss their feelings with and,
even in this situation, were still quite guarded.
For participant 10, the issue of having a confidant
to speak to about one's feelings was highly sig¬
nificant. Within the interview, she spoke of only
being able to speak to her mother about how she
was feeling and, as discussed above, then lost her
mother, which triggered her eating disorder.
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Other participants discussed how they needed
other people to indicate that they had permission
to express their emotions. For example, in the
research memos, it was noted that participant 3
appeared to deny herself from being an emotional
person and that other people needed to give her
permission to share her emotions. This can be seen
quite clearly in the following quote:
P.3:I suppose I'm kind of like, I have strong views
sometimes of that I shouldn't be emotional, but
there's times when I'm annoyed when I think oh
I shouldn't say that, I shouldn't be expressing my
opinion, and I suppose sometimes, but most, erm,
I feel like I shouldn't be like telling people what 1
feel, cos they don't want to know and they have
not given me permission to share my emotions
with them....
Unacceptability of Self as an Emotional Being
Participants both discussed and presented as
individuals that were often without emotion,
especially at the beginning of the interview. When
this was explored further, interviewees described
feeling that it was wrong to be an 'emotional
person' and to share how they were feeling with
other people. The most striking example of this
was offered by participant 5:
P.5:... I suppose to a certain extent, and erm, this
is about me, I am not acceptable, if I have any kind
of emotion, let's not share it with anyone....
Emotion Expression Skills
A lack of emotion skills seemed to be related to
the lack of modelling of good emotion skills while
growing up. Furthermore, the denial of emotion
while growing up also appeared to relate to the
confusion that often surrounded the experience
of their emotions. This overarching category was
made up of three categories, which were: emo¬
tional confusion, overcontrol of emotions and the
use of eating disorder to express emotions.
Lack of Clarity in Knowing One's Own Emotions
In an interesting contradiction to the above on
often frank and illuminating discussion on why
sadness and anger were inhibited, participants
often discussed how, in the past, they lacked clarity
in what emotions they were feeling. For example:
P.8: that you can't do this and you'll not be able
to do that, and what have you, so, I suppose that's
been part of me not being able to, know my own
emotions really as well.
Participant 4, as discussed earlier, grew up within
a loving, responsive family, but sadly, she had two
significant traumas in her teenage life. She described
how she suppressed her emotions because of physi¬
cal health problems. At no time in the interview did
she give the impression of being unable to iden¬
tify her emotions and, indeed, spoke of her anger
and sorrow at certain events in her life. Through
the analysis, the interviewer was left with a sense
of how participants were often unsure about their
emotional states, but this was not the same as not
knowing their emotional states. During data collec¬
tion, the interviewer was careful in assisting partici¬
pants to feel safe in their discussion, and this seemed
to assist in their opening up about their emotions.
P.4: I don't know that I feel scared, or that I'm
frightened sometimes, I just know I'm really
stressed, or I'm really angry about something
someone's done, but it doesn't occur to me at
the time that behind all that is something really
scared me....
The influences from growing up were hypoth¬
esized to have led to a lack of clarity about her
emotions. However, even here, within the discus¬
sion, participant 4 was able to pinpoint emotions
within her life, such as feeling anger at mealtimes
because of her brother's behaviour.
Overcontrol of Emotions
As has been discussed on a number of occa¬
sions, all the participants shared how they 'over
controlled' or suppressed their emotions, which
they did using a range of strategies. The two prin¬
cipal strategies were the actual eating disorders
and other, more behavioural techniques, such as
'masking', 'hiding away' and 'using other situa¬
tions to facilitate emotional expression'.
A number of participants discussed how they
would mask their emotions to stop them from
being expressed/shown. Again, it was interest¬
ing how, upon reflection, participants spoke of
how they did not have emotions, but then came to
realize that they did, but just did not express them.
For example, participant 11 stated:
I suppose I was just sort of didn't have any emo¬
tions about, well I did, but I never showed them,
never, 1 kind ofmasked it all and brushed it under
the carpet....
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Another common technique was to hide away
from other people when feeling negative emotions.
This isolation technique was discussed by partici¬
pant 1:
if I'm upset I'm crying, but I try and, I do that on
my own, I don't really show it very much, unless
I'm really upset, erm, but 1 don't talk about my
emotions very much, I find that very difficult to
do.
Likewise, participant 9 discussed how she would
hide herself away when upset.
P.9: If I was upset, then I'd just go up to my room
and just be in my room on my own, I 'wouldn't
talk to anybody.
Further evidence of participants acknowledging
their emotions and trying to find Ways of express¬
ing them was revealed by participant 8. She dis¬
cussed how she was aware of her own emotional
state, but was not able to share it with anyone.
Therefore, she chose to use a more 'acceptable'
means of expressing her emotions.
P.8: if I feel sad about something I'll watch a
weepy film, or something daft like that, at least
you know I can let the tears fall now.
Eating disorder symptoms used ' to suppress
emotions. The most striking example of the over-
control of emotions came when the relationship
between emotions and eating disorder symptoms
was discussed. As has already been touched on
already, participants were aware of this relation¬
ship to varying degrees, and were especially aware,
of how weight loss appeared to rob them of emo¬
tional experience. Within the memos, this feature
of the results was reflected upon, and it was con¬
sidered that this participant group was in a prime
location to reflect upon these processes. They were
still very close or in the midst of struggling with
their eating disorder, but were sufficiently nour¬
ished not to have the blanket suppression effect
of restricting food intake. It was the opinion of
the researcher that this gave an important insight
into the relationship between the symptoms and
emotional regulation.
This total suppression of emotion, through
weight loss and food restraint, was discussed by
a number of participants, as the following quote
illustrates:
P.9: I feel really kind of like felt numb like some
of the time, erm, like you're just focused on like
food so nothing else really matters so it just feels
you're like, so I didn't really feel anything.
This type of emotional suppression/overcon-
trol was associated with a restricting subtype of
anorexia, and it appeared to be a primary avoider
of emotion. The interviewer was aware of the
literature that discussed how restriction plays
this role, and it seemed to fit with the data being
discussed by interviewees. However, unlike the
previous literature, participants helped to develop
a new narrative about this primary avoidance of
emotion, in that it appeared to be driven by a
desire to inhibit anger and/or sadness (as dis¬
cussed previously). For example, participant 2 dis¬
cussed how restriction was induced by anger, but
if there was any further anger, this was 'removed'
by vomiting.
P.2:... I'm upset or angry or both then it does
affect my eating, erm, both because if I'm angry
and upset, I don't feel that I can eat, physically,
but also erm, that yeah I can get my anger out by
erm, by not eating but also with inducing vomit¬
ing, I do do that when I'm angry....
This participant shared how, when there was too
much anger, she was able to remove it by vomiting.
This 'secondary avoidance' of anger was echoed
by many of the participants and it appeared to be
a common emotion regulation/suppression strat¬
egy, for people who vomited, when there was 'too
much emotion'. As alluded to above, it was evident
from the analysis that people who vomited often
came from backgrounds that fluctuated between
episodes of anger and lack of emotion.
The distinction between the primary and second¬
ary avoidance of emotion (as discussed above) can
be clearly seen by the following quote from partici¬
pant 8. This participant was able to reflect upon the
different narratives about emotion avoidance that
often occurred for herself and her fellow clients in
the group therapies at the eating disorders unit.
P.8:... it's like someone who's in the group
who's bulimic, you know when she gets annoyed
or frustrated she wants to binge and it ivorks the
same if your anorexic, eating disorder, it's, the
longer you internalise it the more you starve,
because you get your own power from bulimia,
it's a case of the same thing but the opposite so
that they binge and not starve....
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With regards to the other emotions, sadness,
under the guise of depression, was another emotion
'managed' by eating disorder symptoms. Almost
all of the participants discussed how depression
and disordered eating were linked in a cause and
effect way. However, the analysis also revealed
how the participants often used restriction to feel
better about themselves, and this appeared to be
associated to a lack of disgust towards the body (to
be explored later) and pride at the low body weight.
Therefore, restriction appeared to be related both
to a search for feeling better about one's body and
having pride in 'successful' weight loss. This is
shown in the following quote.
P.11:... all you can think about is food, so, yeah,
sadness is like the big thing, when I was sad it's
got to be restriction ....
Participant 4 discussed how she used restriction to
feel better about herself:
P.4: It's more hopeless, more depressed. I used to
get very high, well when I was dieting, eating on
a diet, I used to feel a bit positive about life....
Emotional Coupling
Although the title of this category was a researcher-
constructed title, the participants often alluded to
managing their emotional states by using other,
more acceptable, emotions to suppress or inhibit
their emotions. Although as much as possible was
grounded in the data, it was inevitable that some
inference was taken from the data and how people
presented in the actual research interviews. This
process will be as transparent as possible so that
the reader will be able to follow and understand
the analysis for this section.
As has been discussed above, anger and sadness
appeared to be directly related to the use of eating
disorder symptoms to either avoid and /or suppress
the particular emotion. Related across these discus¬
sions, either at the time or later in the interview,
were how they disliked their body and they had
a strong desire to lose weight. It became apparent
in the interviews that this process almost seemed
to happen in an automatic way, where the partici¬
pant was becoming angry and then would resort to
restriction and/or bingeing/purging. It is difficult
to give quotes to support this process, but par¬
ticipant 9 appeared to demonstrate this automatic
coupling within the dynamic of the interview:
Interviewer 1: Ifsomething makes you angryfor
example, was that something you could express?
P.9: Erm, 1 could on somethings, yeah, erm, yeah
I could get angry but erm, not about like, I don't
know, I could get angry at anything but then any
time anyone commented on like my appearance or
something, I was just a bit upset and I suppose
I zvas, not angry, but annoyed that I looked like
1 did in a way, and I zvished 1 could just change
how I looked completely.
The context for this question was discussing
anger in general and it was not related to her phys¬
ical appearance. As can be seen in the above quote,
it was striking that participant 9 quickly turned
the conversation to her physical appearance, how
angry she felt about herself and how this seemed
to be linked to pathologically high body dissat¬
isfaction. Within the memos, it was felt that this
participant was alluding to how anger may well
be coupled with disgust, and this would explain in
vivo coupling that was apparent in the interview.
Other examples of emotional coupling were
between anger and sadness. A number of partici¬
pants discussed how, when they felt angry, this
was turned into sadness so that they cry. Within
the memos, the notion of where this anger was left
was discussed, but this was not answered within
the data for the study:
P.9:... Ifget angry I zvouldn't say anything, just
like get sad, and that zvould be it....
Also, participant 1 said: 'Anger, I don't shozo that at
all. I shozv that by being upset or crying or..., being
moody... .
It is hoped that the presentation of data in this
category provides a feel for the interviews, where
participants gave evidence, both in their answers
to questions and in the dynamic of the interview,
that they were coupling emotions.
'Letting the Emotions Out'
Over the interviews and through the analysis,
it became apparent that certain emotions were
regarded as being acceptable to be 'let out' or not
suppressed. Within the spirit of this study, ques¬
tions were asked about all the basic emotions,
including disgust and fear. When asking partici¬
pants about their perception and experience of
disgust, it became apparent that there was some
confusion in the use of the term disgust, as it is a
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term often used in a colloquial way to state anger at
an object or person (e.g., 'I am disgusted that s/he
acted in that way'). Therefore, within this study,
the interviewer defined the emotion disgust within
the interview by asking about disgust/repulsion as
an emotion. This did seem to clarify the discussion
in the interviews. Within this section of the results,
the principal emotion that participants were able to
express was disgust, towards themselves and their
bodies. Participants discussed how they 'hated
their bodies' and this often made them feel dis¬
gusted, as the following quotes highlight:
P.11:... 1 suppose, that's part of it like, I'm just
disgusted with my body before, you know, before
I started losing weight, like hated my bum, my
legs were just like horrible, I hated em, and like ifl
could have like chopped them offand had someone
else's I would have done, and erm, I hated how,
I hated my face, I hated how, I just hated how I
looked all around, I just you know, I just, yep,
just hated myself, there was nothing that I really
liked, the only thing I had that I liked were my
arms and the top, andfrom like there to there, that
was the only part ofmy body that I liked, the rest
of me I just hated.. ..
P.2:... when I weighed 10 stone, when I didn't
like how I looked, I suppose I was perhaps dis¬
gusted really because I never had weighed so
much, it wasn't erm, wasn't just how my body
shape looked, but that I had allowed myself in the
first place to get to that way. I wasn't fearfrl of it
at all, and I wasn't angry about it, and I wasn't
sad about it, but yeah I suppose having said that
I was very disgusted towards my body....
Participant 2 was able to go through the emo¬
tions and be sure that she was feeling disgusted
with her body, and this was acceptable. Within
the analysis and the associated memos, it reflected
upon this elevated emotion of disgust towards the
body, and how this fits with the functional view
of the emotion of disgust. According to the litera¬
ture (e.g., Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987), disgust
is regarded as the emotion that creates a psycho¬
logical (and physical) distance between the self and
the object of disgust. It became apparent in the
interviews that the emotion of disgust was often an
important driver for avoiding food and for dieting
(as with participants 2 and 11). Itwas hypothesized
that this was the actual process of creating dis¬
tance from the object(s) of disgust. Participant 9
discussed how she felt 'weak' when this distance
was traversed (i.e., she ate some food):
Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Interviewer: What about the emotion of disgust/
repulsion?
P.9:1 felt it with myself sometimes....
Interviewer: How do you mean ?
P.9:... ]ust like if I'd eaten something that I
didn't intend to eat or something, felt like I was
weak and disgusting....
In the interview, the emotion of fear was spe¬
cifically asked about, as it has been regarded as
an important emotion for the eating disorders. All
of the participants discussed having fear in their
lives, and for some, there was a clear develop¬
mental pathway for having increased fear in their
lives. For example, participant 4 discussed how her
past with a violent ex-husband had left her feeling
very fearful.
P.4:... my husband broke my nose and put me in
hospital and I think from there it really just went
downhill. I was already frightened ofhim anyway
because he beat me, but now I was petrified. ...
However, most of the participants described
how fear had developed in their lives because of
the eating disorder. They mentioned how they had
a fear of becoming fat, or of food because it makes
them fat. It was reflected upon in the memos,
during conversations with colleagues and in the
interviews that participants were actually fearful
of having disgust towards food. This process can
be seen in the following quotes.
P.l:.. .fear, yeah, I feel that a lot, yeah. Espe¬
cially this illness, there's a lot offear with it.
P.6: .. . like say like fear and anxiety towards
food, it kind of comes with it, I wouldn't say that
I xvas like before... .
P.9:.. . Yeah, probably, a lot of it's to do with
food. If I wasn't scared ofeating and things then I
wouldn't have started like fearing gaining weight
and....
Summary of Perception and Management of
Emotions within Anorexia Nervosa
Across this section of the results, participants
shared how they had a number of marked diffi¬
culties with certain emotional states, namely, anger
and sadness. There were a number of beliefs that
led to these difficulties and they appeared to result
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in the interviewees being very guarded in their
expression of these emotions. Indeed, the analysis
revealed that this avoidance of emotions almost
happened on an automatic basis, with the person
realizing that the emotion had been experienced
and then avoided once the eating disorder behav¬
iour had 'kicked in'. The analysis also revealed
a whole host of poor meta-emotional skills that
prevented a healthy relationship with their own
emotions.
DISCUSSION
Data from this study on the perception and man¬
agement of emotions appear to offer significant
insights into understanding of emotional process¬
ing within anorexia nervosa. One of the most sig¬
nificant factors that came out of the analysis was
that the participants were able to talk, discuss and
reflect on their own relationship with their emo¬
tions. Given that the research has demonstrated
alexithymic tendencies in people with eating dis¬
orders, this study appears to challenge the notion
of monolithic alexithymic difficulties in this client
group. Related to this point is how there has been a
lack of a basic emotions perspective in the research
and, in particular, within the theoretical under¬
standing of anorexia nervosa. This study's findings
demonstrated evidence of different relationships
with each of the basic emotions within anorexia
nervosa. Again, this finding is in keeping with
Waller et al. (2003) and Geller et al. (2000), but this
study's data highlight some of the particular dif¬
ficulties attached to certain emotional states. The
emotions of anger and, to a lesser degree, sadness
were discussed as being toxic, shaming and were
inhibited by the participants. Anger seemed to be
particularly toxic, and it appeared to play a trigger
role in the rise of eating disorder symptoms.
However, there were differences in the beliefs
about these emotions and why they should not be
expressed. Anger was regarded as being 'toxic' and
'dangerous', and harmful to both the participant
and other people, if it was allowed to be expressed.
For sadness, the predominant belief was one of
'weakness'. The analysis highlighted how people
with anorexia often did not regard themselves as
entitled to be an 'emotional' human being, or that
being 'emotional' would lead to rejection from sig¬
nificant others. This finding fits with the perspec¬
tive of Geller et al. (2000), who argued that people
with anorexia suppressed anger to protect inter¬
personal relationships. The analysis also revealed
Copyright © 2009 (ohn Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
how certain emotions were almost automatically
suppressed by the eating disorder, providing evi¬
dence of a possible link between certain emotional
states and eating disorder symptoms that works
outside conscious cognition. An interesting aspect
of the analysis was the category of coupled emo¬
tions. It seemed that for some participants, there
was a relationship between anger and disgust,
especially body disgust. Although data were col¬
lected and initially analysed before any significant
related readings and involvement in other similar
research, this study's findings are very much
in keeping with a recent paper that potentially
demonstrated a coupling effect between anger
and disgust in bulimia nervosa (Fox & Harrison,
2008). It was argued within this paper that disgust
towards the self is a much less toxic emotion, and,
therefore, it was used to suppress the more ego-
dystonic emotion of anger. Furthermore, this study
highlighted how there appeared to be a significant
amount of anger within the participants, and this
was related to their own developmental histories.
Again, this was in keeping with the findings of Fox
and Harrison (2008), who found that participants
with bulimic symptoms experienced significantly
higher levels of anger than controls, post-anger
induction. This study's findings suggest that this
'anger within' may well be present for anorexia
nervosa as well. Indeed, many of the participants
discussed how they would engage in their eating
disorder behaviour when they felt anger.
The notion of certain emotions feeling toxic, dan¬
gerous and being ego-dystonic is in line with con¬
temporary accounts within the emotions literature.
The SPAARS model (Power & Dalgleish, 2008)
(referred to in the Introduction) also discusses
how each of the basic emotions may develop in a
modularized manner (akin to many other cogni¬
tive constructs), and this development occurs in
relation to environmental influences. According to
the theory, when children experience events and
interactions that lead them to view their emotions
as being wrong, they split off and become ego-
dystonic. Through this process, their emotions
become alien and very frightening. This theory
seems to have been supported by this study because
participants were able to identify their emotions,
but were scared of expressing anger and sadness
(for the reasons identified above). It is also note¬
worthy that the data strongly revealed how their
eating disorder was used to suppress emotions,
and it became apparent in the analysis that the
difficulties with feeling and identifying emotion
were often experienced when people were at low
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weight. This finding led to the hypothesis that
alexithymia may be due to a more compromised
cognitive functioning than an implicit difficulty
with identifying emotions in anorexia nervosa.
This finding is in keeping with the innovative
study by Serpell and colleagues (Serpell, Treasure,
Teasdale, & Sullivan, 1999), where she analysed
'friend or foe letters' from people with anorexia
nervosa. One of the findings that came out of this
study was how restriction could suppress painful
emotions (a positive of anorexia nervosa), but it
went too far because it suppressed everything and
left the person without any feeling (a con of the
anorexia nervosa).
When the emotion of disgust was investigated
across the analysis, the data suggested that it was
very salient for this group of participants. The
ferocity of interviewees' disgust was startling,
and participants were able to express this emotion
quite freely in the actual interviews. The emotion
of disgust was linked to body dissatisfaction, with
fear coming in as a secondary emotion. The emotion
of fear was clearly discussed as a product of the
eating disorder, and this did seem to be related
to the fear of being disgusted about themselves,
their bodies and of food. Davey, Bickerstaffe and
MacDonald (2006) found evidence for a facilitatory
relationship between disgust and fear/anxiety,
using an experimental methodology. They found
that induced disgust led to an increase in nega¬
tive interpretational bias, which maintained levels
of anxiety in their participants, and these authors
argued that this provides evidence for the causal
role of disgust in anxiety psychopathologies. This
confusion between fear/anxiety and disgust has
the potential to be an important theoretical point in
the understanding of eating disorders, because the
long reported 'fear of food' or the 'fear of becoming
fat' may actually be disgust reactions, and hence,
may account for the high co-morbidity between
anxiety and eating disorders, and this perspective
would certainly fit with this study's data. Continu¬
ing within a co-morbidity perspective, Overton,
Markland, Taggart and Bagshaw (2008), and Power
and Tarsia (2007) found that disgust, in particular,
self-disgust, played a significant role in depression.
In light of this study's data, disgust may play a
significant role in the co-morbidity between eating
disorders, in particular, body dissatisfaction, and
depression.
In the first section of the Results, the analy¬
sis revealed that participants felt that they were
often bought up in an environment (home and/or
school) that produced overwhelming emotion. For
the participants that grew up where anger was the
most reported salient emotion, there appeared to
be much more difficulty with emotions, in par¬
ticular, anger. These participants tended to binge
and vomit much more than the other participants.
Theoretically, it is significant that participant 3 wit¬
nessed two angry confrontations in her family, but
spoke much more of a non-emotional environment
at home while she was growing up. This gave the
researcher the sense that there was almost a dose
effect, in that as overt levels of anger increase, so
does the need for more extreme measures to cope
with their emotions (which were postulated to be
anger). Participant 10's apparent utility of anger to
facilitate care on the unit was also interesting, as
she seemed to be a very angry young woman (a
view echoed by staff on the unit). In many ways,
this anger seemed to be her way to protect against
feelings of sadness and fear. However, in saying
this, it was striking that she appeared to 'contain' a
lot of anger about her stepfather, and it was hypoth¬
esized that she was also angry about the loss of her
mum. Her mother was her main confidant and she
spoke of her being the only person with whom she
could share her emotions. Again, with this much
suppressed emotion, it is highly significant that she
started her bingeing-vomiting-restriction shortly
after her mother died. These theoretical points
do appear to allow for the further development
of the model proposed by Waller and colleagues
(e.g., Waller et al., 2007), where they discuss how
restrictive eating is a primary avoider of emotion,
while bingeing and vomiting is seen as a secondary
avoider of emotion. According to this study's data,
the key emotion appears to be anger that moves
people between these two strategies.
The other main stray of overwhelming emotion
was how events seemed to generate a significant
amount of emotion for participants, which was not
expressed or managed at the time. The key feature
of this part of the analysis was how this emotion
was 'too much' and, perhaps, developmentally
inappropriate, as it was hypothesized within the
memos that the participants were young when
faced with challenging emotions. The most strik¬
ing example of this was shared by participants 1
and 5 who were moved around a number of times
as a young child and felt 'resentful'. As discussed
above, it was felt to be significant, throughout the
analysis, that this anger was maintained in the par¬
ticipants once they had reached adulthood.
The other main theoretical point that came out of
the data was how the early environment seemed
to be largely devoid of emotions. Even within
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families where there was a high level of anger, the
emotional backdrop was often emotionless. Most
participants discussed how family members had
poor meta-emotional skills, and it was hypoth¬
esized that these influences would have had a
profound impact upon the development of these
skills in the participants as children. Likewise,
the use of active strategies to deny the experience
of an emotion appears to have been particularly
toxic for the developing child, as their emotions
have not been validated. Therefore, it seemed
that participants, while they were young, had a
vast array of difficult and challenging experiences
that left them with too much emotion (particu¬
larly anger and sadness), but were not taught the
skills to manage and express these emotions. This
study's findings on poor level of meta-emotional
skill add further evidence to the literature that has
discussed how a caregiver's empathy appears to
be related to early attunement to emotional states
in the self and others (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 1998,
2001; Valiente et al., 2004), and how emotional
inhibition in childhood mediates the relationship
between childhood emotional invalidation (as per
Linehan, 1993) and acute psychological distress in
adulthood (Krause et al., 2003). This development
of emotional awareness through interactions with
caregivers has been discussed fully in a number
of classical theories, ranging from psychodynamic
(e.g., Klein, 1952), modelling (e.g., Kugiumutzakis,
Kokkinaki, Makrodimitraki, & Vitalaki, 2005) and
attachment theory (e.g., Bowlby, 1969), and it is
beyond the current scope of this paper to consider
these large theories in detail. However, this study's
findings are consistent with DBT's perspective on
invalidating environments (Linehan, 2003) and the
SPAARS idea of ego-dystonic emotion (Power &
Dalgleish, 2008).
There are a number of potential limitations of this
study that need to be highlighted. The main one
concerns the participants. These individuals were
recruited from one site and this may have lead to a
bias in the type of data collected. However, this site
was deliberately chosen because it was the region's
eating disorder unit and, hence, accepted people
with severe eating disorders. It was felt that the
findings from such a group of participants would
have theoretical significance for the consideration
of anorexia nervosa in general. As outlined above,
there were a number of women who took part
in this study who were quite a bit older than the
expected age (e.g., in their 40s). This may have
had a bearing on the results, but it was felt in the
design that having an everyday clinical group was
important. Also, having a variety of participants
at different stages of their 'illness' allowed for a
fuller investigation ofemotions in anorexia nervosa.
Likewise, it could be argued that recruiting only
11 participants would have comprised the study's
ability to achieve data saturation. This may be the
case, and the recruitment of a few more participants
may have extended the findings a little further.
However, in keeping with Dey's (1999) point, qual¬
itative studies rarely use exhaustive coding, and
categories are suggested by data, rather than satu¬
rated. Dey proposes that qualitative studies should
seek to have theoretical sufficiency, and this study
certainly felt like it had sufficient data to allow for
the development of a grounded theory. Finally, it
could be argued that the researcher's clinical expe¬
rience may have unduly influenced analysis of the
data. It is true that the researcher used his knowl¬
edge within the analysis process, but the analysis
was well grounded in the data. It is the contention
of the researcher that this experience allowed for
a much fuller analysis than otherwise could have
been achieved, a point raised by Glaser and Strauss
(1967), who argued that the researcher must have
a perspective to analyse the data.
In conclusion, this study has examined the per¬
ception of the basic emotions within participants
with anorexia nervosa. It has also looked at the
socio-emotional environments within which the
participants grew up. Anger and, to a lesser degree,
sadness were identified as being problematic for
participants, with both being connected to the
actual eating disorder symptoms. Anger seemed to
be a key emotion that appeared to act in a dose-like
manner, in that the higher the levels of anger, the
more likely there would be bingeing and vomit¬
ing. Disgust was identified as another key emotion
and participants discussed a high level of disgust
towards their bodies. Interestingly, fear was put as
secondary to the eating disorder, and participants
felt that fear and anxietywere a consequence of the
eating disorder. Early history was marked with a
poverty of emotion, while some participants expe¬
rienced episodes of overwhelming emotion.
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This paper examines the relationship between emotions, depression
and eating disorders. Initially, a review is undertaken of the current
state of the research and clinical literature with regard to emotional
factors in eating disorders. This literature is then integrated within
a version of the multi-level model of emotion proposed by Power
and Dalgleish. The aim of this paper is to incorporate a basic emo¬
tions, multi-modal perspective into developing a new emotions-
based model that offers a theoretical understanding of psychological
mechanisms in eating disorders. Within the new Schematic Proposi-
tional Analogical Associative Representation System model applied
to eating disorders, it is argued that the emotions of anger and disgust
are of importance in eating disorders and that the eating disorder
itself operates as an inhibitor of emotions within the self. It is hoped
that the development of a multi-levelled model of eating disorders
will allow for the construction of number of specific testable hypo¬
theses that are relevant to future research into the psychological
treatment and understanding of eating disorders. Copyright © 2009
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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INTRODUCTION
Cognitive theory of eating disorders, particularly
anorexia nervosa (AN) and bulimia nervosa (BN),
has shown significant developments in the last 10
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years. The aim of this current paper is to review
the theoretical developments that have taken place
in the study of eating disorders. In agreement with
Cooper (2005), this review will also look at the
adequacy of the theoretical underpinnings of these
approaches in eating disorders and how they dove¬
tail with theory and research from more generic
areas of clinical psychology. As will be seen across
this paper, theory and research into eating disor¬
ders have largely taken a cognitive-affective route
in the last 5-6 years, and this review will consider
Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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the most significant aspects of this literature base.
In keeping with the above point, this paper will
present a new cognitive-affective model of eating
disorders that is based on both the current state of
evidence in the eating disorder field and on recent
theoretical developments in the emotions litera¬
ture. In order to offer a comprehensive account
of the emotional processes in eating disorders,
this paper will utilize a basic emotions approach
where the research for the five basic emotions is
considered (i.e., anger, disgust, fear, sadness and
happiness). Aswill be discussed later in this paper,
it is acknowledged that there is debate about this
number of basic emotions (e.g., Ekman, 1992a), but
there is a consensus forming in the literature that
states that these are the key five basic emotions
for human beings (e.g., Power and Dalgleish, 1997,
2008). Implications for the future, including clinical
practice and research, will also be discussed.
Although somewhat controversial, this paper, in
keeping with recent developments in the eating
disorders field, will adopt a transdiagnostic per¬
spective (e.g., Fairburn, Cooper, & Shafran, 2003).
According to Fairburn, the core elements of eating
disorders are essentially the same (e.g., across AN,
BN and eating disorders not otherwise specified
[EDNOS]), because they both over-evaluate shape,
weight and the control of eating. There is a strik¬
ing similarity in the expression of similar attitudes
and behaviour across both disorders; thus, accord¬
ing to Fairburn,'. . . patients with anorexia nervosa
restrict their food intake in the same rigid and
extreme way as patients with bulimia nervosa, and
they too may vomit, misuse laxatives or diuretics,
and over-exercise' (Fairburn et al., 2003, p. 519). In
both disorders, there is marked body dissatisfac¬
tion and this plays a powerful maintaining role
for both disorders (e.g., marked fear of being fat).
Research has also demonstrated that binge eating
does not distinguish the two disorders because
there is a subgroup of patients with AN who also
binge eat (with or without compensatory purging)
(e.g., Casper, Eckert, Halmi, Goldberg, & Davis,
1980; Garfinkel, Moldofsky, & Garner, 1980). Fair-
burn and Harrison (2003) argue that the most
compelling evidence for a transdiagnostic account
of eating disorders comes from the longitudinal
study of eating disorder diagnoses. Within their
paper, they present evidence of how individuals
will frequently move between the various eating
disorder diagnoses. For example, Sullivan, Bulik,
Carter, Gendell and Joyce (1996) demonstrated
that in about a quarter of cases of BN, there have
been episodes of AN. In a recent prospective study,
Milos and colleagues (Milos, Spindler, Schnyder,
& Fairburn, 2005) found that stability in eating
disorder diagnoses was low, with just a third of
participants retaining their diagnoses over a 30-
month period. Interestingly, these results were not
due to remission rates, because remission was low
for all the participants, so consequently,movement
between the diagnoses happened in over half the
cases in their study. This finding has been sup¬
ported by a recent study that also demonstrated
considerable diagnostic flux (Fichter & Quadfiieg,
2007). In a recent conference paper, Fairburn (2007)
makes the point that almost half of people seeking
help with eating difficulties do not fulfil criteria for
either BN or AN and are often given the diagnosis
of EDNOS (Millar, 1998; Ricca et al., 2001). It is
proposed that this group of patients share many
of the characteristics of both BN and AN, but are
not accounted for by the current diagnostic specific
models. Fikewise, a mixture of both bulimic and
anorexic symptoms for almost half of presenting
patients suggests that a transdiagnostic approach
would be the best way to formulate and under¬
stand eating disorders (in keeping with the above
discussion).
Therefore, the following discussion will not
distinguish between the specific eating disorder
diagnoses, but concentrate on how certain eating
disorder symptoms act as affect regulation strate¬
gies. However, prior to the review of the literature,
as it pertains to the role of basic emotions in eating
disorders, a review will be undertaken of the rela¬
tion of depression to eating disorders. It was felt
that this was important as many of theories of
eating disorders, either implicitly or explicitly,
consider negative emotion and by reviewing the
literature, this review will be able to comment on
how well contemporary eating disorder theories
account for this co-morbid relationship. It is also
acknowledged that anxiety is often a co-morbid
condition with eating disorders, however, this rela¬
tion will be critically examined in the subsection
on fear in eating disorders, later on in the paper.
Following on from the review of depression, this
paper will consider the new wave of theories and
models of eating disorders, and developmental
factors in eating disorders. Finally, the review of
emotions and their relationship with eating dis¬
orders will be reviewed around the five emotions
(sadness, happiness, anger, disgust and fear), with
sadness being the first to be considered.
The search strategy within this review used all
the main academic search engines, such as Medline
and Psychlnfo, and it used all the eating disor-
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ders terms (e.g., AN and BN) and references to all
the main emotions (e.g., anger, sadness etc.). As
will be seen over the paper, time was also spent
researching current cognitive models and main
developmental factors in eating disorders. Finally,
strategies were also used to search for research
and theory pertaining to emotional functioning.
Due to the size of this search strategy, a decision
was made not to consider other 'co-morbid' dis¬
orders that often co-occur with eating disorders
(e.g., obsessive-compulsive disorder, substance
misuse), because these are not direct affective dis¬
orders, and hence, beyond the scope of this current
paper.
DEPRESSION AND EATING DISORDERS
Depression has long been documented as a sig¬
nificant co-morbid condition of eating disorders
among females (Lewinsohn, Striegel-Moore, &
Seeley, 2000; Santos, Richards, & Bleckley, 2007;
Zaider, Johnson, & Cockell, 2000). In one study,
Blinder, Cumella and Sanathara (2006) found that
46% of female inpatients with BN also met criteria
for concurrent major depressive disorder. A focus
within the literature has been upon the debate as
to which disorder predates the other. One line of
research has indicated that starvation may play
a significant part in the development of depres¬
sion within AN. Altemus and Gold (1992) demon¬
strated that starvation and/or protein malnutrition
can lead to elevations in corticotrophin-releasing
hormone, which may play a role in depression. A
number of other studies have demonstrated that
calorie-controlled diets lead to a reduction in 5-HT
functioning, which may contribute to depressed
mood (Cowen, Anderson, & Fairburn, 1992). In
the seminal work by Keys, Brozek, Henschel,
Mickelsen and Taylor (1950), it was found that
'psychologically robust' men who were placed on
a 'semi-starvation diet' all had significant lower¬
ing of mood over the course of the study, which
lasted for 6-12 months post-refeeding. Interest¬
ingly, Laessle, Platte, Schweiger and Pirke (1996)
found some evidence that, in normal weight
healthy controls, alternating a diet of restriction
with unlimited eating was associated with a signif¬
icant lowering of mood, feelings of loss of control
and heightened irritability. In comparison with the
Keys study, a significant proportion of participants
started to binge and purge, and their mood dete¬
riorated. Fluctuating eating patterns do seem to be
related to a lowering of mood. Plowever, in all of
these studies, it is not clear whether the lowering
of mood ever reached clinical caseness levels. For
example, in the Laessle et al. study, mood only
deteriorated by a mean average of 10% between
the dieting days and the unlimited intake days.
As pointed out by O'Brien and Vincent (2003),
there is evidence to suggest that caloric deprivation
may act as a contributor to depressive symptom¬
atology within women with bulimia and anorexia,
but it does not appear to account fully for the
high level of co-morbidity. On this point, Levy
and Dixon (1985), in their review, argued that the
data suggested that the association between AN
and depression is more complex than only being
the result of starvation. Unfortunately, in their
review, there are a number of methodological
difficulties with the studies presented. However,
these authors stated there is sufficient evidence to
suggest that depression often predates the onset of
the eating disorder and it often continues once the
eating disorder has abated. Interestingly, they also
discussed the fact that there is a high prevalence of
depression in the relatives of people with an eating
disorder and this may be a clue to the emotional
environment and genetic transmission.
Stice (2001) undertook a sophisticated prospec¬
tive study in which he tested his Dual Pathway
model of BN. This model stated that both soci¬
etal pressure for thinness and a thin-ideal inter¬
nalization contributed to body dissatisfaction,
which then predicted dieting and negative affect,
which in turn, predicted bulimic symptoms. Fur¬
thermore, in keeping with research cited above,
Stice proposed that dieting also had a significant
effect upon the lowering of mood. In testing this
model, Stice (2001) found that in a sample of 231
high school girls, the model was supported by the
data. However, it is interesting that dieting only
marginally predicted negative affect in the sample.
Stice argued that this study presented evidence of
how the social norms of thinness for woman, and
the internalization of these norms, lead to marked
body dissatisfaction, which played a direct role in
the development of negative affect and dieting.
In relation to the above discussion, this study
gave evidence that negative affect is both a sig¬
nificant contributor and consequence of dieting
and body dissatisfaction. However, this study has
some important drawbacks; first, the dual pathway
model only accounted for 23% of the variance from
the data, and therefore, it is clear that other sig¬
nificant variables play a role in developing bulimic
symptoms. Second, the model neither adequately
accounts for why some women are particularly
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prone to internalize the thin-ideal, nor does it
explain the findings from Milos et al. (2005), who
showed significant movement between the diag¬
noses. Recent research has demonstrated that the
vast majority of women have significant levels of
body dissatisfaction (e.g., Levine, Piran, & Stod¬
dard, 1999); however, Stice's model does not help
to explain why certain women develop pathologi¬
cal levels of body dissatisfaction and eating dis¬
orders, while others do not. Recent research has
started to clarify these points a little, with Measelle,
Stice and Hogansen (2006) finding that depressive
symptoms predict eating disorders in 13-18-year-
old girls over a 4-year period, but not the reverse.
Furthermore, Burton, Stice, Bearman and Rohde
(2007) found further evidence of the relation¬
ship between depressive symptoms and bulimic
symptoms; when they developed an intervention
for depression in eating disorders, they found a




Cooper (2005) discussed how the application of cog¬
nitive theory to eating disorders has gone through
a number of significant developments over the last
few years (for a full discussion of the cognitive
theory in eating disorders, see Cooper, 2005). Pre¬
viously, cognitive theory was broadly concerned
with the role of behaviour and physiology in eating
disorders, in particular, BN (Fairburn, Cooper, &
Cooper, 1986). However, there have been a number
of important theoretical advances over recent years.
Cooper (2005) argued that second generation cog¬
nitive theories of eating disorders have postulated
that the cognition-affect dimension is of central
importance. These theoretical developments were
built on research that revealed how eating disorder
symptomatology appears to operate as an escape
from aversive self-awareness and emotional dis¬
tress (e.g., Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991; Root,
Fallon, & Friedrich, 1986).
Building on this empirical basis, Cooper, Wells
and Todd (2004) developed a model of BN that
worked on the tenet that eating helps the self to
dissociate from painful cognitions' and negative
affect. According to this model, external events
activate negative self-beliefs which facilitate nega¬
tive emotion. This triggering of negative emotions
leads to bulimic symptoms, especially bingeing. The
decision to binge is facilitated by positive beliefs
Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
(e.g., 'eatingwill make the distress go away'), but is
also accompanied by negative beliefs (e.g., 'eating
will make me fat'). This leads to the triggering
of permissible thoughts to reduce the subsequent
cognitive dissonance that occurs between the nega¬
tive and positive beliefs (e.g., 'I have no control of
my eating'). Therefore, in this model, the beliefs
that bingeing will help the self to dissociate from
negative affect are central to understanding BN. In
keeping with Cooper et al.'s model, Corstorphine,
Mountford, Tomlinson, Waller and Meyer (2007)
found further evidence that people with eating dis¬
orders avoid their emotions, and are intolerant of
their negative emotions.
Waller, Kennerley and Ohanian (2007) propose a
slightly different cognitive theory of eating disor¬
ders that is largely based on schema theory (Young,
Klosko, & Weishaar, 2003). According to the
broader theory, a schema is defined as a pervasive
set of beliefs and emotions that a person has about
himself/herself, others and the world. It is argued
that these schemas originate from experiences in
childhood (Young et al., 2003) and research has
demonstrated that eating-disordered patients have
more 'pathological schemas' when compared with
normal participants and dieters (e.g., Cooper, 1997;
Cooper & Hunt, 1998; Leung, Waller, & Thomas,
1999; Waller, Dickson, & Ohanian, 2002; Waller,
Ohanian, Meyer, & Osman, 2000). The types of
schemas that have been found to be important in
eating disorders are the socially orientated schemas,
such as abandonment, mistrust/abuse, defective-
ness/shame (Meyer & Waller, 1999), while Cooper,
Todd and Wells (1998) found evidence of higher
levels of negative self-belief in people with eating
disorders, which appeared to focus on themes of
worthlessness, uselessness, failure, abandonment
and being alone, when compared with a control
group. On the basis of these results, Waller, Kenne¬
rley, et al. (2007) proposed a theory that attempted
to account for the different symptom patterns
within eating disorders (e.g., restriction versus
bingeing-purging). Again, as with Cooper et al.'s
model, Waller et al.'s model is essentially an affect
regulation model as it proposed that food restric¬
tion is used as a strategy for primary avoidance of
the distress associated with negative emotions and
schemas, while bingeing is viewed as a strategy for
secondary avoidance of the distress of triggered
negative emotions and schemas.
Corstorphine (2006) building on the above
models, proposed a cognitive-affective model of
eating disorders that is broadly based upon dia¬
lectical behavioural therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993).
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The main points of this model are that individuals
learn in their childhoods that certain emotions and
individual traits are not tolerated by their caregiv¬
ers. Therefore, the young females who are des¬
tined to develop eating disorders grow up learning
that certain emotions are not 'acceptable' and/or
are 'dangerous'. In keeping with the other cogni¬
tive-affective models discussed above, bingeing-
purging/restriction is used to distance or prevent
an emotion from occurring; however, the avoid¬
ance of a primary emotion is then related to the
emergence of a secondary emotion. For example,
feeling angry at a betrayal (primary emotion)
which is suppressed, the individual then devel¬
ops guilt at having experienced anger (secondary
emotion). Corstorphine (2006) argued that it is the
secondary emotion that causesmuch of the distress
that is present in eating disorders.
For all three of these cognitive-affective theo¬
ries, the emphasis is very much on the cogni¬
tive variables. The emotions discussed are often
not specified, and it is not stated whether the
emotion generated in the model is akin to depres¬
sion, or whether it is something different. In the
consideration of theoretical movements within
the arena of affective disorders, the role of nega¬
tive core beliefs and associated negative cogni¬
tions have long been shown to play an important
role in depression (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery,
1979). Although it remains an empirical question,
the most parsimonious account of the negative
emotion alluded to in these '2nd generation cogni¬
tive models' is that the high co-morbidity between
depression and eating disorders can be formu¬
lated and understood. This question has received
some empirical consideration. Waller and col¬
leagues (Waller, Shah, Ohanian, & Elliott, 2001)
compared severely depressed patients to moder¬
ately to severely depressed bulimic patients, and
they found equivalent levels of core beliefs in each
group. However, when they performed a discrimi¬
nate analysis on their data, they found only failure
beliefs could distinguish the depressed and the
depressed bulimic groups. Unfortunately, there
were a number of methodological problems with
this study. For example, the patient groups have
very small n sizes. Cooper and colleagues under¬
took an analogue study that attempted to address
some of the methodological weaknesses of the
Waller et al. study (Cooper, Rose, & Turner, 2006).
They compared four groups of adolescent girls
on a specific measure of self-beliefs within eating
disorders, using the Eating Disorder Belief Ques¬
tionnaire (EDBQ; Cooper, Cohen-Tovee, Todd,
Wells, & Tovee, 1997) and the Young Schema
Questionnaire (YSQ; Young, 1998), in which they
were classified according to their scores on the
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck & Steer
(1993) and the Eating Attitudes Test (EAT; Garner
& Garfinkel, 1979). These groups were 'healthy'
(low BDI and low EAT scores), and with high
BDI (with low EAT scores) and high EAT (with
low BDI scores), and 'unhealthy' (high BDI and
high EAT scores). They found that both mea¬
sures could distinguish the 'healthy group' from
the high BDI group, but could not distinguish
the high EAT group from the 'healthy group'.
Both the YSQ and EDBQ measures could not dis¬
tinguish between the 'unhealthy group' and the
high BDI group. Within a discriminate function
analysis, Cooper et al. (2006) found that only two
beliefs (as measured on the EDBQ) were specifi¬
cally related to eating disorder symptoms. These
were 'I'm stupid' and 'I'm ugly'. Although this
study demonstrated that there were some differ¬
ences in the core beliefs between the four condi¬
tions, it is hard to draw any definitive conclusions
from this or from Waller's data. Both studies were
cross-sectional, and the fact that failure seems
to be a dominant theme may well be accounted
for by the actual bulimia symptomatology. A
feature of bulimia that has been discussed by
other authors is that there is a strong desire to
lose weight, but the person 'fails' due to the pres¬
ence of physiological mechanisms (e.g., Fairburn,
Marcus, & Wilson, 1993); it is perhaps not surpris¬
ing that they feel like a 'failure'. This criticism is
also potentially applicable to the belief of being
'ugly'. Within the Cooper et al. (2006) study, the
group means were very low in comparison with
clinical norms on the BDI and EAT. Therefore,
it is hard to make any firm conclusions about
the relevance of these results for clinical popu¬
lations. Despite these criticisms, it does appear
that there is preliminary evidence that suggests
there is some commonality in the type of beliefs
between people with eating disorders and people
with depression. This is certainly an area that
warrants further investigation.
Wonderlich, Mitchell, Peterson and Crow (2001)
presented a model that attempts to integrate some
of the above ideas on emotions and cognitions
in their Integrated Cognitive-Affective Therapy
(ICAT) model. According to this model, the person
with BN has a discrepancy between the 'ideal self'
and the 'perceived self', which creates negative
emotion, which they argue could be regarded as
depression or anxiety, within the individual. Once
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this has been created, the person resorts to a 'self-
directed style', where he/she engages in coping
strategies that include cognitive (e.g., self-criticism,
absence of self-acceptance) and behavioural (e.g.,
rigorous regimens of exercise, extreme dieting, or
binge and purge behaviours) efforts. These strate¬
gies aimed at the self, would have the impact of
reducing awareness of negative emotions through
simple distraction or blocking, but may also rep¬
resent motivated efforts to modify the actual self
(i.e., lose weight). Wonderlich et al. (2008) pub¬
lished a paper that presented two studies that
supported the ICAT model, as their data indicated
that females with BN displayed higher levels of
self-discrepancy and negative self-directed styles.
They also found that negative mood states medi¬
ated relations between bulimic status and nega¬
tive self-directed coping styles. This model also
fits the data from Dunkley and Grilo (2007) who
found that the relation between self-criticism
and over-evaluation of weight and shape was
partly mediated or explained by low self-esteem
and depressive symptoms for people with binge
eating disorder. Although this study's data refer to
binge eating disorder, there are many similarities
between binge-eating disorder and BN.
This model is a useful start in attempting to
connect the body of research that has demonstrated
that people with BN often have co-morbid depres¬
sion and anxiety. The ICAT model starts to offer
some of the cognitive constructs that would help
to explain the co-morbidity and how they may
well fuel the actual eating disorder. However, this
model has neither a significant amount of detail
about why people with BN resort to self-directed
strategies, nor does it explain why the individual
has to engage in bulimic symptoms, as opposed to
just restriction (as in AN), or other emotion regula¬
tion strategies, such as self-harm. In other words,
there appears to be a link missing that connects
the low mood to the eating disorder. This model
appears to suffer the same fate as Cooper et al.
(2004) and Waller, Kennerley, Ohanian (2007), in
that, it cannot actually account for the full array
of eating disorder symptoms, such as the pro¬
found body dissatisfaction. Another criticism of
these studies, and indeed, of many on the topic
of eating disorders and emotions, is the reliance
on self-report measures to collect data. Self-report
measures are open to biases in recall and may not
capture the real-time experience of the emotion.
Researchers from the USA have started to use
alternative research methodologies, in order to
bypass the reliance on self-report, which have
Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
included laboratory techniques and the use of real¬
time recording techniques, such as palm pilots.
An interesting lab study was completed by Agras
and Telch (1998) where they examined the effects
of calorie deprivation and negative mood on binge
eating individuals. Within this study, people with
binge eating disorder were randomly allocated to
either a neutral mood induction or a negativemood
induction. They found that negative mood, but not
caloric deprivation, led to a significant increase in
the loss of control over eating, as demonstrated by
their eating behaviour at a buffet laid on by the
researchers. Using hand-held technology, Engel
et al. (2007) found that over a 7-29-day period,
negative affect and altered states of awareness
preceded binges in people with BN. The authors
argued that this provides further evidence of the
causal role that negative mood appears to have in
bulimic symptomatology. Although these studies
have given further support that bingeing has the
function of managing affect, these results do not
move the theoretical understanding of eating dis¬
orders a great deal. This lack of theoretical sophis¬
tication echoes the views of authors from other
psychopathology field, who argue that the prob¬
lems and limitations of current cognitive behav¬
ioural treatments may actually be due to the lack
of explanatory power in contemporary models of
eating disorders (e.g., Cooper, 2005; Grilo, Devlin,
Cachelin, & Yanovski, 1997). In terms of accounting
for the complex relationships between emotions
that are present in eating disorders, the Corstor-
phine (2006) model and Wonderlich et al. (2001)
make a good start in considering how beliefs about
emotions are important in understanding eating
disorders. However, as discussed above, they fail
to incorporate contemporary emotion theory and
they failed to explain co-morbidity with other
affective disorders in an adequate fashion. None of
the cognitive-affective models explain why eating
disorders occur, in that why does a young woman
choose eating to manage her emotions rather than
some other method (e.g., substance use), or why





The discussion of whether or not childhood
abuse (e.g., sexual, physical, emotional) plays an
aetiological role in eating pathology has attracted
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much attention in recent years. Some authors have
argued that there does appear to be a connection
between bulimic symptomatology and childhood
sexual abuse (Smolak & Levine, 2007), while other
authors have stated that the relationship between
childhood sexual abuse and eating pathology is
overstated (e.g., Polivy & Herman, 2002). These
authors discussed how childhood sexual abuse
is also associated with depression and other psy¬
chological disturbances, and hence specific effects
cannot be concluded. Smolak and Levine (2007)
argued that there is sufficient evidence to link
bulimic symptoms with a history of childhood
sexual abuse, while it is still not clear for anorexia-
restricting symptoms. Within their review, they
also discussed how there is some evidence begin¬
ning to suggest that other forms of trauma (both in
childhood and in adulthood) may well be related
to eating/body image disturbance (e.g., Faravelli,
Guigni, Salatori, & Ricca, 2004; Treuer, Koperdak,
Rozsa, & Furedi, 2005).
In considering the nature of the relationship
between childhood abuse and future psychopa-
thology, Andrews (1995) demonstrated that body
shame moderates the relationship between abusive
experiences (both adult and child) and depression.
In a follow-up study, Andrews (1997) demonstrated
that the relationship between bulimic symptom¬
atology and childhood abuse was moderated by
bodily shame. Although depression was not mea¬
sured in this study, the results are in keeping with
the point already raised, in that Andrews has tried
to develop more complex models of the relation¬
ship between abuse and symptomatology. This
suggests that abuse may play a role in the develop¬
ment of bodily shame and any subsequent depres¬
sion/eating pathology. Likewise, this depression
may play a moderating role in the development of
eating disorder symptomatology (as hypothesized
by Wonderlich et al., 2001). The problem with this
research is that it lacks any real theoretical under¬
pinning on why bodily shame is significant for
the development of both depression and an eating
disorder in people who have been abused. This
is important because the roles of particular emo¬
tions seem to be significant (e.g., sadness, disgust),
and any theory would need to incorporate these
emotional factors (please see later in the thesis).
Interestingly, some researchers have suggested that
one of the key factors in the abusive experiences is
not just the act per se, but the emotional messages
that are communicated both directly and indirectly,
via the abuse. Kent and Waller (2000), on this issue,
argued that the emotional environment in which
childhood abuse occurs moderates its impact upon
the person, as these traumas often occur within
relationships that are 'emotionally damaging'. It is
well documented that experiences of sexual abuse
may leave the victim vulnerable to shame towards
their own body; these types of experiences may
include sexual excitement resulting from the abuse,
seeking abuse in order to avoid being rejected
etc. (e.g., Ainscough & Toon, 2000). Briere (1996)
proposed a model that goes someway to address
tire above points, as it is proposed that childhood
abuse disrupts the development of self-identity and
affects tolerance/regulation, where the individual
often resorts to distractive coping strategies, such as
bingeing and restriction to deal with overwhelming
affect (e.g., Linehan, 1993).
Attachment Patterns
As discussed at the end of the last section, Briere's
model places an emphasis upon early attachment
relationships, and these relationships shape the
development of skills to regulate and tolerate neg¬
ative affect. The importance of attachment figures
has been the topic of researchers and theorists for
decades and has included such notably writings
by Bowlby (1969) and others. Within the eating
disorders field, this is echoed by Bruch (1973) who
argues that understanding attachment problems in
eating disorders is crucial. Likewise, Cooper (2005)
argued that a disturbance in the caregiver-infant
relationship, where the caregiver responses are not
in tune with the infant's internal state, results in
ego deficits, which she describes as a disturbance
of self-awareness and self-concept, which results in
an inability to distinguish hunger and satiety from
other needs and discomforts. Within this frame¬
work, it is adolescence that places the individual
under stress, which reveals the inherent difficulties
with self-identity and self-reflection.
Shoebridge and Gowers (2000) found that
mothers of children that go on to develop AN often
report heightened anxiety during the prenatal and
perinatal period. Moreover, they argue that this
suggests that the mothers resort to being over-con¬
trolling and overprotective throughout the child's
development. Ward, Ramsay and Treasure (2000)
and Ward et al. (2001) also found evidence of a
dismissive attachment style, which was also associ¬
ated with reduced emotional expression and defi¬
cits in emotional processing with people with AN
and their parents.
There is a growing body of evidence that sug¬
gests that there may be problems with attachment
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in the history of people with eating disorders,
especially AN. As has been discussed above, early
relationships have been regarded as the corner¬
stone of helping the child to learn affect regulation
skills, and problems with these attachments may
lead the child to develop alexithymia. According
to Stefnos (1973), alexithymia can be regarded as
a difficulty in identifying feelings, distinguish¬
ing feelings from bodily sensations of emotional
arousal and describing feelings to other people.
A number of research studies have identified
a relationship between eating disorders sym-
ptomology, in particular AN, and alexithymia
(Carano et al., 2006; Troop, Schmidt, & Treasure,
1995; Zonneville-Bender, van Goozen, Cohen-
Kettenis, van Engleland, 2002). Alexithymia will be
discussed more fully below.
Family Environment
Kent and Waller (2000) argue that emotional abuse
has often been the 'elephant in the room' when
the role of childhood abuse and eating disorders
are discussed in the literature. Within their review,
they point out that there appears to be a phenom-
enological link between childhood emotional
abuse (CEA) and eating pathology, and this link
may have a broader impact upon eating pathol¬
ogy than other types of trauma. Furthermore, they
proposed that the relationship between childhood
CEA and eating pathology is moderated by low
self-esteem. According to these authors, CEA has a
profound effect upon self-esteem, because its toxic
effect cannot be easily attributed to external factors
(e.g., the abuser). They argued that CEA operates
as a generalized risk factor for both bulimic and
restricting symptom patterns.
Drawing on DBT, Corstorphine (2006) argues
that a key origin of emotional regulation difficul¬
ties often present in people with eating disorders
is growing up in an environment that is perceived
to be invalidating, where there is a discordance
between the actual emotion being expressed and
the responses from key individuals in the child's
life (e.g., caregivers). According to Corstorphine
(2006), this often means that emotions are either
responded to negatively or ignored, and positive
emotions are encouraged and are held in high
esteem by the family. Some of the ideas from DBT
are also reflected in the expressed emotions (EE)
literature. The EE concept refers to the number
of critical comments, hostility and emotion over
involvement that occurs within the environment
and around the person with the disorder, and this
has been extensively researched for many psychi¬
atric disorders, including psychosis (e.g., Barrow-
clough, Tarrier, & Johnston, 1996). The relation
between emotional expressiveness in the family
environment and a child's ability to identify and
describe his/her feelings has been documented
in the literature (Kench and Irwin, 2000). As was
discussed with the Briere model, it may well be
that the interrelation between inherited influences
and the lack of skill in the parent in describing
his/her feelings may explain these links. Related
to this point, Espina (2003) found that parents of
children with eating disorders reported signifi¬
cantly higher levels of alexithymia, as measured
by the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS), while
Kyriacou, Treasure and Schmit (2008) have shown
that parents of individuals with AN exhibited
higher levels of expressed emotion (e.g., emotional
over-involvement and criticism) when compared
with normal controls. Waller, Corstorphine and
Mountford (2007) argued that these 'invalidating
environments' lead to the development of two
principal emotional difficulties in adulthood, being
chaotic-dissociative and detached-alexithymic pre¬
sentations. The chaotic-dissociative presentation is
hallmarked by an impulsive-bulimic presentation,
where the individual experiences his/her emo¬
tions as overwhelming and terrifying, and is often
engaged in behaviours to reduce or dissociate from
his/her emotions. The detached-alexithymic pre¬
sentation is where the person presents in a much
more detached and 'emotionally cut off' manner.
It is argued that the key difference between these
presentations is the point at which the emotion is
inhibited. In otherwords, in the chaotic-dissociative
presentation, the emotion is inhibited once it enters
consciousness, while for the detached-alexithymic
presentation, the emotion is inhibited before the
emotion is experienced consciously. These authors
argued that this earlier inhibition is the reason why
clients with this type of presentation often deny
any emotional experience. This point is important
in terms of theoretical development, because it fits
with the schema approaches that Waller and col¬
leagues (Waller, Kennerley, et al., 2007) have pro¬
posed, which were discussed above.
Summary of Developmental Factors
It does appear that there is a growing consensus
that emotional invalidation during upbringing
is important in the development of emotional
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difficulties in adulthood (e.g., Krause, Mendelson,
& Lynch, 2003). The works of Waller and colleagues
(Waller, Cordery, et al., 2007; Waller, Kennerley,
et al., 2007) have highlighted how a potential key
factor in delineating the eating disorders is when
the emotional inhibition occurs and this can lead to
markedly different presentations. However, there is
a lack of theory in how this accounts for co-morbid
depression and body dissatisfaction. Moreover,
the theoretical consideration of emotions is very
simplistic. There is no attempt to discuss which
potential emotions may be effected by upbring¬
ing, as there is a suggestion from emotions theory
that environmental responses to individual emo¬
tional states may actually create different relation¬
ships with different emotions. For example, the
Schematic Propositional Analogical Associative
Representation System (SPAARS) model (Power
& Dalgleish, 1997, 2008) argues, from a basic emo¬
tions perspective, that emotions develop as semi-
independent cognitive modules (in keeping with
other domains of cognitive development, such as
memory, or perception). Therefore, the external
influences may 'invalidate' certain emotions by
claiming that they are wrong or not allowed, and
such, certain emotional states may become ego-
dystonic and frightening to the sense of self, if they
are evoked.
Research on Emotional Factors in
Eating Disorders
As has been seen above, research has identified the
role of emotional functioning in eating disorders,
with the role of negative affect being of signifi¬
cance in the onset and maintenance of the eating
disorders (e.g., Arnow, Kennedy, & Agras, 1995;
Binford, Mussell, Peterson, & Crow 2004; Fairburn
et al., 2003;Wegner et al., 2002). Although it remains
an empirical question, there has been debate in the
literature about the nature of affect in eating disor¬
ders, as it is not clear from contemporary models
of eating disorders which is more important, the
actual level of emotion (if it is, indeed, possible to
measure quantity of emotion) or the ability to toler¬
ate negative emotions. In an interesting analogue
study by Anestis, Selby, Fink and joiner (2007) with
undergraduate students, it found that high scores
on the distress intolerance scale (Simons & Garner,
2005) predicted bulimic symptomology, when they
controlled for depression and anxiety symptoms.
Also, within this analysis, the authors found that
distress intolerance further mediated the relation¬
ship between anxiety sensitivity (defined as the
actual physical symptoms and their perceived con¬
sequences) and bulimic symptoms. Anestis et al.
(2007) argued that it is not simply the presence
of negative affect that predicts eating pathology,
but whether the negative affect is perceived to be
intolerable. Despite this finding, it still needs to be
tested whether individuals with eating disorders
experience significantly higher levels of emotion
than control participants within situations where
the triggering of an emotion can be controlled. In
other words, this question needs to be addressed
by the types of methodologies that induce emotion
within the laboratory (e.g., Agras & Telch, 1998).
This will be a feature of this paper. This section
will now consider the research that has applied the
five basic emotions to eating disorders. However,
before this discussion can proceed, it is important
to note that there has been a significant debate
about the nature of emotions and whether there
are dimensions of emotionality (e.g., negative
affect) or distinct basic emotions. Furthermore, no
consideration of emotion within eating disorders
would be complete with an analysis of the issue of
alexithymia within the eating disorders. These two
topics will now be discussed.
Basic Emotions or Dimensions
of Emotionality?
The issue of whether emotion can be understood
as differences along two continuum of positive and
negative affects (e.g., Watson & Clark, 1992) or as
discreet, individual emotions (e.g., Arnold, 1960;
Ekman, 1992a; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987) has
been the source of debate for many years in the
study of emotion. Although it remains somewhat
controversial, there is some agreement that there
are a number of broadly distinct and separate basic
emotions, namely, fear, disgust, anger, sadness and
happiness. Power and Dalgleish (1997, 2008) argue
that there are a number of sources of evidence for
a basic emotions approach, including a conceptual
argument for different appraisals across the dif¬
ferent emotions (e.g., appraisal of loss in sadness),
pan cultural awareness of different emotions
(e.g., Ekman, 1973,1992a, 1992b) and the linguistic
analysis of emotional terms by Oatley and Johnson-
Laird (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989). Interest¬
ingly, research has started to highlight how there
appears to be emotion-specific physiology, within
autonomic arousal. This work is not without its
critics, as some authors have argued that the
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similarities between different types of arousal
patterns outweigh any similarities (e.g., Stemller,
1989). This debate is bound to continue; however,
it is the perspective of this thesis that there is now
enough evidence to argue for a basic emotions
approach and this approach will be used across
the rest of this thesis.
This debate about the primacy of particular basic
emotions is missing from much of the literature
of eating disorders. For instance, throughout this
chapter, it has been shown that many theorists
have argued that negative emotion causes binge-
ing (e.g., Cooper et al., 2004; Wonderlich et al.,
2001, 2008) or the fear of negative emotion causes
restriction (e.g., Corstorphine, 2006; Waller, Ken-
nerley, et al., 2007). However, there is very little
consideration of which emotions are important.
Related to this literature on emotional process¬
ing, there is no account, within the eating disorder
research, of the actual architecture of emotional
processing such as the different types of regulation
that can occur for an emotion over its time course
(e.g., how fast an emotion returns to baseline after
it has been activated).
Eating Disorders and Alexithymia
As already been discussed in this paper, a number
of authors have linked the adverse effects of child¬
hood abuse and/or problematic dynamics within
the family home to the development of problem¬
atic knowledge of the emotions within the self.
These difficulties have been called alexithymia.
This idea of a difficulty identifying, distinguishing
and expressing emotions in eating disorders has a
long history stemming back to Bruch (1962). Bruch
(1962) felt that the main problem in anorexia was
a difficulty in distinguishing and expressing emo¬
tions, and having a sense of total lack of control
within one's life. As detailed earlier, a body of
research has identified how people with eating dis¬
orders, especially AN, appear to have a high degree
of alexithymia, with most of this research having
used the TAS. Alexithymia has been shown to be
an important issue for predicting outcome, as it has
been shown to have negative impact upon progno¬
sis (Speranza, Loas, Wallier, & Caros, 2007).
Sim and Zeman (2005), using an analogue
study, found that the relation between body dis¬
satisfaction and dysregulated eating was partly
mediated by the frequency of negative emotional
experience, poor emotional awareness and non-
constructive coping with negative affect. There
Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
have been several hypotheses about what this medi¬
ated relationship signified, with one hypothesis
being that individuals with poor emotional recog¬
nition and coping skills may attribute their negative
emotions to their body, via body dissatisfaction, and
use disordered eating to reduce their uncomfort¬
able level of arousal. Other hypotheses suggested
that it could be the other way around, with body
dissatisfaction compromising one's ability to iden¬
tify and cope with negative affect, and therefore,
using disordered eating to manage ambiguous emo¬
tional states. A related study that directly assessed
the relation between body dissatisfaction and emo¬
tional expressiveness was conducted by Hayaki
and colleagues (Hayaki, Friedman, & Brownell,
2002.). Within this analogue study, they found that
poor emotional expression predicted body dissat¬
isfaction, when depression and assertiveness were
controlled.
Much of the research on alexithymia in eating
disorders has tended to be rather simplistic in
how it considers their relation, with recent research
demonstrating that the role of low mood may be
an important variable to consider. Bydlowski
et al. (2005) and Kessler, Schwarze, Filipic, Traue
and Wietersheim (2006) found that there is a close
link between measures of anxiety and depression,
and alexithymia. Moreover, Eizaguirrea, Saenz de
Cabezo, Ochoa de Aldaa, Olariagab and Juaniza
(2004) found that the relationship between eating
pathology and alexithymia was moderated by
levels of depression. What is interesting from
these results is how they emphasize the appar¬
ent conceptual contradiction within analysis of
alexithymia, and how it is possible for individuals
who are unable to distinguish and name their emo¬
tional states, but are able to fill out measures about
their own emotional status (e.g., mood measures
etc.). Likewise, the construct itself has a confused
conceptual underpinning, in that, some authors
refer to it as a trait phenomena (Taylor, Bagby, &
Parker, 1997), while others use it as a state con¬
struct (Honkalampi et al., 2001).
The majority of studies have not considered the
meta-emotional skills that underpin alexithymia
and it may be that certain emotion skills remain
intact, while others are problematic. For example,
it may be that people with eating disorders are able
to acknowledge their own emotional states, but
are too frightened to express this emotion. Within
this view, certain emotional states are ego-dys-
tonic, and hence, perceived to be overwhelming
to the self. Related to this point is the fact that the
majority of the studies on alexithymia are predom-
Clin. Psychol. Psychother. 16, 240-267 (2009)
DOI: 10.1002/cpp
250 /. R. E. Fox and M. J. Power
inantly correlational, and as such, the direction of
causation is not clear between alexithymia and
eating disorder symptomology. Keys et al. (1950),
in their seminal study of the effects of starvation,
found that reduced weight and food intake were
associated with reduction in emotional expressive¬
ness. It may well be that the noted effects from an
extreme diet may actually account for the alexithy-
mic presentation. There is only one study that has
attempted to address this point; Schmidt, Jichwany
and Treasure (1993) looked at TAS scores between
bulimia and anorexia groups, and compared them
with controls. This was also performed across two
time points, and they found that improvement in
symptoms (due to medication) was not related to
improvement on the TAS. Although they argued
that this suggests that alexithymia acts more as
a trait-like construct, they did acknowledge that
most of their participants at Time 2 still met clinical
caseness levels. It was interesting, however, that
body mass index (BMI) did not correlate with TAS,
and they did state that this was evidence that alexi¬
thymia was not just a product of weight loss and
malnourishment.
As has been discussed earlier in the chapter,
the SPAARS model (Power and Dalgleish, 1997,
2008) proposed a model that suggests that differ¬
ent learning experiences, while growing up, lead
the individual to have different relationships with
each of their basic emotions. Therefore, it is theo¬
retically possible that someone may have devel¬
oped an emotion which is ego-dystonic and lost
to the self, while other emotions are much more
integrated with the sense of self. In this instance,
it would be plausible for an individual to be
alexithymic for certain emotions, while still be able
to express and regulate the other basic emotions.
This section will now consider the five basic
emotions in turn.
Anger
Research over the last 5 years has demonstrated
that anger is a particularly difficult emotion for
people with both BN and AN. Waller et al. (2003)
found that women with eating disorders, espe¬
cially with bulimic symptoms, reported signifi¬
cantly higher state anger scores and significantly
higher anger suppression scores when compared
with university student controls. In other words,
Waller et al. (2003) found that their participants
had an increase in their levels of the emotion of
anger, but were less likely to express this emotion.
Interestingly these authors found that higher levels
of trait anger were associated with 'unhealthy
core beliefs' in both groups, while the same core
beliefs were only associated with anger inhibition
in the eating disorder group. Within this paper,
the authors discussed how their results could have
implications for the treatment of eating disorders,
as a feature of therapy could be to consider whether
problem-solving strategies would assist the patient
in making changes to his/her environment that
either reduce the anger-eliciting components, or
help in the expression of anger. Waller, Kennerley,
et al. (2007) discussed the evidence of the rela¬
tion between state anger and anger suppression,
and these authors argued that binge eating served
as an emotional-avoidance function (as discussed
above). This finding was supported by Fox and
Harrison (2008) when they found that females with
bulimic symptoms had higher levels of state anger
after an anger induction, when compared with a
matched control group. These authors also found
that the females with bulimic symptoms scored
much higher on the anger suppression scales.
In another recent study, Ioannou and Fox (2009)
found that depression and the perception of threat
from the emotion of anger predicted poor emo¬
tional expression in people with eating pathology,
while Coggins and Fox (2009) found in a qualita¬
tive study of emotional inhibition that anger was
the most difficult emotion to be experienced and
this was linked directly, by the participants, to
dieting and food restriction.
Within restricting eating disorders, Geller and
colleagues (Geller, Cockell, Hewitt, Goldner, &
Flett, 2000) found that people with a diagnosis of
AN exhibited significantly higher levels of anger
suppression, when compared with psychiatric and
normal controls. Related to this anger suppression,
Geller et al. (2000) also found that their participants
endorsed more care and self-sacrifice schemas
(i.e., putting the needs of others before their own)
and silenced self-schemas (the inhibition of self-
expression and action to avoid confrontation and
interpersonal conflict).
Milligan, Waller and Andrews (2002) undertook
a study that looked at the relationship between
anger and disordered eating within a female
prison population. These authors found that levels
of probable eating disorders, as measured by the
sick, control, one stone, fat, and food (SCOFF)
(Morgan, Reid, & Lacey, 1999), were significantly
higher than would be expected in the general
population. In terms of difficulties with anger,
these authors found that bulimic symptoms were
associated with levels of trait anger, while restrict-
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ing symptoms were associated with state anger.
Therefore, these authors concluded that the restric¬
tive environment (i.e., prison) prevents an outlet for
anger, and the women regulated these emotions by
using differing eating disorder symptomatology.
This regulatory aspect of eating disorders control¬
ling or inhibiting anger was also shown in a recent
paper by Engel et al. (2007), in which these authors
found that levels of anger predicted binge eating
episodes and this relationship was moderated by
levels of subjective impulsivity. Interestingly, this
study used palm pilot technology to collect data
from participants within their everyday life. Fur¬
thermore, Telch, Agras and Linehan (2001) under¬
took a trial of DBT, in group format, for people
with binge eating disorder. They found that for the
people who undertook DBT, the vast majority had
stopped bingeing at the end of treatment (89%).
Interestingly, the only measure that was reduced
(apart from symptoms) was the urge to binge in
response to anger. Although the authors do not
discuss this finding in any real depth, it does
appear to be an important finding because it could
be interpreted that anger was the main driver for
the binges, which was reduced via the DBT. These
findings are very much in keeping with the models
discussed above, such as Cooper et al. (2004) and
Waller, Kennerley, et al. (2007).
A final point in attempting to detail the relation¬
ship of anger with eating disorders is the need
to consider the research that has examined the
relationship between anger and depression. As
detailed above, the co-morbidity between depres¬
sion and eating disorders is high and a number of
theories have proposed that depression originates
from difficulties with anger. Freud (1917/1963)
argued that depression originated from a mixture
of anger and sadness at the loss, for example, of a
significant other, hi their review of the relationship
between depression and anger, DiGiuseppe and
Tafrate (2007) argued that there was some evidence
which suggested that depression can be a product
of an inability to express anger (e.g., Mook, Van
Der Ploeg, & Kleijn, 1990). However, they argued
that these relationships may be different between
populations. Keeping this in mind, the potential
relationship between inhibited anger, eating dis¬
orders and depression is an important theoretical
point that will be returned to later in this paper.
Sadness
As has been discussed above, the literature on the
role of sadness in eating disorders has not been
researched at all. In the literature search, not one
single reference was identified that looked at the
role of sadness in eating disorders. However,
as detailed in the above section, the relation of
depression to eating disorders has been extensively
researched and the literature seems to be indicat¬
ing that there is both a cause and a consequence
of depression within disordered eating. Although
there are potential conceptual problems with claim¬
ing that depression is a disorder of sadness, Power
and Tarsia (2007), using the Basic Emotions Scale,
found that one of the main emotions of depres¬
sion (measured using the BDI) was sadness. These
authors also found that the emotion of disgust was
also important in depression, and it will be argued
later in this thesis that this relationship between
sadness, disgust and eating disorders is significant
in understanding the co-morbidity between eating
disorders and depression.
Happiness
The overt consideration of happiness in eating dis¬
orders is still rather limited. As already detailed
elsewhere in this paper, research has tended to
focus on negative emotions and how these play
a role in eating disorders. Research by Overton,
Selway, Strongman and Houston (2005) highlighted
how eating disorder symptoms can be used to reg¬
ulate negative emotions, and importantly, facilitate
the experience of pleasant emotion. Linked to this
perspective is the work by Goss and Gilbert (2002)
who have argued that eating disorders, in particu¬
lar, restricting eating disorders, are often linked
to pride. These authors, drawing on the work of
Bruch (1973), argued that the eating disorder starts
as a means of gaining acceptance, avoiding rejec¬
tion and painful emotions, which results in pride.
This pride becomes internalized and it becomes
a source of internal pride with the self. In other
words, this pride is used to defend against some
of the more painful emotions (e.g., shame) and
thoughts that were there prior to the start of the
eating disorder. As with sadness and depression,
there are a number of conceptual problems with
linking pride with happiness, but it is suggestive
of a link that warrants research. As detailed within
a number of the second generation of cognitive-
behavioural approaches to eating disorders, the
person with the eating disorder has been shown
to often experience both negative emotions and
negative cognitions. It may be interesting to con¬
sider how the emotion of happiness is managed
within these individuals because it may be incon-
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gruous to their main emotional state and therefore
suppressed or avoided.
Fear
Within the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (4th
edition) (DSM IV; APA, 1994), fear is regarded as
a key diagnostic feature of AN, especially in rela¬
tion to the fear of becoming 'fat'. However, despite
its apparent salience in eating disorders, it has not
received a significant amount of attention within
the eating disorders literature. In a recent article,
Waller (2008) argued that next editions of the diag¬
nostic systems (e.g., DSM and International Clas¬
sification of Diseases (ICD)) should reframe eating
disorders as a subset of anxiety because there is
such a high co-morbidity of anxiety with eating
disorders (e.g., Goddart, Flament, Perdereau,
& Jeammet, 2002; Pallister & Waller, 2008). Fur¬
thermore, research has demonstrated that anxiety
tends to precede eating concerns (e.g., Bulik, Sul¬
livan, Fear, & Joyce, 1997; Swinbourne & Touyz,
2007). In a recent review paper by Pallister and
Waller (2008), it is argued that the relationship
between anxiety and eating disorders is an unclear
one because the chronology between the two dis¬
orders is not clear. However, Pallister and Waller
(2008) argued that it is possible to relate anxiety
and eating disorders conceptually because they
may share common aetiological factors and these
factors can increase susceptibility to either disor¬
der. In contrast to this paper, they take a traditional
cognitive-behavioural view and argue that safety
behaviours and vulnerability schemas are the main
cognitive constructs behind these disorders (for a
fuller discussion, see Pallister & Waller, 2008).
In a more direct experimental test of the effect
of fear on eating behaviours, Heatherton, Herman
and Polivy (1991) undertook a study in which they
looked at the effects of the fear of threat (both phys¬
ical and ego) on eating in restrained and unre¬
strained eaters. They found that ego threat (e.g.,
failing at an easy task), but not physical threat (e.g.,
electric shock), led to an increase in a restrained
eater's eating, while unrestrained eaters showed
no such increase in their eating. For the physical
threat, the unrestrained eaters showed a signifi¬
cant reduction in their eating, but the restrained
eaters showed no change in their eating levels.
The authors argued that these findings highlight
how fear of a more personal nature makes self-
awareness more painful and the shift towards
disinhibition helps the individual to 'escape from
the self' (as discussed above).
In a study that looked directly at the effects
of fear and disgust on eating attitudes, Harvey,
Troop, Treasure and Murphy (2002) found that
disgust was as equally important as fear in the
avoidance of certain stimuli (high calorie foods and
large body sizes). As discussed by Haidt, Rozin,
McCauley and Imada (1997), disgust is often
regarded as the emotion that has been used by
humans to keep a distance between oneself and
objects that would be hazardous to health if
ingested. Uher et al. (2005) found that measures
of anxiety and disgust often correlate highly (+0.7)
and this may offer a position where it could be
argued that they both have the function of distanc¬
ing oneself from a feared object or outcome. It may
be that disgust of one's body or of foodmay actually
account for the 'fear' reaction towards perceived
body weight within the eating disorders. Davey,
Bickerstaffe and MacDonald (2006) found evidence
for this type of relationship between disgust and
fear/anxiety, using an experimental methodology.
They found that induced disgust led to an increase
in negative interpretational bias which maintained
levels of anxiety in their participants, and these
authors argued that this provides evidence for the
causal role of disgust in anxiety psychopathologies.
This confusion between fear/anxiety and disgust
has the potential to be an important theoretical
point in the understanding of eating disorders,
because the long-reported 'fear of food' or the 'fear
of becoming fat' may actually be disgust reactions,
and hence, may account for the high co-morbidity
between anxiety and eating disorders.
Disgust
Davey (1994) defined disgust as 'a type of rejec¬
tion response that is characterised by a specific
facial expression, a desire to distance oneself from
the object of disgust, a physiological manifestation
of mild nausea'. Given that a common feature of
eating disorders is the feeling of disgust towards
the patient's own body, it is perhaps surprising
that there has been so little research in this area.
Nick Troop and colleagues found a mixed picture
when they investigated disgust in eating disor¬
ders (Troop, Murphy, Bramon, & Treasure, 2000;
Troop, Treasure, & Serpell, 2002). They hypoth¬
esized that eating disorders would be associated
with an increased general sensitivity towards the
emotion of disgust. Interestingly, they found that
patients with a current eating disorder did dem¬
onstrate an increased sensitivity towards disgust
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that was associated with body or food, but not
with more general areas of disgust (e.g., sexual
practices). In a similar study, Burney and Irwin
demonstrated that shame towards the body and
eating are uniquely predictive of eating pathol¬
ogy (Burney & Irwin, 2000). It has been discussed
elsewhere that shame is a complex emotion that
is derived from the basic emotion of disgust (e.g.,
Power and Dalgleish, 1997, 2008). Indeed, a study
by Marziller and Davey (2004) found evidence
for primary and secondary disgust. It was argued
that primary disgust was defined by the stimu¬
lus' ability to elicit fear of oral incorporation or
stemming from an animal origin, while secondary
disgust was defined by moral or social transgres¬
sions. In many ways, it appears that the second¬
ary disgust, as proposed by Marziller and Davey
(2004), is very much like the complex emotion of
shame and fits with the Power and Dalgleish (1997,
2008) notion of shame being a multifaceted and
more complex version of disgust.
The Troop et al. findings (2000, 2002) are inter¬
esting for their potential theoretical implications.
Some authors have argued that within AN, the
feelings of anger towards an external object are
unacceptable, and as a consequence, they are
directed towards the self in terms of the physical
body being perceived as 'fat' (Bruch, 1973, 1978).
Although, Bruch does not talk about this percep¬
tion of being 'fat' in disgust terms, it is alluded
to. In other words, feelings of disgust towards the
body could potentially work in a way to manage
other more painful or 'ego dystonic' emotions,
such as anger (as discussed above). This may help
to explain why the participants in Troop et al.'s
studies were more sensitive for disgust directed
at their own bodies. Emerging from within the
research literature, there is some preliminary
evidence to support this hypothesis. Geller et al.
(2000) found, in the study reported above, that
inhibited expression of emotions was related to
body dissatisfaction. This finding was reinforced
by the findings from Hayaki et al. (2002) when they
found that limited emotional expression predicted
body dissatisfaction in an analogue sample (when
BMI, non-assertiveness and depressive symptoms
were controlled in their analysis). New data from
Fox and Harrison (2008) found that females with
bulimic symptoms reported significantly higher
state anger and disgust sensitivity after an anger
induction compared with controls. These authors
interpreted this as evidence that anger and disgust
are potentially acting in a coupled way within
people with bulimic symptoms.
Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
As described above, it is argued that shame
is a complex version of disgust, and it has been
shown to be of significance in eating disorders.
Goss and Gilbert (2002) argued that shame is a
central emotion in eating disorders and involves
two forms of shame, internal (negative self-evalu¬
ation) and external (others looking down upon
them). Frank (1991) highlighted that people with
eating disorders have significantly higher shame
and guilt about eating, when compared with
depressed and control participants. Cook (1994)
found that internal shame was significantly higher
in eating disorders groups than in all other clinical
comparison groups. On the issue of body shame,
Swan and Andrews (2003) found that symptom¬
atic and recovered females with eating disorders
have significantly higher levels of body shame and
shame about eating than controls, while Polivy
and Herman (1993) and DeSilva (1995) found that
binge eating can regulate shame affect in partici¬
pants with eating disorders. In a qualitative study
by Skarderud (2007), data were gathered that high¬
lighted how people with AN feel shame over a
number of domains, including shame for some
of the emotions they are feeling (in keeping with
the Corstorphine, 2006 cognitive-affective model),
body shame, shame for not achieving more, shame
for not controlling their behaviour and shame for
having an eating disorder. Skardeerud (2007) also
found evidence that an eating disorder can give
someone pride in his/her life for keeping control
within his/her life and maintaining thinness.
Some research has started to suggest that females
are more predisposed to experience disgust and
associated emotions (e.g., shame) than males. This
particular point was addressed by Barrett and
colleagues when they found that female children
were more likely to react with shame when a toy
broke (the participants withdrew from the broken
toy), while male children appeared to react more
with guilt (they attempted to fix the toy) (Barrett,
Zahn-Waxler, & Cole, 1993).
As discussed above, there is a growing body of
evidence that certain emotions are being inhib¬
ited and are 'managed' by other, more acceptable
emotions. The theoretical treatment of disgust has
highlighted how it is the emotion of rejection and
is often behind the desire to distance oneself from
the object of disgust (Davey, 1994), such as food
or body shape (as seen in eating disorders). The
picture that disgust and its derivative, shame, are
being 'used' as a way ofmanaging other emotional
states is allowing the eating disorder literature to
move away from simplistic models ofmaintenance
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and 'pure cognition'. This is a key construct of this
paper, in that, emotions can become connected and
have either a facilitatory or inhibitory function to
one other. In other words, experiencing disgust
can be used to inhibit other more painful, ego-
dystonic emotions from being expressed and/or
experienced.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The early cognitive accounts of eating disorders
(e.g., Fairburn et al., 1986), in particular BN, pro¬
posed a maintenance level model that discussed
how extreme dieting led to breakthrough bingeing
and associated purging methods to avoid weight
gain. This model led to the development of a man-
ualized cognitive-behaviour therapy (CBT) for BN
which had some success in treating bulimic symp¬
toms in normal weight individuals. However, the
therapy only accounted for a 50% improvement in
patients and it was clear that there were gaps in the
theory and the intervention. One of the main gaps
in these early models was the explicit role of both
cognitive and emotional triggers for eating disor¬
der symptoms (e.g., Cooper et al., 1998; Cooper et
al., 2006). Furthermore, these models offered no
attempt to understand co-morbidity in the eating
disorders, especially with depression. The works
of Cooper et al. (2004), Waller, Kennerley, et al.
(2007) and Wonderlich et al. (2001, 2008) have
highlighted how certain eating disorder symp¬
toms (e.g., bingeing-vomiting and restriction) are
used to regulate and manage 'painful emotional
states' and associated cognitions. These points
highlight an important theoretical advancement in
the understanding of eating disorders. However,
the way that emotion is conceptualized is simplis¬
tic and does not take into account the research
that has highlighted a more complex relationship
between emotional expression and eating disor¬
ders. For example, it is not clear from these cog¬
nitive models why eating disorder symptoms are
chosen as emotion regulation strategies, instead of
other behaviours (e.g., self-harm). Moreover, there
is a complete lack of consideration of the marked
body dissatisfaction that is almost always present
in eating disorders, with the works of Geller et al.
(2000) and Hayaki et al. (2002) suggesting that there
is an inverse relationship between the expression
of emotion and body dissatisfaction. The nature of
the emotions behind the eating disorder symptoms
is also neglected because none of the models have
attempted to incorporate the apparent difficulties
with anger and disgust.
Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
It is argued that these second generation cog¬
nitive models have allowed the theory to move
beyond simple cognitive-behavioural accounts of
eating disorders because they have highlighted the
need to consider emotional factors. But, in keeping
with Cooper's (2005) point, theoretical accounts of
eating disorders need to be developed to account
for the research on specific emotion functioning,
the high level of body dissatisfaction and co¬
morbidity. In keeping with Fairburn and Harrison
(2003), it is argued that where there are shared dis¬
tinctive clinical features across diagnoses and there
are significant movement of patients between dif¬
ferent diagnostic states, clinical phenomena should
be understood from a transdiagnostic perspective.
As has been highlighted throughout this paper,
patients nearly always present with co-morbid
depression and anxiety, but the paucity of theory
has limited our understanding of this potential
transdiagnostic process.
Finally, cognitive-behavioural models of psy-
chopathology have also come under criticism from
a number of authors for only considering emotion-
eliciting propositions within a verbal format (e.g.,
negative automatic thoughts) (e.g., Jones, 2001;
Power and Dalgleish, 1997, 2008). There are a
number of potential emotion-eliciting stimuli that
could play a role in the generation of affect and it
is clear from clinical work with people with eating
disorders that there are potentially different sche¬
matic representations of emotions in eating disor¬
ders, for example, the disgust towards the body
generated by the sensation of a pair of jeans being
too tight, or the visual image of the self being 'fat'
(e.g., Cooper, Deepak, Grocutt, & Bailey, 2007). It
will be argued that these analogical representa¬
tions are of specific importance in understanding
emotions in the eating disorders, and this theoreti¬
cal point is in keeping with other authors' obser¬
vations in other psychological disorders, where it
is argued that single level cognitive-behavioural
models lack explanatory power, which compro¬
mise their ability to generate effective clinical inter¬
ventions (Dalgleish, 2004; Jones, 2001).
INTRODUCTION TO A NEW THEORY
OF EATING DISORDERS—SPAARS
MODEL APPLIED TO EATING
DISORDERS (SPAARS-ED)
As can be seen in the review above, it is argued
that a new model of eating disorders needs
to account for the difficulties with certain basic
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emotions (e.g., anger and disgust), and for the rela¬
tionship between expression of emotion and body
dissatisfaction, and the high level of co-morbid¬
ity between depression and anxiety. Furthermore,
theoretical consideration needs to be given to the
different representations of information that can
elicit emotion.
Although a more comprehensive introduction to
the SPAARS model will be given, its key points
will be presented here to highlight how this model
addresses the gaps in the literature and allows for
the generation of a new model of eating disorders.
Within the SPAARS model, it is argued that certain
emotions can become 'coupled', where two emo¬
tions become linked and work together either in
a facilitatory or inhibitory way. As will be seen
below, this emotional process may help to explain
the findings of the relationship between disgust and
anger (Fox & Harrison, 2008) and low emotional
expression and high body dissatisfaction (Geller et
al., 2000; Hayaki et al., 2002). Furthermore, Power
and Dalgleish (1997, 2008) argued that common
emotion processes may account for co-morbidity
and thismay help to explain co-morbidity in eating
disorders. Finally, the SPAARS model incorporates
a second route to emotion generation that can work
without conscious awareness, which has the poten¬
tial to explain the clinically observed link between
different representations and emotional responses
(e.g., 'tight jeans' = disgust). All of these points are
new concepts in the study of eating disorders and
it is argued that considering eating disorders from
a SPAARS perspective allows for an important
theoretical advancement beyond the cognitive-
behavioural models discussed above. This paper
will now present a more detailed overview of the
SPAARS model (Power & Dalgleish, 1997, 2008).
Multi-Level Approach to Cognition and
Emotion—SPAARS Model (Poiver and
Dalgleish, 1997, 2008)
As has been more fully discussed elsewhere (Power
& Dalgleish, 1997,2008), cognitive theory ofmental
disorder has tended to be based on single-level
approaches to emotion, where, for example, there
is a direct link between verbal propositional cog¬
nition (e.g., a negative automatic thought) and
emotion (e.g., depression). Although there have
been clear benefits from this type of operational-
ized cognition in therapy (e.g., Gloaguen, Cot-
traux, Cucherat, & Blackburn, 1998), CBT still has
its drawbacks and theoretical difficulties, including
its difficulty in accounting for why certain proposi¬
tions in verbal form often miss how other stimuli
(e.g., visual) can generate emotion (Teasdale &
Barnard, 1993). Also, as noted by Jones (2001),
the classic 'Beckian' CBT approach often does
not account for the complex interactions between
emotion and cognition observed in therapy, and
how one set of propositions (in the form of verbal
thoughts) can account for a number of different
emotions within one person. Finally, as Power and
Dalgleish (1999) pointed out, it is often observed
clinically that patients will report various emo¬
tions, but without any apparent associated cogni¬
tions. This is a potentially serious theoretical flaw
in any single level approach to mental disorder.
A number of authors have proposed models
that show how emotions can be potentially gener¬
ated across multi-layers of processing (e.g., inte¬
grated cognitive systems (ICS) model [Teasdale
& Barnard, 1993]; SPAARS model [Power & Dal¬
gleish, 1997, 2008]). Because the SPAARS model
builds upon the ICS model, this paper will focus
on the SPAARS model. A diagram of the model can
be seen in Figure 1.
As can be seen above, an event (either internal
or external) enters the SPAARS via the analogical
system. According to Power and Dalgleish (1999),
the analogical system is made up of a number
of parallel processing modules that are modal¬
ity-specific (e.g., verbal, olfactory, gustatory and
proprioceptive). The representations generated
within a specific modality do not require a linguis¬
tic interpretation to have a meaning and modular-
specific representations are present throughout
the SPAARS processing systems. It is argued that
these modular-specific representations within
SPAARS are an important point in understanding
certain emotional disorders. For example, in post
traumatic stress disorder, certain sights, sounds or
other bodily sensations may become inherent parts
of the memory of the traumatic event (Power &
Dalgleish, 1997,2008). The schematic model level is
the highest processing part of the SPAARS mode!
and it is essentially an effortful appraisal route, in
which either external or internal stimuli is eval¬
uated. This route is in keeping with contempo¬
rary theory in 'normal' emotional processing (for
a fuller discussion, see Power & Dalgleish, 1997,
2008 and Teasdale & Barnard, 1993) and according
to these theories, this schematic level of process¬
ing incorporates a higher level of representation
that is above 'verbal expressible propositional con¬
cepts'. Within their book, Power and Dalgleish dis¬
cussed the distinction between propositional and
schematic model (implicational) representations,
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Figure 1. Power and Dalgieish's multi-level model of emotion—SPAARS
by using the example offered by Teasdale and
Barnard, in which they compared a piece of prose
with a piece of poetry. This is given below:
Implicational meaning:
O what can ail thee, Knight-at Arms
Alone and palely loitering?
The sedge has wither'd from the lake
And no birds sing
Propositional meaning:
What is the matter, armed old-fashioned soldier,
Standing by yourself and doing nothing with a
pallid expression ?
The reed-like plants have decomposed by the lake
And there are not any birds singing
As noted by Teasdale and Barnard (1993, p. 73),
'the implicational meaning or 'sense' conveyed
by the two versions is very different. The poetic
form conveys a sense of melancholy, emptiness
and abandonment that is largely lost in the much
more matter of fact tone of the prose example'. As
Jones pointed out, this abstract level of process¬
ing is much more complex than Beck's concept
of a schema (Jones, 2001). According to Beck, a
schema is the sum of propositional statements
that have been learnt over a period of time, while
Power and Dalgleish argued that the schematic
appraisals capture the contextual, historical and
emotional information (as shown in the poetry
example). Thus, within the schematic models, the
system is dynamic, draws from all other parts of
the system to generate rules that apply to emotion
generation and, in agreement with Beck et al.
(1979), the SPAARS model proposed that domains
of knowledge are organized around the self, others
and the world.
The propositiona 1 levelwith in the SPAARSmodel
consists of representations that can be entirely
described within normal language (although not
one particular language). These representations
are more akin to the negative automatic thoughts
that are considered in other theories (e.g., Beck et
al., 1979). The representations within this level are
discreet (e.g., 'the tallest mountain in the world
is Everest') and the propositional level does not
have a direct emotion output. In agreement with
Teasdale and Barnard (1993), it is argued that this
level of information processing feeds into either
the schematic or associative level for emotion gen¬
eration, though certain words or phrases may lead
to the direct generation of emotion (e.g., certain
insulting or offensive words), or they may trigger
associative emotion due to a certain place or person
being mentioned (e.g., the name of someone who
has recently died).
The second route to emotion generation is an
associative route, where emotion is produced
without any effortful cognition. It is proposed that
there are two primary pathways for an event to
become linked with an emotion. The first is via
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an evolutionary preparedness for certain stimuli
to elicit emotion (e.g., a snake phobia versus a
telephone phobia). This draws from Seligman's
proposal that certain stimuli may be more 'evo¬
lutionary prepared' for emotion generation (e.g.
snakes, spiders etc.) (Seligman, 1975). A second
source for the development of event-emotion
links being developed comes from a learning per¬
spective, in which certain pairings of events with
emotions may become automated. For example,
the eating of a particular food that gives someone
a bad case of food poisoning could be linked with
the emotion of disgust. This emotion could then
be automatically generated every time that person
saw the food following taste-aversion conditioning.
Jones (2001) also pointed out that the event may
also be internal, as well as external. For example,
propositional representations can also be linked to
particular emotions, such as 'they are out there'
may be linked, over time, with the emotion of fear.
Therefore, certain propositional statements can
become an emotion generator in their own right,
but through an automated associative route.
There are two final theoretical points from the
SPAARS model that need to be considered before
the model is applied to eating disorders, which are
the constructs of inhibition and coupled emotions.
According to the SPAARS model, inhibition can
occur in three differentways: passive, active and the
inhibition of particular emotion modules. Passive
inhibition can be broadly understood as when the
individual has an awareness of the internal emo¬
tional state and uses strategies such as distraction
to inhibit the emotion, while active inhibition is
much more akin to the psychodynamic concepts
of repression and dissociation. According to the
model, early learning leads to the development of
schematic models that lie across the three domains
of knowledge (i.e., self, others, world). Once these
schematic models have been developed, they have
the capacity to organize and filter information. This
can be seen more clearly in the following example;
Peter experiences during his childhood constant
comments and opinions from his caregivers that
he is not a very nice person because he is loud and
talkative. The schematic model of the self would
develop accordingly (e.g., SELF-BAD-NOT LIKE¬
ABLE) which would then inhibit incoming infor¬
mation to the contrary. However, once a 'critical
mass' has been achieved that represents informa¬
tion to the contrary, Peter may be able to develop
alternative schematic models that account for the
new information about the self (e.g., Peter may
have started a relationship in which he is loved and
respected). In this instance, the original schematic
model of the self might not be lost, but it could be
inhibited. If events occur that trigger the old sche¬
matic model, the prior emotion could occur (e.g.,
losing a relationship—sadness). In this instance, the
'new' schematic model would become inhibited.
As discussed by Young et al. (2003) and Le Doux
(1996), there is some evidence that suggests that
schematic representations are laid down, through
early childhood, within the sub-cortex. Although
it is not clear whether their definition of schema
is the same as the one proposed by Power and
Dalgleish (1997, 2008), it does fit theoretically,
as Le Doux proposed that once a schema has been
laid within the amygdala it is very resistant to
change, and they argue that it never completely
disappears (Le Doux, 1996).
A key point in understanding the SPAARS
model's role for emotional inhibition is that it
proposes that the emotional schematic modules
develop in a way that are akin to other modularized
cognitive functions (e.g., elements of perception
etc.). Accordingly, an individual's learning history
may play a significant role in learning whether
certain basic emotions are 'acceptable' or not. If,
from an early age, a particular emotion is regarded
as wrong or unacceptable, it is proposed that this
modularized emotion 'splits off' from normal emo¬
tional development and becomes 'ego-dystonic'
and modularized. Thereby, the schematic model
within SPAARS operate in a way that is similar to
a 'central executive', in that, it monitors informa¬
tion processing and the corresponding emotional
output from the SPAARS model.
The notion of 'coupled emotions' is an important
feature of the SPAARS model. It is argued that two
or more basic emotions can become coupled via
a person's learning history. Power and Dalgleish
argued that more complex emotions and, impor¬
tantly, emotional disorders can be the product of
coupled emotions. For example, depression may
be made up of the emotions of sadness and disgust
directed at the self. The idea of coupled emotions
compliments emotional inhibition because one
emotion may be regarded as ego-dystonic, while
the other emotion may be viewed as 'acceptable
to the self'. In this instance, the acceptable emotion
would be used to inhibit the unacceptable or 'ego-
dystonic emotion'.
Emotional disorder occurs when the system
becomes 'stuck', such as when different compo¬
nents of the system start to activate other parts of
the system. For example, when a schematic model
has been activated that indicates that the self is bad
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(i.e., SELF-BAD), this then leads to the activation
of prepositional representations (e.g., 'I am a bad
person'). Through a process of repetition this then
leads onto the development of an associative link
to low mood.
Applying a Multi-Modal Emotion Approach to
Eating Disorders—SPAARS-ED
Throughout this paper, it has been proposed that
any theoretical understanding of eating disorders
needs to account fully for the complex interrela¬
tionship of emotions that research has highlighted.
It is argued that eating disorders are an affect regu¬
lation strategy, and hence should be regarded as an
extension to affective or emotional disorders/dif¬
ficulties. The works of Waller, Cordery, Corstor-
phine, Hinrichsen, et al. (2007) and Corstorphine
(2006) have shown that the interpersonal context
is important because individuals with eating disor¬
ders have a number of socially orientated 'schemas'
(e.g., fear of rejection, mistrust in relationships,
unrelenting standards etc.), and there is an overall
sense of the self perceiving himself/herself as
'bad', 'worthless' or at risk of rejection/abandon¬
ment. According to the SPAARS model, these rep¬
resentations could be understood as 'SELF-BAD,
OTHERS-IMPORTANT and WORLD-UNSAFE'.
As has been discussed earlier, research has identi¬
fied that these types of appraisals are also found
in depression, and, thus, one of the outputs of the
schematic arm of the SPAARS is the activation of
the sadness emotion module.
Researches by Geller et al. (2000), Waller et al.
(2003), and Fox and Harrison (2008) have started
to suggest that the anger module is significant for
people with eating disorders. It is hypothesized
that the anger module may be primed by earlier
experience. Moreover, anger has traditionally been
regarded as a non-feminine emotion in Western
cultures and this may place a cultural propensity
on females having difficulties in expressing their
anger (e.g., Lorenz, 1966; Tavris, 1989, 1992). Kent
and Waller (2000), in their review, pointed out that
emotional abuse may well lead to the development
of belief systems that are likely to involve seeing
oneself as undeserving and unlovable, seeing
others as dangerous and hurtful, and experiencing
the world as harmful, unpredictable and unfair.
According to emotion theory (e.g., Oatley &
Johnson-Laird, 1987; Power & Dalgleish, 1997,
2008), anger can be understood as an emotional
response to the blocking of goals; these goals can
be regarded as life goals, relationship goals etc. It is
plausible that one of the main emotional responses
to early life experiences is the development of a
sensitive anger emotion module (e.g., at being 'let
down' by carers, anger at self for being a 'bad
person' etc). DiGiuseppe and Tafrate (2007) argued
that having the experiences of abuse and maltreat¬
ment in childhood leaves the developing child with
a significant 'hurt', leading to a sense of the unfair¬
ness of the world. Interestingly, they also argued
that these experiences can also be responsible for a
number of cognitive errors, such as an expectation
of threat and suspicion from others. These authors,
from their review of the literature, also suggested
that the research evidence on the emotion of anger
shows that the relationship between perceptions
of threat and anger expression is moderated by
beliefs of self-efficacy (i.e., limited expression
of anger is related to low self-efficacy). Related
to this point on the role of self-efficacy to anger
expression, Hochschild (1979) termed the phrase
'emotional deviance' which describes the disso¬
nance between the perceptions of one's own emo¬
tional experience and the perception of socially
prescribed 'emotional scripts' for the expression
of certain emotions. In other words, certain envi¬
ronments may be perceived to limit or expressly
forbid the expression of certain emotions, such as
anger. These points offer some useful additions to
the theoretical points raised above in the discus¬
sion of emotional abuse within eating disorders
(e.g., Corstorphine, 2006; Kent & Waller, 2000). It
is argued that abuse and neglect leave a child with
an emotional hurt, which predisposes the young
person to a sense of threat and unfairness within
his/her surrounding world. These same experi¬
ences also predispose the same person to percep¬
tions of low self-efficacy and therefore, according
to the points raised above, limit the expression of
anger. Moreover, DiGiuseppe and Tafrate (2007)
also argued that there is evidence that inhibited
anger leaves the person more vulnerable to epi¬
sodes of depression (as discussed above).
These theoretical points about the expression of
anger appear to be important in their application to
eating disorders because research has shown that
this is an emotion that is inhibited within these
disorders. There is some evidence that the emotion
of anger is regarded as dangerous and unpredict¬
able within an interpersonal relationship (Fox,
2009) for people with eating disorders, and these
results are in keeping with the work of Geller and
colleagues (Geller et al., 2000) who discussed how
people with eating disorders may well suppress
anger in an attempt to protect relationships. The
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points raised by DiGiuseppe and Tafrate (2007)
suggest that the emotional factors in a female with
an eating disorder background may well be impor¬
tant (e.g., neglect, frank criticism and belittlement),
because abuse may well leave the individual with a
sense of 'hurt', which predisposes the person with
the eating disorder to perceptions of being treated
unfairly, and thus an increase in overall levels of
anger. However, due to beliefs about low self-
efficacy, this anger may be inhibited. These devel¬
opmental factors, in SPAARS terms, would lead
anger to become modularized and ego-dystonic
and thus detached from the person's sense of self
(for example, ANGER-DANGEROUS; ANGER-
THREAT-OTHERS). However, there would also
be in existence other automated appraisals that
would suggest that other people are danger¬
ous, threatening and important (for example,
OTHERS-THREATENING; OTHERS-DANGER¬
OUS), and that would suggest that the world is
unfair and unpredictable (WORLD-UNFAIR;
WORLD-UNPREDICTABLE).
Research has highlighted the importance of
disgust and its potential role in body and food-
related aspects of eating disorders (e.g., Troop et
al., 2002). Moreover, the application of a dual level
emotion theory allows for the theoretical develop¬
ment of the role of disgust, and its relation to other
emotions.Worksby Fox and Harrison (2008), Geller
et al. (2000) and Hayaki et al. (2002) have shown
that the lack of expression of emotions, in particu¬
lar anger, is related to disgust and body dissatis¬
faction. On the basis of this research it is proposed
that disgust via both 'preparedness' and 'over-
learning' becomes an automatic emotion within
certain contexts and interpersonal relations. Previ¬
ous research has shown that body shape concern
is significantly high among adolescent females and
negative feelings towards the body is virtually uni¬
versal in modern-day society (Stice, 2001; Maine &
Kelly, 2005). Given the presence of socially directed
schemas and the inhibition of anger, it is argued
that anger and disgust (and to a lesser degree
sadness) may become coupled during the course
of emotional development. The work of Power and
Dalgleish (1997, 2008) argued that depression can
be understood as the product of the coupling of
disgust (in the form of self-disgust) and sadness,
and this theoretical point may help to explain the
high level of co-morbidity of depression and eating
disorders. The coupling of anger and disgust may
also help to explain the theoretical processes that
occur in eating disorders. The potential use of the
basic emotion module of disgust to suppress and
'redirect' the emotion of the anger is an important
part of the model being proposed, and to a lesser
degree, sadness. According to SPAARS, the rep¬
resentations throughout the model take different
sensory modalities (e.g., olfactory, tactile, visual).
It is a common observation in clinical practice
that people with eating disorders have an array of
modalities that evoke disgust towards themselves
and food. For example, the sensation of a 'tight
pair of jeans', the smell of food cooking, the visual
image of the self being fat or eating could all poten¬
tially be directly related to the emotion of disgust
for people with eating disorders. Anxiety is often
regarded as a key emotion within eating disorders
because a morbid fear of fatness is regarded as a
crucial symptom (e.g., DSM IV [APA, 1994]). It was
discussed earlier in the paper that there is a strong
relationship between disgust and anxiety (fear) in
eating disorders because they are both emotions
of avoidance (e.g., Uher et a I., 2005). The work of
Davey et al. (2006) has suggested that the relation¬
ship between disgust and anxiety is uni-directional
with induced disgust creating a negative interpre-
tational bias within the individual. It is argued that
the emotion of disgust leads to the development of
fear, in that, there is a fear of weight gain and/or
food. In other words, the fear of disgust eliciting
stimuli induces anxiety in people with eating dis¬
orders, and therefore, the anxiety is secondary to
the principal emotion of disgust. This is an area
that appears to warrant further investigation.
Thus, once the SPAARS-ED model (Figure 2) has
been activated in a particular fashion, it becomes
biased in its appraisal of incoming information
(both externally and internally) and this can
lead to the development of a 'default mode' of
operating. This 'locking' maintains the dominant
emotion within the SPAARS-ED model, and thus,
the person has a heightened sensitivity to disgust-
eliciting stimulus, via the associative route. The
finding from Fox and Harrison (2008) that anger
and disgust are potentially coupled also suggests
the dominance of disgust within the SPAARS-ED
as anger-eliciting stimuli will also elicit the emo¬
tion of disgust. Again, the feedback loops in the
SPAARS model help us to explain why it is only
self-disgust that is particularly sensitive because
the analogue system is 'locked' on the main stimuli
of disgust elicitation, namely food, body and self.
According to the SPAARS model, emotional
modules are shaped by an individual's own learn¬
ing experiences. Power and Dalgleish (1997, 2008)
argued that certain environments and/or cultures
lead an individual to learn that the expression, or
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Figure 2. A diagram of the SPAARS model applied to eating disorders (SPAARS-ED)
indeed, the feeling of a particular emotion is 'bad'
or 'wrong', and in these situations the person comes
to perceive that particular emotion as being ego-
dystonic/damaging to the sense of self. In these
situations, the schematic level may inhibit the expe¬
rience of that emotion, although the emotion may
still be generated at the associative level. Within
Western culture, traditionally certain emotions are
acceptable to be expressed by females, while others
are often not allowed (e.g., anger). Perhaps it is no
coincidence, therefore, that females are the vast
majority of sufferers of eating disorders.
Waller and colleagues discussed that one of the
key processes within their model was where the
actual emotion was being inhibited. The notions
of primary and secondary inhibition of emotion
fit neatly with the definitions proposed within the
general SPAARS model, of passive and active inhi¬
bition. According to the model, passive inhibition
is a process where an emotion is experienced, but
the person engages in strategies to distract or avoid
the feeling of that emotion (e.g., involving oneself
in something else, or avoiding a conversation
that is discussing an emotion-eliciting situation).
Passive inhibition fits with all the research and
theory that have demonstrated that bingeing and
vomiting occur in relation to negative affect. The
primary avoidance of negative emotion fits with
the idea of active inhibition where the individual
uses almost automatic procedures (e.g., repression
and dissociation) to inhibit emotion. It is likely that
in reality, both processes are in operation within
eating disorders, but to varying degrees. It is
an empirical question whether these differences
could account for the different symptom patterns
found in eating disorders (e.g., restricting versus
binge-vomiting).
The final theoretical point that needs to be dis¬
cussed is the role of eating disorder symptom¬
atology that maintains the emotional components
of the eating disorder. As discussed by others,
eating disorder symptoms have an important
physiological underpinning. For both restrict¬
ing and binge-purging eating disorders, the role
of extreme dieting has been shown to be impor¬
tant in the maintenance of the eating disorders
(Fairburn et al., 1993; Keys et al., 1950). As discussed
above, research suggests that extreme dieting and
bingeing-purging cycles have an impact on lower¬
ing mood (e.g., Keys et al., 1950). It is argued that
these physiological effects may well feedback into
the emotional processes and reinforce a sense of
worthlessness and disgust, and provoke a sense
of anger at oneself for having the eating disorder.
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Furthermore, these factors lock the SPAARS model
for certain emotions and therefore, maintain the
disorder within the individual.
IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH AND
CLINICAL PRACTICE
So far, through this paper, a new model of eating
disorders has been presented that has used the
current status of the research literature on both
cognitive processing and emotional functioning in
eating disorders. However, it has also used con¬
temporary emotion theories and models to develop
and formulate a new model that both accounts for
current research findings and offers new theoreti¬
cal insights into the emotional processing in eating
disorders. The notion of anger being a suppressed
emotion is not a new concept, nor is the notion
of disgust and shame being directed at the body.
However, the theoretical construct of these two
emotions being coupled and that the emotion of
disgust being present at an associative level (and in
different modalities) help to offer some theoretical
insights into the relationship between suppression
of emotion and the subsequent development of
pronounced body dissatisfaction in females. This,
as has been argued throughout the paper, has been
a significant theoretical gap in the cognitive litera¬
ture. The remainder of this paper will now con¬
sider both the research and the clinical implication
of this model.
Research Implications
As with all new theories and models, it is hoped
that the SPAARS-ED model will generate further
research and theory development. At the start of
this paper, the current controversies about diagno¬
ses of eating disorders were presented. Although
this model has adopted a transdiagnostic perspec¬
tive (in keeping with a number of other authors
in the field, Fairburn, 2007), it is still important to
unpick the nature of emotional processes between
predominantly bingeing-purging and restrict¬
ing eating disorder symptom clusters. Moreover,
there are a number of research questions about
the nature of the representations of emotions, and
it would be worth undertaking research that looks
at these within individuals with eating disorders.
It has been hypothesized that anxiety and disgust
have an important relationship and this is cur¬
rently a part of a research project that the authors
are undertaking.
Clinical Implications
The current main models (with the exception of
some of the second generation cognitive theories)
have tended to focus on the various maintenance
factors involved in eating disorders (e.g., beliefs
about weight gain, beliefs about dieting etc.). As
such, they have tended to emphasize very practi¬
cal strategies that focus on behavioural change,
with very little focus on other cognitive variables.
If these factors are considered in light of the pro¬
posed model, it becomes evident that the notion
of emotions in the treatment of eating disorders
has been forgotten. According to the theory, certain
emotion modules are primed and activated within
eating disorders and these are involved with the
actual emotions concerned and the ability or moti¬
vation to express a particular emotion (e.g., anger).
Only schematic interventions (e.g., Waller) cur¬
rently focus on the schematic modules of emotion,
in that they focus on goals, aspirations and beliefs
about the self and others. Despite this, it is impor¬
tant to note that some CBT approaches tend to focus
on propositional levels of the SPAARS model (e.g.,
challenging negative automatic thoughts (NATS)),
and thus fail to address the higher-level schematic
models. This will not only prevent any real emo¬
tional change, but also paradoxically reinforce
the schematic model. A good example offered by
Power and Dalgleish (1999) concerns how the ther¬
apist may work to challenge the clients' assump¬
tions about being a failure, thereby reinforcing
that very belief, as they are 'incapable of doing it
on their own'. As proposed by more traditional
models of CBT (e.g., Fairburn et ah, 2003), there is
a directive manner in the treatment of BN, and the
outcome studies have only demonstrated approxi¬
mately 50% improvement rates. The points above
may suggest that there is a risk that this type
of manualized approach may reinforce schematic
representations of the self as a 'failure' because the
focus is the propositional statements occurring as
negative automatic thoughts.
There is neither consideration of the actual emo¬
tional output nor the associative route in current
models. It has long been noted that people often
leave treatment for an eating disorder with still a
very poor body image (e.g., Deter & Herzog, 1994;
Goldbloom & Olmsted, 1993; Ratnasuriya, Eisler,
Szmukler, & Russell, 1991). As has been discussed
within the main theory section, this residual poor
body image after treatment could be accounted for
by the role of disgust still being active via the asso¬
ciative route within SPAARS-ED.
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Within the SPAARS model, Power and Dalgleish
(1997,2008) discuss fast and slow change processes
in therapy. They give the example of panic disor¬
der in which therapy helps the person to reframe
or reappraise his or her beliefs about imminently
having a panic attack to one of understanding
that they are symptoms of anxiety/panic. However,
panic sufferers may still have marked symptoms
after therapy, and Power and Dalgleish argue
that this is due to the over-learnt associative route
taking longer to change than the fast route for ther¬
apeutic change. Within the eating disorder field, it
is argued that therapy will need to work with the
emotion of disgust that is directed at the body, and
with the schematic model of the unacceptability
of certain emotions, especially anger. Power and
Dalgleish (1997, 1999) argue that exposure and the
use of 'behavioural experiments' are much more
useful than purely cognitive or linguistic methods
for associative route change and it has long been
argued by some authors that behavioural change
is an essential component of the treatment plan
for someone with an eating disorder (e.g., Waller,
Cordery, Corstorphine et al., 2007). Moreover,
the notion of working with disgust towards the
body, in the guise of marked body dissatisfaction,
would need to be incorporated into any treatment
option.
This would enable the person to start to re-learn,
via the associative route, a non disgust emotion
attached to his or her body. This is an empirical
question, but recent work by Jensen, Nederkoorn
and Mulkens (2005) on attentional training in
body image distortion in eating disorders tends to
suggest that this could be a productive way towork
with individuals with eating disorders. According
to this point, the individual is trained to attend to
parts of his/her body he/she does not dislike (by
using a mirror) in order to help him/her gain a
more balanced perspective of his/her body. Within
the SPAARS understanding of eating disorders, it
is argued that this would allow the individual to
learn to associate alternative emotions to his/her
body and, thereby, reduce the relation of disgust
towards the body and food. Indeed, this may be an
important theoretical point why exposure work to
new or banned foods may help to break down the
associated disgust attached to the foods.
With regard to the schematic arm of SPAARS-ED,
the notion of inhibited emotion has been consid¬
ered to be important. Interestingly, recent develop¬
ments within the CBT field have started to consider
the issue of emotions and their avoidance. For
example, DBT (Linehan, 1993) and Acceptance and
Commitment Therapy (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson,
1999) both argue for the need to accept one's own
emotions, whether 'positive or negative' and that
the notion of 'healthy normality' (where there is an
expectation that everything is happy and healthy)
is very unhelpful within the field of mental health.
These ideas with SPAARS-ED fit with these theo¬
retical and therapy perspectives and it is proposed
that an aim for a person with an eating disorder is
to accept his or her emotions and to learn to live
with them in a more productive manner. Thus, in
theoretical terms, this would involve the teaching
and/or facilitation of the development of cognitive
skills that allows the person to experience painful
overwhelming emotion (and/or associated trau¬
matic event), while being held in the conscious¬
ness of the experiencer. This allows the individual
to become aware of the self-as-experiencer of the
emotion. This reflective state could allow the indi¬
vidual to develop a new schematic model of what
may have previously been overwhelming, but now
it is experienced as painful but contained within
the self.
CONCLUSIONS
It has been argued throughout this paper that
evidence exists to indicate that there are marked
difficulties with both the experience and expres¬
sion of emotions for people with eating disorders.
Although these difficulties have been highlighted,
there has been very little attempt to address these
issues within a theory of eating disorders.
By adopting the SPAARS approach, a model is
proposed that attempts to account for both the
emotional underpinning of eating disorders and
the developmental pathways that lead to disor¬
dered eating. It is suggested that cognitive therapy
approaches appear to be effective in the treatment
of eating disorders, but the evidence does suggest
that there is a long way to go in the develop¬
ment of these treatment models. It is hoped that
the SPAARS-ED model will act as a catalyst for
research and theory development for understand¬
ing and treating eating disorders.
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